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**An examination of the relationship between Informers and their Handlers
within the Police Service in England.**

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by

Roger Eric Billingsley


Thesis

**Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the award of
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ABSTRACT

The aim of this study is to examine the relationship between Informers and the police officers who handle them in England. Informers are specifically defined and can be differentiated from other sources of information or informants, such as public spirited citizens and police contacts.

This research centres around the relationship, how it starts and is maintained, and its consequences. This is a partnership, although not necessarily equal. It is assumed that the partnership is unique and cannot be compared with other alliances such as the doctor and his patient. This research examines whether that assumption is correct.

The reasons or so called motives for Informers helping the police have been examined to determine whether these motives have any relevance to the relationship, and if the reasons for informing affect the partnership in any way. In particular, the study has examined the change of motives over time, the results of which will inevitably provide management information to the police service in their future supervision and control of Informers.

It is important to establish why some police officers become involved in the use of Informers. This has been achieved through a separate study undertaken in the Lincolnshire police district. Questionnaires were used to interview two groups, those who have been actively involved, and those who have not. A comparison has been made of their responses. The results have failed to show specific reasons why some police officers become involved in the use of Informers, other than their individual choice to use it as an investigative tool.

The thrust of the study has examined how far the two groups will go in terms of breaching the criminal law and the police discipline code, in furtherance of their relationship. It has been established that both Informers and police officers consider it acceptable to break the law.

There is evidence that both groups use their discretion in selecting the information that comes in their possession, and there are circumstances when they will not act on the information they have received. A substantial number of Informers and Handlers are prepared to commit criminal offences, or allow the commission of offences because of their relationship.

The findings of this research have identified shortcomings in the way Informers are managed and controlled by the police service, and recommendations have been made in order that national Guidelines on the use of Informers can be amended.

CONTENTS

	Page
CHAPTER ONE	
Introduction	1
An Informer defined	5
Some problems - an overview	9
The Research Question	12
Some additional comments	14
CHAPTER TWO	
Legal Issues	18
Corroboration	20
Disclosure	21
Entrapment	31
Discounting sentence	37
Agent provocateur	43
Misprision	48
Summary	50
How does this relate to the present research?	53
CHAPTER THREE	
Literature Review	55
A review of literature from the USA	56
General	56
Motivation	61
Police management	64
Juvenile Informers	66
The relationship	67
Summary	68
British Government publications	69
Summary	73
A review of literature from the UK	74
General	74
Crimestoppers	78
Literature relating to practical matters	79
Motivation	80
Police management	81
Juvenile Informers	86
Linking the Handler to the Informer	89
Summary and overview	92

CHAPTER FOUR

The Research Question	97
The Aims	97
Method	102
The Research Design	103
The Informer population	105
Reliability and Validity	108
The Pilot study	111
The interviews for the Main study	115
The questionnaires	117
Other sources	119
The problems and difficulties experienced during research	120
Summary	128

CHAPTER FIVE

The Theory	130
Standard Professional Relationship	131
Police Relationships	137
Informer/Handler Relationship	144

CHAPTER SIX

A Case Study in Lincolnshire	151
Background information	152
Methodology	155
Reliability and Validity	157
The Handler	161
The Non Handlers	165
Discussion and Conclusions	170

CHAPTER SEVEN

Results	177
Aim 1 - To determine what constitutes an Informer	177
Broad Demographic Detail of Informers	187
A Profile of an Informer	202
Summary of Aim 1	208
The Female Informer	209
Aim 2 - To determine what constitutes a Handler	210
Summary of Aim 2	218
The Female Handler	218
Aim 3 - To determine the relationship between the police and the Informer	220
Summary of Aim 3	238

Aim 4 - To determine what the Informer wants to get out of the relationship	238
Summary of Aim 4	251
Aim 5 - To determine whether the police use of Informers breaches the law or Police Discipline Code and if so, to what extent	252
Summary of Aim 5	295
Aim 6 - To make recommendations, if relevant, relative to the relationship between the Informer and Handler	295

CHAPTER EIGHT

Summary of the thesis	298
Theoretical implications	308
Theoretical overview	316
Recommendations	318
Future research	321

BIBLIOGRAPHY	328
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APPENDICES

A. Registered Informers in England as at 1.1.95	344
B. Blank Questionnaire for Informers	345
C. Blank Questionnaire for Handlers	357
D. Specimen contract between researcher and police forces/agencies	367
E. Activity Analysis - Lincolnshire Police	368
F. Additional Questionnaire for Lincolnshire police officers	378
G. Extract from 1991 Census	379
H. Extract from Schedule 1, Police (Discipline) Regulations, 1985	380
I. Extract from Registrar General's Classification of Occupations, 1970	384

INDEX OF TABLES

	Page(s)
CHAPTER VI	
1. Ranks of police Handlers and non Handlers	158
2. Gender of police officers	158
3. Age groups of police officers	159
4. Status of police officers	160
5. Main reason for involvement	161
6. Main reason for involvement, by rank of Handlers	164
7. Reasons given by non Handlers for not being involved	165
8. Reasons for non involvement of police officers by status	166
9. Ranks of those officers who suggested a lack of opportunity	169
CHAPTER VII	
1. Definition of an Informer, as perceived by the Informer and Handler	178
2. Informers reasons for starting, by definition	180
3. Detailed comparison between definition of an Informer and reasons given for informing	182
4. Differences between Informers and contacts or public spirited citizens according to the Handlers	184
5. Age/Gender profile of Informers	187
6. Marital status of Informers by gender	188
7. Divorced/separated Informers reasons for informing, by gender	189
8. Marital status of Informers by age group	189
9. Extended table of marital status by gender	191
10. Employment status of Informers	192
11. Unemployed Informers, by age and gender	193
12. Informers in full time employment, by age and gender	194
13. Age groups by employment status and gender	196
14. Type of employment, by gender	197
15. Informers with criminal convictions, by gender	198
16. Previous convictions by type and gender	199
17. Length of time as an Informer with convictions, by gender	200
18. Other members of the Informer's family	201
19. Handlers by rank	211
20. Handlers by position	212
21. Handlers position, by rank	212
22. Handlers experience, by rank	213
23. Handlers experience, by occupational position and length of service	214
24. Frequency of Handler's role	216
25. Role of the Handler, by length of time being a Handler	217
26. Where the relationship first starts	220
27. Situations where relationship began	221
28. Start of relationship, with respondents who meet socially	222
29. Description of relationship, compared by Informed and Handler	223
29a. Relationship described as friendly, by Informer and Handler	224

INDEX OF TABLES (continued)

29b. Relationship described as professional, by Informer and Handler	224
30. The importance placed on 'friendship' by Groups	226
31. Level of importance given to main factors of the relationship, by Informers	227
32. Respondents rating of each characteristics as Important or Very Important	228
33. Importance of the Relationship to Informers and Handlers	230
34. Main advantage of the relationship, as perceived by Informers and Handlers	232
35. Does the use of Informers advance the Handler personally?	233
36. Main disadvantage of the relationship, as perceived by Informers and Handlers	234
37. Protection given to Informer, by groups	235
38. Main reasons for starting informing, by the Informer	239
39. Compares the Informers' motives against the Handlers perceptions	241
40. Do the reasons for informing affect the usefulness of the relationship?	243
41. Reasons why relationship affected	244
42. Motivations compared with Informers description of relationship	246
43. Informers reason for informing - changes through time	247
44. Informing experience by age	248
45. Breakdown of how the reasons for informing are likely to change through time	249
46. Reasons for Informers being selective by types of crime	253
47. Selectivity of Informers with convictions, by types of crime	255
48. Selectivity of information given or received	256
49. Reasons of selectivity, by Groups	257
50. Handlers selectivity of information by length of experience	261
51. Examples where crime not acted on, by groups	262
52. Criminals not acted against, by groups	263
53. Examples of selectivity of individual, by groups	264
54. Informers breaking the law, by groups	266
55. Examples where the law was broken	267
56. Informer and Handlers involved in setting up crime	271
57. Examples of crime set up, by groups	272
58. Category of crimes set up, by previous convictions	276
59. Respondents who have been party to the commission of crime	277
60. Informers who have participated in crime whilst informing	279
61. Examples of crimes in which Informers had participated	280
62. Whether participation in crime had been declared by Informer	282
63. Handler will allow Informer to commit crime, by groups	283
64. Use of discretion about the law	285
65. Immunity granted, by groups	287
66. Breaches of the Police Discipline Regulations	288
67. Examples of breaches of the Discipline Regulations	289
68. Occasions where Handlers had sorted out problems	292

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CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

The main aim in this research is to examine the relationship between a registered Informer and a police officer, the Handler. This partnership is unusual; it differs from the doctor/patient or the lawyer/client relationship, in that the customer or client pays the professional for a service. With the Informer, it is he who usually demands some sort of reward from the professional, the police officer.

The relationship is likely to create distrust because of differences in the backgrounds of Informers and police officers and probable differences of objectives. If such distrust does exist between the two parties, it is likely to become an important issue, particularly as the relationship can be close. It may be natural that such distrust should exist, as the two sides of the partnership come from different sides of the criminal justice system. The police officer is a law enforcement officer whose main function it is to uphold the law; the Informer, on the other hand, is primarily interested in helping the police in return for some personal benefit. That distrust appears to seep into the criminal justice system generally. For example, the lack of willingness by the police to disclose to the courts of an Informer's involvement will clearly affect the legal issues. The implications of this will be discussed in Chapter two.

It seems that the police will give priority to protecting the identity of the Informer, which may be due entirely to the demands placed by the Informer as part of the agreement between the two parties. This will inevitably become important to the progress of the relationship, but may also affect judicial process. This confidentiality issue will be discussed further in the thesis. This union could be better understood if the parties involved joined together for a common goal, say the reduction of crime. That may be one of the objectives of the police officer, but the thesis will show that rarely to be the case with regards to the Informer. It is this unique and somewhat incomprehensible partnership that makes the study so interesting.

The problems which will be identified in this thesis are not new and have existed as long as Informers have been used. As discussed, they include the relationship itself and how that evolves over a period of time. The study will also explore the accepted boundaries surrounding the police use of Informers and examine whether or not those boundaries are crossed and, if so, for what purpose and to what end. Specifically, the study will examine whether there is evidence of police officers breaching the police discipline code, or more sinister, whether their relationship has any bearing on the commission of criminal acts. The motivational factors or reasons for informing have been recognised as an important facet of police handling of Informers. This study, however, will go further and examine whether those reasons change over a period of time and, whether this affects the relationship, or indeed the police perception of that relationship.

The study will also attempt to define what Informers are and describe their use by the police in England. In doing so, it is hoped this will provide a foundation for the empirical study that follows. This study will concentrate on the situation in England, rather than say Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland, but in

reviewing the literature there have been a number of studies from North America, and these have been included where relevant.

There are, however, numerous questions not discussed in this study which remain unresolved and unaccounted for. The use of juvenile Informers is referred to occasionally but not examined specifically, and this topic may benefit from future research. Certainly, the use and supervision of juveniles who act as Informers has serious implications for the police and others, if it is not managed properly. Similarly, the reduction or discounting of sentences, the payment to Informers and supervision of meetings, and the ethical issues linked to them are not examined. A number of police forces are presently examining the implications of witness protection schemes which can be closely related to the use of Informers. The study though, will not examine this matter.

Although the thesis will discuss where and how the relationship between the Informer and Handler starts, the problems of recruitment and cell intervention (the practice of police officers recruiting Informers whilst still in custody) will not be looked at closely. Moral and ethical questions arise here, but there are also legal issues. For example, the questioning of a juvenile offender whilst in police custody on the grounds of securing information may well breach the Police and Criminal Evidence Act in terms of failing to secure an Appropriate Adult during that interview. Similarly, the payment to Informers out of public funds for information may not sit comfortably with the public who may consider they pay enough from taxes to maintain an effective police force, without some of the money going to criminals. These are all important issues in themselves and perhaps require future research.

The history of Informers is considered not to be relevant to this thesis, and has not been included. Historical data perhaps only serves to prove that there is

nothing new in the use of Informers, and also that many of the mistakes made in the past are probably still being made. This thesis, though, has concentrated on contemporary issues, which affect their current use.

The part the media play in the police use of Informers is also not directly connected with the aims of this work, although it could be argued that the consequences of the relationship have resulted in press and media coverage following specific incidents, particularly where an alleged miscarriage of justice has taken place. Perhaps the most common area for the media is the allegations that the police have 'set up' crimes using Informers to catch target criminals. The practice of Informers and police officers setting up crimes together will form a major part in the thesis when it examines the part the relationship plays in such activity. The suggestion that police and Informers have set up crimes is an emotive subject, and of course make the public concerned about this agreement between the two parties. Such concerns are often reported by the press and are well documented, appearing on a frequent basis. For example in one story, an undercover police Informer claimed that dozens of people who were jailed for drug trafficking, were in fact 'set up', and he cast doubt on 40 such prosecutions. The feeling at the time was that the police were breaking the rules, in that alleged offenders were being actively encouraged to import drugs by informers who were in fact inciting crime.¹ Another case involved a drug trafficker who, after being arrested, became an Informer for the Regional Crime Squad. He was asked to 'set up' crimes and although he attended himself, always managed to escape. It is alleged he encouraged targets to obtain drugs, and then informed on them in return for payment from the police and crimestoppers.²

¹ "Police informant 'set up' drug busts," The Sunday Times 30 October, 1994.

² "Double dealer with a poisonous sting," The Guardian 7 March, 1994.

In 1994, the BBC postponed a television programme following pressure by the police suggesting that it could endanger the life of an Informer.³ The programme was eventually shown and looked at the work of a number of Informers, asking the question "*Are crimes being created by the informants to entrap police targets?*"⁴ One Informer had apparently made a living out of drug dealers by providing bogus drugs, knowing that those same drug dealers would not complain to the police. He suggested that the police started to target him because they thought he was dealing in drugs, or the dealers themselves were Informers and they wanted him off the scene. These are the sort of issues which the media quickly pick up on and are of course clearly of concern to the police because of their implications. Such issues will be addressed in this study by examining whether the relationship can lead to occurrences as described above, and determine how prevalent it is.

An Informer defined

As with all areas in social science, definitions remain difficult. This study is no exception, though it has been made worse by the variety of slang names and definitions used. Indeed, in America, it was suggested in the 1990s that there existed no less than 68 such terms for Informers. Perhaps the most common is 'grass', the origin of this is somewhat dubious.⁵ Campbell (1991) suggests it is derived from cockney slang.⁶

³ "Police pressure pulls Panorama off the air," The Observer 17 July, 1994.

⁴ "Panorama," Grassed - the changing role of the police informant", BBC television, London, 8 August, 1994 9.30pm..

⁵ One theory is that it comes from the song, Whispering Grass which uses the lines, "Why do you whisper, green grass?...Whispering grass, dont tell the trees because the trees dont need to know".

⁶ Campbell D., "Splendour in grassing," The Guardian 26 January, 1991: p13.

It has to be said that the police themselves do not help to clarify the murky world of Informer use when they refer to him or her as an 'informant' or 'informer'. One definition suggests that an Informer is, *"A person who informs or proffers an accusation against another, whom he suspects of the violation of some penal statute."*⁷ Rapp⁸ suggests that the words 'informer' and 'informant' are completely different in that an informant is someone who provides information, but only as a victim or witness, whereas an informer is a, *"Co-conspirator or criminal associate who provides information for money or to secure another advantage, such as a reduced sentence or immunity from prosecution."* Rapp goes further and categorises the informer into three types: the agent in place, the defector, and the agent provocateur. It is the first which is the most common, that is he who informs secretly but at the same time does not give up his criminal status. He is the most vulnerable because he remains within easy reach of those he is informing against, and therefore always in danger of physical injury. Greer⁹ also recognises the differences between an 'informer' and 'informant' and suggests a sociological model which identifies an informant as a source of information which may include the Informer. Interestingly, he categorises people who give information as either Insiders or Outsiders, and separates these into Single or Multiple Event informants. Simply explained, Greer suggests the following can fully define all aspects of information providing:-

A. Outside Single Event Informant - This is the casual observer who is an on-looker or witness with information to assist the police.

⁷ Black H. C., Black's law dictionary (St. Paul, Missesota (USA): West Publishing Company, 1968) p919.

⁸ Rapp B., Deep Cover: Police Intelligence Operations (Colorado, USA: Paladin Press, 1989) p33.

⁹ Greer S., "Towards a Sociological Model of the Police Informant," London School of Economics Vol 46 issue 3 (January, 1995).

B. Outside Multiple Event Informant - The 'snoop' who always seems to be in the vicinity. Greer describes this person as a busy body.

C. Inside Single Event Informant - This is the one-off accomplice who gives information only to help himself at the time. This category may also include the 'confession informant', those suspects who give information against themselves. This type of person is rarely discussed when debating Informers and yet they are widely used by the police.

D. Inside Multiple Event Informant - These are the regular Informers, agent provocateurs or supergrasses who tend to be registered as Informers.

Others seem to emphasise that the Informer is closely connected with the criminal, in that he or she is either actively involved in committing crime or at least associating with other criminals. Such a conclusion is not too difficult to accept. Harney and Cross ¹⁰, for example, suggest that he is likely to be, *"A person in the underworld or a person on its periphery; in its confidence, or so much a part of the scenery... that this person is in a particularly good position to know the story of a crime committed, the story of criminal business done, being transacted or proposed for the future..."* Brightwell ¹¹ agrees that informers usually come from a criminal background, who have *"one or both feet in the underworld and for various reasons impart information of criminal activities to the police."* Similarly, the National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) ¹² also describe a typical informer as an individual, *"normally of*

¹⁰ Harney M. L. & Cross J. C., The informer in law enforcement (Illinois (USA): Thomas, 1968) p40.

¹¹ Brightwell A., What considerations ought to govern the use of informants in the investigation of crime (Metropolitan Police service: (unpublished), 1984).

¹² Service level agreement between the National Criminal Intelligence Service and the Association of Chief Police Officers for England and Wales Crime

criminal history, habits or associates, who gives information about crime or persons associated with criminal activity, such information being freely given, whether or not for financial reward or other advantage. That individual having the expectation that his/her identity will be protected."

The NCIS definition has been adopted by the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) in their guidelines on Informers.¹³ whilst the United States Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA)¹⁴, on the other hand is far less specific and suggests that an Informer could be any person, not necessarily one who associates with criminals, that is, *"Any non law enforcement person...who supplies information about criminal activities to a police officer."* On a more light hearted note, one practitioner suggests, quite cynically, that an informant is, *"a person who knows a great deal about very little, and goes along telling you more about less and less until finally he tells you practically everything about nothing."*¹⁵ This is however, contrary to the view of most practitioners that most Informers are a mine of information who merely need to be treated in the right way to coax that information from them.

What constitutes an Informer will be discussed in Chapter VI. This study will go further, however, and consider the motivational factors in terms of defining an Informer. In the same way that Greer has arrived at a sociological model for informants generally, this thesis will provide a similar model, but specifically relating to the Informer. Even though this study concentrates on the Informer,

Committee, 15 March, 1995 : Para 11.7 p15.

¹³ ACPO, "National Guidelines on the use and management of informants," Part 1, Section 1 (January, 1995): p3.

¹⁴ Dorn N., Paul R & K., et al, Traffickers: Drug markets and law enforcement (1992) .

¹⁵ Byrom D. R., "Informants- The way forward," National informant seminar, Home Office, Exeter, 13 September, 1995.

there has been some reference to other sources of information such as the contact or the public spirited citizen. The study will differentiate between each of these categories, and in doing so, help provide a definition of an Informer.

It will be seen in the methodology and design of this study that the respondents interviewed are all registered with the police. This was because of the complexities of selecting the population. It should be noted, though, that not all police Informers are in fact registered, but this fact alone can cause problems for the police service in terms of disclosure. If police supervisors and controllers do not keep records of their active Informers, then it would not be possible for them to be disclosed to the defense in any criminal trial. This quite important aspect has not been examined in detail during the study.

Some problems - an overview

There exists many varied and diverse problems connected with the use, management and supervision of Informers. For example, the Informer may argue that the present systems do not afford him sufficient protection; or the rewards are not worth the potential risks; or indeed that there is insufficient flexibility should he be caught committing crime in the furtherance of his so called duties. On the other hand, the police officer may argue that the problem lies with little or no support from his senior officers; no additional reward or recognition by the police service; or perhaps he merely feels isolated by having to associate often with criminals in covert and dangerous situations. All these may be problems of varying degrees; but the overriding factor is that they all originate from the relationship between the Informer and Handler.

These anomalies highlight the interesting partnership between the law enforcement officers and those who do not possess the same obligation or

commitment, but agree to work together - a unique association between opposites. Their reasons or motivation will probably be different, as will their backgrounds, yet they have to bind the partnership in some loose and unofficial agreement between themselves in order to work together, even though this agreement may only be tacit. It is the relationship itself which is important, how that evolves, and indeed the implications should it fail to succeed. It is important because unless satisfactory control and management systems are put into place, this association could affect the principals of the British Justice system itself. In fact what could happen if it has not already happened, is that the relationship could add to the extent of criminality, instead of being a method of crime detection. This research aims to examine this aspect specifically.

If such a partnership is found to be in conflict with the reason it was first instigated, that is to assist with the investigation of crime and criminals, then it may be sensible to ask what is being done to alleviate that conflict. Chapter three will emphasise the sparsity of official publications published on the subject of Informers, that is to say governments seem to have taken a less than positive stand on the subject. Through the Home Office, various guidelines have been produced on Informer use for the benefit of practitioners, but these have been quite shallow. Similarly, the Association of Chief Police Officers has relied also on promoting such guidelines, but appear to have done little to address the potential problems relating to the association of the Informer and the Handler, other than support the fundamental need to promote more use, as long as it does not interfere with the process of law. In fact, there is no evidence to suggest that ACPO recognised that such problems existed. The British Criminal Justice system has gone further, by producing a number of stated cases originating from relevant criminal trials, and these will be discussed in Chapter two.

The courts have shown a definite move away from demands from the police to protect the identity of the Informer. Whereas perhaps thirty years ago, the Informer had the luxury of total anonymity, and the circumstances surrounding his involvement was hardly ever questioned, that is not the case now, and any case brought to the courts where an Informer has been used is subjected to close scrutiny. There are however systems in place which assist the Informer, such as the possibility of being provided with Public Interest Immunity (PII), otherwise there would be a rather abrupt end to its use. Nevertheless, the disclosure rules demand that where an Informer is used, it must at least be revealed in order that the court may determine the degree of sensitivity. This thesis will also examine the importance placed by the Informer and Handler on the disclosure rules.

This study will concentrate on the Informer, how he may be defined, what his reasons are for informing and how he reacts to the relationship with a police officer. However, it is just as important to look at the police themselves and why some of them become Informer Handlers. A separate study is discussed in Chapter five, when a number of police officers from one specific force were interviewed. Here there were two separate groups, those who were actively involved in the use of Informers, and those who had never become involved. They were asked for their reasons for making their decision, and the responses compared. This will help to understand the motivational factors for police officers, clearly and distinctly different to those of the Informer, but probably just as important.

Perhaps the most crucial problem emerging from this liaison between an Informer and a police officer is the fact that both are prepared to breach the law in furtherance of this relationship. To some extent it is acceptable that criminals will have a propensity to break the law because that is what they do. The police officer though, has a duty to uphold the law. Such actions are not just in

contravention of accepted human standards, but may even attack the basic fabric of the Criminal Justice System.

The Research Question

What is the nature of relationships between Informers and Handlers within the Police Service in England, and what are the consequences of those relationships?

This thesis has identified the need to consider the relationship between the police Handler and his or her Informer, and how this relationship affects the underlying concept of crime investigation and detection. It may be reasonable to assume, in the absence of findings to the contrary, that the alliance itself is the root of all concerns. In particular, it is important to establish how the relationship evolves, how it affects each of the partners, and how far they will go in terms of their attitude towards breaching the laid down rules and regulations.

It is this relationship then that the present research will focus upon, but first of all it is essential to understand why there is a need to examine this area at all. It is suggested that the most striking reason has to be because of the enormous gap in the knowledge of such relationships. In the Literature Review (chapter three) it will be seen how little research has been undertaken, and this in itself provides an incentive to know more about it. There appears to be a consensus of opinion that the police cannot operate without using Informers, and if this is true, then the need to learn more about their use must be paramount.

It is clear then, that the notion of a relationship which exists between an Informer and Handler is critical to this study. Accepting that law enforcement agencies need Informers, then it is inevitable that a police officer and an Informer

will form a relationship which needs to be managed. That can never be achieved without understanding how the relationship works. It has been necessary, therefore, to theorise the nature of the relationship which is central to the thesis. This is discussed in chapter five and examines other professional relationships, including those involving the police.

The diverse partnership that ultimately exists between a police officer and an Informer, is bound to create an unstable relationship at times. It is hardly surprising that some consider the relationship diverse, when police officers, who are employed to arrest criminals, are prepared to work closely with those criminals. The implications of this instability must be studied.

The research will concentrate on those persons who are registered with the police as Informers on a regular basis, often for some sort of reward, as described above, differentiating between Informers and Informants,

Having described what constitutes an Informer and examined the relationship between him and the police officer, the study will then concentrate on the reasons why Informers become involved with the police. These reasons, or motivational factors, will affect the relationship and may well dictate how the relationship is to progress.

Finally, the study will examine the consequences of the relationship in terms of what extent those parties would allow the police discipline regulations to be breached, or indeed the criminal law. The fears and concerns expressed by the media in relation to police officers setting up crimes, or at the very least, using too much discretion to become selective about crime, will be addressed to establish if there is indeed evidence to support those concerns, and if so, how widespread the problem is.

Some additional comments

Those who have tried to define an Informer have been predominantly practitioners; mostly police officers who have relied essentially on their own experiences. In some cases, others have undertaken shallow research studies which have involved collecting data from police officers. There has been no previous research directed towards the Informer himself as a source of data and it is this area which has been concentrated on during this study.

This chapter highlights the need to undertake direct research into this subject. The observations of others in terms of agreeing on a definition of an Informer is far from satisfactory if it fails to observe the perceptions of those people themselves - the Informers. How they see themselves and describe their function is paramount if we are to fully understand their existence. This relationship desperately needs close scrutiny and it is this area which will uncover the situation that exists as a result of their association.

Even without looking at the history on the subject, it can be assumed that the Informer is by no means a new initiative, and its existence is more likely to be a behavioural aspect of human activity which has merely been exposed and used by the police for their own purposes. This use has not been all together surprising as the police have been put under substantial pressure to show results and other agencies have supported the use of Informers as an efficient and effective investigative tool, for example, the Audit Commission. Of course, the relationship has been a two way enterprise, with both sides profiting, albeit at different degrees, and history has provided the means to compare those relationships and their successes.

The response by the media, at least in recent years, has served to provide some indication of the public's response to the subject, and although there is evidence that the police are supported in their use of Informers as an investigative tool, it is apparent that the over-riding view is that there are real concerns that the relationship will become unstable and ultimately create a unhealthy and unreliable team. Specific reference has been made to selective informing and too much use of police discretion in this respect. The public, generally, have never been at ease knowing that their police force are able to use discretion in the way they deal with crime and criminals. The level of discretion used in the context of Informer use will be examined in this thesis.

It would seem that the most common preoccupation is the suggestion that Informers are being used to set up crimes in order that other criminal targets may be caught. Indeed, these fears have often been substantiated through reports of specific cases where such action has been uncovered by the media. This particular area forms a substantial part of the present study and will be considered within the notion that it is the relationship between the Informer and handler that creates the problems.

