

Long-distance quantum key distribution secure against coherent attacks

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Quantum key distribution (QKD) permits information-theoretically secure transmission of digital encryption keys, assuming that the behavior of the devices employed for the key exchange can be reliably modeled and predicted. Remarkably, no assumptions have to be made on the capabilities of an eavesdropper other than that she is bounded by the laws of nature, thus making the security of QKD “unconditional.” However, unconditional security is hard to achieve in practice. For example, any experimental realization can only collect finite data samples, leading to vulnerabilities against coherent attacks, the most general class of attacks, and for some protocols the theoretical proof of robustness against these attacks is still missing. For these reasons, in the past many QKD experiments have fallen short of implementing an unconditionally secure protocol and have instead considered limited attacking capabilities by the eavesdropper. Here, we explore the security of QKD against coherent attacks in the most challenging environment: the long-distance transmission of keys. We demonstrate that the BB84 protocol can provide positive key rates for distances up to 240 km without multiplexing of conventional signals, and up to 200 km with multiplexing. Useful key rates can be achieved even for the longest distances, using practical thermo-electrically cooled single-photon detectors. © 2017 Optical Society of America

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1. INTRODUCTION

Translating the exceptional properties of QKD-enabled unconditionally secure key exchange [1–3] into practice requires a rigorous approach to all aspects of the involved protocol and hardware [4–7]. Several hacking attacks on QKD systems [8–18] have shown in the past that many underlying assumptions on protocols and hardware can open the door to unwanted intrusion. However, in the presence of ideal equipment, an eavesdropper (Eve) is powerless as long as the laws of Nature are not violated. In this ideal scenario, QKD can guarantee secure communication irrespective of Eve’s computational capabilities, which has been termed unconditional security.

Even so, it is sometimes convenient and insightful to study the security of a QKD protocol in the presence of a limited eavesdropper. Traditionally there have been three main classes used to constrain Eve’s attack: individual, collective, and coherent (or general) attacks [19–24]. Only the latter does not limit the attacking capabilities of the eavesdropper. Any QKD system aiming to implement an unconditionally secure protocol therefore has to be proven secure against coherent attacks. Another aspect that cannot be neglected is security in a finite size scenario [25–29]. No key transmission session can be endless, and the resulting statistical fluctuations have to be taken into account. For example,

collective and coherent attacks against the BB84 protocol [2] are known to coincide in the asymptotic limit, whereas they can provide different secure key transmission rates in the finite-size case [30].

In the past, most QKD experiments have fallen short of the target to demonstrate security against coherent attacks in the finite size regime [31–37]. This is as much due to limitations of the employed hardware as it is to a lack of practical security proofs. For instance, only recently has the efficient BB84 protocol [38] implemented with decoy states been proven secure against coherent attacks [39,40]. Other common protocols, such as the coherent-one-way (COW) protocol [41], are still lacking a rigorous security proof, while the differential-phase-shift (DPS) protocol has been implemented only under the assumption of individual attacks [42]. In these cases the gap between coherent and non-coherent attacks appears to be greater than in other protocols, and the maximum achievable transmission distance and key rate can be severely reduced when general attacks are considered [43,44]. More demanding protocols based on entanglement distribution [45] or the recently developed measurement-device-independent QKD [46,47] are secure against coherent attacks, but often provide impractically low secure key rates or require a significantly more complex experimental apparatus.

In addition to security, multiplexing with conventional data communications is fundamental for the integration of QKD into existing optical networks. In the past, deployment of QKD technology has been hampered by the frequent need for dedicated “dark” fibers to segregate the very weak quantum signals from conventional traffic. The biggest limitation is the resulting broadband Raman scattering that swamps quantum signals, rendering QKD inoperable. Nevertheless, we have already demonstrated co-existence of QKD in short-reach environments such as quantum access networks [48] as well as high-speed (>100 G) classical data traffic over distances of 100 km for metropolitan networks [49]. Here we address long-haul distances and demonstrate QKD’s coexistence with multiplexed classical signals over distances $\gtrsim 200$ km.

In this article we implement two different variants of the efficient decoy-state BB84 protocol providing security against coherent attacks [39,50] in a state-of-the-art QKD system and explore the limitations to the secure transmission distance both in dark fiber and in coexistence with conventional data transmission. We demonstrate secure key transmission over 240 km and 200 km, respectively, using highly practical thermo-electrically cooled single-photon detectors.