Individual police forces are making moves to review their own systems in the light of heavy criticism recently by the media and the courts alike. Lincolnshire is one such force which has made mammoth advances in identifying the problems which arise from the use of Informers, as well as providing practical solutions. This force, like others, now use a computerised system which not only acts as a register of all Informers actively used within the force area, but also provides a management tool for budgetary control and supervision of Handlers. In particular, it has created an innovative tasking system which has attracted considerable attention from other forces. Lincolnshire has also incorporated a training course for Handlers and controllers using expert key speakers from

throughout the United Kingdom and Europe,¹⁶ and again this appears to have received positive responses from other forces.¹⁷ Indeed, there now appears to be moves by both the National Crime Intelligence Service and the National Crime Faculty (NCF) at the Police Staff College to promote such courses throughout the country.¹⁸ The Lincolnshire course has addressed the many issues relating to Informer use, both practically and theoretically, and a dedicated Informer Handler Unit has also been set up within the force, where officers are engaged full time on the cultivation and use of Informers. Following an inspection of the force in 1995, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary reported favourably on the Informers Management course, and adds, "*The use of informants by Forces to investigate crime is a cost effective resource and one which is well used in Lincolnshire Police.*"¹⁹ Part of this study involves research into the use of Informers in Lincolnshire, comparing the responses from active Handlers against other police officers who, for whatever reason, have decided not to use this particular investigative tool. The results are shown in Chapter Five, and will be relevant to the main study in terms of police officers' motives, in that one of the aims is to determine what constitutes a Handler.

The advancements presently being seen throughout the country seem encouraging, and the country is now seeing some improvement at least in the way the police service are thinking about the subject. There is a considerable amount of work being done to create a Code of Conduct for the use of Informers nationally, and this document is expected to be widely distributed, even within the public domain, a move which has been long awaited by those

¹⁶ Billingsley R., "Using informers," Police Review 26 April, 1996: pp20-1.

¹⁷ 'Skills gap' warning on informants," Police Review 24 May, 1996: p6.

¹⁸ Morris R., "Informer database underway," Police Review 17 May, 1996: p14.

¹⁹ Home Office, "A report of Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary," Lincolnshire Police Chapter VI (1996): p39.

who consider that far too much has been kept from them. But even here, there is a definite void in terms of addressing, evaluating and managing the relationship between the Informer and his Handler, and if police forces continue to produce figures which encourage more and more use, then the need to ensure that the partnership is properly controlled becomes even stronger.

The use of Informers is a delicate subject and has generated a substantial amount of sensitivity within police forces during the data collection process. Chapter Four will explain in detail the specific problems and difficulties encountered during the research, but suffice to say, it has been a privilege to have been able to undertake this study, which has not been done before or indeed since. It will be seen in the Research Design (Chapter four) that this study is unique primarily because of the methodology used in interviewing active Informers throughout the country. My position as a senior police officer allowed me access to a very secret and confidential world, and one which could not have been made available to a non police researcher.

CHAPTER TWO

LEGAL ISSUES

This chapter will examine the legal use of Informers and look at some of the issues which have affected practitioners within the criminal justice system. The use of informers is not governed by legislation unlike, for example, the use of firearms covered by the Firearms Acts, or the use of motor vehicles by the Road Traffic Acts. There are, however, a number of procedural guidelines which have given rise to argument in the courts requiring judicial decisions, usually by way of stated cases, and it is these decisions which will be discussed here. There are also a number of interesting cases heard in the American courts and some of these have some relevance to the situation in this country.

Any future legal decisions will depend largely on public opinion on the use of Informers in this country. In Folkestone at least, the public were not that supportive. Here, the local police advertised a 'squeal for a meal', when they offered a night out including a meal and a show worth £200, for information about a burglar. They argued that the cost was less than the cost of an investigation, but the police were disappointed that nobody came forward.¹

¹ "Squealers turn down £200 meal," Folkestone Evening Standard 19 March 1993: 3.

The specific questions raised here will examine the disclosure of an Informers identity, entrapment, discounting sentences, agent provocateur, and misprision. These relate directly to the research aims. The issue of disclosing the Informer's identity is arguably the most emotive of them all, particularly for police officers and of course the Informer himself, because it creates a conflict with the age old submission by practitioners that the protection of an Informer's identity is crucial to the relationship. The question of entrapment is also an important aspect because it impacts on the relationship between the Informer and the Handler, particularly if that relationship allows a criminal to be tricked into becoming involved in a crime. The use of Informers as agent provocateurs is also relevant, as does the reference to misprision which will also be discussed. The decision by the courts to discount or reduce the sentence of convicted Informers is clearly relevant to this study as it may be one of the reasons why an Informer becomes involved.

A series of legal issues will be examined including corroboration, disclosure etc. Despite the feelings of the police, supported by the Audit Commission and Her Majesty's Inspectors of Constabulary that the use of Informers is a proven and effective investigative tool, the courts and some legal advisers are becoming increasingly uncomfortable. This is not being helped by recent incidents which have given rise to anxiety within the criminal justice arena. For example, Ethon Leonard Green, a known crack cocaine supplier and criminal as well as successful Informer for the Metropolitan Police Service, led an armed raid at a warehouse in Nottingham in 1993, where a cocaine (yardy) party was taking place. It is alleged that Green, who came from the ghettos of Kingston, Jamaica, and brought up with guns and drugs, came to the United Kingdom whilst on bail for attempt murder. He was arrested shortly after for another offence and became a police Informer. He was, apparently very successful but because he continued to be involved in other major crimes, he soon became out of control,

and was violent against other drug dealers. The police always insisted that they had evidence he was committing crime and maintain that he was warned he would be arrested. Green was arrested by Nottingham police for an offence at the warehouse, which involved him shooting another person, and whilst on remand, he admitted murder in Jamaica. The police apparently did nothing about this. Nottingham police said they were not given full information about Green and the Metropolitan police failed to co-operate and impeded their enquiries. Moreover when the case got to court, Green apparently was given protection, and a senior police officer even tried to stop the trial. Green eventually received 6 years imprisonment but there remains substantial discomfort as a result of this case. Green was dealing in cocaine, involved in an armed robbery and murder at a time when he was a police Informer.² The thesis will examine the questions surrounding known criminals giving information as Informers, whilst openly committing crime.

1. Corroboration

When a person is arrested on the uncorroborated word of an informant, there is always a danger and the courts will become more aware of this. For example, in the case of *James v. Chief Constable of South Wales* (1991) the case was dismissed, although on appeal the court advised that the arrest was lawful but gave a warning that such information should be treated with considerable reserve.³ A similar warning was given by the then National Executive Co-ordinator for the Regional Crime Squads, Neil Dickens when giving evidence to the Home Affairs Committee enquiry into organised crime, urging that

² "Jamaican Yardies," *World in Action*, Granada Production, 6 November 1995.

³ "Care is urged over word of informers," *The Daily Telegraph* 3 May 1991:p3.

Informers who were participating in crime should be assessed by a judge in advance. Dickens said that,

*"This way, the need of the informant to be protected from retribution can be reconciled with the need for independent assessment of his credibility. Informants are very dangerous people. They were usually criminals looking for money and their evidence had to be treated with caution."*⁴

This is just one example where distrust exists within the criminal justice system when Informers are involved. This thesis will examine that issue and other matters relating to the relationship between the Informer and the police officer, especially the motives of the Informer. It is the reasons why Informers give information to the police that has often urged the courts to seek corroborative evidence.

2. Disclosure

One of the most important questions relating to the use of Informers in the criminal justice system is that of disclosure; specifically whether the Informer's identity should be divulged. This is fundamental to any understanding between an Informer and Handler. The study will examine how important both parties consider this question of confidentiality within their relationship. Here, the legal findings will be discussed although there are a relatively small number of Stated Cases on this topic. It is apparent though, that the general feeling in the courts has gradually changed over the years. The following cases, which are representative but by no means exhaustive, show this change of attitude.

⁴ Clarke M., "Plea for pre trial 'NOD' to protect informants," Police Review 3 June 1994: 2.

In 1794 when the court of appeal examined the conviction of a drug dealer, Hardy, the police executed a warrant following information, and drugs were found in the defendants coat. The police were asked about two men who left the flat prior to the warrant, but the police refused to answer stating that it would reveal the identity of the informant. It was ruled that no miscarriage of justice would arise by not identifying the men, and this case started the debate on disclosure, advising that,

*"no questions may be asked and no evidence given which would reveal the identity of the informant."*⁵

The decision not to disclose the Informer's identity continued for nearly one hundred years, when a plaintiff tried to identify an informant when suing for conspiracy to prosecute maliciously. Although the decision was upheld, the Court accepted that there may be cases when an informant's identity should be revealed if it proves the defendants innocence.⁶ This did not, however, deter the Metropolitan Police Commissioner, Sir Ronald Howe from saying in a speech to the Ghost Squad during 1945,

*"Never will you be required to disclose your sources of information."*⁷

At about the same time, the police in America were experiencing similar problems but the courts there decided there was no need to disclose the identity if the information resulted in obtaining a search warrant. As long as the validity of the warrant was not questioned, and there was little evidence of any challenge, then it was accepted that warrants were a good way of not disclosing

⁵ R v Hardy (1794) Criminal Law Review 687

⁶ Marks & Beyfus (1890) 25 QBD 494

⁷ Lucas N., Scarlett B., *The Flying Squad* (London: 1945) 129-41.

the identity of the informant.⁸ This particular issue is known in America as 'probable cause', which simply means that the prosecution have a fundamental responsibility to prove that they could justify an arrest or search, and the issue of a warrant is one way of showing that there was probable cause to take the action they did. It became the norm in America, that where the information originated from a third party, such as an informant, the courts need to be shown :-

- (a). Details of how the informant concluded his claim, and
- (b). Details of how the officer concluded that the informant was credible and reliable.⁹

These two requirements became known as the Aguilar two-pronged test, and it became accepted practice for American Courts to demand corroboration of such information.¹⁰ In one case where there was no warrant, the court convicted without disclosure on the basis that the police officer's testimony fully supported probable cause in that he relied on good faith and reliable information. It was argued though, that,

*"It is not unknown for the arresting officer to mis represent his connections with the informer, his knowledge of the informers reliability, or the information allegedly obtained from the informer."*¹¹

Although this thesis will not consider such misrepresentations, nevertheless it will examine how important it is to protect the Informer's identity. Another

⁸ People v. Keener- California Supreme Court (1955)

⁹ Aguilar v Texas (1964)

¹⁰ McGuinness R. L., "Probable cause: Informant information," FBI Law enforcement Bulletin Part II (November 1982) pp23-31.

¹¹ "McCray v Illinois (1967)," U.S Supreme Court Reports 18 L ed 2d : 74.

American court quashed the conviction of a man convicted of possession of heroin and supplying to the informant, on the grounds that,

*"The informants possible testimony was highly relevant and might have been helpful to the defence. The informer was the only witness in a position to amplify or contradict the testimony of Government witnesses."*¹²

It is interesting to learn that one of the Judges, Justice Clark, dissented with the findings, arguing that informants needed protection and were crucial in drugs cases, and more importantly perhaps, that disclosure was not essential to proving the cases charged. An American court took a different stance in the case of *State v Edwards* (1958) where it held that no police officer should have an unqualified right to withhold the identity of an informant. This was probably one of the first cases which made the police concentrate on whether the informant was more valuable than the prosecution.¹³ The debate continued in America, when an undercover informant bought heroin from a defendant using marked money. The informant gave evidence but his identity was not disclosed. He was convicted but on appeal the Supreme Court reversed the decision, arguing that the credibility of the informant was an important issue. The court also suggested that there may be an exception if the prosecution were to show that physical harm to the informant or his family were likely, or the informant was not a principal witness against the accused.¹⁴ This case was further discussed in *Theodor* (1972) when the court agreed that the identity of the informant should not be disclosed merely to question probable cause of arrest. If the defendant could show that the informant was a material witness on the issue of guilt or

¹² *Roviaro v U.S.* (1957) US Supreme Court Reports I L ED 2D P.647

¹³ Sullivan F. C., "*State v Edwards*, 317 S.W.2d.441 (1958)," *Police* Vol./Issue (March/April 1959)

¹⁴ Rissler L. E., "The informer - witness," *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin* (May 1977): 31.

innocence, the case would be dismissed unless the informants identity is disclosed.¹⁵

One of the most important cases heard in Britain was Birtles (1969) when the court accepted that Informers should be protected, at least within certain limits. The Court recognised that such decisions may be disagreeable, but it was felt that the police should be allowed to make best use of their informants.¹⁶ For practitioners, this was a turning point, and 1969 also saw the circulation of Home Office Guidelines on Informers, which was the first time Britain had seen such documentary advice afforded to the police. The decision taken in R v Birtles to protect the Informer continued, even with prosecutions brought by other agencies. HM Customs and Excise brought to the courts a case which was dependant on information in relation to tax liability. The source was not disclosed on the grounds that it would result in a lack of future information, making the Revenue Act unworkable. The court felt that there were arguments on both sides, and where such a fine balance existed, the court should uphold the claim to refuse to disclose the identity.¹⁷ In D v NSPCC (1977) it was accepted that public policy must demand that sources of information will be withheld, but at the same time agreeing that no innocent man should be convicted as a result.¹⁸ And yet, in R. V. Hennessey (1978), a case concerning telephone tapping, the courts appreciated the need to protect the informants identity for their own safety and also to ensure that the supply of information does not dry up.¹⁹

¹⁵ Theodor v Superior Court (1972) 8.CAL. 3d 77.

¹⁶ R. v Birtles (1969) 53 CR.APP.R 469.

¹⁷ Alfred Crompton V Commissioners of Customs & Excise (HL) (1974)

¹⁸ Hanvey P., "A structured approach to informants," Police Staff College, Bramshill, 4/5 April, 1994.

¹⁹ Blackstones Criminal Practice - Public Policy and Privilege (London: 1993) Sect F9:p1898.

At this stage, then, there exists an overriding rule that the source of information will not be disclosed, but there is the proviso that non disclosure must not result in the defendant being denied the possibility of proving his innocence.²⁰ This was also recognised when the Attorney General distributed some Guidelines in relation to the disclosure of unused material to the defence, when it was strongly advised that in the case of Informers, where there were reasons for fearing that disclosure would put him or his family in danger, then at least the prosecution should seek Counsel's advice.²¹ Nevertheless, there continued to be a strong public interest in ensuring that the defendant was allowed to put forward a tenable case in its best light. (*R v Agar* (1989)). A tenable case could only be presented if the informants identity was disclosed.²²

In the *Agar* case in the West Midlands, the Crown Prosecution Service offered no evidence rather than disclose an informant's identity against the defendant John McPhee who was charged with possession of Cocaine having a street value of £50,000, with intent to supply. The defence was that the drugs had been planted by the Informer and the Judge decided that the informant must give evidence if there was to be a fair trial, despite the prosecutions plea that his life would be in danger and the police view that future operations would be put in jeopardy.²³

Another case, *R v Saunders & Others* (1990) commonly referred to as the Guinness trial, questioned the disclosure of unused material. The Judge ruled

²⁰ Acton H., "From a usually reliable source," *Police Review* 27 January 1989: 189-90.

²¹ Attorney General's Guidelines (1982) Home Office London (unpublished)

²² "Protecting informer prejudiced defence," *The Daily Telegraph* 11 September, 1989.

²³ Seton C., "Drugs case dropped to protect informant," *The Times* 13 June 1990.

that such disclosure should cover any relevant material, not just witness statements, and this included all police reports which had a bearing on the case. This ruling had serious implications for the police, particularly where the use of Informers was involved, as all their records of meetings, contacts, intelligence and general reports would have to be disclosed. The current situation is that such material is sensitive, and in practical terms, the court will listen to ex parte hearings to decide on whether or not they should require the prosecution to disclose. In Scotland, there is no such legal duty to disclose information to the defence, although the Crown has an obligation to act in the interests of justice, to ensure that the true facts are divulged. A Scottish case (McKie v WSMT Limited (1952) confirmed that police reports are confidential, arguing that,

*"The only method of securing absolute candour and freedom in the making of such reports is an absolute guarantee against publication"*²⁴

Relying on the cases of Hennessy and Agar, the Court of Appeal considered the circumstances when Stephen John Keane was arrested for counterfeit currency found in his car and at his home address. The defence was that the defendant was set up and the disclosure of the informant's identity was necessary to put forward a tenable case. The trial Judge agreed that the police need not answer questions which would identify the source. The Appeal held that it was wrong for the police to be the sole arbiters, but concluded that:-

- (a). There was a public interest in not disclosing, and
- (b). That material would not have assisted the defence.

²⁴ "Informants seminar," (Unpublished), Strathclyde Police, 24 June 1994.

The court decided that there had been no unfairness to the defendant, and the appeal was dismissed.²⁵ This then brought about the issue of 'fairness' to the judicial system, as opposed to the question of having the opportunity to prove innocence. A subtle difference perhaps, but an important one, certainly for the police. They were so concerned, that the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) wrote to the Home Office fearing that prosecutions against key criminals would fail if the police were forced to identify their sources.²⁶

Another case where the defence demanded the Informer's identity be disclosed was in Sheffield Crown Court. Andrew Meredith was charged with possession of cocaine with intent to supply following a successful search warrant at his home address. It was argued that the Informer's information was material evidence which may prove their clients innocence. As a result, the prosecution dropped the supplying charge and he pleaded guilty to simple possession, receiving 9 months imprisonment.²⁷ Here was a situation where a substantial reduction of sentence was given in preference to an Informer giving evidence. A similar case, again heard in Sheffield Crown Court revolved around information from an Informer suggesting that a robbery was to take place in a private house. Police carried out observations and the offenders were seen to break in to the premises and later arrested. The defence suggested that the incident had been set up by the Informer and demanded that he give evidence. The Judge agreed that this was a reasonable request, and the prosecution decided to offer no evidence. The officer in the case later said,

²⁵ R v Keane(1992) - Court of Appeal No.92/6617/74

²⁶"Police fear court disclosure rule will rob them of key informants," The Times 21 December, 1992.

²⁷ R v Meredith (1993)

"It is difficult to comprehend exactly what damage has been done to the effective investigation of crime." 28

This practice of offering no evidence, rather than proceeding with the prosecution may be regarded as morally wrong, perhaps, and maybe there are those who would argue that this is not justice. However, at the same time as these trials, the Regional Crime Squad were reporting that in the preceding 12 months, 3 Informers had been murdered. Furthermore, there had been no less than 60 serious prosecutions dropped over the same period. The RCS National Co-ordinator, Neil Dickens recalled,

"In the last year several of our informants have lost their lives, mainly in the drugs field where money and weaponry are so widely available." 29

The disclosure rules laid down in the courts resulted from an Appeal Court judgment in the case of Judith Ward the convicted IRA terrorist who was cleared after 17 years imprisonment after it was revealed that the police failed to disclose information which would have assisted her defence. What has transpired since is that police forces have become fearful that their Informers will be compromised, and are abandoning prosecutions rather than risk revealing an informant's identity. One informer was reported to say,

"This ruling puts me and many like me in a vulnerable situation. In future I will have to think twice about getting involved." 30

²⁸ R v Wiggan & Wiggan (1993) South Yorkshire Police Report (Unpublished)

²⁹ "Save this threatened species," The Daily Telegraph 29 September 1993.

³⁰ Henry I., "Fight to save key informers," Sunday Express 31 January 1993.

The only course open to the prosecution in these cases is to seek ex parte hearings for the Judge to issue Public Interest Immunity certificates, but the defence will always ask for disclosure, sometimes based on vexatious reasons, often as a spoiling tactic to get the case dropped.³¹ The defence may legitimately be allowed to put forward a tenable case. Also, there are cases where the court has granted Public Interest Immunity, and therefore afforded protection, but nevertheless the evidence of an informant has been excluded on the grounds of fairness.³² All this has given the police some encouragement to refuse to identify their sources, and in one unreported case, a detective was given an ultimatum by a Judge that either he disclose, or go to prison for contempt of court. The prosecution stepped in at this stage, asking for an adjournment and in the end no evidence was offered, but the police are fearful that this practice will become more commonplace. In an unsuccessful drugs raid in Ireland, two detectives faced dismissal from the force for refusing to identify their informants, even though no criminal proceedings were instigated. They maintained that the protection of informants is vital to police work.³³

In a recent case, and one which portrays the feeling of the courts in this country at the present time, *R v Reiley* (1994) the defendant met with an undercover police officer and informant after which the latter two men made up their notes of the meeting. The defendant gave his account of his involvement in the trial which differed from the other versions. The defence argued that the informant should give evidence because he was present at the meeting and his evidence was necessary to maintain a fair trial. The court of appeal agreed, concluding that if the Informer was capable of producing relevant evidence, he should have

³¹ Informants and Observation Posts - Crown Prosecution Training Handout (1994) (Unpublished)

³² Ibid.

³³ "Garda detectives defend secrecy on informants," *Police Review* 18 March 1994: 6.

been called. Some barristers are now suggesting, following this case, that this is a licence for acquittal in every case where an Informer is used, as the defence will always argue that he has 'relevant' evidence.³⁴

The question of disclosing the Informer's identity has become more apparent over recent years and the Courts have changed their view; from protecting the Informer at all costs, to ensuring that trials are fair. This has made the police less comfortable in their disclosure of Informers to the point where they are considering the Informer to be more valuable than the prosecution. As a result, more criminal cases are withdrawn and criminals, according to the police, are going free.

This issue is critical in the relationship between the Informer and the Handler. This study will examine disclosure of identity to determine whether the Informer or the Handler are more interested in maintaining the partnership than consideration of the legal system.

3. Entrapment

Entrapment exists where a criminal is dealt with through the courts for a crime which has been engineered by a law enforcement officer, or his agent, for example an Informer. In effect, the criminal has been trapped into committing an offence which he would not have committed, had it not been for the actions of the police. In this thesis, entrapment is defined as setting up crime, and again it is the relationship between the Informer and Handler which will be examined to determine whether such practice is acceptable to the partners, and if so to what

³⁴ Kelson P., "R v Michael Reiley (1994)," Unpublished, Regional Crown Prosecution Service, Briggate Lodge Hotel, Brigg, Humberside, 11 June 1994.

extent. In English law there is no defence of entrapment. The American courts have established guidelines, where it is apparent that the majority of cases have been connected with the illegal use of drugs. The cases fall into one of two main categories, the subjective, which focuses on the defendants state of mind or the objective which concentrates exclusively on the conduct of the police.³⁵

The subjective test, otherwise known as the Origin of Intent is generally viewed by the American courts as the most acceptable, and in essence allows the defence of entrapment if it is shown that the offence charged was actually created by the police or other law enforcement officers. The court, in applying this test ask two questions:-

(a). Was there an inducement on the part of the officer?

(b). If so, did the defendant show any predisposition to commit the offence?³⁶

This criteria depends on whether the criminal intent is in the mind of the police officer or the accused. It would not be construed as entrapment if the officer only provides an opportunity for the accused to offend.

The two main cases are Sorrells (1932)³⁷ and Sherman (1958)³⁸ In the Sorrells case, the defendant had been involved in the possession and selling of whisky, contrary to the National Prohibition Act. He had obtained the liquor after persuasion by a police Informer who was acting as a tourist. The court

³⁵ Callahan M., "Entrapment, inducement and the use of unwitting middlemen," FBI Law enforcement Bulletin Part I (December 1993): 17-24.

³⁶ "Entrapment to commit narcotics offense," 62 ALR3d 110 (1972): 117-48.

³⁷ Sorrells v United States (1932) 287 US 435, 77 l Ed 413, 53 S ct 210, 86 ALR 249

³⁸ Sherman v United States (1958) 356 US 369, 2L Ed 2d 848, 78 S ct 819

held that he was not guilty because the police had lured him to commit the offence.³⁹ In the Sherman case the defendant was receiving medical treatment for drug addiction and was befriended by a police Informer by the name of Kalchinian who claimed to be another patient. Sherman was persuaded to obtain illegal drugs and he returned to drug taking himself. The court acquitted him on the grounds that law enforcement officials had created the criminal activity. In the case of Peters (1970)⁴⁰ the defendant was convicted of possession of drugs and on appeal it was held that although he was given the opportunity to commit the offence, he was ready, willing and able to do it and was therefore not subjected to entrapment. In a similar case against Gellers (1971)⁴¹ the defendant appealed after a conviction for possession of drugs. The court held that there can be no entrapment where the criminal intent originates in the mind of the accused, even though he was given the opportunity and helped to commit the offence. This decision was upheld in another drugs case⁴² where the court said that entrapment could only be used if the criminal intent originates in the mind of the informer. In this particular case, the police set a trap to catch the defendant in the execution of a criminal offence which he himself had conceived.

Although this subjective test seems to be the most popular in the American courts, some favour the objective test where it is the activity of the police that is considered and not the predisposition of the defendant. In a number of cases, the defendants had been convicted of supplying drugs, but their convictions quashed on the grounds that the police actions in securing the convictions were reprehensible. These courts argued that unless the objective test was

³⁹ Elliott D. W. & Wood J. C., A casebook on criminal law (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1974) 34-40.

⁴⁰ Peters v State (1970) 248 Ark 134, 450 SW2d 276

⁴¹ State v Gellers (1971) 282 A2d 173, cert den 406 US 949, 32 L Ed 2d 337, 92 S ct 2047

⁴² State v Harney (1972) 499 P2d 802

administered the public's confidence in the administration of justice would be shaken.⁴³ Such police action which was taken apparently to secure the conviction of a suspect, rather than provide the evidence, became known in the American courts as the Outrageous Government Conduct Defense. In one case, an Informer suggested setting up an amphetamine factory. He supplied the equipment and even did most of the manufacturing because the defendant did not have the requisite knowledge. He was acquitted because the government, it was suggested, was involved in the crime.⁴⁴ Another example where the court found in favour of the defendant based on Outrageous Government Conduct was where an Informer supplied a would-be heroin distributor with a sample of high purity heroin which was never recovered, and apparently made its way to unknown users.⁴⁵ It can only be assumed, because there are no documentary comments, that the court felt the police were doing no more than illegally supplying drugs.

Another successful defence overturned a Federal child pornography conviction in the case of *United States v Jacobson* (1992) where it was decided that the police had induced the commission of a crime and implanted in the defendant the disposition to commit the criminal act. The circumstances were that Jacobson lawfully received magazines from an adult book store that contained photographs of nude boys. Such action later became an offence and he was targetted over the next two and a half years by repeated contacts through fictitious organisations. He subsequently ordered books and was later charged with receiving child pornography through the mail.⁴⁶ Despite the success of this defence, the majority of courts expressed the opinion that they approved of the

⁴³ *Op Cit* Entrapment to commit narcotics offense, p121

⁴⁴ *United States v Twigg* (1978) 588 F. 2d 373 3d Cir.

⁴⁵ *United States v Sontana* (1992) F.Supp D. Mass

⁴⁶ Thomas V. Kukura J.D., "Undercover investigations and the entrapment defense," FBI Law enforcement Bulletin (April 1993): pp27-32.

police infiltration and sanctioned their limited participation in the crime, including providing valuable items to the defendant in order to gain their confidence; even drugs. ⁴⁷ For example, in one case, the court approved of the police providing heroin to the defendant and then arresting him when he sold it back to them. ⁴⁸

In 1977, the Law Commission in England proposed various remedies to existing law, including the creation of an offence of entrapment for agent provocateurs, as well as mitigated sentences for entrapped defendants. Its recommendations however were not taken up. ⁴⁹

In one of the few relevant cases to be heard in this country, two defendants, McEvilly and Lee had been convicted of handling stolen property. An Informer gave information to the police about their activities who then provided an undercover agent tasked with buying stolen property. The defence argued that the defendants had been subjected to entrapment, but the court, in dismissing the appeal, decided that the police did nothing wrong. They had received information which led them to believe there was a plan to commit crime, and the undercover agent was put forward as a willing means of disposal in order to bring the offenders to justice. ⁵⁰

This was not the outcome though in another case reported in 1985, when Customs officers lured two Yugoslavs into a £30,000 heroin deal. The court ordered the prosecution to identify the Informer and the case was abandoned.

⁴⁷ Callahan M., "Entrapment, inducement and the use of unwitting middlemen," FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin Conclusion (March 1984): p31.

⁴⁸ United States v Hampton (1976)

⁴⁹ Report on defences of general application - The Law Commission (Law. Comm. No.83(1977))

⁵⁰ R v McEvilly and Lee (1973) Court of Appeal

The court heard that the defendants were alleged to have been encouraged to bring drugs to England for an undercover agent, in order that they could be arrested. ⁵¹

A remarkably similar case, that of *R v Latif & Shahzad* (1994) ⁵² looked at the implications of entrapment, but came to a very different conclusion. A Pakistani named Honi working as an Informer for the Drugs Enforcement Agency (D.E.A.) brought 20 kilos of heroin into the UK at the request of Shahzad, and with the knowledge of H.M. Customs officers. The Informer met the defendants who were given what they believed to be heroin but in fact was Horlicks. They were arrested and charged, but on appeal claimed that there had been an abuse of process, and also that the evidence of Honi should have been excluded (Section 78 Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984) because it was unfair. The court dismissed the appeal stating that S.78 was designed to protect the innocent, not major drugs traffickers. On the issue of entrapment or abuse of process, it was felt that,

"If on occasions the big fish are lured here, then hooked, there is no abuse in that." ⁵³

Even though English law does not recognise entrapment as a criminal offence, the above Cases show the courts do not condone such action. The American system of examining the subjective and objective tests highlights an interesting difference of opinion and is beginning to appear now in Britain. Those Cases which described how the police merely engineered the evidence to secure a

⁵¹"FBI style trap used by heroin case officers," *The Observer* 8 December, 1985.

⁵² The Times 17 March 1994

⁵³ Morton J., "Some you win, some you lose," *Police Review* 25 March 1994:

14.

conviction, had no sympathy from the courts and the defence were successful. The use of undercover agents and Informers are used by the defence as examples of entrapment, but the general view is that the police acted properly if they were providing the means to bring the offender to justice.

This thesis will look at whether the Informer and Handler are prepared to become involved in entrapment, and if so to what extent. The study specifically examines 'agent provocateur' which is closely related to entrapment and discussed later in this chapter.

4. Discounting sentence

Another area which has created some consternation in the courts, especially where the use of Informers is concerned, is when in return for co-operation or help to the police, a person charged may be given a reduced sentence. If this practice is acceptable within the judicial system, then it has serious implications for the Informer/Handler partnership. Clearly, it would be in the interest of a criminal facing a custodial sentence to become an Informer if there is any possibility that by doing so would help his cause during the trial. This thesis will examine the motivations of the Informer, but will also look at whether the reasons for informing change over time and if so, why.

In one appeal hearing, the Lord Chief Justice, Lord Lane, was obviously in favour of discounting sentences. He was quoted as saying,

"This is one area in which it is particularly important that offenders should be encouraged to give information to the police, and a confession of guilt coupled

with considerable assistance to the police can properly be marked by a substantial reduction in what would otherwise be the proper sentence." ⁵⁴

Such a stance was also taken in the appeal court which considered the case against four defendants who were properly convicted for the illegal importation of cannabis worth more than four and a half million pounds. ⁵⁵ Two of the defendants had their sentences reduced, but the other two had given information to the authorities which was considered to be of value. Due regard was given to the nature and effect of the information, the degree of assistance provided and the potential risk to the Informer and his family. The court agreed that there should be a discount and the sentences were reduced from 10 years and 6 years to 7¹/₂ and 4 years respectively. ⁵⁶ A similar case heard by the court of appeal was R v Afzal (1989) where the defendant acting as a courier was concerned in the importation of over 4 kilos of diamorphine. He made statements identifying the person who recruited him and volunteered to give evidence. He succeeded in having his sentence reduced from 7¹/₂ years imprisonment to 6 years, and the supplier was arrested as a result. ⁵⁷

In another case, though, the criminal justice system showed their dislike for what was considered to be an abuse of process, when George Dean, 17 years of age, appeared before court having admitted being involved in a murder in Croydon, Surrey. He in fact burnt the victim's car in order to destroy vital evidence. Dean maintained that the police had assured him throughout the enquiry he would not be prosecuted if he assisted them in arresting the other defendants. The police emphatically denied making such promises, but the Crown Court threw out all

⁵⁴ R v Aramah (1982) 4CR.APP.REP(s) 407 p.409

⁵⁵ R v Sivan, Ferman, Shortwise & Greenfield (1988)

⁵⁶ "Discounting sentences for assistance," The Times 6 December, 1988.

⁵⁷ "Sentence discount for drugs co-operation," The Times 14 October, 1989.

criminal charges against him, taking the view that the police had usurped the authority of the Crown Prosecution Service who had sole authority to proceed or not. The main offenders were in fact arrested and dealt with as a result of Dean's information. ⁵⁸

Another case where the court felt that the police had overstepped the mark was heard in the appeal court. The defendant appeared before the Central Criminal Court in 1993 on charges of robbery and possession of firearms whilst unlawfully at large. He was convicted and sentenced to 9 years imprisonment to run concurrent to a sentence imposed in 1990. The submission on appeal was that he pleaded guilty and co-operated with the police on the condition that the police provide a letter to the court showing mitigating circumstances and supporting a reduction in sentence. This letter was not forthcoming, and the court of appeal held that the decision whether to provide a letter is not for the discretion of the police, but a matter for the Counsel for the Crown. A discount on sentence was given by the court in the light of fresh material submitted by the defendant. ⁵⁹

Although the use of Informers as supergrasses is not part of this thesis, this has been included because the use of a so called supergrass is directly concerned with the use of Informers within the legal system. Supergrass Informers have been used predominantly in Northern Ireland to describe those professional criminals who, with a view to securing a reduced sentence for themselves, or other such reward, decide to give information against others. The difference between the supergrass and others seeking a reduced sentence is that the term supergrass refers to the more serious type of offence such as terrorism. There

⁵⁸ "Court rejects charges against informant," The Independent 20 February 1993.

⁵⁹ R v Piggott (1994) Court of Appeal Criminal Division No 94/0235/W5

were a number of trials where the term supergrass was used in 1972, and it was at this time that a Commission was set up to enquire into terrorist trials generally in Northern Ireland. This produced what was commonly known as the "Diplock" courts where a single Judge sat without a Jury. Jury trials were considered to be unreliable with a danger of intimidation of witnesses and jurors.⁶⁰ The Royal Ulster Constabulary reported that the use of the supergrass was having a devastating effect on terrorism, although it was also arousing considerable political controversy.⁶¹ Critics of the system argued that it was doing nothing but creating a form of 'internment by remand', in that the alleged offenders were spending unwarranted time in prison awaiting trial.⁶² In practice many defendants were released either because the supergrass had withdrawn his evidence or it had been rejected by the trial Judge. One particular Informer though, Christopher Black from the Ardoyne area of Belfast gave evidence against 38 alleged terrorists, 35 of whom were convicted. Some of those opposed to the supergrass system argued that a supergrass was merely an accomplice and as such, his evidence should be corroborated. The lack of corroboration in Northern Ireland allowed the supergrass to provide false information, and fabricate evidence. One author commented that,

*"The supergrass system has achieved little except misery for those involved, considerable public expense, and a sharpened and perhaps even extended distrust of the legal system amongst certain sections of the community. It should never have happened at all....."*⁶³

⁶⁰ Report of the Commission to consider legal procedures to deal with terrorist activities in Northern Ireland. Cmnd. 5185 (1972) para 36.

⁶¹ "Will supergrass sow a bitter harvest?" The Times 13 September, 1983

⁶² Walsh D., The use and abuse of emergency legislation in Northern Ireland (London: Cobden Trust, 1983) Ch.5.

⁶³ Jennings A. (Ed), Justice under fire - The abuse of civil liberties in Northern Ireland (London: Pluto Press, 1988) 98.

This did not appear to deter potential Informers, and there continued throughout the 1980s a search for members of the main terrorist groups who would be prepared to give evidence against their colleagues in exchange for an indemnity and a new life.⁶⁴ It would seem that many were blackmailed into becoming Informers, although the rewards were high, but a large proportion committed suicide. Such a fate was far from new and could be traced back, for example to Judas Iscariot who hanged himself after giving information for money.

In Northern Ireland there was a history of resistance to British rule in some quarters and this presumably highlighted the need for spies and Informers. One author suggested that such dangerous activity allowed the police to identify specific criminals whom the Informer should inform against.⁶⁵ Boyd argues that the promise of remission or immunity is distasteful and could encourage Informers to manufacture evidence.⁶⁶ This stance is supported by Bonner⁶⁷ who argues that it is morally wrong to grant immunity to Informers whose crimes may be as serious or more than those accused. He suggests that there were allegations that the police encouraged Informers whose future depended on pleasing them, and recommended that, amongst other things, there should be a return to Jury trials and all Informer evidence should be corroborated.

Another criticism of supergrass Informers is their cost effectiveness. They require protection, with high running costs and financial assistance required for their families whilst they are serving their sentence. They also tend to re-offend

⁶⁴ Greer S., "Supergrasses and the legal system in Britain and Northern Ireland," Quarterly Law Review 198 (1986).

⁶⁵ Boyd A., The informers - A chilling account of the supergrasses in Northern Ireland (Dublin: Mercier Press, 1984) 30.

⁶⁶ Ibid: p.40

⁶⁷ Bonner D., "Combating terrorism: supergrass trials in Northern Ireland," The Modern Law Review Vol 51 (Jan 1988): 23-53.

and cause embarrassment to the authorities. There was certainly some embarrassment when in 1987, Nikolas Chrastney, one of the organisers of the biggest cocaine consignment smuggled in Britain, escaped from police cells in Yorkshire whilst helping Customs officials against other alleged offenders. He has never been found. ⁶⁸ But one author believes that the use of the supergrass will continue because,

"As long as there is a chance to avoid a long time inside by a bit of judicious talk and walk, the singing will continue." ⁶⁹

Not all the cases relating to supergrasses have been in Northern Ireland. For example, George Cheung gave evidence in 1992 as a supergrass in England, against other triad members plotting to shoot a rival gang member. The court was told that Cheung was given preferential treatment following his arrest, and he was likely to receive residency status on relocation abroad. It was alleged during the trial, that a police officer had abused his authority by looking after Mr. Cheung far too well, seeing this assignment as a *'feather in his cap'* ⁷⁰ Another supergrass, Maurice O'Mahoney, who had worked for the police over a number of years was acquitted of armed robbery in 1993 after accusing the police of setting him up. Nicknamed 'King Squealer' he intimated that he feared for his life both from the criminal fraternity and the police. He had given information on more than 100 colleagues in relation to underworld activities and made a living dealing in jewelry, admitting that some of it was known to have been stolen. He claimed that the police asked him to commit a robbery in order to catch another criminal. During the robbery, he says, the police fired at him

⁶⁸"The inside story on a five star supergrass," The Times 3 July 1992.

⁶⁹ Campbell D., "Whisper who dares," Police Review 3rd September, 1991: 532-33.

⁷⁰ "Police criticised over triad perks," The Independent 11 June 1992.

intending to kill him because they feared he would expose them. He went on to admit fabricating evidence for the police to catch others. Naturally, the prosecution dismissed his revelations but he was subsequently acquitted.⁷¹

The practice of offering reduced sentences to Informers causes much debate, some encouraging its use whilst others are concerned that it does nothing more than persuade criminals to become Informers in order to benefit at court. The use of the supergrass, particularly in Northern Ireland, has been discussed and, although some practitioners argue that the supergrass has had a devastating effect on terrorism, others suggest that it merely prolongs the justice system whereby defendants are kept in custody awaiting trial for much longer. It is suggested by practitioners that if the supergrass Informer is to continue, then their evidence must be properly corroborated. Otherwise, there will remain the danger that such Informers will fabricate evidence and supply malicious information solely to receive a better deal by the court for himself.

All these cases are relevant to the thesis in that they refer to the relationship between the Informer and the police officer, and the motivation an Informer may have. The reduction of an Informer's sentence for information about other criminals is a legitimate method of court procedure, but some practitioners argue that it is dangerous and morally wrong. It is important, therefore to determine how prevalent this practice is.

5. Agent Provocateur

⁷¹ "Supergrass's claims leave him between the dock and a hard place." The Guardian 16 July 1993.

Closely related to the defence of entrapment is the submission by the defence that an Informer or undercover officer was acting as agent provocateur. This submission is more commonly used in Britain. Again, this practice is an important feature of this thesis as it will examine the possibility that in the furtherance of the relationship, the Informer and Handler will incite the commission of criminal offences.

An early example of the incitement to commit criminal offences, can be found in a 1947 case. A plain clothes police officer was carrying out observations in a public house when he saw betting slips being passed from one customer to another. He made a bet himself, and later made a second bet in the presence of another officer. At the trial, the court found this practice unacceptable, and the magistrate declared,

"It cannot be too strongly emphasised that it is wholly wrong for a police officer or any other person to be sent to commit an offence in order that an offence by another person may be detected." ⁷²

The courts maintained their dislike for such actions in a later case when the defendants had pleaded guilty to robbery on a postmaster with an unknown man, and received 4 years imprisonment. They continually declared throughout the trial that the unknown man had persuaded them to commit the offence, and it later became apparent that this man was in fact the informant. With the agreement of the postmaster, he had pretended to be tied up, with the police on the premises at the time. This was not disclosed at the trial. In effect, the defendants had pleaded guilty to an offence which had not been committed because the postmaster had technically consented. On appeal, the convictions

⁷² Brannan v Peek (1947) 2.ALL.ER 572

for larceny were substituted, and sentences reduced. The court felt that the Justices had been blindfolded and perverted and, although they did not criticise the police for non disclosure of the informant, they expressed concern that evidence was concealed⁷³ which effected the quality of the offence. As a result of this case the Home Office published Guidelines on the use of Informers as agent provocateur.⁷⁴ As said above in the case of Birtles (1969) the police were supported in their use of Informers, but on the issue of incitement, the court said,

*"It is vitally important to ensure so far as possible that the informer does not create an offence, that is to say, incite others to commit an offence those others would not otherwise have committed."*⁷⁵

There was indeed growing concern that Informers were being used to set up crimes, recruit participants and then give evidence against them after informing the police. This was increasing criminality rather than preventing it, and a lecturer in law, J. D. McClean suggested that three main questions should be asked in the courts:-

- (a). How much can the police precipitate an offence?
- (b). How much can they resort to trickery?
- (c). How far can they breach the law themselves?

He accepted that in drugs cases where there are no victims, the police have to resort to using Informers, but he argued that every participant, even an Informer

⁷³ R v Macro & others (1969) Crim LR 205

⁷⁴ Home Office Circular No.97/1969 (12 May 1969) Informants who take part in crime.

⁷⁵ Devlin K. M., "Informers, spies and agent provocateurs," Justice of the Peace and Local Government Review (31 October, 1970): 805.

should be treated as an accomplice, and his evidence could be used as corroboration. ⁷⁶

A number of lawyers and civil liberty group members expressed concern about the use of agent provocateurs in 1993, and one officer for Liberty said,

"We do not think it is the job of the police to go round creating crime. We think it is their job to prevent crime. To step over the line is a breach of their role." ⁷⁷

He was referring to a case where an Australian whilst in Amsterdam met an Englishman who was a heavy drugs user. At the instigation of this man, he flew to England to meet some contacts and became involved in the trafficking of drugs. According to the Australian, a certain amount of pressure was put on him to obtain large amounts of drugs and eventually he flew to London where he was given a suitcase containing 50,000 tablets of LSD. He was arrested and charged with importation of drugs estimated to be worth up to £1 million. In his trial, the defendant suggested that the people who befriended him were police officers and an informer, who had pushed him into carrying the drugs. He said, *"This is a crime that would never have happened if it had not been for the people pushing me."* ⁷⁸ This matter did not appear to have been resolved, as the other persons concerned were not traced or identified.

Another case in 1994 gave the crime correspondent for The Guardian cause to express his concern, after seven people were convicted of conspiracy to murder

⁷⁶ McClean J. D., "Informers and agent provocateurs," Criminal Law Review (1969): 532

⁷⁷ Campbell D., "Appeal to query drugs informer's role," The Guardian 26 June, 1993:p5.

⁷⁸ Ibid

their partners, all claiming that they were victims of police entrapment. They were jailed in separate cases although it was alleged that the hitman in each case was an undercover police officer. It was the hope of the various defence lawyers that each of the cases could be referred to the Court of Appeal, but none have so far appeared. ⁷⁹

Khan and Gillance ⁸⁰ discuss a number of relevant cases and concluded that there is little point taking a case to trial if the evidence is either inadmissible or will be given no credence by the court, and in any case, they say, the courts dissatisfaction with the methods used will inevitably be reflected in a reduced sentence. However, it may be that such considerations are not given by the Informer or even his Handler. This thesis will examine the incitement of criminal offences as agent provocateur by the Informer and Handler.

There is no support within the British Criminal Justice system for the use of agent provocateur or inciting another to commit a criminal offence. A number of cases have highlighted the courts' dislike for such tactics which do no more than create a criminal offence that would not have happened without the assistance of an Informer or other agent. Such actions only increase criminality instead of reducing or preventing it, and most practitioners argue that the police are abusing their authority in these cases.

This study will examine the existence of 'agent provocateur' and try to determine how such practice is affected by the relationship between the Informer and his Handler.

⁷⁹ Campbell D., "Entrapment claim in police 'hitmen' cases," The Guardian 18 July, 1994: p5.

⁸⁰ Khan A. N. & Gillance K., "Agent Provocateur," Police Review 30 April, 1976: pp536-8.

6. Misprision

This particular concept is included here because there is a belief that all Informers commit a criminal offence themselves as soon as they become involved in a particular crime, and this then is directly relevant to the relationship between the Informer and the Handler. Misprision is, "*The deliberate concealment of the commission of a felony*".⁸¹ There is, however, no longer an offence in this country if a person fails to tell the police when he has knowledge that a crime has been committed, that is with the exception of treason and acts of terrorism.⁸² So here there is quite an important anomaly. On one hand, it is accepted that an Informer, when infiltrating a criminal gang, cannot be an accessory because he is acting in the public interest but conversely, practitioners may argue that the police (including Informers) have no authority to commit crime to obtain evidence. This seems to be the nub of the problem, in that it becomes a matter of interpretation how far an Informer should be allowed to go. It has already been discussed that perhaps the most effective way of dealing with this is to treat the Informer as an accomplice and use his evidence as corroboration against the co-defendants.⁸³ But again, this raises the issue of disclosure, and the police would argue that such action would reduce the numbers and usefulness of Informers. The question of corroboration of hearsay evidence has been fully discussed in the American courts, and cases have suggested that corroboration may be simply verifying the details of the information,⁸⁴ although it is recognised that there needs to be a significant number of factors corroborated. Another method used is for the Informer to

⁸¹ (Chief Editor)Hanks P., The Collins Concise Dictionary (Glasgow: William Collins Sons & Co.Ltd., 1989) p727.

⁸² Williams G., Textbook of criminal law (London: Stevens & Sons, 1983) p375.

⁸³ Ibid p.611

⁸⁴ United States v Draper (1959)

file an affidavit on oath in court, but again his identity will be revealed as a result. In Britain, there are an increasing number of cases where the Judge will listen to an Informer's account in secret in order that he may decide on the progress of the trial. All this shows the importance placed by the courts on the Informer's evidence. ⁸⁵

The Criminal Law Act, 1967 (Section 5(1)) actually replaced the offence of misprision but this offence is far less absolute. It merely creates an offence for a person to accept or agree to accept a consideration for not disclosing information about a crime. ⁸⁶ This is different to Informers who are paid to disclose such information, but the thesis will examine whether the relationship affects that decision to disclose the information, or whether there is any level of discretion on the part of the Handler, or even whether the Informer and handler are selective about the information. If it is found that such practices exist, then, by definition, the existence of the Informer/Handler partnership may well be in contravention of the criminal law.

The American court in a way supports the notion that the use of informers is unacceptable, in that they maintain that everyone has a reasonable expectation of privacy under the 4th Amendment. Such a stance is cited in the case of *United States v Katz* (1967) where an informant entered the defendants house for the purpose of discussing crime. It was considered to be a warrantless entry and not acceptable, as it had violated a citizen's expectation of privacy. It would appear that other cases have provided significant exceptions to this rule, for example *United States v Hoffa* (1966). In this case, it was found that,

⁸⁵ McGuinness R. L., "Probable cause: informant information (conclusion)," *FBI Law enforcement bulletin* December (1992):pp 19-24.

⁸⁶ Smith J. C., Hogan B., *Criminal Law* (England: Butterworth & Co., 1969) p521.

"A criminal suspect voluntarily invited a police informant into an area where he reasonably expected privacy, and chose to expose criminal conduct to the informant. The suspect gave up any reasonable privacy expectation by misplacing his trust in the informant." 87

It could be argued that, if it is acceptable for an Informer to impose on a suspect's privacy in this way, it would be difficult to then suggest he has committed a criminal offence by his involvement. And yet there are many who believe that this is the case, and technically the Informer could be said to be conspiring with a criminal.

The thesis will examine whether the partnership between an Informer and Handler breaches the criminal law. Although misprision in itself is not a criminal offence in this country, it does seem quite amazing that the law allows Informers to conceal information about the commission of criminal offences. As already stated, practitioners may argue that such concealment is inevitable if the use of Informers is to be successful, but perhaps this issue needs more debate in the courts.

Summary

This chapter has looked at the judicial system in relation to the Informer, and how this has been reflected in a number of criminal trials both in this country and America. It can be said that although there is no legislation governing the use of Informers, there has been substantial debate about their use and the procedures adopted by the law enforcement agencies. It is fair to say that ten or twenty

⁸⁷ Callahan M., "Reasonable expectation of privacy, the employee - informant and document seizures," FBI Law enforcement Bulletin August (1982): pp25-31.

years ago the police found few people who were against the use of Informers, indeed there was a considerable argument for protecting them. As a result, it was not practice for their identities to be disclosed. Over the years, though, there has been conflict between those who have tried to show their value as an investigative tool, against those who favour the rights of the defendant. In recent years, the emphasis has been placed on ensuring that the accused is able to submit a tenable case, and giving every opportunity for him to prove his innocence. The concerns expressed by some practitioners about Informers setting up alleged offenders and offences is substantial. Such practices raise the issue of fairness, that is to say defence lawyers are increasingly suggesting that the evidence supplied by an Informer is unfair and should be excluded by the Judge, thereby weakening the prosecution case.

On the questions surrounding entrapment, a large debate exists in the American courts between the so called subjective and objective tests.⁸⁸ On one hand, questions are asked about whether there was any inducement and whether the defendant had a predisposition to commit the offence, on the other hand, whether there has been an abuse of process by the law enforcement officials? The majority seem to be more comfortable with the subjective test.⁸⁹

In relation to the discounting of sentences, some practitioners have asked whether the police have overstepped the mark, and more importantly perhaps, others have alleged that Informers have given information in order that they can benefit by a reduced sentence. To take this argument further, it is suggested by some that Informers may go so far as to fabricate information if a reduced sentence is available. The implications of this are even more important as the

⁸⁸Op Cit: Elliott D. W. p.40

⁸⁹Op Cit: State v Harney (1972)

evidence of an Informer, unless an accomplice himself, does not need to be corroborated. Of course, this is why defence lawyers try whenever they can to convince the court that the identity of the Informer should be disclosed.

There are a number of Guidelines on the issue of agent provocateur, with a number of cases suggesting that the police have 'set up' crimes, alleging trickery, breaches of the law and precipitation. Although there is no longer an offence of misprision, the question of concealment of the commission of offences has been discussed. It has been argued that Informers must always be treated as an accomplice and used in the courts as corroboration. This again raises the question of disclosure, which seems to be one of the critical issues in terms of criminal trials.

In relation to the use of supergrasses, this type of Informer became a regular part of the judicial system in Northern Ireland during the terrorism trials of the 1980s. After the Northern Ireland agreement it is likely to lead to an end to this practice, but there will always be criminals who see an easy way out of serving their full sentence. Such acceptance by the courts will continue to be debated, and a number of practitioners have demanded a high level of corroboration. The dangers are numerous and allegations against the police in relation to abuse of authority need to be regularly addressed.

What of the future? Will there be more or fewer restrictions placed on the use of Informers in the courts? A lot will depend on public opinion and how the media interpret the decisions made by the courts. The greater the use the police make of Informers, the more opportunities there will be for others to criticise their use. A good indicator perhaps is the number of cases highlighted where the use of Informers has breached the rules or resulted in an abuse of the judicial system. It is inevitable that there will be more and more research undertaken in this area, in the hope that some of the questions and concerns may be resolved.

How does this relate to the present research?

This research cannot cover all the aspects discussed above - not the least because the study of court cases using Informers warrants a separate study, as does the use of a supergrass system. However, all the cases referred to in this chapter are relevant to this research because they concern the relationship between the police and Informers. The question of disclosure will feature highly throughout; the respondents were questioned about their views on disclosure, whether or not they had in fact not disclosed such involvement, and their observations, and whether they should be placed in the situation where their identities are disclosed. Specifically, it will be interesting to learn from the results whether active Informers consider terminating their involvement rather than have their identities disclosed, and how important Handlers consider the protection of their Informers.

Although the defence of entrapment is not in itself an offence in English law, the issue is also crucial to this research as it will try to discover how far the Informers and their Handlers are prepared to go, in terms of breaching the law, in order to secure an arrest and conviction. It may well be that the American tests of subjective or objective are considered and perhaps, if this is the case, then there may be recommendations to look at the feasibility of using a similar rule. Likewise, using Informers as agent provocateur will be closely examined, and specifically, it will be crucial to determine the extent of setting up crimes. Indeed, respondents were asked whether they have knowledge of incidents where the use of Informers has in fact broken the law. Their answers undoubtedly beg other questions for future researchers as to the usefulness of Informers, or indeed whether their use increases criminality or reduces it. This matter is closely related to the question of misprision, and again it is important to

determine, if possible, just how far the Informer and his Handler will go in concealing a crime in order to detect another crime.

There are of course a number of ethical questions, but it is not intended in this research to examine this area, although a number of such questions will inevitably be raised.

The importance of this chapter is that it has shown how legal problems arise and their implications to the criminal justice system, when the use of Informers is badly managed or worse, abused. The Research Question requires an examination of the partnership and its effects in terms of breaches of the criminal law. There can be no doubt that if this partnership is flawed, then it will have a measurable effect on the British Criminal Justice System, and the credibility of the use of Informers will be diminished.