Figure 1 summarizes results of recent long-distance QKD experiments, highlighting the significance of our result in terms of both practicality and security. Electrically cooled detectors previously have been able to support only a maximum fiber attenuation of 34 dB [33]. We extend this limit to close to 45 dB and, at the same time, demonstrate security against coherent attacks in the finite size scenario. Security against general attacks has been implemented rigorously for the efficient BB84 protocol in only one recent field trial [51] and in a proof-of-principle experiment using a plug-and-play QKD system [52], but without a detailed

analysis of the robustness and limitations in the long-distance regime. In Fig. 1, the only QKD experiments performed on a distance longer than in this work are based either on the DPS protocol secure against individual attacks [34] or on the COW protocol secure against collective attacks [37]. However, the only rigorous security bounds against coherent attacks available for these protocols predict for them an attenuation range smaller than 25 dB [44]. Therefore, our results represent the longest distance currently achieved by a QKD secure against coherent attacks. It is notable that this is achieved in the finite-size scenario using a real QKD setup and electrically cooled detectors.

2. COHERENT SECURITY

The protocol of choice for our experiment is the efficient version of BB84 [38], implemented with decoy states [54–57], which features high key rates and unconditional security in the finite-size regime. We focus in particular on the security proofs described in Refs. [39] and [50], which build on the min-entropy estimation from the uncertainty principle presented in Ref. [58]. Such proofs pose no assumption on the eavesdropper and assume an ideal behavior of the equipment owned by the users. For short, we call the above two variants of the BB84 protocol “BB84_{coh}⁽¹⁾” and “BB84_{coh}⁽²⁾”, respectively, and we briefly summarize their features in the next paragraph. Also, to show the difference in the BB84 protocol’s key rate when Eve performs collective or coherent attacks, we consider the BB84 protocol described in Ref. [35], called here “BB84_{coll},” which is secure up to the class of collective attacks. As it will become clear later, the gap between collective and coherent attacks is small for the BB84 protocol, whereas it is expected to be considerably larger for protocols like DPS and COW [44].

Both protocols BB84_{coh}⁽¹⁾ and BB84_{coh}⁽²⁾ use three intensity settings, u (“signal”), v (“decoy”), and w (“vacuum”), and two complementary bases, Z (data basis) and X (test basis), to run the decoy-state BB84 protocol. However, the two protocols present small differences that are worth mentioning as they lead to different optimization parameters and key rates. The BB84_{coh}⁽¹⁾ protocol distills the key bits in the Z basis from all the three intensity settings. The decoy-state estimation is performed using the analytical equations presented in Ref. [39], and the protocol provides the following amount of secure key bits per key session:

$$S_{coh}^{(1)} = -n_0 + -n_1[1 - h(\bar{e}_{ph})] - \lambda_{EC} - \Delta. \quad (1)$$

In Eq. (1), $-n_0$ ($-n_1$) is the lower bound to the zero-photon (single-photon) events detected in the Z basis, whereas \bar{e}_{ph} is the upper bound to the phase error rate of the single-photon events. The quantity λ_{EC} is the information revealed on the public channel to correct the bit strings of the users and is directly measurable in the protocol. Finally, $\Delta = 6 \log_2(21/\epsilon_{sec}) + \log_2(2/\epsilon_{cor})$ is a quantity related to the security and correctness of the protocol, quantified by the two parameters ϵ_{sec} and ϵ_{cor} , respectively. For all the details about this protocol, we direct the reader to Ref. [39].

The BB84_{coh}⁽²⁾ protocol is similar to the previous protocol, but distills the key bits from only the signal intensity setting, u , in the basis Z . It adopts the linear programming technique described in Ref. [50], numerically solved, to perform the decoy-state parameter estimation and delivers the following amount of key bits:

$$S_{coh}^{(2)} = -n_0 + -n_1 - \bar{n}_1 h(\bar{e}_{ph}) - \lambda_{EC} - \Delta'. \quad (2)$$




Fig. 1. Selection of recent long-distance QKD experiments. The graph plots the temperature of the single-photon detectors used in the experiments over the maximum attenuation that could be tolerated. Following [53], we select only demonstrations that fulfill the practical bit rate limit of > 1 bit per second (bps). Two detector types are considered: avalanche photodiode (APD) single-photon detectors, which can be cooled electrically, and superconducting nanowire single-photon detectors (SNSPDs), which have to be cooled cryogenically. Reference [37] uses APDs that are cooled with a cryocooler. The data points are shape-coded to highlight their security level: square, security against individual attacks; circles, collective attacks; triangles, coherent attacks. Open symbols refer to experiment considering only the asymptotic limit, whereas filled symbols take finite size effects into account.