The legal issues discussed in this chapter are all connected with the relationship between the police and Informer, particularly in terms of protecting the Informer's identity. One of the aims of this thesis is to determine what that relationship is and examines how important confidentiality is to them.

It is also one of the aims of the thesis to determine whether the police use of Informers breaches the criminal law, or the Police Discipline Code. Some of the legal cases referred to in this chapter suggest that crimes are 'set up' and engineered improperly, for example agent provocateur, misprision etc. The study will examine whether such practices still exist.

CHAPTER THREE

Literature Review

In this chapter, the literature regarding Informers will be reviewed. This existing work from the United Kingdom and America has become the foundation from which the present research study was built. There is a noticeable lack of research; this being an unexplored problem area. Certainly, in Britain the literature on Informers could be described as "unoccupied territory"¹ although there is rather more from America, but even then it cannot be described as in abundance. Zander ² noted a substantial lack of empirical evidence in relation to police investigative methods in general.

The review will be divided into three sections. Firstly, it will concentrate on researched literature emanating from the United States. American research is relevant to the research because it examines some of the problems already referred to in Chapter One and, not surprisingly, the concerns and fears expressed by writers in the USA have been duplicated here to some extent. Secondly Government publications in Britain will be discussed, including such documents as Home Office Circulars, which deal with the working practices,

¹ Leedy P. D., Practical Research: Planning and Design (London: Collier Macmillan, 1989) p67.

² Zander M., "The Investigation of Crime: A study of cases tried at the Old Bailey." Criminal Law Review 203 (1979).

rules and guidelines laid down within the criminal justice system, and from which practitioners work from. Indeed, the police service operated their Informer systems under Home Office guidelines which remained unchanged for 23 years, and only recently have they been updated. Finally, the empirical evidence originating from the United Kingdom will be discussed, although there is little available. That which is will include documents from police seminars and conferences, from police journals and other publications where Informers have been discussed. It will of course include the findings from commentators outside the law enforcement system.

Not only is the literature limited, but even where it exists, it comes from the non academic level, such as the practitioner. This does not detract from its importance but such publications tend to include rather more anecdotal and speculative opinions than otherwise.

1. A review of literature from the USA.

(a) General

The notion that the Informer is a dangerous person was recognised by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in 1981 whilst discussing Informers, when they suggested that, *"Occasionally we may require a degree of co-operation with persons whose motivation and conduct are open to question."*³ Helfand⁴ a boxing Commissioner in New York, and someone not usually associated with Informers, nevertheless made the following relevant statement. *"Without informer information, you're not going to get very far. It's more valuable than*

³ Attorney General's guidelines on FBI undercover operations. Office of the Attorney General, Washington D.C. (1981)

⁴ Helfand J., "Informants," Saturday Evening Post (New York) 2 June, 1956.

all the work that investigators and detectives can do." This argument is somewhat qualified by Earhart ⁵, who believed that the general public actually tolerate Informers, rather than condone them, dependent of course on the crime. Child murder is a type of crime where their use would be seen as acceptable. Other practitioners warn that good Informers are invariably involved with criminal activities. ⁶ This is supported by Harney and Cross ⁷ who argue that the Informer is likely to be a criminal or at least an associate of criminals. They advocate that every citizen has a duty to report any breach of the law, if a democratic society is to be preserved ⁸, and add that, *"No modern policeman who properly uses informers needs to be apologetic about them. Informants are used because no other avenue is open to the conscientious investigation whereby the identity of the perpetrator can be determined."*

Although the use of Informers is generally defended, especially by law enforcement officers, Falk ⁹ has looked at the consequences of Informer use and believes that support could make the police reluctant to turn to more scientific and objective means of law enforcement, for example forensic science and technical surveillance. More importantly, he is concerned with the involvement between law enforcement officials and the criminal, and suggests that such associations will damage the public's image of the police. Katz ¹⁰ goes further

⁵ Earhart R. S., A critical analysis of investigator-criminal informant relationships in law enforcement (Washington: International Assocn. of Chiefs of Police, 1962).

⁶ Weston P. B. & Wells K. M., Criminal investigation - Basic perspectives (Englewood Cliffs New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970) p92.

⁷ Harney M. L. & Cross J. C., The informer in law enforcement (Illinois, USA: Thomas, 1960) p16.

⁸ Ibid: p105

⁹ Falk G. J., "The public's prejudice against the police," American Bar Assocn. Journal 50: 754 August (1964): p755.

¹⁰ Katz H. A., "Narcotics investigations: Developing and using informants," Police law quarterly(U.S.) April (1978): pp5-12.

and acknowledges the possibility that the Informer may use his reward to purchase drugs. He advised that, *"The use of informants is controversial, repugnant to the general public and always under attack by civil libertarians. Officers must be judicious and ethical in developing and using informants."*

Rapp ¹¹ is also concerned about the ethics and questions any police officer who grants immunity on the spot for minor offences on the grounds that an arrest would impede the investigation. He suggests that the officer becomes merely a collaborator to an illegal act. Oscapella ¹² also reinforces the fears of Katz when he established that some Informers actually ask for drugs as payment, rather than use the money to buy drugs. Nevertheless, he advocates that the Informer must be protected, even at the expense of an investigation, arguing that he may be useful in future investigations as well as the current one, and revealing his identity could jeopardise his safety. This in turn, suggests Rapp, would lessen the chances of cultivating others. ¹³

Marx ¹⁴ reluctantly agrees that the use of Informers as an undercover tactic is a necessary evil, but finds it difficult to reconcile the paradox, *"preventing crime by facilitating it."* In particular he discusses the use of unwitting Informers such as John DeLorean who desperately needed cash to save his car business. An FBI agent gave him money to finance a major cocaine deal, and the agent later testified that it was the only way to set up the job, using DeLorean's vulnerability. Marx found that the police regularly legitimise improperly gathered evidence, and suggests that they can become inventive in finding legal

¹¹ Rapp B., Deep cover: Police intelligence operations (Colorado USA: Paladin Press, 1989) p33-47.

¹² Op Cit: Oscapella (1980) p144.

¹³ Op Cit: Rapp (1989) p30.

¹⁴ Marx G. T., Undercover: Police surveillance in America (USA: University of California Press Ltd., 1988) pp10-158.

ways to obtain information already obtained illegally.¹⁵ He also believes that the police do not necessarily have to tell Informers to act illegally, because the relationship between them makes supervision almost impossible.¹⁶ One occasion where the Informer is alleged to have acted illegally, according to an American court, is when Mel Weinberg was involved in the theft of certificates worth \$2 million. Weinberg decided to help the police in their recovery, resulting in a three year prison sentence being waived. He also received \$133,000 for his co-operation. He later wrote a book about it and received a further \$15,000. During the trial, it was suggested that the certificates had not even been stolen. Although this was not substantiated, the Judge clearly was not convinced about Weinberg and called him an "*Archetypical, amoral, fast-buck artist.*"¹⁷

The criminal will always show a dislike for Informers, it being a cardinal violation of the convict code. There are those who disregard this rule and an example was during 1959 in Texas, USA after 4 members of one family had been murdered. Floyd Wells, a prison inmate knew about the murder having been imprisoned with the offenders and discussed it with them. He was of course frightened of the convict code and initially said nothing, but eventually told all and testified in court. He was the vital link to the case, and without his information, the crime may well have gone unsolved.¹⁸

Skolnick¹⁹ studied the use of Informers by local police in an American west coast City with a population of 40,000. He spent several months with local

¹⁵ Ibid: p153

¹⁶ Ibid: p156

¹⁷ Fullam J., "Memorandum & Order" US District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. US v Harry P Jannotte, George Schwartz. No. 80-166 (November 1980)

¹⁸ Wilmer H. A., "The role of the rat in prison," Federal Probation 29(1) (1965): pp44-9.

¹⁹ Skolnick J. H., Justice without trial (New York, USA: Wiley, 1966)

police, and concluded that, *"-there is an implied understanding between the policeman and the informer that the policeman will protect the informer's criminal status."* He believed that the police maintain a class of Informers through permitting them to commit crime, and argues that their use of discretion allows them to decide guilt or innocence, although he concedes that such reports are *"exaggerated, but not entirely untrue."* ²⁰ Nevertheless, he insists that the drugs officer, particularly, often outwits the spirit and the letter of the law and even suggests that they routinely violate the law, although this view is not accepted by Harney and Cross. ²¹ Skolnick also found, in support of others fears, that there was an understanding between detectives and Informers that, as a drug addict, he will buy drugs with the rewards he receives. More specifically, he found that police officers investigating burglary offences allowed their Informers to commit drug offences, whilst drug squad officers allowed Informers to steal. ²² The study also showed that, although the police have no moral reservations about setting a trap to catch a target criminal, their pride and morality is hurt if their informer sets up another criminal, for example planting drugs in his house, in order that he can be taken off the scene. Skolnick also concluded that there is a pressure on police officers to produce results and this produces conflict for them between efficiency and legality. ²³

There are however a number of practitioners who have declared their support for the concept of Informer use. Hoover ²⁴ for example insisted that all citizens had an obligation to furnish information. He maintained that their use could always be justified, and felt that the criminal world would continually try to

pp115-231.

²⁰ Ibid: p124

²¹ Op Cit: Harney & Cross (1960)p13.

²² Op Cit: Skolnick (1966)p129.

²³ Ibid: p231

²⁴ Hoover was at the time Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

destroy an effective informer system. He stated that, *"Experience demonstrates that the co-operation of individuals who can readily furnish accurate information is essential if law enforcement is to discharge its obligations."*²⁵

The acceptance of the Informer as a dangerous tool was reiterated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in 1981 whilst discussing Informers when they suggested that, *"Occasionally we may require a degree of co-operation with persons whose motivation and conduct are open to question."*²⁶

(b) Motivation

This issue of motivation was examined by Brown²⁷ and he identified the importance of establishing what motivates Informers when he declared that *"To understand the motive of an informant is to have the key to control of the informant."* Ericson²⁸ agrees that the police need to establish what the motives are for Informers and use them. He argues that sources can be categorised into organisational, acting on behalf of private or public organisations, or individuals acting on their own behalf. He suggests that, if no motive is apparent, the police officer should create one, so that he in fact can provide the Informer with a purpose which can be satisfied, especially if police demands are to be met. Such practice would not be difficult to maintain if Maslow's theory is correct.²⁹

²⁵ Hoover J. E., Law Enforcement Bulletin June (1955): p1.

²⁶ Attorney General's guidelines on FBI undercover operations. Office of the Attorney General, Washington D.C. (1981)

²⁷ Brown M. F., "Criminal Informants: Some observations on use, abuse and control," Journal of Police Science and Administration (USA) Vol 13 No.3 (1985): pp251-6.

²⁸ Ericson R., Making crime: A study of detective work (Toronto, Canada: Butterworths, 1981) p117.

²⁹ Hampton Et al, A theory of human motivation: The basic needs(In Organisational behaviour and the practice of management) (Glenview, Illinois (USA): Scott, Foreman & Company, 1968) pp27-40.

Maslow suggests that any person will, *"-hunger for affectionate relations with people in general, namely for a place in his group, and he will strive with great intensity to achieve this goal."*

Deininger ³⁰ believes that the Informer performs a vital civic duty and in fact forms a basic part of society. Even so, he agrees that they will ultimately have a reason for giving information and lists six main categories:

- (i). Payment - Some sort of reward, usually money.
- (ii). Revenge - To get back at a fellow criminal.
- (iii). Self protection - May dissuade the police from targeting the Informer.
- (iv). Damage a competitor - E.g. to take out a fellow drugs trafficker.
- (v). Secure esteem of the officer - And as a result become friends.
- (vi). Personal satisfaction - Enjoys the excitement.

O'Hara ³¹ seems to agree with these main reasons, or motivational factors, although he goes on to suggest that the list is not exhaustive, and depending on circumstances peculiar to the subject, there may well be others. However, he lists the most common factors as:

- (i). Fear - for his own safety or that of his family
- (ii). Vanity - so that he can be looked on favourably by the authorities
- (iii). Revenge - to get even with a fellow criminal
- (iv). Repentance - rectifying wrong, guilty conscience
- (v). Jealousy - so that he can humiliate another

³⁰ Deininger R., "Using informants and co-operative witnesses," Law and order (US) July (1977): pp64-70.

³¹ O'Hara C. E., Fundamentals of criminal investigation (Springfield, Illinois (USA): Scott, Foreman & Co., 1976) pp160-61.

- (vi). Remuneration - material gain
- (vii). Avoidance of punishment
- (viii). Civic mindedness - to rid the community of crime
- (ix). Gratitude - to express appreciation
- (x). Competition - eliminate criminal competitors in category of crime

Katsampes ³² has also examined the reasons behind informing; he concludes that they can be separated into two main areas. Firstly there are those who "*like the thrill of the skirmish*" and in fact play the role of the police officer. Then there are those who, having been arrested, are given the opportunity to help the police in exchange for a reduced charge or sentence, or even as an alternative to being charged. Lee ³³, on the other hand, supports the general consensus and goes along with the generally accepted reasons such as fear, revenge, money, repentance and altruism. He goes on to discuss the problem Informer who he describes as "*perversely motivated*" who offers services to identify undercover agents, learn police methods, identify targets and intelligence, or eliminate their own competition in drug sales. He suggests that these often infiltrate police departments to learn about traffickers, and supply information about them as a decoy to divert police officers away from his own activities. ³⁴

Reese ³⁵ has also discussed the motivation of Informers, but specifically refers to the characteristics of a psychopath which will effect the way he, as an Informer, is handled by the police. He suggests that one reason why a psychopath may

³² Katsampes P. L., "Informants: motivations and inducements," Police (US) Vol 16 (December, 1971): pp52-3.

³³ Lee G. D., "Drug informants: motives, methods and management," FBI Law enforcement Bulletin September (1993): pp10-15.

³⁴ Ibid: p12

³⁵ Reese J. T., "Motivations of criminal informants," FBI Law enforcement Bulletin May (1980): pp23-7.

turn Informer is so that he may deflect the focus away from himself, and hopefully shift the investigation elsewhere. Reese concedes that a psychopath could be a successful Informer, although any information he may give needs to be checked and corroborated. This type of person feels no guilt or remorse and cannot form a close relationship. According to Reese, such persons are untruthful, insincere and unreliable.³⁶

(c) Police Management

There are a number of issues studied which loosely fall into the category of police management. Oscapella's study in the late 1970s found a number of police practices which were questionable, and he was particularly concerned about the payment of inducements to Informers, which he advised should not be too large so as to incite crimes or persuade Informers to manufacture information. He put the problems down to a lack of management, and argued that if police systems were not improved, the police would find themselves compromised, and the public alienated. He said, *The greatest potential lies in improved control by senior police officers over the conduct of informer dealings.*"³⁷

Kleinman³⁸ discusses whether the Informers should be controlled by the individual Handler or the department in which he works. The department will argue that they should in order to minimise corruption, to discourage Informers committing crime, and to ensure that the rest of the department is not denied access. Detectives, on the other hand, will argue against, saying that information will dry up if department files are kept, but more important, the Informers

³⁶ Ibid: p26

³⁷ Op Cit: Oscapella (1980)p 145

³⁸ Kleinman D., "Out of the shadows and into the files: Who should control informants?" Police Magazine (New York) November 1980: pp36-44.

anonymity is at risk if their names are known by corrupt or incompetent officers. The arguments continue, but in this country the majority of police forces accept that the individual must not control the Informer himself. Kleinman insists that the most common problem for the detective is that he is *"sometimes too anxious to overlook an informant's crimes."*

Mount ³⁹ argues that there is a need for properly laid down procedures to deal with those Informers who breach the rules creating significant legal and public relations problems. He also suggests that because a close relationship often develops between a Handler and Informer, this can lead to the loss of objectivity, in that the relationship itself becomes more important than the reason for the association, that is the arrest of the criminal. There is no evidence, though that this conclusion was drawn from anything other than personal experience. The procedures he refers to, though are often omitted leaving a lack of control over Informers. Practitioners ⁴⁰ have suggested that this may be due to a number of reasons:-

- (i). Pressures on officers for success
- (ii). Competition between officers
- (iii). Secrecy within the department
- (iv). Belief that other criminals may obtain information
- (v). Danger of retaliation

With regards to the question of secrecy, this seems to have been exacerbated by officers who believe that they own the Informer rather than the Police Force in

³⁹ Mount H. A., "An administrator's dream or nightmare," FBI Law enforcement Bulletin December (1990): p16.

⁴⁰ Williams J. R., Redlinger L. J. & Manning P. K., "Police narcotics control: patterns and strategies," National Institute of law enforcement & criminal justice Law enforcement assistance administration (1978): Grant No. 76-NI-49_0109.

general and they often consider that they have the authority to promise that the Informer's identity will never be disclosed. Such action results in few records being maintained.⁴¹

(d) Juvenile Informers

Katz⁴² has examined the area of juvenile Informers and warns that practitioners must consider peer group pressures, child protection laws, attitudes and behaviour, before using juveniles. He suggests that Informer use becomes a topic of conversation throughout schools. In relation to the parents, Katz insists that their permission should be given, although he concedes that their permission has little legal significance and they could sue the police if the juvenile was injured as a result. In America, the law enforcement agencies not only seek parental consent, but also authorisation from a juvenile court, but even this practice has not stopped civil claims being made against them.⁴³ Nevertheless, there is evidence that juveniles are being used more particularly in the area of drug trafficking involving children, where the use of adult Informers is not practical. Herbert and Sinclair⁴⁴ for example argue that use must be made of juveniles as only they can stand any chance of infiltrating their own peer group. They suggest that such use does not breach any criminal law, as there is never any criminal intent, and in fact the juvenile becomes part of the enforcement process. Katz concluded that a juvenile Informer is more likely to fabricate

⁴¹ DeGarmo J. W., "Must identity of informants be on record?" Law and order (US) Vol 20 (April 1972): pp80-3.

⁴² Katz H. A., "Use of juveniles as police informants," Journal of California Law Enforcement Part 4 (1979): pp196-98.

⁴³ Juvenile Informers - National Criminal Justice Reference Service (NCJRS) Database, National Institute of Justice (USA) Washington 1 June, 1981p13.

⁴⁴ Herbert D. L & Sinclair Jnr. V. L., "The use of minors as undercover agents or informants: Some legal problems," Journal of Police Science and Administration, Vol 5 No.2 North Western University School of Law (USA) (1977): pp185-92.

information, and because of the legal and personal risks, he advises that such use should be avoided at all costs.

(e) The relationship

The common thread which seems to have been apparent throughout this section of the chapter is the effects of the relationship between an Informer and his Handler. Skolnick describes this relationship as, *"-a matter of exchange in which each party seeks to gain something from the other in return for certain desired commodities.....police relations with informers are in the pattern of a bargain. When two persons make a bargain it is in the interests of each to hold the strongest position possible; police maximise their position by using the authority given to them by the State."*⁴⁵

In 1988, the FBI spent \$8.4 million on Informers which has given rise to critics that unethical relationships had been formed where some Informers started to think they were police officers.⁴⁶ Marx⁴⁷ found what he thought to be an interesting concept when he studied police behaviour in riots, as a member of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorder. He concluded that the police, in responding to disorder, may contribute, not perhaps intentionally, to the conditions which they seek to control.

Manning⁴⁸ believes that the one thing separating the ordinary citizen from the Informer is the formal relationship which the latter has with his Handler. He

⁴⁵ Op Cit: Skolnick(1966) p124.

⁴⁶ " The Boston Globe (USA) 15 April, 1994: p16.

⁴⁷ Marx G. T., "Civil disorder and the agents of social control," Journal of social issues, Washington USA 26, No.1 (1969): pp19-57.

⁴⁸ Manning P. K., The narcs' game (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1980) pp141-93.

suggests that officers are under pressure to produce results, and those officers who are showing a flair for this type of work are encouraged. Indeed, failed jobs, he says, can cause embarrassment and damage the officers' credibility. Manning believes that police officers can become preoccupied with their roles rather than the agency's purpose. He says that, *"Their vast discretion makes the law as well as enforces it. Police are keeping them (informers) in business. Making money from informing is assumed to be a legitimate motive."* He concludes that the more control the organisation can exercise, the less control the agent has.⁴⁹ This argument will be considered throughout this study, especially regarding the relationship between the Informer and Handler.

(f) Summary

There is an overwhelming consensus by American writers that the use of Informers is inevitable, but they have all expressed their conclusions about the implications of such use. Some consider that the police image may become affected, whilst others believe that unless more stringent controls are adopted, a number of ethical issues could be raised.

Some writers have touched on the motives of the Informer and tried to produce a definitive list, but their research has been shallow in that they merely provide a number of labels or categories for Informers. This has resulted in uninteresting conclusions. There has been no work carried out on how the motivation may affect the relationship between the Informer and the Handler, or whether the reasons for informing change over time.

⁴⁹ Ibid: p193

The management of Informers has been studied mainly in terms of police practices and procedures and most agree that there exists in America a lack of control by police supervisors. There is some agreement that the use of Juvenile Informers is on the increase, and some of the dangers are identified, but again very little empirical evidence exists about Juvenile Informers. There is an obligation for the police in America to consult with the parent of a Juvenile Informer, purely to alleviate any future civil claim. This is not the case in Britain, though, which may suggest that more care is necessary. This area is not covered in this thesis and clearly, there is a need for further research to be undertaken.

It is the relationship between the Informer and the police officer which creates the most concern, but again any conclusions drawn are not based on any in-depth study. It is acknowledged that this relationship is unique, and it is for this reason that this thesis will concentrate heavily on the relationship and its implications. For example, reference has been made to the use of discretion and the role of police Handler which may conflict with other police roles. Such issues could result in corrupt practices although there is no previous research. This study will examine the relationship between an Informer and Handler with this mind.

2. British Government publications.

Informers are not new, and their use has been evident throughout the centuries in many varied legal cases. The recognition by governments in this country of the need for control has, though, been slow and only recently has there been any real progress, perhaps due to the upsurge in activity by the police service in their use. For example, there is evidence that uniformed police officers are becoming

more involved whereas in the past only detectives were considered suitable.⁵⁰ It could be assumed that the government, acting in the best interests of the police service, and having a positive interest in its progress, would have produced ample guidelines on the subject. This however is not the case, and one wonders whether the lack of publications is significant, or merely that historically, Informers have been associated with danger and misconduct, and as such, the authorities have simply neglected to address the issues.

In 1969, after a number of legal cases where the use of Informers had been criticised, the then Home Secretary supported their use. He said, *"If society is to be protected from criminals, the police must be able to make use of informants in appropriate circumstances. Informants appropriately employed are essential to criminal investigation and within limits, ought to be protected."*⁵¹

Those limits became abundantly clear some two months later in what became the first laid down Guidelines for the police on the use of Informers, and which have continued very much alone, at least until recently.⁵² The Guidelines demanded that no-one should incite the commission of an offence and an Informer must not act as agent provocateur. It was accepted that Informers may be required to participate in crime, but only where certain conditions apply. Officers were advised that they must never mislead the court, they cannot offer immunity if the Informer participates in a crime, and can ensure that payments from public funds are supervised. The Guidelines were accepted by every police force in the United Kingdom, and were produced because of public interest

⁵⁰ "Share crime work, says inspectorate report," Police Review (17 February, 1995): p3.

⁵¹ Speech by Right Honourable James Callaghan, M.P., Home Secretary (February, 1969) London

⁵² Home Office Circular No.97/1969 (12 May, 1969) Informants who take part in crime.

arising from a number of cases, some of which are referred to in chapter two. The question of whether they have been adhered to by the police must be relevant, and forms an integral part of the current study.

In 1992, the police were beginning to express their concern that Home Office Circular 97/1969 was unhelpful and needed to be replaced.⁵³ A new manual was suggested as a replacement which, it was hoped, would become less constraining and more consistent with modern case law.⁵⁴ The Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) commissioned, through their Crime Committee, a working party to examine the use and management of Informers in order that some agreed Guidelines could be given to the police service. This resulted in a report which was accepted by ACPO and later by every police force in the United Kingdom.⁵⁵ The document acknowledges that "*the effective handling and exploitation of informants calls for judgement, experience and the management of risk.*"⁵⁶ This document can be looked upon as a watershed in the use of Informers, in that it clearly provides practitioners with acceptable practices, based on the results of legal cases, linked with experience from police officers. Most police forces agreed to accept the Guidelines in their entirety, with minor concerns over a few of the proposals, and in fact, there is evidence that the publication of this document persuaded the police to consider their own working practices. A number of forces have since made quite rigorous changes to their own systems. The data collection for the present research was carried out after the ACPO Guidelines had been implemented, and therefore their acceptance or otherwise will be reflected in the results.

⁵³ ACPO Crime committee meeting (4 June 1992)(unpublished)

⁵⁴ ACPO Crime Committee meeting (17 September, 1992)(unpublished)

⁵⁵ National guidelines on the use and management of informants and related issues. (January, 1995)_ACPO.

⁵⁶ Ibid: Foreword by W. Taylor, Chairman ACPO Crime Committee.

One specific kind of Informer has been identified by the Home Office. These are similar to the others, but have one particular motive, to secure a reduced sentence. They have been involved in an active participation of a serious crime, but elect to inform on their associates who have been involved in that or other crimes. These people, often referred to as protected witnesses or supergrasses became apparent in the 1980s in Northern Ireland. They are widely used by the police who believe that they have a valuable part to play in the fight against crime.⁵⁷ In essence, such Informers are protected if it is considered that they may be prevented from giving evidence at trials, or there is a likelihood of revenge attacks on them or their families. As long as they fulfill their obligation to the police, they can be provided with a new identity and be assisted with re-housing as well as being offered long term welfare and support.⁵⁸ ACPO have never felt particularly comfortable with this arrangement⁵⁹ although it is apparent that little has been done to alleviate ACPO concerns or indeed change the working practices of law enforcement agencies. Although protected witnesses do not form part of this present research study, their relationship with the police is most certainly relevant. Here we have, by definition, known criminals who are involved in usually quite serious offences, often involving injury, and the police are apparently content to deal with them to their mutual satisfaction. It has been noted that ACPO are not comfortable with this arrangement, but allow it to continue subject to some very loose and simple Guidelines which remain susceptible to abuse. Nevertheless, at least there are some Guidelines for Informers who are protected in this way.

⁵⁷ Home Office Circular No. 9/1992 Resident informants (1992)

⁵⁸ ACPO Crime committee letter to all Chief Constables dated 15 February, 1990 (unpublished)

⁵⁹ ACPO (Crime committee) meeting 17 September, 1992 (unpublished)

An Audit Commission study in 1993 encouraged the use of Informers and commented that they are the lifeblood of the CID, and wondered why more regular use was not being made of them.⁶⁰ The Audit Commission report suggested that more emphasis should be placed on proactive work, and supervisory police officers should advocate more use. It also warned that if the police reduce their payments to Informers due to restricted budgets, this may be counter productive if it stops informers co-operating.⁶¹ It must be stressed, however, that the Audit Commission have never undertaken any research into the use of Informers, relying heavily on the data supplied to them by official sources, and their motives for the study were based on financial accountability.

Summary

It is apparent from the lack of official publications in this country on Informers that government did not identify the need to circulate satisfactory guidelines or controls to the police service. Home Office Circular 97/1969 was for years the only guideline for the law enforcement agencies in this country, but this had no effect on police management, resulting in a lack of control of the Informer and supervision of the police. The inevitable consequence, some say, is corruption within the police service, and undue pressures on police Handlers to produce results. ⁶²

The ACPO Guidelines were published in January 1995 and to date have become the rules for every police force in the country, and includes areas such as recruitment, resident Informers and juveniles which have been debated albeit not

⁶⁰ Effective Crime Management - Report of Audit Commission Study (November 1993): Informant handling para 84-6.

⁶¹ Ibid: Encouraging the use of informants para.130.

⁶²Clark R, "Informers and corruption" (In Informers: Policing, Policy, Practice, Billingsley R et al (Ed.) Willan Publishing) (2000) pp38-49

at length. The ethical, moral and legal implications give rise for most authors to conclude that they should not be used as Informers. It is interesting that the police service are now beginning to question the legitimacy of the ACPO Guidelines and their effectiveness, and suggesting that they should be replaced by a code of practice for use by law enforcement officers.

The data for this present research was collected after the ACPO Guidelines were published which makes the findings so important, and any recommendations made in this thesis will reflect the areas of weakness found in the Guidelines, in the hope that tighter controls will be put in place.

3. A review of research literature from the United Kingdom.

(a) General

It may be the reluctance by the police to identify their Informers which has resulted in a lack of documentary evidence about them. Certainly Zander noted a lack of empirical data in England whilst researching police investigative methods in general. A study of 150 cases at the Old Bailey during 1971/72 revealed only 9 instances where an Informer was used.⁶³ O'Connell⁶⁴ confirmed this in a later study and suggested that this was extraordinary when the police admit that Informers are the most common method of solving crimes.

The consensus of opinion, for example the Audit Commission, has always appeared to be in favour of Informers as a useful means for the law enforcement

⁶³ Op Cit: Zander (1979).

⁶⁴ O'Connell E., "A study of informers in England, "Criminal Law Review (1980): p136.

agencies to adopt. Westley⁶⁵ for example considers them to be "*-the life blood of the good detective.*" Gluttermann⁶⁶ agrees that the Informer is vital to combat crime and suggests that if this view is accepted, then it follows that the anonymity of the Informer must be preserved. Such police support of Informers is also given by Wyles, an ex woman senior police officer,⁶⁷ who argues that many crimes would remain unsolved without their use. Indeed there have been many examples where the public have thought the police had made brilliant detections, when in fact the Informer had been responsible. She warns this is a risky business where the Informer is "*-running with the criminal while hunting with the police.*" She enquired, "*-What a strange mentality is theirs; taking with one hand profit from the gang with whom they work, with the other hand they collect the reward for their treachery against that same gang. Honour among thieves? There is none.*"

The fate of three men, alleged to be Informers, was revealed in a television programme in 1994, and highlighted the dangers involved in this type of work. The men, Gregory Burns, John Dignam and Aidan Stars were accused by the IRA of being police agents. They were abducted and interviewed on tape, when it is alleged that they confessed to being Informers. As a result, they were executed. All three were apparently involved in the murder of Margaret Perry, Burns' girlfriend, because she knew about a robbery they had committed. Dignam says that he told the police about the murder and agreed to work for them. According to Stars, he was told by the police that if he didn't give information he would be arrested for murder. A year after the murder, in 1991, they were executed and the television programme accused the police of failing to

⁶⁵ Westley W. A., The Police: A sociological study of law, custom and morality, diss., University of Chicago (Chicago: Dept. of Sociology, 1951) p70.

⁶⁶ Gutterman M., Journal of criminal law, criminology and police science Vol.58 No.1 (1967): p63.

⁶⁷ Wyles L., A woman at Scotland Yard (London 1952) p76.

act in relation to the murder. There is of course some doubt as to whether the confessions were true or whether the story was merely IRA propaganda against the Royal Ulster Constabulary, but Brendan Cirran of Sinn Fein said, *"Agents are corrupt. That's why the British use them."*⁶⁸

On the other hand, Reiner⁶⁹ agrees that the police may well *"feel impelled to stretch their powers and violate suspect's rights"*, but argues that, for the most part, the police are dedicated to maintaining order and fighting crime. Jones agreed arguing that the police service has been encouraged to use Informers, but felt that this was a cause of the problem as some police officers were not suited to this type of work but would not admit it. This will be discussed later in Chapter five, but on this issue, Jones warns that this is a specialised field and far too valuable to spoil. He explains that, *"In my early days we used to say the three most dangerous things were what we called the three P's - prisoners, prostitutes and property. But the one I, for informants can make the P's pale into insignificance. They tend to be untrustworthy, unbalanced, greedy, treacherous and yes, dangerous."*⁷⁰

Brightwell confirms that the use of Informers is an essential and established part of police work, but stresses that those that deal with them should always be aware of the inherent dangers, and always establish their motives. He suggests that, *"They present a minefield of indiscretion which can only be negotiated by the application and preservation of a decent standard of fair play and a resolve to act within the spirit of the law at all times."*⁷¹

⁶⁸ States of terror. BBC Television production. Peter Taylor, Producer/writer (Thursday 13 January, 1994)

⁶⁹ Reiner R., *The politics of the policer* (Brighton: Wheatsheaf books, 1985) p88.

⁷⁰ Jones J., "Its good to talk," *Police Review* 29 September, 1995: p21.

⁷¹ Brightwell A., What considerations ought to govern the use of informants in

Gosling, a practitioner who worked in the 1950s appeared to be far more nonchalant, although he too accepted that Informers were a difficult group to deal with. He argued though that, *"-You may have to let him go free after he's committed a crime because then you can put the squeeze on him afterwards-."* His attitude at the time is perhaps one of the most significant reasons why this present research was considered, especially when he explained that, *"-I began to cultivate thieves. I made friends with them, listened to their troubles, and shut my eyes to their minor misdeeds."*⁷²

The question of payment was highlighted by the national press when it was reported that an Informer had sued the Hampshire police for £30,000 in relation to unpaid tip-offs. The Informer, a criminal on legal aid, claimed he was owed money for information against a number of gangs and had waited four years. He decided to take civil action after Hampshire police revealed that they were enhancing their intelligence network. It could be argued that proper management systems would not have allowed the police to have found themselves in this situation, but the High Court found against the Informer. He explained that, *"I see myself as a self employed police officer rather than an informant."*⁷³

Following the Audit Commission Report in 1993, the Home Office commissioned a study into how some police forces looked at proactive criminal investigation methods. Specifically looking at Informers, all forces were concerned about the lack of training, and it also became apparent that a number

the investigation of crime - thief maker or thief taker. (1984) Metropolitan Police Service (Unpublished)

⁷² Gosling J., *The Ghost squad* (New York: Doubleday, 1959) p17.

⁷³ McGowan R., "Grass demands a cut - Informer sues police for tips." *Daily Express* 7 February, 1996: p19.

of experienced detectives expressed reservations about *"sharing or even revealing their existence to supervisors."*⁷⁴

The Audit Commission report concluded there was a widespread view that the disclosure rules deterred potential Informers, and that the restriction of payments gave little incentive bearing in mind the risks involved. One practitioner argued that one way of alleviating these fears was for police forces to ensure that they maintained an adequate intelligence system. This would support the notion, he says, that intelligence belongs to the force and not the individual, and presumably bring everything out into the open.⁷⁵ This theory may have been somewhat naive but the theory has to be considered.

A seminar on Informers held at the Police staff college, Bramshill in 1994 heard a heated debate in connection with selective informing, a key issue in this study. Selective informing is where the Informer decides on which piece of information he passes on, depending on the circumstances. For example, an Informer may be a drug addict and will not wish to jeopardise his supplier. The danger that the Informer will not give information which may involve himself or in any way disadvantage his own objectives. Those present at the seminar, who were all senior police officers, accepted this as an unsatisfactory but natural phenomenon, although one of the delegates commented that, *"Leaving the decision to prosecute to the police is controversial; leaving it to the informer seems indefensible."*⁷⁶

⁷⁴ Maguire M. & John T., "Intelligence, surveillance and informants: Integrated approaches," Crime detection and prevention services paper Home Office (July 1995): p27.

⁷⁵ Rusling M., Police intelligence - an investigation into the collection, correlation, evaluation and use of intelligence. Metropolitan Police Service (unpublished) 1990.

⁷⁶ A structured approach to informants. Police seminar at Police Staff College, Bramshill (unpublished) 4/5 April, 1994.

(b) Crimestoppers

Although the crimestoppers scheme ⁷⁷ is not in any way connected with the police use of registered Informers, there are similarities in as much it is a way for the public to give information about crime and criminals, anonymously if they wish, and in return for a reward. It is worth including therefore, in this literature review. One practitioner commented about the system, *"These methods all continue to make the job of detecting criminals easier, giving better protection to the people and property of our community."* ⁷⁸ Although the Scheme is regionally based and funded by the participating police forces. ⁷⁹ the rewards are funded by a National charity, Community Action Trust. ⁸⁰ In the first six years of its inception, the system helped with nearly 8,200 arrests nationally, and the recovery of £13.7 million worth of stolen property. One officer posted to a regional office suggested that, *"I have found most people who ring in prefer to leave information anonymously rather than claim the money."* ⁸¹

Because of the confidentiality of the system, it is not known whether police Informers use the crimestoppers scheme. Certainly there is no system in place allowing the police to check, but there seems to be nothing to stop a registered informer being paid for his information twice; once out of public funds by his handler, and again through the Crimestoppers scheme. There are moral questions here, together with management issues, but without more research, the

⁷⁷ Originated in Minnesota, America because State law prohibited public funds to be paid out as rewards. This became the forerunner to Crimestoppers set up in London in 1988 and now taken on throughout the Country.

⁷⁸ Bennett W., "Contacting and paying informants," Law and Order Vol 21 (21 April, 1973): pp28-31.

⁷⁹ Minutes of No.3 Region meeting at Wakefield 2 August, 1988. (unpublished)

⁸⁰ No. 3 Region Crimestoppers Unit - Standing Order (unpublished)

⁸¹ "Crime-time Prime-time The Crimestopper Unit," 999 Emergency Services Publication Vol 8 No.2 (1994): p7.

extent of the problem is not clear. Again, the official Guidelines are quite sparse and do not appear to have addressed the issues relating to registered Informers. This present research study does not address this issue either but it is nevertheless relevant as the Crimestoppers scheme is so closely related to the use of Informers.

4. Literature relating to practical matters.

Some of the existing literature discusses a number of specific issues relevant to the practitioner, and which will be examined in this study.

(a) Motivation

The Thames Valley police, when registering Informers, ask their handlers to complete a profile form, and they are asked to report the perceived motivation of their Informer.⁸² These fall under the following headings:

- (i). Avoidance of punishment
- (ii). Gratitude
- (iii). Remuneration
- (iv). Revenge
- (v). Vanity
- (vi). Repentance
- (vii). Fear
- (viii). Competition
- (ix). Civic mindedness.

⁸² Cox M., Crime informants - a new approach, Thames Valley Police, (unpublished), 1989) p10.

One of the most recent studies of Informer motivation was conducted by Dunnighan ⁸³ who refers to two types of Informer, the regular and the supergrass. The latter's reason for informing is purely to receive a lighter sentence and as such his usefulness is short-lived. The regular, on the other hand, can go on providing information for a long time. His research involved asking police officers for their perceptions of the motivation behind Informers who they had been involved with. The main reasons were identified as:

- Financial reward (33%)
- Enjoys being an informer (13%)
- Looking for a favour (11%)
- Gratitude to officer (7%)
- Dislike for that type of crime (7%)
- Pressure by officer (6%)
- Part of a deal (5%)
- Friends with officer (1%)

These reasons are of course those of the police officers, and not the Informers. It is suspected that Informers would have responded in much the same way, but there is a need to seek the views of the Informers before any conclusions can be drawn. Perhaps their motives are quite different. This thesis will undertake to compare and examine the responses from both groups.

(b) Police management

Many of the issues addressed by Dunnighan and Norris ⁸⁴ during their research, concentrate on police management of Informers. The study relies heavily on

⁸³ Colin Dunnighan, "Reliable sources," Police Review 14 August, 1992: pp1496-7.

⁸⁴ Dunnighan C. & Norris C., Practice, problems and policy: Management issues

interviews with 62 police officers from 2 police forces and questionnaire responses from 227 police officers, and concludes that:-

- (i). Insufficient training is given
- (ii). Handlers by-pass system
- (iii). Handlers under pressure to provide results
- (iv). Lack of supervision
- (v). Officers believe they act for the right reasons

Zander ⁸⁵ and Oscapella's ⁸⁶ findings which showed a reluctance by the police to disclose the use of Informers, were supported by Dunnighan and Norris's study; when 31 case files were examined and none showed the role of an Informer having being used. Skolnick's view is supported by the finding that police officers are put under pressure to provide results, and it was found in some cases that officers used their own money to reward their informers. Dunnighan and Norris suggest their research demonstrated that, *"not only does the practice of running informers often involve corner cutting and breach of rules, but it also involves what many may view as ethical misconduct."* Dunnighan believes that his study has uncovered *"legally and morally dubious tactics"* and suggests that the officers consider that their actions are *"in the best interests of both the public and the police service."* ⁸⁷ The researchers in this study had hoped to interview about 30 Informers but only managed to see 11, and 8 of those were seen in the presence of their police handlers. This was mainly due to difficulties experienced in arranging the meetings as well as the officers' reluctance to

in the police use of informers, University of Hull, (unpublished) (May 1995) .

⁸⁵ Op Cit: Zander (1979)

⁸⁶ Op Cit: Oscapella (1980)

⁸⁷ Burrell I. & Ley A., "Police accused of abusing the 'snout' system," The Sunday Times 7 May, 1995.

introduce their Informer to a third party.⁸⁸ It was also conceded that this research was carried out between 1993 and 1995, prior to the ACPO guidelines on the Management and Use of Informants.⁸⁹ Nevertheless, the police service appear to be actively addressing the issues, as shown by a Durham police training initiative which has set up a course to train controllers. The course, run in conjunction with Teeside university, has received independent accreditation by the National Crime Faculty and the Police Foundation have shown an interest.⁹⁰

It has been widely accepted by the police service that the use of Informers creates problems, and it is how those problems are managed which are important. Grieve⁹¹ expressed his concerns and said, *"It is my contention that the base of all these problems is not just the weakness of the officers involved but the failure of their organisations to outline to them the dangers involved."*⁹²

In the report, Grieve refers predominantly to drug offenders and suggests that, even when dealing with this category of criminal, the police must be fair. He believed that there has to be a measure of risk management involved, but suggests that management decisions are more likely to relate to operational risks rather than the Informers reliability or the content of the information. He argues that *"Risk is concerned with decision making in conditions of uncertainty."*⁹³

⁸⁸ Norris C & Dunnighan C., "The role of the informant in the criminal justice system," Economic and Social Research Council R000234202 (1995): pp1-16.

⁸⁹ Dunnighan C, & Norris C., "The Nark's Game," New Law Journal 22 March, 1996: pp 402-404.

⁹⁰ Potter K., "Inside Information," Police Review (2 January, 1998): pp20-21.

⁹¹ Commander Grieve was at the time the Director of Intelligence for the Metropolitan Police Service.

⁹² Grieve J., Informant handling-Dangers (draft report) Metropolitan Police Service (unpublished report) 1985:p2

⁹³ Grieve J., Leadership and risk - how to decide...."What you can get away with or drilling a 50 foot hole in mother earth"...when using informers and some other applications. Police Staff College (1989)(unpublished)p6.

His fear was that, unless the management systems are properly in place, "*the informer will become a more prolific, more dangerous criminal than those we are seeking to destroy by his use.*"⁹⁴

Grieve accepts that handling Informers must inevitably involve approving criminality to some degree, if only because a high proportion of Informers come from criminal backgrounds. What Grieve in fact is suggesting, is that because the Informer is generally a criminal himself, then his association with a police officer may at some stage corrupt that relationship, manifesting itself in some degree of law breaking by one or both of the partners. He suggests, though, that such a situation is workable as long as the decision-making process is open to scrutiny, that is, each police force must determine a system which allows for comprehensive documentation so that an independent body may carry out an audit. Grieve recalls where he has seen many occasions where officers write down the minimum on files, which is counter productive, and open to criticism by defence lawyers who are more frequently becoming "lawfully audacious".⁹⁵ Explaining that Informers are treacherous people, Grieve reluctantly agrees that the informant system can be a prime cause of corruption, which is a problem not managed very well by the police in the past. He says, "*The relationship between the informant and his handler is a hot house where corruption can flourish. You have to have a system. It has to be open to audit analysts and third party scrutiny.*"⁹⁶

Following a number of disasters in the London area during the 1970s, very stringent regulations were imposed on the police dealing with Informers.

⁹⁴ Op Cit: Grieve (1985):p13.

⁹⁵ Personal interview with Commander John Grieve. 24 May, 1994 New Scotland Yard, London.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

Unfortunately, these were largely unworkable and the number of arrests and the detection fell.⁹⁷ It is important therefore that any rules should be realistic without stifling the flexibility of the situation. Such rules have been constantly monitored and evaluated by Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary, who give due consideration to the management of a police force's working practices in terms of their systems, level of security and protection of the Handler, and it may be significant that no mention is made of the protection of the Informer. An assistant Inspector of Constabulary suggests that the whole purpose of an inspection is, *"to satisfy that there is integrity and security of the system and the maximum protection for police officers involved in handling informants."*⁹⁸

The lack of official documentation on the recruitment of Informers is, to say the least, bewildering. On one hand the police support the need for increased use of Informers, and yet they seem to have neglected to take the opportunity to advise their officers how to do it, and the problems and pitfalls that may arise as a result. It is as though this has not been considered as a worthwhile area to pursue, that every police officer must somehow already be aware. Even the ACPO Guidelines which are recognised as the definitive document on the subject, makes no reference whatsoever to this important aspect. Grieve points out that there is a history of problems connected with recruitment, but maintains that, *"The informant is just another method of intercepting communication and assists in interdiction."*⁹⁹

But even here, Grieve fails to debate the specific problems, such as the implications for the police in failing to understand the motivation of an Informer,

⁹⁷ Penrose R., Informants - The ACPO view. National Seminar on informants - Exeter (13 September, 1995) (Deputy Assistant Commissioner) (unpublished)

⁹⁸ Abbott J. M., Police Use of informants. National Seminar on informants, Exeter (13 September, 1995) (unpublished)

⁹⁹ Notes of presentation by Commander John Grieve 26 October 1993, p3 (unpublished)

and the handler. There is an obvious lack of research into the issues of recruitment. One officer attached to the Special Branch in Belfast insisted, *"If the CID arrest a man on a positive fingerprint, for example, and we get to hear about him, we will try to cultivate him. We will offer immunity from the crime in return for his help. It's a great way of recruiting and I wish the CID always told us of such cases."*¹⁰⁰ It is hardly surprising to learn that the CID in the Royal Ulster Constabulary are not always so supportive of this initiative, as often it will undermine their responsibility to detect crime. The special branch, however are not put off by such criticism, and one officer pointed out, *"I will use blackmail if necessary. I have no problem with that. We are trying to identify terrorists and that is the overriding factor."*¹⁰¹ The use of Informers against terrorism is arguably the most difficult for the police, especially when the IRA openly threaten the public that they will "take action" against anyone who informs to the RUC about terrorist activity.¹⁰²

In 1995 a long awaited document was produced on recruitment, which followed a study based on interviews with 85 police officers from throughout the United Kingdom, Europe and the United States of America.¹⁰³ This research has turned out to be somewhat shallow; it did not seek the views of the Informers themselves. Nevertheless, it was aimed at increasing police officers knowledge and awareness, as well as highlighting to senior officers the importance of having a structured approach. In particular the motivation of the Informer was discussed. Interestingly enough these motivations were rarely known by

¹⁰⁰ Confidential notes of visit to Royal Ulster Constabulary 22/23 June 1994 (unpublished)

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² "IRA Threat to Police Informants," Police Review 17 January, 1997: p6.

¹⁰³ Hanvey P., "Identifying, recruiting and handling informants," Home Office Police Research Group Special Interest Series: Paper 5 (July 1995): p1.

Handlers. ¹⁰⁴ A number of recommendations were made which are being considered.

(c) Juvenile Informers

As already noted in Part 1 of this chapter there is very little literature and a lack of data originating from America on juveniles and this is also the case in Britain. Law enforcement agencies have not as yet given this area the consideration it deserves, and in fact some European countries explicitly restrict their use of Informers to adults. ¹⁰⁵ Iganski ¹⁰⁶ agrees that there would be a great deal of hostility against recruiting juveniles, and the national media has been negative in its response, the major concern being over payments to juveniles. Police officers going into schools may well damage the image of the police, but more importantly may raise other issues such as the breach of confidentiality, and the implications for the police should they decide not to obtain permission from a parent. These are all questions which have been raised but to date not answered. They are of course important questions, particularly when it has emerged that there exists in this country a number of juvenile informers who are earning substantial amounts of money that the police are investing these rewards into trust funds to provide for the child when he reaches 18 years of age. ¹⁰⁷

Despite little literature on this topic, more and more police forces are acknowledging the presence of juvenile Informers, particularly as the National

¹⁰⁴ Ibid: p9

¹⁰⁵ Minutes of the 1st European Meeting on Informant Handling - Lyons, France 13/14.2.96.

¹⁰⁶ Iganski P., "Exploring the sensitivities about the police use of juvenile informants," National Seminar of Informants, Home Office(unpublished), Exeter, 13 September, 1995.

¹⁰⁷ Twomey J& Oakes J, "Trust Fund Informers," Express on Sunday 5 October, 1997: p26.

crime figures suggest that *"- 14 to 16 year olds are responsible for a great number of crimes."* ¹⁰⁸ It follows that the more useful Informer for this category of crime will be of a similar age group. The ACPO guidelines does refer to the subject, albeit briefly, suggesting that there is no legal reason why juvenile informers cannot be used, but emphasises that *"Great care must always be taken -"*. ¹⁰⁹ Current Home Office research looking at the registering and handling of juvenile Informers is hoping to formalise Guidelines for the police. This research has studied selected police forces and secured interviews with police Handlers, but it appears that some officers have developed their own unofficial operating rules. ¹¹⁰ Recommendations made in the report include the suggestion that all police forces promote the use of juvenile Informers with appropriate Guidelines for officers which would, it is hoped, enhance the value of such use. ¹¹¹

The use of juvenile Informers most certainly raises a number of ethical questions, and like the subject in general, has not to date been resolved. In 1992, the police service identified the need to consider ethics within general policing, and published a statement of ethical principles. ¹¹² These resulted from a review of operational policing which led to a quality of service initiative. It was agreed that the police service should accept the rule of law and actively oppose any malpractice, ensuring that all police officers only act within the law. Specifically, the principles state that, *"-It is not for the police to operate outside*

¹⁰⁸ Balsdon S., "Juvenile informants," Police Review (21 July, 1995).

¹⁰⁹ Op Cit: ACPO guidelines (1995) p83.

¹¹⁰ Balsdon S., Juvenile informants - National Seminar on informants 13 September, 1995, Exeter (unpublished)

¹¹¹ Balsdon S., "Improving the management of Juvenile Informants," Home Office April, 1996: p28.

¹¹² The Police Service Statement of Ethical Principles (1992) (unpublished)

the law to achieve a conviction. It is for the legislative to legislate; the police to police; the judges to judge." ¹¹³

This appears to be sufficiently clear, and yet the use of Informers seems to be in direct conflict with this. In any event, how these principles are interpreted by practitioners is vague. There are those who may feel that the conviction is the most important issue, and how that is achieved is merely a means to an end. At a recent assembly of police officers discussing Informers, one was quoted as saying that *"Noble cause corruption feels ethical to some handlers."* ¹¹⁴ But specifically relating to children, it is perhaps interesting to note that in 1991, the United Nations Convention on the rights of the child have identified the need to ensure that special care and protection is given to them due to their vulnerability. Their report demands protection from exploitation where their use is *"prejudicial to any aspect of the child's welfare."* ¹¹⁵

It is clear, then that Police Forces in Britain are at least addressing some of the issues affecting juvenile Informers, and one police force has incorporated this essential aspect into their own training course, ¹¹⁶ On the other hand few forces have developed a satisfactory code of practice or procedures. There is a real need for further research into this aspect, otherwise, as Balsdon has pointed out, *"-we will drive the whole issue underground, putting both the officers and youngsters at risk."* ¹¹⁷

¹¹³ Ibid: p20

¹¹⁴ Informers Management Course (Lincolnshire Police) 22/24 January, 1996 (unpublished)

¹¹⁵ The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. UNICEF, London (1991) Article 36 p12.

¹¹⁶ "New Course for Informant Controllers is Launched," Police Review 17 January, 1997: p6.

¹¹⁷ Potter K., "Teenage sources," Police Review (8 November, 1996): pp22-3.

(d) Linking the Handler to the Informer

Whether the issues are regarding juveniles or not, the common theme maintained throughout is the importance placed on the relationship between the two groups, the Informer and the police Handler. In the 19th Century, there were regulations prohibiting police officers associating with criminals, but detectives tended to ignore this, arguing that they needed to buy information, either with money or promises of preferential or lenient treatment. ¹¹⁸

According to Maguire and Norris, the police can become too close to the Informer, resulting in corrupt practices, and they noted excessive pressure put on some offenders to give information against others, which tended to shed doubt on the truth of the information. ¹¹⁹ They also suggest that the closeness of the relationship allowed some police officers to reward their informers out of their own money, to fail to report participating informers, in order for them to avoid the official systems of red tape. This closeness became apparent during a study in the Metropolitan Police District by Searby ¹²⁰ when 50 police officers were interviewed with a follow up questionnaire involving 159 respondees. One officer, talking about his relationship said of one informer, "*He wanted a stall in the market. He came to us because an officer has contacts in the market and was able to pull a few strings and get him a little stall.*" ¹²¹ Another officer admitted that some informers are allowed to commit crime as long as they give regular information. He explained, "*He may wish to get involved in a little bit of villainy and if he's going to see police regularly about information perhaps he'll*

¹¹⁸ Maguire M. & Norris C., The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice: The conduct and supervision of criminal investigations. (Research study No.5: HMSO, 1992) p15.

¹¹⁹ Ibid: p107

¹²⁰ Searby G. P., Giving criminal information to the police in confidence. An assessment of public motive and police response, Cranfield Institute of Technology, 1988 (London: January 1988) Volume I-II.

¹²¹ Ibid: p67

be given a little bit of the old insurance." ¹²² Other officers in the study accepted that some informers will give information against drug traffickers with a view to removing their own debts. By putting the opposition out of business, they can make a lucrative trade for themselves. Others will give information about other criminals so that the focus will be taken away from their activities. It has been noted in America that in drugs work, informants are involved in 95% of cases, and some defence lawyers have suggested that it has been common for Informers to receive a percentage of drug forfeitures.

Bean ¹²³ noted from his research into drug users, that some dealers were believed to be enjoying a *"favoured relationship with the police"*, and appeared to be practicing with immunity. They were thought to be Informers using their close relationship with the police for their own benefits, although this was never substantiated. One particular house in Nottingham became one of the busiest for crack dealing, which allegedly was occupied by an Informer, where the dealers were *"capitalising on the informers perceived police immunity."* ¹²⁴ Bean accepts though that his study produced little data to guide him through an area which was neglected in terms of research, but asks the question - does the police use of Informers actually increase criminality?

South's study of the police use of Informers in 1993/1994 ¹²⁵ concluded that the relationship between Informers and their Handlers was a key area of policing which needed to be researched to enable it to be better understood by policy makers, the public and the police themselves. His research included interviews

¹²² Ibid: p71

¹²³ Bean P. T., "Home Office," Cocaine and crack in Nottingham - a follow up study, (1992).