In Eq. (2), the quantities have analogous meaning as in Eq. (1). However, the symbol \bar{n}_1 represents an upper bound to the single-photon events, as opposed to the lower bound appearing in Eq. (1). This is due to a stricter interpretation of the proof method presented in Ref. [50] and would intuitively suggest a lower key rate for BB84_{coh}⁽²⁾ than BB84_{coh}⁽¹⁾. However, this is not always the case because of the different parameter estimation routines featured by the two protocols. The quantity λ_{EC} is the same as in Eq. (1), whereas Δ' amounts to $6 \log_2(46/\epsilon_{sec}) + \log_2(2/\epsilon_{cor})$. In both protocols, we set $\epsilon_{sec} \lesssim 10^{-10}$ and $\epsilon_{cor} = 10^{-15}$.

3. EXPERIMENTAL REALIZATION

We explore the limits to secure key transmission for both variations of the efficient BB84 protocol secure against coherent attacks with a state-of-the-art QKD system, which is based on phase-encoding and decoy states [35,59] (see details in [Supplement 1](#)). We use Corning Ultra fiber with a loss coefficient of 0.18 dB/km to connect Alice (transmitter) and Bob (receiver) with a fiber distance of up to 240 km. The attenuation at this longest distance is 44.4 dB, which is higher than the expected loss of 43.2 dB due to fiber connections between several spools.

The receiver is based on thermo-electrically cooled avalanche photodiode (APD) single-photon detectors [60–62]. Electrically cooled APDs are the most practical solution to single-photon counting and they will be of particular importance for commercial applications of QKD. Other cooling methods, such as Sterling refrigerators, permit achieving cryogenic temperatures and therefore lower dark count rates [37], but they have a number of disadvantages. Their specified lifetime is typically no more than five years, they are large in size and heavy, and they are significantly more expensive [63], which makes them unlikely to be considered for telecommunication applications. At a temperature of -60°C we achieve a dark count rate of 10 counts per second (cps) at a detection efficiency of 10% with our electrically cooled APDs [Fig. 2(a) and [Supplement 1](#)]. To our knowledge, this is the best




Fig. 2. Detector performance and secure bit rate without multiplexing of conventional signals. (a) Dark count rate as a function of APD temperature for three different devices. The dark count rate decreases by about a factor of two per 10°C . Error bars correspond to one standard deviation from 15 consecutive measurements and are in most cases smaller than the reported data points. The data points follow a color code that suggests red (blue) shades for higher (lower) temperatures and is consistent with the color code in Fig. 3. Please see [Supplement 1](#) for more details on single-photon detectors. (b) Secure bit rate as a function of distance for three different variants of the BB84 protocol. Black circles correspond to BB84_{coll} [35], which is secure up to collective attacks in the finite-size scenario. The key rates for BB84_{coh}⁽¹⁾ [39] (upward red triangles) and BB84_{coh}⁽²⁾ [50] (downward blue triangles) are calculated from Eqs. (1) and (2), respectively. The dashed line extrapolates the reduction of the secure key rate purely from attenuation in the fiber and provides an indication of the regime where the dark count rate plays a dominant role.

noise performance of an electrically cooled single-photon detector implemented in a QKD system, and it compares well with what has been achieved with Sterling coolers [64].

We perform a first experiment where we send only the quantum signal over the fiber channel. Figure 2(b) compares the measured secure bits $S_{coh}^{(1)}$ and $S_{coh}^{(2)}$ [Eqs. (1) and (2), respectively] per second as a function of fiber transmission distance. For each distance the detector temperature and biasing conditions are adapted to achieve best performance. The intensities are set to $u = 0.5$ photons/pulse, $v = 0.11$ photons/pulse, and $w = 0.0007$ photons/pulse, and the probabilities with which they are selected are $P_u = 0.5$, $P_v = 0.25$, and $P_w = 0.25$, respectively. These parameters are not optimal for all the presented protocols, but represent a compromise that permits calculating secure key rates for all protocols from exactly the same dataset. Slightly higher key rates can be achieved in some situations when optimizing the parameters. Also plotted, with black filled circles, is the secure key rate for BB84_{coll} to highlight the penalty imposed by the higher security level. For the shortest distance the difference is marginal, about 10%, and it increases to more than a factor of two at 240 km, where we measure 23.5 bit per second (bps) and 8.4 bps, respectively. Both rates are well above 1 bps, which is regarded as a practical limit for telecommunication applications [53].