¹²⁴ Bean P. T., Informers and the police: drug dealers as informers, Loughborough university, (November, 1995).

¹²⁵ South N., The police use of informants: some key issues and recommendations, University of Essex, (September, 1994) .

with 20 police officers and 5 Informers and his findings supported Maguire & Norris who showed that officers often omit to reveal that their Informer has participated in a crime. One officer said, *"You don't reveal to the court that they were participating, and its not as though they are going to know - so you bend the rules and don't tell them."*¹²⁶ South concluded that there was room for improvement and made a number of recommendations which are being considered, although the ACPO Guidelines seem to have addressed most of the issues covered. He makes the point though, that *"The relationship between the informant and the handler is a partnership - but it is not an equal partnership. The handler must run the informant not the other way round."*¹²⁷

(e) Summary and overview

The literature discussed in this chapter suggests there is substantial support for the use of Informers, mainly from practitioners, arguing that they are an essential part of the investigative process. Nevertheless, there are those who agree with the system in principle but warn that such use will inevitably allow Informers to commit crime. Furthermore, there is evidence that some practice selective informing, the dangers being that Informers are in fact being allowed to use their discretion in terms of which information and criminals are targeted.

Some concern has been expressed in relation to the use of rewards, and the level of immunity afforded by some police officers, with some argument about the measure of police discretion which subsequently arises. In a number of cases, the lack of data where the use of an Informer has been disclosed in a criminal trial, has been the subject of discussion, as has the difficulty for some academics

¹²⁶ Ibid: p21

¹²⁷ Ibid: pp16-17

to reconcile the balance between the prevention of crime and the facilitation of criminal offences, as a result of the use of Informers. These are both understandable and valid concerns which demand clarification, and the present research will address some of these issues.

Police management issues have also been debated and concern expressed over the reward system, and whether it may induce criminality. The fact that minor criminal offences by Informers have been overlooked has not been considered necessary by most, and it has seemingly resulted in the cutting of corners and a breach of the rules.

The notion of Informer/Handler relationship is a major issue, and the consensus appears to be that they are too close, and this situation can only lead to a unhealthy situation for the police service. It is crucial to point out, though, that none of the theorists referred to in this chapter have actually examined this relationship in any meaningful way. This conclusion is based on the fact that although they have sought the views of practitioners and relied on police reports and other documentation, none have studied the observations of police officers and Informers, and gone on to compare the results. It is only by doing this that the implications of this relationship can be understood and therefore acted upon. There will always be those who will argue in support of Informers or against their use, but surely no real conclusions can be drawn until those who are directly involved are studied. Skolnick ¹²⁸ acknowledges the limitations of his research in restricting his study to "*one City, one police department, one prosecutor's office, one criminal court's community.*" Indeed, his data regarding Informers was totally reliant on other bodies. Oscapeella, in his study of Informers in England, had a surprisingly weak methodology, in that he examined

¹²⁸ Op Cit: Skolnick(1966) p40.

the role of the Informer through court files and police documentation, rather than collect data from source. Similarly, the research undertaken by Dunnighan and Norris relied heavily on interviews with police officers from only two separate forces, and some case studies. South's study in 1994, and that of Dunnighan & Norris (1995) both interviewed Informers, but only small samples were used, and they cannot be regarded as representative.

Some practitioners referred to in this chapter admitted they have had direct contact with Informers and some of those are recognised as experienced officers in the field. Grieve is one such man who is regarded by most as an officer with vast practical knowledge of the use of Informers. But even this is not sufficient to arrive at solid conclusions about their use. Only by talking to a substantial number of Handlers and Informers and securing data direct can there be any hope of determining the real situation.

The discussions in relation to juveniles, crimestoppers, recruitment and the supergrass system are of course all relevant to the general topic, but will not be covered in the present research. These particular areas have been included so as to provide a complete picture of the situation and encompass all the issues of the subject which of course is most complex. What is significant though is the change of management procedures which have resulted from the circulation of the new ACPO Guidelines which were accepted by every police force in the country. These guidelines were implemented from January 1995, and therefore any lessons which may have been learned over the decades since Home Office Circular 97/1969 was brought into being, will have been incorporated into the new rules. The present research involving interviews with Informers and their Handlers all took place after the new rules were brought into operation, and it is hoped therefore that the results will reflect the success or otherwise of the Guidelines. The level of control of the systems practiced within the police

service is also relevant to the present study, in that it will show how much self regulation exists, if at all. By establishing and identifying these controlling measures, the present research will be in a position to examine whether or not they are being maintained.

It is the relationship between the Informer and his Handler which is of particular importance, and how that alliance manifests itself in the police use of Informers. The thesis will examine how the partnership works, if at all and if it is too close. The study will also examine the implications of this relationship. The suggestion that police officers are content to allow their Informers to commit crime, and use discretion about their activities is of course important to establish. It will be relevant to see whether the relationship puts undue pressure on the police officer to secure results, or indeed whether the Informer is subjected to pressure, which may affect the reliability of the information. Indeed, it will be useful to understand just how far each of the partners will go in their relationship, before there becomes a breach of the rules, a short cutting of the systems or a contravention of the law. Perhaps the police use of Informers can be compared with the experiments carried out by Milgram ¹²⁹ to establish how far people were prepared to inflict harm on others if they were ordered to do so. Tests included volunteers using electric shock treatment on participants who were being tested on their memories. This treatment was in fact faked and the volunteers were misled with a view to establishing the experiment which showed that many would in fact be brutal on the authority of others. There is an ethical question here but when relating this exercise to Informers, how far they will go under the authority of a police officer is quite relevant to the present study. The use of Informers could be in conflict with the police service tradition of

¹²⁹ Milgram S., Obedience to authority: an experimental view (New York (USA): Harper & Row, 1973).

upholding the law, and the research will be looking to see if the police are in control or the Informer, and is that control being dealt with properly.

Put simply, the concerns, fears and suggested implications of this relationship, expressed by authors both in America and this country, will be examined in this thesis, using data which has not before been available or accessible. This work will therefore prove or disprove what has been inferred for years, that the partnership is dangerous, not controlled and creates criminality; that is to say the relationship between an Informer and Handler increases crime rather than prevents or detects it. The important difference is that the data is now available for analysis, enabling a detailed study of the relationship to take place.

This chapter has shown a lack of research into the use of Informers, both in America and Britain. In particular, there are few studies which have secured their data directly from the Informer, relying instead on police records and police officer's perceptions.

This lack of research has resulted mainly because of the sensitivity of the subject. The work of an Informer is confidential and the police service generally are uncomfortable about discussing their relationship with Informers. It has not been possible for anyone outside of the police service to have access to the data, and this has therefore restricted the research to the police themselves.

Further research into Informers in Britain would need the authority of the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) through both the Crime Committee as well as the Research Committee, the final decision resting with the individual Chief Constables concerned. Chapter four will discuss this further and detail the problems and difficulties experienced during this study.

CHAPTER FOUR

The Research Question

What is the nature of the relationship between Informers and their Handlers within the Police Service in England, and what are the consequences of these relationships?

The Aims

1. To determine what constitutes an Informer.

SUB AIMS

a. To define an Informer, and identify the role.

Law enforcement agencies interpret the name Informer in a number of different ways. It is crucial that all interested parties begin to understand exactly what an Informer is and what part he/she plays in the criminal justice system.

b. To differentiate between a registered informer, a police contact and a public spirited citizen.

There are a number of sources of information and the Informer is just one. They are all different, and these differences must be understood if they are to be dealt with properly.

c. To establish a profile for informers.

If a typical profile exists for an Informer, this fact may assist law enforcement agencies in their management and control.

2. To determine what constitutes a Handler.

SUB AIMS

a. To establish a profile for Handlers.

Not every police officer has the inclination or skills to become an Informer handler, and it would be useful for those who are tasked with identifying potential handlers to be aware of such factors.

b. To identify the Handler's role.

What the Handler does, his terms of reference and how this fits into the role of a police officer generally needs to be established.

3. To determine the relationship between the police and the Informer.

SUB AIMS

a. To determine how the relationship is initiated.

This refers to where the Informer and Handler met and under what circumstances.

b. To determine whether the relationship can be categorised.

The study examines the factors which make up the relationship and looks at their importance.

c. To determine whether the relationship has any significance.

The relationship between the Informer and the Handler may only be important if it is relevant to the work they both do.

d. To compare those features of the relationship with other partnerships.

Chapter Five has examined the theoretical implications of other partnerships involving professionals, and specifically those partnerships which involve the police service. The chapter begins with an assumed model of the Informer/Handler relationship; that is to say, the common perception of practitioners as to what the features are which make up that relationship. The assumed model will help to determine the data collection for the research. This study will establish whether those features which emerged from the theoretical examination actually exist in the relationship between an Informer and Handler, and if not, will perhaps propose a more accurate model.

e. To establish what causes some police officers to involve themselves with Informers and others not?

This may be connected to Sub aim 2a in relation to a Handler's profile. A separate study looks specifically at the reasons why some police officers engage in the use of Informers.

4. To determine what the informer wants to get out of the relationship.

SUB AIMS

a. To establish the motivational factors for informers.

The reasons why Informers become involved are diverse and numerous and this study looks at providing a definitive list of those reasons.

b. To determine whether these factors affect the use of informers.

An examination will be made into the reasons to see if they make any difference to the relationship or how it is developed.

c. To establish if the reasons for informing can change.

If the motivational factors change during the partnership, then this may affect how that partnership is progressed and managed.

5. To determine whether the police use of informers breaches the law, or Police Discipline Code and if so, to what extent.

SUB AIMS

a. To determine whether selective informing exist.

The existence of selective informing could have a dramatic effect on any national guidelines or codes of conduct, and it is crucial therefore to determine the level of activity.

b. To determine whether the use of informers break the law.

The management of Informers is accountable and any breach of the criminal law therefore needs to stand scrutiny, but first the level of such breaches has to be determined.

- c. To establish if there is any level of discretion used with the law.

The study will try to determine how widespread the use of discretion is by the Informer and the Handler.

- d. To determine whether Police Officers breach the Discipline Code.

The police is a disciplined service and subject to strict regulations. The study will establish if those regulations are being breached and if so, to what extent.

6. To make recommendations, if relevant, relative to the relationship between the informer and handler.

SUB AIMS

- a. Does the informer/handler relationship in any way effect working practices.

The management of Informers in this country is subject of national guidelines, and eventually an agreed code of conduct will be published. If this study shows that existing procedures are not adhered to or breaches occur, then the guidelines must reflect such action.

- b. Is there a need to make any recommendations?

Only when this study has been carried out will it be possible to determine whether any recommendations should be made, but if so, then the Association of Chief Police Officers will be the likely recipients.

Method

Aims 1 and 2 will be established through interviews with Informers and police handlers by way of structured questionnaires, studying each of the group's perceptions of their role and comparing the responses. The specific comparison of police officers who are involved in Informer handling against those who are not, with similar rank and service, is made in a separate study which is covered in Chapter six. The data obtained from the main sample will however be used to produce a typical profile for both groups. In addition, the definitions of an informer were examined from the literary review, where practitioners and theorists debated the topic.

Some people give information to the police who are not considered to be Informers. For example, the public spirited citizen who sees an incident or overhears some suspicious conversation which they feel compelled to relate to the police. This is not a regular occurrence, and they do it for no other reason than to help the police. There are also the regular contacts such as the bank manager and the local social services officers who are willing to help the police whenever possible. These again do not help for any reward or personal gain. Of course these people give information and could be described as informants but it is the informer, the person who regularly gives information motivated by some sort of reward, financial or otherwise, who is of interest to this study. Sub aim 1b will establish the difference between these three types of informants, the Informer, the Public spirited citizen and the Contact.

Aims 3 and 4 will be established using the same interviews, referred to above. As a means of determining the relationship between the Informer and Handler, the respondents were asked for their thoughts and observations. Some theoretical work has been carried out in Chapter five which has identified some

common features from relationships involving professionals, some involving police officers, others not. This study will establish whether those features also appear in the relationship between an Informer and Handler, proving in fact whether this partnership is as unique as commonly thought.

Specifically referring to sub-aim 3e, a separate and distinct study was undertaken in Lincolnshire and the results are discussed in Chapter six.

Aim 5 will be established using the same prepared questionnaire as the previous main aims. Reference to the law means the criminal law by way of statute or Common Law, and the Discipline Code is found in Police Regulations ¹

Aim 6 relates to the effect on working practices within the police service, and substantial reference has been made to the ACPO guidelines on the use of Informers, in establishing exactly what the current procedures are. The interviews with both Informers and Handlers was used to reflect their observations, and this has allowed a number of recommendations to be made, which are shown in Chapter seven.

The Research Design

This work is an exploratory descriptive study; that is to say, it is looking to formulate new hypotheses, rather than test existing ones. As such, it will have a relatively low theoretical input and a relatively high level of data collection, because very little is known about Informers and it was necessary to get the whole subject off the ground. This type of explanatory survey certainly has its

¹ HMSO, "Statutory Instrument No.518," The Police (Discipline) Regulations 1985: Schedule 1. Reprinted 1994: pp20-23.

limitations and some of these will be discussed later, but it has the advantage of obtaining data direct from source. As Silverman points out, "*No hard and fast rules for conducting research can be provided.*"² It was a question then of determining the most effective method of dealing with this problem. Because of the lack of previous research, even though there exists some work relative to the law on Informers, it has been inevitable that this study breaks new ground, and the methods reflect this.

Because of the limitations of this type of study, a number of a priori³ assumptions have been made, based on the experience and practical knowledge of the police. For example, some Informers may not have been totally truthful in their responses due to their criminal background and although the data was checked where possible, the information had to be taken on face value. This situation is not helped by the lack of previous research, as discussed in chapter three.

The research will involve to a large extent, the use of questionnaires, and will be based on the perceptions of various people, including the Informers and Handlers, with only a small amount of documentary data as corroboration. This is because of the importance of securing data direct from source, rather than having to rely on police records, which themselves could not be assumed to be accurate. The Literary Review of Informers has included both published and unpublished material, the latter of which was taken generally from police sources. It has already been noted that very little academic research has been undertaken in relation to the police use of Informers, and the review therefore

² Silverman D., *Qualitative methodology & sociology* (London: Gower Publishing Co., 1985) p17.

³ I have on a number of occasions had to think about what exists using my own practical experience, without knowing if it does or not.

relies mainly on the rules, guidelines and orders produced internally by the police service, as well as anecdotal evidence from practitioners, which forms the basis for the qualitative research. A broad spectrum of areas will be discussed in order that the subject can be understood.

The Informer population

At the time of writing, 43,352 police Informers were registered in England (Appendix A). It was inevitable therefore that only a small number of Informers and Handlers could be used in the study. Also, it was apparent from the start of the research that not every police force would agree to participate, and in fact a total of 12 forces co-operated with the study. These 12 police forces were likely to be unrepresentative as they were not chosen in a controlled manner, although they may represent an adequate cross section of the total including large metropolitan areas, rural and urban, as well as a substantial Regional Crime Squad office (now reorganised as the National Crime Squad). Although only a proportion of police forces participated in the study, it was felt that because this was an exploratory study, it was the inferences made by the participants that was important.

Those forces which decided against participation all acknowledged the importance of the research but either felt that it was a far too sensitive a subject to allow such an exercise within their area, or merely felt that their systems were in need of improvement and therefore did not wish any sort of external scrutiny. This in itself was of concern and showed even more the importance of this work. The reasons given by Forces for not participating were accepted without question, and it was decided that any attempt to persuade them would have been futile, as clearly they were not comfortable with a request to visit their areas.

Interviews were restricted to registered informers mainly because there existed at least some documentation relating to them which could be used if necessary to check their validity. For example, it was necessary for the purposes of producing a profile, to ask their dates of birth. Not everyone gave it but those who did could be checked against their records to confirm or otherwise their accuracy. The rules governing the police use of Informers insist that Informers must be registered, and although it is recognised that some officers may not follow this rule, it would have been difficult to identify unregistered Informers.

Recognised sampling methods were considered in turn, and not found to be practical for a number of reasons. Firstly, because of the sensitivity of the subject, the interviewees had to remain anonymous. Secondly, the selection relied heavily on the Informer's agreement to be interviewed, and any method of systematic sampling would therefore be inappropriate. This was also the problem when considering the statistical method of random sampling. This research then has relied on the nonprobability method of accidental samples, that is taking the opportunity of using those Informers willing to assist, and ensuring that they do not grossly mislead the situation. There has been an attempt to control bias as far as possible, but it was recognised from the beginning that the method of selecting individuals from a group such as police Informers would be difficult to account for.

There is no data available from individual police forces which shows the ratio between male and female Informers. Similarly, there is nothing to suggest what percentage of police Handlers are female. One indicator may be the percentage of female officers in each force, although no assumptions could be made from this. Any figure established in this way would be dangerous because there may be other factors which contribute to the total, for example, the rate of female detectives. Their ages, length of service and type of work, uniformed or plain

clothed are also unknown, and in relation to the Informers, their antecedent history and backgrounds are not specifically recorded. This meant that it was impossible to decide on a sampling method using such key factors. The gender of the Handler could well be the subject of research in the future. In this study, the only criteria set was that both the Informer and the Handler should have been actively involved in this type of work. Each force was asked to provide a number of each for interview using no other consideration.

It was accepted that by restricting the questionnaires to registered informers and police officers who handled informers, then each and every interviewee's responses were relevant and appropriate. Even though, for example, one informer may have given a reply which was not representative of the population, the fact that he gave it was indeed valuable data and worth including. To some degree, then it was not so important to abide by the general rule "*The larger the sample, the better.*"⁴ The total number of persons seen in this study was not restricted to a maximum figure. Instead, the numbers were dependent on how many could be arranged within the available time. In making contact with each of the police forces who agreed to participate, a senior police officer was asked to act as liaison officer and secure a number of officers and Informers to be seen. There was no stipulated limit to actual numbers, but the liaison officers were restricted in terms of time, resulting in a manageable number being organised for interview. Logistically, the researcher travelled long distances from his own force area, and although some stays lasted for a number of days, there was a limit as to how many interviews could be arranged in one session. This had the effect of automatically placing constraints on the actual number of elements.

⁴ Leedy P. D., Practical Research: planning and design (New York (USA): Macmillan Publishing Company, 1989) p156.

Reliability and validity

The data for this present research relied on the responses of Informers and police officers, and as such, an important consideration is whether such data is valid. Galtung ⁵ argues that information obtained through verbal data is just as important as non verbal, however Phillips ⁶ maintains that if the interviewees motives are suspect, making him or her provide a less than candid report, then that report has little credibility. Certainly in the case of Informers, many come from a criminal background and therefore can be assumed to be dishonest to some degree. This assumption may not be made with police officers, however they may feel reluctant to give totally honest answers to some of the questions.

It has to be conceded from the beginning that this research study covers a very sensitive area, and therefore must be susceptible to inaccurate responses. A number of validity checks within the questionnaire were used, such as date of birth etc., which were checked against the Informer files. From this exercise, no cases were identified where details given were found to be incorrect. Nevertheless, substantial reliance was given to the assessment of each interviewee. This is far from satisfactory, but in the circumstances probably all that can be hoped for. Kidder ⁷ makes the point though that such a method provides information for the researcher which could only be obtained by other methods which are perhaps less valid. This data check showed that all the respondents gave their correct details. Of course, it can not be assumed that because they answered one question truthfully, they would continue to give honest answers, but it did provide some confidence in the other data.

⁵ Galtung J., Theory and methods of social research (New York (USA): Columbia University press, 1967) .

⁶ Phillips D., Knowledge from what? Theories and methods in social research (Chicago (USA): Rand McNally, 1971).

⁷ Op Cit: Kidder p147

The impressions of the researcher were quite surprising, in that it was felt the Informers genuinely wanted to provide accurate information. It was wrongly assumed that they would take every opportunity to mislead the interviewer who they knew was a police officer, but on the contrary, the respondents all seemed to want to help this important research work, perhaps because they felt they may benefit from changes in the working practices.

Dean and Whyte ⁸ discuss the problem a researcher is faced with when interviewing an Informer, and stress the importance of assessing whether the information is subjective or objective. *"The informants statement represents merely the perception of the informant, filtered and modified by his cognitive and emotional reactions and reported through his personal verbal usage."* They warn of distortion for whatever reason and suggest that a system of cross checking is essential. In this present study, a certain amount of testing has been achieved within the questionnaire. As already discussed, the date of birth of an Informer was requested, albeit not particularly relevant to the study, as their general age group was all that was required.

There are a number of questions which are the same for both the Informer and Handler, and some of these relate to factual questions where the response options were alike and therefore able to be compared. Such a comparison would help to show the level of validity of these questions specifically but also the questionnaire in general. This was achieved by testing for statistical significant differences between the two sets of responses, as shown in Chapter Seven.

⁸ Dean J. P. & Whyte W. F., "How do you know if the informant is telling the truth," *Human organisation* Vol 17 (1958): pp34-8.

There were ten specific questions chosen which fitted the criteria, and only two of those showed obvious disagreement, giving a high degree of confidence in the rest of the data. Another validity test built into the questionnaire was the response options to each of the questions. Due to the effective pilot study, all possible options, with some exceptions, were included at an early stage which meant that the relevant options were covered in the exercise. This resulted in later frequency checks on the questions showing no missing cases, concluding that all cases were valid.

Perhaps the most important reason for the researcher undertaking all of the interviews was to reduce the bias caused by systematic differences from one interviewer to another, and enhance the test-retest reliability. This meant that any bias that existed was restricted, which could be controlled as much as possible during each session with the respondents. As a sole researcher, inter-rater reliability did not apply.

A measure of this reliability was achieved through the questionnaire, which allowed for a structured response, and alleviated different perceptions the researcher may have held during the interviews. This in effect reduced the interviewer's freedom thus negating any preconceived ideas he may have had of the responses. It is the respondent's perception of the interviewer that is probably more likely to have caused some distortion.

Both the Informer and the Handler never previously experienced a situation before when they were asked sensitive and delving questions by a senior police officer. The Handler is a police officer and therefore subject to police discipline regulations and as such may be guarded with his answers. The Informer may also have a number of reasons for giving less than accurate answers to a police officer whom he or she has never previously met. All these possibilities are

inevitable and must exist to some degree, and this was identified from the start of the research.

The Pilot Study

Having produced what was considered to be a relevant and workable questionnaire, it was considered necessary to undertake a pilot study⁹ to pretest the questions on a number of recipients, referred to as qualitative fieldwork by Sieber.¹⁰ The rationale was to try out the questionnaires to ensure that they would work, to resolve unforeseen problems and also to see if any changes were required prior to the main study.¹¹ It was particularly interesting to learn how the phrasing of the questions would be accepted, and whether there would be a need to eliminate some questions and add others. Having identified at an early stage, that the questions will differ between Informers and Handlers, it was also necessary to accept that Informers may find it more difficult to understand the function of the questioning. It was imperative, therefore to be satisfied that the questions were pitched at the right level, and fully understood.¹² This point was also identified by May when he noted that, *"You might think that the meaning of a question is clear enough, but it does not follow that the people answering it will agree with your interpretation."*¹³

⁹ Shipman M., The limitations of social research (London: Longman, 1988) p80.

¹⁰ Sieber S. (Denzin N. K. (Ed.)), The integration of fieldwork and survey methods in Sociological methods: a source book (London: McGraw-Hill, 1978) p365.

¹¹ Kidder L., Research methods in social relations (New York (USA): Holt-Saunders), (1981) 4th edition: p162.

¹² Leedy P. D., Practical Research - Planning and Design ((USA): Macmillan Publishing Co., 1989) p143.

¹³ May T., Social research - issues, methods and process (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1993) p76.

Although it was established that the main study should be undertaken outside Lincolnshire, the Pilot Study was in fact conducted within the County, as a matter of convenience. This did not have any negative effect on the study, and the advantage of accessibility far outweighed any disadvantages envisaged, such as having personal knowledge of the respondents.

Before the decision was made to pilot the questionnaires in Lincolnshire, a postal questionnaire was considered using one specific police force. A senior officer within that force was contacted and he agreed, after some deliberation, to receive a total of ten questionnaires with which he circulated to officers who he believed would take the trouble to complete and return them. They were duly sent back and without exception lacked explanation, and as far as the police officers were concerned, gave very safe and deliberate replies which in no way put them in jeopardy. This exercise was discontinued, and it was accepted that all the interviews needed to be done personally. Nevertheless, this was a worthwhile exercise which helped to decide on the agreed methodology.

Three questionnaires were completed for the Informers and the same number for the Handlers. A senior police officer centrally based in the force who had responsibility for maintaining records of informer handling within Lincolnshire, was used to identify the respondents. Three Handlers were randomly identified from his records, relying on code numbers alone, and therefore not concerned with their age, sex or for that matter, any other type of categorisation. The Handlers were asked to nominate one Informer with whom they had recent contact, and further interviews were arranged with them, at different times. All the interviews were conducted separately and no other persons were present. They were all carried out at police stations - this did not appear to have caused any problems. It should be pointed out here that in the main study, it would not be left to Handlers to identify Informers for interview. This was achieved

through a Senior police officer in each police forces concerned, so that only he would know who had been chosen, in line with the agreed methodology.

All the recipients were fully aware of the purpose for the pilot study, and where there were areas of confusion in the answers, they were asked to provide more acceptable responses. Some time was spent in discussing the questions, and all answers were recorded. The questionnaire required that all questions should be answered, and there was no need therefore, to complicate the session by pointing out areas not requiring attention. At the end of each interview, sufficient time was allowed to note any relevant observations and comments from the session, including the questionnaire itself, for example space allowed for each question, and general format.

This type of research poses problems of confidentiality. Some of the questions are sensitive and honest answers may place the recipient and the interviewer in an invidious position. It was for this reason that the questionnaire did not seek to identify individuals. Furthermore, an undertaking was given that the information provided would not be acted upon at any future date.

During the pilot, it was found that the Police Officers interviewed showed a great deal more discomfort in answering than the Informers. It was thought that this was in part because they were talking to a senior police officer, knowing that potentially they were in danger of admitting certain breaches in their codes of practice. Some time was spent in assuring the interviewees that total confidentiality would be afforded. This problem arose again in the main study, and was dealt with at the time. Although all of those persons interviewed appeared satisfied with the assurances given at the start of the sessions, it is known that two Handlers and one Informer refused to participate in the pilot. Their reasons were not recorded, although it seems that the Informer intimated

that he required payment for this work. This was refused on the grounds that no funds were available for this purpose, and also, this would set a precedent for the main study.

The pilot interviews took approximately forty minutes and this was felt to be a reasonable period to retain attention. The time taken for each interview was important when it came to arranging large numbers of interviews during the main study.

Following the pilot interviews, the respondents were again assured that their responses would be treated as confidential, and on every occasion they appeared to be satisfied with the questions and the general progress of the interview. In all cases, the interviewees suggested that they would be available for further interview should it be required. In addition to the interviews, the questionnaire was shown to a number of other senior police officers and their observations requested. No specific criticism was made.

Following this pilot, a small number of amendments were necessary. A few questions required changing and in some cases, taken out completely. Where the interviewee was asked to expand on some detail and give examples, this had not been made clear. A number of the questions were changed as a result.

The Pilot Study showed how frank and honest the interviewees would be and of course this was encouraging. For example, when one Handler was asked, who incidentally was known to the researcher, about whether he had been selective about the information he had received, he said, *"I've used certain informers knowing full well they have handled stolen property but to arrest active burglars, I have turned a blind eye."* The same sort of honesty was experienced by a local Informer who answered the same question by saying, *"I've missed a*

job out like when I waited for the offender to get out the way. The police have been happy because they recovered the property." This type of response helped to support the validity of the research.

Where multiple choice answers were offered, the Pilot provided a number of additional options which had not been recognised before and these were all incorporated into the final document, and it was necessary to establish some supplementary questions to Informers which were not applicable to their Handlers. However, there was no need for substantial changes and in view of this, it was felt that a second pretest was unnecessary.

The Interviews for the Main Study

The main thrust of the data collection involved the interviews of Informers and police Handlers. Kidder ¹⁴ considers that interviews and questionnaires are a useful method of collecting data when it is impossible or impractical to collect data about people by observation. Certainly in the case of Informers, it would have proved very difficult to observe them whilst in the business of informing due to the very nature of their role, and their reluctance to participate. The interviews were done, therefore, by way of a structured prepared questionnaire, the detail of which will be discussed later. It was felt that the interview was crucial to this particular research as it gave the researcher the opportunity to talk to each of the individuals personally. Watson ¹⁵ supports the notion of conversation and suggests that it *"...gives a feel of something, even if it tells you nothing you did not already know."* The interviews were intended to extract more than just factual information, but feelings and observations of the

¹⁴ Kidder. L. H., Research methods in social relations (International edition: Holt-Saunders, 1976) p146.

¹⁵ Watson. G, Writing a thesis (Essex: Longman Group, 1987) p53.

respondents. Sellitiz et al ¹⁶ argued that it is always useful to "*obtain the respondent's perceptions of the facts rather than the facts themselves.*"

The option of using a tape recorder was considered and certainly there was an obvious advantage of ensuring that every part of the conversation was recorded. It was decided against such use though, mainly because the questionnaire was considered an alternative tool in collecting the data. Hubbuch ¹⁷ advised that the permission of the respondent was essential when using tape recorders, and there was a real possibility that some would not give their consent, making the interviews dissimilar in their approach. May ¹⁸ agrees, arguing that some people may find the tape recorder inhibiting, but also accepts that it can assist the interpretation of the interview, in that it can allow the interviewer to concentrate on the conversation. In view of the sensitivity of the questions, it was felt that the majority of participants would be suspicious of such a technique, and at the least, feel uncomfortable during the session.

Not only was the questionnaire designed to fulfill the research objective, it was intended to be "*a tool to probe beneath the surface*" ¹⁹ It was essential therefore that the questions were clear and all the relevant assumptions had been examined. The questions were kept simple with all ambiguity eliminated. The fact that the interviews were face to face also helped to provide the respondent with an explanation for specific questions or clear up any misunderstandings, should this have been necessary. It was regarded by the researcher as an important feature for him to be present for all the interviews, in order that he

¹⁶ Sellitiz. C, Jahoda. M, Deutsch. M, Cook S. W., Research methods in social relations (London: Methuen & Co., 1979) p246.

¹⁷ Hubbuch. S. M., Writing research papers across the curriculum (CBS college publishing, 1985) p35.

¹⁸ May. T., Social research: issues, methods and process (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1993) p104.

¹⁹ Op Cit: Leedy. p142

could establish a rapport with the interviewees. This was essential when considering the nature and sensitivity of the questioning. It was because of this aspect that the option of telephone questionnaires was not considered, although of course this latter method would have been substantially more cost effective and perhaps allowed the possibility for a larger sample, although there was some doubt as to whether such interviewees could be convinced to talk on the telephone with any degree of confidentiality.

A total of 120 Informers and 120 Handlers were interviewed over a period of approximately 9 months.

The questionnaires

Two questionnaires were used for this study, relating to all the aims; one for the interview of Informers (Appendix B) and a second for police Handlers (Appendix C). They were similar in that some of the questions were used for both groups. There are a number of other questions, however which differ. The questionnaires were made up of four parts and follow a similar pattern for both the Informers and Handlers. The first part examines their personal details and is used to provide a profile. Part two examines the relationship between the Informer and Handler, how it begins and how it is maintained. Part three concentrates on the motivational factors for both groups in establishing why they get involved in this type of work. Part four looks at the results of the association and the interviewees perceptions of their relationship in terms of how far they will go to maintain this partnership. In addition, the Informer questionnaire contains some sensitive supplementary questions and which were not considered beneficial or worthwhile putting to police officers. For example, the Informer was asked how he might feel if a criminal avoids punishment due to the rules having been broken. It was not considered relevant to ask the Handler

that question, although in hindsight, their responses may well have been interesting.

A number of the questions contain multiple choice responses, some of the more obvious being included in the document from the outset, and the Pilot study helped to identify these answers. There were further replies which were included, and all of the responses were coded for the purposes of computer analysis. A number of the questions sought the interviewees' opinion towards certain areas and these have been shown by way of Likert Scaling. Using this method, it was possible to test a series of attitudes around a particular theme rather than rely on individual questions, which may have been considered to be unreliable.

A substantial number of questions were open ended. The study aimed at determining the interviewees perceptions, and therefore it was considered necessary to give them the opportunity to explain why they took certain actions or made a particular decision, or at least give them the opportunity to explain their answers. A number of responses also called for specific examples.

The sensitivity of this research has been referred to earlier, and the anonymity of the respondents has been particularly important. Indeed, without such assurances, interviews would not have been given. The qualitative evidence is also crucial to the credibility of this work, providing important additional data; this too had to be given in such a way as to provide confidentiality.

It will be seen in Chapter VI, then that the qualitative references merely give the questionnaire number, so avoiding individual respondents from being identified. For example, the study does not say,

"A Detective Sergeant with 5 years service in a metropolitan police force said —".

Whilst this would have undoubtedly enhanced the data and perhaps even helped to put it into perspective, the anonymity of the respondents is of such high priority, that no chance of them being identified was allowed.

Other sources

To enhance the knowledge of the researcher, a number of police seminars, conferences and meetings throughout the country were attended, although not directly contributory to the aims of this study. In addition, a visit was made to the Royal Ulster Constabulary, and particular attention was given to officers of the Special Branch in Belfast, where arguably the most effective Informer Handler unit in the western world is run. Although their problems involving terrorism are often quite different from most other police forces, the fundamental systems are comparable.

An Informer Management Course, directed by the author and attended by experienced police officers, became a useful vehicle on which to examine the issues and theories in informer use. A National Conference on Informers, again organised by the author at the request of ACPO(Crime Committee) was another method of source collection and the key speakers involved academics and practitioners, including police officers, Special Branch and FBI Agents, as well as representatives from the Security Services.²⁰ It is interesting to note that this conference has been established as an annual event.

²⁰ National Informers Conference, 1st - 3rd April, 1997, Lawress Hall, Lincoln.

The problems and difficulties experienced during research.

At the time of carrying out this research, the author was a Detective Superintendent in the Lincolnshire Police with responsibility for C.I.D Operations, which mainly involved the investigation of murder and other serious crime. Of course this was often difficult to manage in terms of setting aside sufficient time to undertake both roles, and there have been numerous occasions when one has interfered with the other. My responsibility as a police officer always took priority, but there was no real conflict between the two.

The Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) have published national guidelines setting out how they see the future for informer use, although a skeptic may argue that the guidelines will benefit ACPO officers rather than the police practitioners. Their paper outlines how an informer should be used and provides rules which must be adhered to. But the relationship between the Informer and his handler, and how this relationship affects the way business is done is not covered in the document. The Audit Commission have supported the use as an investigative tool, and Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary also accept that the use of police informers is the way forward as part of pro-active policing. Cost effectiveness has been strongly argued, compared with other methods of investigation such as surveillance and observations, although there is now some indication that this argument is not without critics. Nevertheless, it is perhaps this acceptance of Informer use that may create its own problems, particularly if Police Forces are not prepared for such an upsurge.

In order to establish a reasonable population who had experience in the handling of Informers, contact was made with the Heads of Criminal Investigation Departments (C.I.D), in a number of Police Forces, other than Lincolnshire, to allow them to identify Police officers engaged in the handling of Informers. A

total of 120 handlers were identified in this way, each one being interviewed by the researcher. This ensured that each question was fully understood, as well as enable the interviewee the opportunity to provide personal observations and examples without restriction.

Certain criteria was laid down, so that there existed some control on the Handlers identified. By using the same method, 120 Informers were identified and interviewed. Only those Informers who were registered with the police were used so that there existed some documentation from which to validate the responses. It is recognised that this may have restricted the representative population, and this issue will be discussed later.

Because of the potential time constraints that would inevitably occur during the study, it was decided to consider a secondary method of data collection relating to the aims. Using the same questionnaires, one Police Force was chosen to carry out a postal method of interviewing. This entailed identifying a liaison officer in that force, an officer of the rank of Detective Superintendent, who agreed to act on the researcher's behalf to identify a number of Handlers and Informers willing to participate. Twenty questionnaires were sent with some written advice on completion, together with an assurance of confidentiality. It was apparent that the Police Force were having second thoughts. After a number of lengthy telephone conversations, the Force concerned decided that they no longer wished to participate and returned the questionnaires, not one of which had been completed. It was suggested by the Liaison Officer that the questions were too sensitive, and because this Force were looking at their Informer handling procedures internally, they felt that it would be unwise to take part in my research. At least, this made the decision on methodology relatively easy, in that it was blatantly obvious that the interviews would have to be undertaken personally.

The predominant part of this research involved interviewing a number of Informers and police Handlers throughout England. This was carried out by way of a prepared and structured questionnaire, giving a degree of uniformity and standardisation during the interviews, as well as assisting in the later computer based analysis. It was first of all assumed, wrongly as it transpired, that being a research student AND a serving police officer would create a synergistic effect. In reality, though, this combination rarely assisted the situation at all.

There were a number of sensitive questions put to both Handlers and Informers which tried to establish whether the respondent had or was likely to breach the criminal law or the Police Discipline Code during their involvement in Informer use. Such questioning required careful management, because on one hand the researcher needed to prove credibility with people not met before, but on the other, as a Police Officer, he had a responsibility to uphold the law and deal with those who contravene it.

Although some of the interviews took place in local police stations, there was a reluctance by some to be seen in such places, and it quickly became apparent that the interviewees wishes, both Informer and Handler, had to be given priority. As a result, meetings had to be arranged in various locations, including public houses, hotels, open spaces, and on one occasion under a viaduct some miles from a built up area, at 3.30 in the morning. This created its own problems in the completion of the questionnaires in far from ideal situations, but more importantly giving real concerns about safety, although it did seem to provide some reassurance to the interviewees. There were many occasions when waiting in a prearranged spot for hours before the interviewee appeared seemed inevitable and sometimes the respondent failed to show at all. Those meetings

had to be arranged again, when the subjects' fears or concerns had been overcome.

To ensure that the Informers could not use the meetings for any illicit purpose afterwards, a full contact record was submitted through the relevant force registrar, which complied with the general police procedure of recording all meetings with Informers.

There is an ethical problem which arises from this study, in that it was understood from the start that any admission made by the respondents regarding the criminal law or police discipline code would not be acted upon. This was essential to maintain credibility. To justify this work, it is argued that the research is crucial to the future of crime detection, and can only continue if such questioning is included. A similar problem of ethical and political issues was identified by the National Opinion Research Centre (NORC) in America when it sought to design research on American's sex lives.²¹ This same conflict, however meant that all the interviews were undertaken personally, so as not to burden other police officers with this dilemma.

Some Senior Police Officers have yet to accept the necessity for these questions, and furthermore, have expressed their concern about the work generally. It could be suggested they fear that the results may create an embarrassing situation for them. There is evidence in both the United Kingdom and America, that research into sensitive subjects have incurred such opposition that those commissioning the work have been persuaded to withdraw support.²² This seems to be an issue of police culture that needs to be addressed.

²¹ Sieber J. E., The Ethics and Politics of Sensitive Research. (California, USA) 1992 pp14-26.

²² Lee R. M. & Renzetti C. M., "The Problems of Researching Sensitive Topics:

Being a police officer has not been particularly helpful in seeking ACPO support. Most forces in England are reluctant to allow research in their districts without ACPO Crime Committee backing. This was not forthcoming in this study, indeed it became apparent that some Senior Officers did not wish this study to continue, and as a result, a number of forces have refused to participate. The official explanation offered was that there was ample research into this subject. The fact of the matter is though, that there is no other study looking specifically at the relationship between an Informer and his Handler and how that relationship can effect the future use of Informers. There may be another, more sinister reason for not wishing this study to continue, relating to the fact that some forces perhaps felt they could not stand scrutiny. What this means, in practical terms though is that the sample size was reduced - as is discussed earlier in the chapter.

Fortunately, there have been a number of forces throughout England who were prepared to allow access. A circular was prepared by the Home Office in consultation with ACPO, after the ACPO Crime Committee had expressed concern about releasing police data to researchers. Although it suggests that police forces should welcome research and encourage it whenever possible, the document warns that unless the project is sponsored by the Home Office or ACPO, then it should give serious consideration to the sensitivity and confidentiality of the subject as well as any future publication of the data obtained.²³ This study does not carry such sponsorship, and this has indeed created some difficulty when visiting other police areas. It was necessary in a number of cases to provide a written contract between the researcher and the

An Introduction and Overview." American Behavioural Scientist. 33. (1991): pp3-13.

²³ Home Office Circular No. 48/95 The release of police data for academic research (September 1995) Home Office London.

Police Force concerned, before access was allowed. Such a document gave a certain amount of credibility for the study, but more importantly helped to assure those forces of the commitment to the notion of confidentiality (Appendix D).

There is also the question of logistics. Those forces which agreed to participate are situated throughout England, and it was difficult to arrange visits at convenient times. It was necessary to take periods of annual leave to undertake this work, and of course to visit as many areas as possible in the time allowed. This proved to be frustrating, to say the least, and sometimes impossible bearing in mind the researcher's responsibility to the Lincolnshire Police, as already discussed.

It was originally felt, perhaps naively, that some sort of structured approach could be used in determining the population to be used in this study. Indeed, by contacting each separate Police Force in England the number of registered Informers and the population/acreage of each force area was established which provided sufficient data to produce a satisfactory random number from each Force. Unfortunately, as previously stated, not every Force was willing to participate, and this affected the overall ratios. To some extent, it has been found necessary to accept what has been offered.

Because each Force was allowed to identify its own respondents, it was not possible to control the population. This task was left with the Registrar of Informants in each Force area, usually of the rank of Detective Inspector. Certain requests were made, such as a need for a mixture of male and females, but in the final analysis it was inevitable that those respondents put forward by the Force had to be accepted. There was some consolation in the knowledge that those officers did not pick the interviewees most likely to participate. Indeed, there are examples of a number who were difficult to meet with and talk

to. Because the decision to arrange the interviews was left to each individual Force, then there is no data to show how many Informers, or for that matter Police Officers, refused to participate. Assurances were however given that these numbers were low.

During visits to other Force Areas, it was found that ample numbers of Police Officers were willing to participate in the research. In relation to the Informers, though, some incentive was necessary to encourage a proportion of them to participate. Two police forces were prepared to give cash to their Informers from their budgets in order to persuade the Informer to attend, although most police forces did not consider such a course of action. An early decision was made in this research not to pay Informers for the interview, and it has not been a particular problem. Of course, the Informers' motivation is relevant here, and if the respondents reason is financial, then naturally enough, he or she will want to be paid for his time.

The Police Handler may have a lot to lose by telling the truth. Certainly, unless the Police Officers could be convinced that the assurances of confidentiality and anonymity were credible, then it would be difficult for them to admit breaches of the law or the Police Discipline Code to a Senior Police Officer. Fortunately a refreshing level of frankness was demonstrated by most. One Informer, though insisted that his one and only reason for informing was because of his commitment to assist the Police as a friend. The researcher was however aware of his criminal history; he was in fact a professional drug smuggler, and at the time of the interview was awaiting trial in another force area for possession with intent to supply quite copious amounts of heroin!

By far the most problematic area was the distrust shown by police officers during the interviews. As already stated, the police officer perhaps has more to

lose in admitting breaches of the police discipline code. The art is to see through their answers and to convince the respondent that "no harm will come to him by telling the truth". This in itself is a total turn around for most officers. Usually it is the police who are trying to convince others to tell the truth. Supervisory officers were often the worst, with the Detective Inspector feeling obliged to give the safe answer. A considerable amount of time was spent discussing these points hoping always to secure an honest response. On the other hand, there were also occasions when both Informers and police officers who for one reason or another felt obliged to embroider the truth, and suggest that the problem was more acute than it really was. Such respondents were just as misleading as those who responded within the rules and regulations, and their answers just as futile. Fortunately, these types were in the minority. Also, it was possible to check their validity against police records or individuals who had a personal knowledge of their backgrounds.

It can be seen, then, that the problems and difficulties being experienced in this work have been varied and diverse. They range from logistical problems in actually setting up the interviews, to obstacles in seeking permission to actually carry out the work, to the difficulties in checking the validity of the respondents in ensuring that their answers are as honest and accurate as possible.

There have been a number of police forces anxious to participate because they realise that the service cannot progress further until it knows more about the subject. That can only be achieved by talking to those people who are heavily involved in it. That is why this study has concentrated on interviews with Informers and Handlers.

Summary

It has been noted on numerous occasions throughout this thesis that it is the relationship between an Informer and the Handler that is so important, and this is reflected in the aims of the research. This study has relied heavily on individual interviews with police officers and registered Informers by using a standardised questionnaire. The responses to set questions together with some freedom for the interviewee to express an opinion or explain an answer have been crucial to this study which has tried to establish through their perceptions and experiences what the true picture is of this association. A number of areas have been recognised as lacking; for example, no approved method of sampling has been used due to the sensitivity and background of the subjects. As a result, and despite some test and retest exercises, the validity of the answers had to be accepted.

The interviews were all carried out by the researcher although other methods were considered and discarded. The advantages and disadvantages of using such a method have been discussed in this chapter.

A number of problems experienced during this research have been identified, but by far the most important has been convincing police forces to allow interviews with registered Informers. Such access has hitherto been denied to researchers but is crucial if meaningful research is to continue.

It is still the case that ACPO consider the subject of Informers to be too sensitive to allow outside agencies to carry out research work. It is certainly the case that the police have the monopoly on relevant data and without their co-operation, no meaningful study can be undertaken. Nevertheless, there is also a need for research work to have credibility, and this can only be achieved through

academic resilience. This concept needs to be understood by the Association of Chief Police Officers in the interests of future research.

Because of the sensitivity of the subject and the need for police forces to maintain confidentiality, the data collection has been problematic throughout the study. Because of this unique situation, it has been felt necessary in this chapter to include the problems and difficulties experienced by the researcher during the study. This section has been detailed because of its relevance to the methodology and design.

This Chapter cannot be concluded without referring to some personal observations from the researcher. The data collection was naturally interesting but often not enjoyable, and in fact was sometimes positively frightening. There are many memories where the interviews arranged were dangerous, and often even reckless, although all were necessary for the sake of the study.

It has been difficult to accept throughout this study that many police officers, colleagues within the service, have themselves broken the law. This has been a disappointment throughout the work for a number of reasons. Of course there are a number of ethical and moral issues, but by far the most worrying aspect is that law enforcement officers, trained to investigate and prevent crime are prepared in effect to increase criminality. In the same vein, it has also been surprising that so many respondents were prepared to tell the truth and be honest about their involvement. Both the Informers and police officers could have taken the easy way out and been less than frank, but this was not the case, which has given substantially more credence to this study.

CHAPTER FIVE

The Theory

It has already been stated that this study is based on exploratory descriptive research, and as such contains a relatively high level of data but has a relatively low theoretical input. This has been necessary because of the lack of previous research, and therefore limited knowledge, to get the subject off the ground. It would have been wrong therefore to impose too heavy a theoretical input at this stage.

Nevertheless, a study of some of the issues surrounding the relationship between an Informer and the Handler are worthy of discussion. The main thrust of this research deals with the inter-action between the Informer and his/her Handler, a police officer. The Informer is generally a lay person, with no recognised qualifications and no rules or guidelines to obey. The Handler, on the other hand is regarded as a professional, trained to undertake his role, and obliged to work within laid down regulations.¹ It is the interaction between them which is crucial to the research and how it affects their relationship.

This chapter will examine firstly a so called standard professional relationship; that is to say, an accepted classic relationship involving a Professional. This will be examined in order to identify a number of features which make up this

¹ It is commonly accepted that a professional is one where their occupations require an educational qualification, and their behaviour is subject to a code of conduct laid down by a central body or professional association.

relationship. Secondly, general police relationships will be examined to determine whether those classic features also exist in policing. Finally, the Informer/Handler relationship will be compared to the standard. In this way, it is hoped that any differences will become apparent, especially those which emerge from the findings in Chapter seven relating to the Informer and Handler relationship.

1. Standard Professional Relationship

Looking first at the standard professional relationship, there have been a number of studies and examples of this and it is not necessary to review them here. In general terms, however, the professional relationship is characterised by a number of common features. If we concentrate on two of these features, 'power' and 'control', it is suggested that these will throw some light on the police Handler/Informer relationship, for 'power' and 'control' appear at first sight to be the most important features of any professional relationship.

Looking further into the link between power and control, as it affects the professional, Eliot Freidson ² suggested that what is special about professionals is that they are bound by a stable set of ethical values which guide their behaviour. He argued in the 1970s that professionalism in the medical services reduced its effectiveness because of the way the professional interacts with the patients. He suggests that the professional sees himself as a creative, self regulating individual and, to put it crudely, a cut above the rest of humanity. ³ Furthermore, he argues that the educational differences were relevant, as is the status difference, both of which leave the client feeling uncomfortable. An

² Freidson E., Professional dominance: the social structure of medical care (New York: Atherton Press, 1970).

³ Ibid: p60

interesting thought, and this may also be relevant for the Informer/Handler relationship, in that the police officer may consider that he enjoys a much higher status than his Informer, and therefore to some degree is the better person. Perhaps even, the Handler may consider he has power over his Informer.

Freidson also talks of the professional being handicapped when the client is not subject to the same bureaucratic authority; that is to say, the client may request something which the professional may feel is inappropriate. For example, an Informer who is expecting payment for some information will not be sympathetic towards the Handler who, because of the bureaucratic reward system, cannot deliver the cash on time. Freidson refers to the different perceptions of a problem, where the patient may consider it to be an emergency whilst the doctor looks at it as routine.⁴ The outcome is reached on trust. *"Essentially, he (the patient) is expected to have faith in his consultant - or else choose another consultant in whom he does have faith."* It seems that this same element of trust exists between the Informer and the Handler; that is to say, the bureaucracy which exists in the police service may be a handicap to the relationship. Or perhaps their trust in each other becomes more important, resulting in the bureaucracy taking a back seat. If this is indeed the case, it will have serious implications for the police service: the Handler may disregard any regulations and rules in favour of his relationship with the Informer - perhaps leading to corrupt practices.

Max Weber studied the distribution of power, and argued that such distribution was reflected in the existence of status groups, for example elite clubs or associations, and classes, suggesting that the class struggle first became apparent

⁴ Ibid: p105

with the relationship between debtor and creditor.⁵ Weber attributes power according to a person's class and status, and suggests that power is *"the chance of man or a number of men to realise their own will in a communal action even against the resistance of others who are participating in the action."*⁶ Butterworth and Weir suggest that, *"Power does not exist in itself: it flows between people. And everybody has some of it, some area of choice, of ability to affect things his way"*.⁷ They make the point that power is not randomly distributed, but institutionalised, arguing that the most common orders, political and economical have the most importance in deciding the level of power.

These issues of control and power certainly have an important part to play within organisations and specifically private sector companies: indeed references to 'power struggles' are only too frequent. It must be assumed therefore that these same issues are considered to be important to individuals within those organisations. It is of course true that a natural ingredient of ambition is having more power and control over others.

Kinlaw⁸ differentiates between power and empowerment, seeing the latter as a way of improving organisational performance by making the most of competent people. He acknowledges though that organisations mistakenly concentrate on the notion of power rather than the competent influence derived from empowerment.⁹ Kinlaw suggests that managers have difficulty with

⁵ Runciman W. G. (Ed.), Weber - selections in translation (Cambridge: University Press, 1978).

⁶ Gerth H. H. & Wright Mills C. (Ed.), From Max Weber - essays in sociology (London: Routledge, 1970) p180.

⁷ Butterworth E & Weir D (Eds), The Sociology of Modern Britain (London: Collins, 1970) p250.

⁸ Kinlaw D. C., The Practice of Empowerment: Making the most of human competence, (Aldershot: Gower Publishing, 1995)

⁹ Ibid:p21

empowerment because they do not understand what it means. They feel that organisational empowerment results in them giving up control over other people, and if controlling others is their function, then they will be out of a job.¹⁰

Kinlaw also suggests that grass-roots workers probably know more about the technical aspects of their jobs than their supervisors, and empowerment can only be successfully demonstrated if such managers learn the competencies of those under their control.¹¹ This thesis does not examine specifically the level of power and control, nor of the knowledge of police officers acting as Controllers, but there is evidence that many Controllers have not had the benefit of experiencing for themselves the handling of Informers and there may be some comparison here then. Handlers are empowered by their managers to obtain information from their Informers in order to improve performance, but this brings with it a lack of control, perhaps allowing the Handler far more power than is acceptable. Using Kinlaw's theory, a police Controller will have difficulty in empowering the Handlers unless he fully understands the skills required to become a Handler. This highlights the difficulty a Controller has when supervising and managing officers under his authority, especially when a Controller has not experienced the role of Handler, a situation which is far too common in the police service today.

Whilst comparing democracy with bureaucracy, Weber visited America where he found that the workers there *"preferred a set of corrupt politicians whom they could oust and despise, to a caste of expert officials who would despise them and who were irremovable."*¹² Weber suggests that the professional is indeed a bureaucrat who will deal within the rules irrespective of human feelings, and

¹⁰ Ibid:p27.

¹¹ Ibid:p29

¹² Op Cit: Gerth & Wright Mills (1970) p18.

argues that the professional execution in effect means the execution "*without regard to persons in accordance with calculable rules.*" ¹³ Weber advocates that there must be strict hierarchical control by the professional; perhaps this is the crucial difference between Informer and police officer; the fact that the latter is considered to be a professional, and therefore 'controls' his Informer.

Giddens ¹⁴ describes professionals as 'gatekeepers', i.e. those who control access, such as the university professor who may determine the grade and pass or failure of academic degrees, or the surveyor who may control the relevant licences required before building work can start. Perhaps then, the police Handler can be similarly described as he controls the access of crime intelligence from his Informer. This element of control then, clearly features in the work of professionals no matter what the organisation.

Others have discussed professionalism in terms of moral values and rules required to ensure that those values are maintained, as with Durkheim who insists there has to be a level of morality within economic life. ¹⁵ Elliott ¹⁶ discusses the importance of the professions in modern society and suggests that they may be described as an elite group, so that where the organisation holds a strong position over the client, then the professional may well ignore the clients representations. He concedes though that there is insufficient research to determine whether such professional assertiveness necessarily increases with professional superiority over the client. Others who have discussed the theory of

¹³ Rheinstein M. (Ed.), Max Weber on law in economy and society (Harvard (USA): University Press, 1954) p350.

¹⁴ Giddens A., Sociology (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989) p287.

¹⁵ Durkheim E., Professional ethics and civic morals (Glencoe: The free press, 1958) p29.