The necessity to use dedicated, dark fibers to perform quantum communication would be a severe hindrance to its applicability. Coexistence of strong conventional data signals and quantum signals in the same fiber medium has therefore attracted much attention in recent years [49,65–68]. Operating QKD links over lit fiber is substantially more difficult due to excess noise generated by Raman scattering. The longest transmission distance achieved so far is 101 km [49]. Here, we explore the limits to multiplexed QKD employing a low-noise amplifier at the receiver end and narrow fiber-Bragg-grating-based 25 GHz dense wavelength division multiplexing (DWDM) filters.

Figure 3(a) shows a schematic of the filter arrangement at the sender and receiver end (see [Supplement 1](#) for details). We combine the quantum channel with two conventional channels with an 8-channel DWDM multiplexing module at the sender side. At the receiver, a drop filter separates the conventional signals from the quantum channel before they are amplified with a low noise amplifier with a noise figure of <3.3 dB. This is followed by a de-multiplexing 8-channel DWDM module separating the conventional channels. The quantum signal itself is filtered a second time using an off-the-shelf 25 GHz DWDM filter to suppress Raman noise. The additional filter increases the attenuation in Bob by approximately 3 dB. No actual data is transmitted in the experiment. One conventional channel is used to synchronize the sender and receiver with a 15.625 MHz clock signal, and the other channel simulates further conventional channels with a CW laser; we refer to this channel as the simulated data channel. An increase of the launch power of the data channel can be interpreted in two ways: transmission of a higher power data channel, or transmission of an increased number of data channels [61]. An increase of 3 dB thereby corresponds to doubling the number of transmitted data channels.

In Figs. 3(b) and 3(c), we plot the secure bit rate and quantum bit error rate (QBER), respectively, measured with the multiplexing setup as a function of receive power of the data channel in front of the amplifier. The receive power at the receiver side is an important figure of merit, as it determines if the transmitted




Fig. 3. Secure bit rate with multiplexing of conventional signals. (a) Schematic of the multiplexing setup to transmit conventional signals together with the quantum channel on the same fiber. At the transmitter side an 8-channel DWDM module combines the quantum signal with an optical clock and a CW laser to simulate a data channel. After transmission over the long-distance fiber, a drop filter separates the quantum signal from the conventional signals. The conventional signals are amplified before separating them with a DWDM de-multiplexer. The quantum channel is filtered with a 25 GHz DWDM filter to suppress Raman noise. Also shown are (b) secure bit rate and (c) quantum bit error rate as functions of receive power of the simulated data channel in front of the low-noise amplifier for 100, 150, and 200 km of low-loss fiber transmission. The solid lines are the result of a simulation model (see [Supplement 1](#)). The color code is the same as in Fig. 2, with red (blue) shades suggesting higher (lower) temperatures set in the detectors.

signals can be received error free or not. QBER and secure key rate are plotted for 100, 150, and 200 km of fiber. We plot only $S_{coh}^{(2)}$ for clarity, to avoid overlaps with $S_{coh}^{(1)}$, which is always very close to $S_{coh}^{(2)}$. The key rate secure against coherent attacks stays positive for receive powers greater than -23 dBm for a link length of 100 km. This value reduces to -35 dBm for a link length of 150 km. In a previous experiment [49] we have shown error-free operation of a 100G link together with a quantum signal for a receive power down to -35 dBm. Our results show, therefore, that QKD can coexist with one 100G data channel up to a distance of 150 km. However, the amplifier implemented in the setup has a specified minimum input power of -45 dBm, and it is expected that up to ten 100G channels can be multiplexed with QKD over 150 km if the receive power per channel is -45 dBm. At 200 km no additional data signal can be launched in the same fiber together with the quantum signal and the clock, even with the launch power of the clock channel set close to the minimal value for stable locking, -8.7 dBm, corresponding to a receiving power before the amplifier of -46.6 dBm. However, the transmission of the clock signal on the same fiber as the quantum signal is already an important advantage, as it improves the stability of the link.

4. CONCLUSION

We have demonstrated that practical QKD systems based on thermo-electrically cooled detectors can reach transmission distances beyond 200 km, while maintaining security against the most general class of attacks allowed by quantum mechanics. This sets the current longest distance achieved by a QKD secure against coherent attacks in the finite-size scenario, to the best of

our knowledge. Additionally, we have shown that multiplexing high-speed data signals (100G) with the quantum channel is feasible up to 150 km, while multiplexing the synchronization signal only is feasible up to 200 km. The measured key rates compare well or exceed what has been achieved in previous demonstrations despite the higher security level. Our system is therefore ideally suited for building back-bone QKD networks, providing, for example, inter-city links.

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See [Supplement 1](#) for supporting content.

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