¹⁶ Elliott P., The sociology of the professions (London: Macmillan, 1972) p105.

professions argue that it is far from a generic concept, but rather one which will change regularly throughout history. ¹⁷

A number of features have emerged involving the professional relationship, including accountability, status, bureaucracy, trust and elitism. It is suggested that these are all features which may also manifest themselves during an examination of police relationships. However, the two particular features already referred to, power and control, stand out and are especially attributable to police work. Clearly, a police force has a duty to uphold the law, and in doing so is allowed to use appropriate force. This is just one example where power and control become important to the police. Skolnick ¹⁸ noted this during his study and concluded that police officers may be tempted to use this power even when they have no legal grounds to do so. He suggests that the police consider themselves to represent “*authoritative power*” and are therefore entitled to “*command obedience*”.

Skolnick identified that the issues of power and control can be manifested in the police use of discretion; either delegated or unauthorised. He accepts that a police officer is entitled to use his discretion, for example to arrest a wrongdoer or report him for summons depending on the circumstances. He suggests, though, that the police often exercise discretion for which they have no authority: Skolnick says that the police officer sees his job, ‘ - *to maintain public order, and restraints upon his initiative will only reduce his capacity to fulfill his assigned task.*’ ¹⁹

¹⁷ Dingwall R. & Lewis P. (Eds), The sociology of the professions (London: Macmillan Press, 1983) p22.

¹⁸ Skolnick J. H., Justice without trial - Law enforcement in democratic society ((USA): John Wiley & Sons Inc., 1966) p90.

¹⁹ Ibid.

A more detailed examination of police relationships will determine whether these features are indeed apparent, and, if so, how and in what way they affect the relationship with the Informer

2. Police Relationships

The police service has for some time been forging partnerships with a growing number of so called customers, the public being but one example. The relationship between the police and the general public has to be based on trust and confidence, so that linking this to management, if a police force loses management control, it can ultimately lead to a loss of public confidence.²⁰ This trust is considerable but will only be maintained if the police service displays the highest standards of conduct. Richards²¹ identifies trust as a key concept in policing and suggests that, *"Only by gaining its (the public's) co-operation and trust could it hope to secure the objective of helping to uphold social order."* The basic sense of trust was recognised by Erikson²² as one of the most important stages of personal development, and therefore of extreme importance to the individual. It is suspected that such trust of the police service has been eroded considerably since the 1980s perhaps due to revelations of corruption, high profile criminal trials alleging miscarriages of justice and malpractice, and more recently the allegation of institutionalised racism following the Stephen Lawrence murder investigation. Questions are being asked about the amount of discretion available to police officers, which if not controlled could effect police morality and ethics. Others argue, though that the police are expected to exercise discretion in order to *"-realise the 'spirit' rather than the letter of the*

²⁰ O'Connell G., "Will the drive for efficiency in the British police service endanger the police/public relationship?" 25th Senior Command Course Police Staff College (1989) (unpublished)

²¹ Richards N. "A plea for applied ethics" in Thackrah J. R. (Ed.), Contemporary Policing: An examination of society in the 1980s. (London: Sphere Books, 1985)p13.

²² Erikson E. H., Childhood and Society (New York: Norton, 1964).

law”²³ One such supporter was Scarman²⁴ who said that, “*Discretion is the art of suiting action to particular circumstances. It is the policeman’s daily duty.*” Richards argues that for the police to enjoy the trust and confidence of the public, they should not rely on their codes of conduct, but instead use applied ethics as a necessary requirement for every individual officer.²⁵

The relationship between a police officer and a member of the public is complex, in that a police officer often finds it difficult to carry out his duties and at the same time become an accepted member of the community. Banton²⁶ uses the 1962 Royal Commission on the police to support this argument. Out of the sample of police officers interviewed, two thirds stated that they found difficulties in making friends outside the force, and the majority felt that the public were suspicious of them. This suspicion was also noted in the latest British Crime Survey report²⁷ which found that people closer to the top of the social ladder had contact with the police most often.

It is interesting to see that the police service, as a legitimate authority, has the power to make and enforce rules, but that does not mean that others have to accept those rules. Reiner defines police power as the “*capacity to inflict legal sanctions including force*” and suggests that such power is legitimised into authority, but says that “*just because the police, as an authority, are considered*

²³ Ibid:p20.

²⁴ Scarman The Rt. Hon. Lord, The Brixton Disorders 10-12th April, 1981 (HMSO,1981).

²⁵ Op Cit: Richards,p31.

²⁶ Banton M., The policeman in the community (England: Tavistock Publications, 1964) p198.

²⁷ Skugan W. G., The police and public in England and Wales: A British Crime Survey report, Home Office Research Study 117, (London HMSO, 1990): p7.

*to be legitimate, does not mean that their rules must be agreed with, merely some acceptance of their right on a minimal basis to make or enforce rules."*²⁸

Howley tries to categorise the difference between the police and the people they deal with, suggesting that the police tend to be preoccupied with technical efficiency whilst their clients are more concerned about seeking support and reassurances.²⁹ Lowenstein argues that the police see their role purely as upholding the law and seem to be more concerned with rules than people.³⁰ This may support Freidson's theory already discussed, that the professional's need for bureaucracy is in fact a hindrance to the relationship.

Skolnick³¹ has looked at the concept of police conduct v. professionalism, and argued that a professional code within the police service fails to bridge the gap between the conflict of rule of law against law and order. In fact he goes further and suggests that it undermines police accountability. On one hand, he says, the police are striving for managerial efficiency in the guise of improved technology, and on the other trying to work within the rules of ideals and values. Skolnick suggests that professionalism is not the solution to this conflict, although it is often considered to be so. Evans³², speaking as the incoming president of ACPO and Chairman of the presidential task force on corruption suggested that there was a need for a Professional Institute of Policing which should be able to "*-inform and stimulate debate about the future shape of policing in a world in which we feel less like the driven and more like the drivers.*"

²⁸ Reiner R., *The politics of the police* (London: Wheatsheaf, 1985) p215.

²⁹ Howley J. A., *Victim/Police interaction - Community policing in microcosm*. Police Staff College, Bramshill (1984) (unpublished)

³⁰ Lowenstein L. F., *The police and the social services: what unites and divides them?* (The police journal July, 1994): pp243-5.

³¹ Op Cit: Skolnick, p235.

³² Evans J., *Inside Write*, (Policing Today Volume 5, Issue 3, September 1999)p5.

Clearly, he believes that police officers as professionals should have more say in the way policing evolves, in fact it could be suggested that Evans is talking here of wanting even more control and power.

One practitioner Buchanan, takes a much more simplistic view and argues that everything depends on how one person treats another. He was speaking specifically about policing the gay community, but explained that *"If you treat the most vulnerable well, the chances are you are going to treat the great mass of people fairly well, if not better."*³³ According to McEldowney who examined the relationship between the regular police and special constables, the latter did not appear to have been treated very well. Although the research only used a sample of 19 respondents, it concluded that regular police officers despised those officers who put on a uniform on a part time basis, pretending to be professionals. One officer commented that *"Specials do not earn the respect of regulars because they are incompetent, and lack knowledge."*³⁴ This may suggest a feeling of guarded jealousy on the part of the regular police officers in terms of their professional standing. However, it may also support Freidson's argument that so called Professionals insist on some sort of status difference.

Holdaway³⁵ continues with the theme of the police being professional and therefore accountable, but argues that there are those people who can weaken or neutralise police work, whom he calls 'disarmers', such as women and children, and others known as 'challengers' who will continually question the power of the police such as lawyers, doctors and social workers. Both these types can attack the professionalism of the police. Informers do not appear to fit into either of

³³ Buchanan, Inside, outside, (The Job 23 July, 1993).

³⁴ McEldowney B., The working relationship between the special constabulary and the regular constabulary (West Midlands Police: Unpublished, 1989) p196.

³⁵ Holdaway S., Inside the British police: A force at work (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Publisher Ltd., 1983) p71.

these categories, but nevertheless could attack the accountability of the police service in terms of corruption.

The partnership between a police officer, a professional, and his client, a lay person creates additional problems because of differences in priorities and objectives. This was recognised in a research study which examined levels of co-operation between social services and the police, where it was agreed that co-operation is essential but that huge differences may never be overcome.³⁶ For example, the police and social services work closely together on child protection matters and in fact both agencies work within recognised and accepted guidelines. Despite this, there exists friction between the two groups largely because their priorities are different. The police are law enforcers and look towards arresting an offender, whilst the social worker concentrates on what is best for the welfare of the child. This difference in priorities is best illustrated in a Home Office study of police and victim relationships where it was concluded that most victims were not satisfied with the police following an initial visit after a crime had been reported. However the police felt that further contact was unnecessary, and anyway they did not have the time.³⁷ This may reflect, yet again, how the perceptions of groups can be so far apart.

It is apparent that the law enforcement officer has to possess many qualities if he is to carry out his core business professionally. His relationship with the many facets of police work makes it a complex affair, when on one hand he is providing a service in order to solve a problem, but on the other he is involved in a confrontational situation, for example public disorder, where the officer is

³⁶ Cooperation between social services and police - International crime research association (ICRA) (1990) Denmark (unpublished)

³⁷ Newburn T. & Merry S., Keeping in touch: Police - victim communication in two areas. (Home office research study 116 London HMSO, 1990): p10.

perhaps seen as the enemy. His technique in dealing with a member of the public may be different to dealing with a criminal, but his professionalism on both counts is what seems to be paramount. Russell et al ³⁸ note on this point that, *“The police officer with a professional attitude toward behavior must be able to assess and understand the behavior with which he is dealing.”* The Police officer has the same human feelings and emotions as those he is responding to and he has to develop ways of dealing with them. The professional police officer will anticipate his own emotions and those of the person he is dealing with, allowing him to be objective and not judgmental, focusing on the real problem whatever it may be. For example, the police officer often has to deal with simple traffic offences such as the ‘speeder’. The facts may be quite simple, but there is a potentially volatile situation: The driver may not dispute that he was speeding but cannot accept any criticism about his driving and takes offence against the officer. It is this type of behaviour that the police officer is expected to deal with using all the skills available to him. Such skills are necessary for most professionals though, not just police officers.

The partnership between a police officer and the criminal is a complex one and differs between organisations and even individuals. Many police officers would argue that their role is to uphold the law and there is therefore a clear distinction between them and the criminal. Other practitioners would suggest there is a thin line separating the two and often difficult to define the difference. It is a fact though that the two groups are on different sides of the criminal justice system and most would have little difficulty in drawing the line. The situation may however become more complex when the line is crossed. A good example of this is in Hong Kong where every offender arrested by the anti corruption

³⁸ Russell H. E., & Beigel A., Understanding Human Behavior for Effective Police Work, (Basic Books Inc, USA, 1982)p26

agency becomes a long term Informer. The reason for this is that custodial sentences for those convicted are inevitable and lengthy, resulting in defendants being prepared to give information in return for reduced sentences.³⁹

One interesting section of the Informer/Handler relationship, commonly known as the so called Stockholm Syndrome, is worth noting here. Named after a bank robbery attempt in Stockholm, Sweden on 23 August, 1973 when a hostage declared her fear of the police and of her protection by her captor. There have been a number of cases where the hostage expresses unusual sympathy for the criminal, and research suggests that this may occur when both are isolated by authorities.⁴⁰ There seems to exist a sensitive relationship which emerges over a period of time, between a terrorist and his hostage. Studies have shown that in these situations, the hostage may actively collaborate, and there becomes a developing bond much like any friendship, albeit forced on them by the circumstances.⁴¹ Strentz talks of a positive bond in which there is created a philosophy of *"It's us against them, uniting its victims against outsiders."*⁴² This issue of friendship will be discussed at length in Chapter seven.

There does appear to be, then, a number of similarities between the standard professional relationship and the police professional relationship. In particular, the issues of accountability, bureaucracy, trust and confidence seem to exist in all types of professional partnerships. It is interesting, but not surprising that the issues of power and control also feature high in police relationships. It is

³⁹ The author had the opportunity of studying working practices in 1999 of the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) and although this visit was after the handover to the Chinese Government, had not changed it's procedures.

⁴⁰ Olin W. R. & Born D. G., A behavioural approach to hostage situations, (Australian Federal Police Journal April, 1983): pp67-75.

⁴¹ The Stockholm Syndrome, (Police Review 9 January, 1981): pp54-6.

⁴² Strentz T., Law enforcement policy and ego defenses of the hostage, (FBI Law enforcement bulletin Vol.48 (4), April 1979): pp2-12.

important now to examine whether these features exist in the specific Informer/Handler relationship.

3. Informer/Handler Relationship

Skolnick⁴³ suggests simplistically, that *'The informer-informed relationship is a matter of exchange in which each party seeks to gain something from the other in return for certain desired commodities. From the informer, the policeman receives information that assists him in the enforcement of the law. Informers typically cooperate with police because they have been caught doing something illegal and want a reduction in charges or some sort of "break" in the criminal process.'* He is referring mainly to drug addicts and this definition of the Handler/Informer relationship is of course valid but the Informers' motives can be far more diverse than he is suggesting.

Because of the lack of existing theoretical examinations regarding Informers, this study must consider some common assumptions. That is to say, how is the relationship between an Informer and Handler regarded by others? This can best be shown using a comparative table from which an assumed model emerges. It is generally regarded that the police use of Informers has some sort of mystique, and as such, its mystery is what makes it so different from other relationships.

The following table lists some of the most common differences as perceived by most people, including some practitioners, and compares the Handler/Informer relationship with a standard professional relationship.

⁴³ Op Cit: Skolnick, p124

Assumed model - Informer/Handler relationship

Standard Professional Relationship	Handler/Informer Relationship
Client pays Professional	Professional pays client
Relationship is accepted in community	Community mostly unaware of relationship
Both parties work within agreed standards	Only Handler is bound by standards
Client has recourse outside of profession	No such recourse available
Professional and client meet openly	Handler and Informer meet in secret
Friendship appears to play no part	Informers consider it important
Business open to public scrutiny	Business sensitive and covert

The relationship between a doctor and his/her patient or a solicitor and his/her client may well typify a standard relationship between the professional and the lay person. However, the most obvious difference between these and the Informer/Handler relationship, and highlighted in the above assumed model, is the fact that it is usually the professional who is paid for his services. With the Informer, though, it is he who gains some personal benefit. This alone suggests that the relationship is unique, but maybe the real difference is that the role of 'customer' and 'supplier' changes during their contact. For example, a person arrested and in custody is in effect a customer or client of the police. As soon as that prisoner decides, for whatever reason, that he wishes to become an Informer, then his role changes to one of supplier; the provision of information. The Informer is providing a service, and one which the police are keen to reward.

Another common perception is that most professionals such as lawyers and doctors for example, are accepted in the community. As such, they would not be out of place setting up their offices within that community. That would not be the case with the Handler and Informer because of their need for

confidentiality. Indeed, it is essential that the Informer and Handler meet in secret and this leads to a general unawareness by the general public.

Also, it is accepted that a patient relating to his doctor, or a client to his solicitor, will maintain their relationship within accepted standards, either moral or legal, and should that patient/client have cause for complaint, he can progress it through an independent body such as the General Medical Council or the Law Society. The Informer, on the other hand is not bound by such standards and it is unlikely he will make a complaint regarding his relationship with his police Handler because of the need for maintaining anonymity. In the event that such a complaint is made, it would be investigated by other police officers and could not therefore be described as an independent enquiry.

The assumption then, is that the relationship between a police officer (the professional) and the Informer (the client) is totally unique and cannot be compared with any other professional partnership. It is commonly believed amongst practitioners, at any rate, that what sets this union apart is the mystery and secrecy that surrounds it. The expectation is that it is best not known what really goes on between Informers and police officers, and in fact this is not an unnatural stance to take. Many law enforcement officers also do not understand nor want to understand the relationship, let alone be involved. This helps the relationship to be considered unique; this theoretical study will examine, however, whether or not the assumption is valid.

The police have a monopoly on the business of informing; for where else can the Informer sell his wares? Useful comparisons can be made with the Forensic Science Service, where neither its members nor the agency generally are in

competition with anyone. Some commentators consider this to be unhealthy.⁴⁴ It may be this monopoly situation which allows the police officer to have the upperhand and ultimately take control. The Informer will be only too aware that if his relationship with the police begins to break down, he does not have the opportunity to consider other professionals or sell his wares in other markets. It may follow then, that if financial gain is uppermost in the Informer's mind, he will try to ensure that this lucrative partnership continues.

Nevertheless, police officers can be categorised with the doctor and the lawyer as professionals which brings more autonomy and discretion in relation to their jobs. All have control over others, are bound by codes of conduct and therefore accountable, but free to carry out their duties and accept their responsibilities without interference from their organisations. For example, a Health Authority would not insist that a surgeon carries out an operation in a particular way, or a firm of solicitors tell a partner how to present a case in court. Similarly, a police force does not strictly tell an officer how he can detect crime, although all three must work within comprehensive guidelines to achieve their objectives.

There is no evidence to suggest that a police officer can exert power over another, merely because he is in a professional occupation. In the case of an Informer, it would be natural to assume that a police officer would have difficulty as he, the Informer is not subject to any rules or procedures and therefore has no constraints on his actions. Those who investigate corruption within the police service are now suggesting that the police officer can be 'controlled' by his Informer; so much so that their roles are being reversed.

⁴⁴ A monopoly on science, (Police Review 20 July, 1994: pp16-17.

Clearly then, it is far from straightforward to compare the relationship between an Informer and Handler with any other partnership. Certainly it is the inter-reaction between them that is so important and this chapter has distinguished some of the features from other classic professional relationships as well as relationships between the police and other parties.

The use and distribution of power, the need for control and professionalism all feature in the relationship between two partners. Weber places substantial importance on the professional having to work within a set of rules or codes resulting in bureaucracy. The existence of the professional and his relationship with others has been widely discussed, and Chapter seven will consider the relationship between the Informer and Handler in terms of the professional and his 'client', and in particular the importance placed on the relationship between the two groups.

The relationship between a police officer and other groups unsurprisingly identifies power, professionalism and accountability as key features of the relationship. There are however, additional features which emerge from the police partnerships. In particular, the public's need to trust and have confidence in the police, knowing that their business is guided by high standards of conduct and ethics. Concerns over the level of discretion used by the police are also apparent. More surprising though is the importance placed on friendship. Namely that the longer the relationship between the police officer and Informer continues, the more the partners begin to like each other. This is not a feature that would naturally emerge from a relationship with many other professionals. However, it is of course natural for two people to become closer as they get to know each other.

In terms of power and authority, the issue is not just one of the police controlling the Informer; more importantly, perhaps, it is a question of how much power the Informer/Handler relationship has over the police service. For example, how much discretion does the relationship exercise, and how selective are the police in the use of the intelligence gathered?

These features will be considered in the main study (Chapter seven) to determine whether the Informer/Handler relationship can be compared with other partnerships. It seems, though, that the main difference between the Informer/Handler relationship and other professionals is the mystique that it creates for itself. Practitioners seem to prefer to hide behind the veil of secrecy for whatever reason, but probably to alleviate the need to discuss the relationship.

With this exception, perhaps the Informer/Handler relationship is not that different to other professional relationships. Interestingly, Weber's definition of social behaviour ⁴⁵ where he distinguishes between:

- rational goal-oriented conduct
- rational value-oriented conduct
- affectual conduct
- traditionalist conduct,

could easily be compared with the Informers' motives for informing; in terms of personal gain, friendship, or moral reasons (see Chapter Seven) The 'traditionalist' behaviour is not so relevant as Weber considers this to be an ideal rather than a practical application. 'Goal-oriented' behaviour could be described as utilitarian and will have some objective such as a reward. 'Value-oriented'

⁴⁵Freund J The Sociology of Max Weber (Allen Lane The Penguin Press, London 1968) p104.

behaviour is practised by someone who is “guided solely by his convictions”⁴⁶, for example has high moral standards, or because what he is doing is right. The affectual conduct, according to Weber, also has emotional and passionate elements which may be determined where the action seeks revenge, for example. This type of conduct could also be as a result of pleasing others through gratitude or merely taking some pleasure from a relationship.

The theoretical decisions found in this Chapter will be compared with the empirical findings in Chapters Six and Seven. The summary and conclusions (Chapter Eight) will show whether or not there is any support of the theories in this study.

⁴⁶ Ibid:p105

CHAPTER SIX

A Case Study in Lincolnshire

Aim 3 of the study is to determine the relationship between the police and the Informer, and sub aim 3(e) is to establish why some police officers involve themselves with Informers and others do not (Chapter four). It is important to establish why some police officers involve themselves in this type of work, so that the motives of the police officer may be established. This may be relevant to the overall relationship between a police Handler and Informer. A Case Study was undertaken in Lincolnshire to examine why some police officers are actively involved with Informers. For example, a detective constable working in a normal C.I.D environment may want to become involved in the use of Informers, whilst another officer with a similar background and antecedent history will not.

There is no direct financial reward for Handlers, although the findings in Chapter Seven may suggest that some police officers see Informers as an advancement to their career. The common perception would be that there is justification for becoming involved with criminals on a regular basis; indeed it could be considered perverse that a police officer could associate with criminals when his main objective is to lock them up. It is important to know, therefore, why a police officer may feel the need to involve himself with Informers. An examination of the relationship between the two parties may help to understand, at least to some extent, why this should be so.

The main part of the research analysed in Chapter seven, concentrates on police forces outside Lincolnshire County, due largely to the sensitivity of the questions and the need to maintain confidentiality and anonymity. The need to go out of the County was considered to be not so crucial for this part of the study and accordingly this smaller study was restricted to Lincolnshire. It is also important to note that the data collected for this study was by way of postal questionnaire to nominated officers, rather than through personal interviews. This is because the researcher was known to the Handlers, and it was thought that the questionnaires would be completed honestly and accurately if there was no direct personal contact.

Background information

Lincolnshire is predominantly a rural County covering some 2,300 square miles with a resident population of 600,000. There are a total of 1200 police officers within the Lincolnshire Police and the force has three autonomous Divisions each having its own Crime Management Unit. The philosophy of the force is that each Area identifies its own problems and concerns locally, and tries to commit sufficient resources to resolve them. Like most forces in this day and age, there are many constraints including financial, and the manpower implication is an ongoing issue. There is presently one police officer for every 503 inhabitants, compared with the national figure of one per 407. ¹

The constraints quite obviously affect the investigation of crime, making it more and more difficult for the force to detect and reduce crime. This fact has been

¹ Lincolnshire police Annual Report (1998)

identified by the then Chief Constable of Lincolnshire, Peter Bensley, when in his report to the police authority in 1995 he said that,

*"It is likely in the coming year many of the expectations of the people of Lincolnshire will not be met, not through any lack of effort on our part but through a diminishing ability to meet all of the demands placed upon us."*²

All this means that the police have needed to evaluate their crime management systems with a view to increasing the success rate using the resources available to them. The use of Informers is recognised by Lincolnshire Police, like many other forces, as a useful investigative tool and one which must be encouraged.

In July 1995, the Research Department of the Lincolnshire police completed an activity analysis of all detective officers working in three of the five police areas of the County. The analysis looked at officers of all ranks who were involved in the investigation of crime, and identified their duties by category, enabling them to produce total figures showing these duties as a percentage of the total hours worked, over a period of a month (Appendix E).

The use of Informers was of course one of the activities analysed, but the figures revealed that detective constables only spent 6.12 minutes per day per officer on the use of Informers, which is 1.25% of the total hours worked. Supervisory detective officers spent even less time, with sergeants averaging 2.81 minutes per day per officer, being 0.57% of the total. Detective Inspectors showed a greater commitment although their work was predominantly administrative and not normally connected with operational work. This perhaps only serves to

² Lincolnshire police Annual Report (1995)

show that the police are not placing sufficient importance on this aspect of their work, or conceivably that police officers generally are not adequately trained with the skills to engage in Informer use.

Lincolnshire had a total of 590 Informers registered as at the beginning of 1995 (Appendix A). These were not all active in as much as they were not all regularly volunteering information to the police. There are other reasons why police officers desire to register Informers. For example, it has been suggested, although there seems to be no evidence to confirm this, that officers wishing to join the Criminal Investigation Department try to impress their superior officers by registering Informers, giving the impression that they are already involved in the use of Informers, and are therefore the right calibre to become detectives. This present study does not examine the registration procedures within the police service, which may be worth future research.

Nevertheless, there still remains a number of people who are potentially willing to help the police. In terms of pro-active policing, which in effect means Informers, observations and surveillance, and the development of intelligence, it must be far cheaper for the police to be told exactly where a crime is going to occur, who is involved, and where the stolen property will be taken to. In simple terms, all the police have to do, armed with this information, is wait for the offenders to turn up. This continues to be the philosophy of intelligence led policing which is practised in Lincolnshire. The police force covering this County is similar to many other forces in the provinces, with a relatively low crime rate, and an emphasis on community policing.

Methodology

Confidential records in Lincolnshire, which could not be published, showed that twenty five police officers were actively involved in handling Informers. The criterion used to establish those 'active' Handlers was merely to choose those officers who had requested payment to their Informers on more than two occasions in the preceding twelve months. It was not relevant how many Informers were actually registered to these officers, but only that regular requests for payments had been made. This information is sensitive, and in fact only known to the Registrar of Informers within the force, and even the Area Crime Managers are unaware of the true identities of Informers working within their districts. The author of this research was at the time in charge of the Informer Indices, and therefore in a unique position to ensure access of the data.

It should be pointed out here, though, that the records only apply to registered Informers, and predominantly therefore, those who had sought financial payment. There are of course those officers who received information from people not registered, although this is becoming more and more infrequent due to the need to disclose the source of information to the defence in court. There also exists a number of Informers who provided information for reasons other than financial; this will be discussed later in the main study. However, the requests for payments are a useful indicator of how active the Handler is at that particular time, and therefore a useful method of identifying the relevant officers for this study.

Questionnaires (Appendix F) were compiled so that they could be completed by all interviewees, regardless of whether they were actively involved in informer use or not. In addition to questions relating to their own personal circumstances, each of the interviewees were asked why they became involved in the use of

Informers, or conversely why they did not, dependent on which group they belonged to.

In order to give some freedom to express their views, interviewees were given the opportunity to qualify their answers, and a number of officers did in fact take up this offer. Each of the interviewees knew which category they had been placed in, and therefore there was no possibility of an officer with no Informer experience answering the questionnaire as if he/she was one of the original twenty five. The advantage of this was that the interviewees were known personally to the author, and in particular, all the respondents were personally identified as officers who were actively involved or otherwise.

It was felt unnecessary to undertake a pilot study prior to the main research study. Clearly, there were some limits to the number of officers who could be used as active Handlers, and the questionnaire itself was simple in its format, as the majority of questions simply required factual data about the individuals concerned. It was, however desirable to consult with a number of other police officers, not involved in the study with a view to establishing whether the questionnaire was 'user friendly' or that no ambiguous questions had been included. The response to this consultation process confirmed that no amendment was necessary.

Contact was made with the twenty five active Handlers in Lincolnshire. A 100% response was achieved from these officers. A further 50 officers were also identified in the force who had not been actively involved with the handling of Informers. This was confirmed by force records which showed that none of them had registered an Informer with the force during their service. This second set of interviewees were established and made up of similar rank, age, gender and duties to the first twenty five. In this way, it was hoped that a true

comparison could be made. It was decided to enlist the help of twice as many non-Handlers as Handlers, so that a better comparison could be made. It will be seen though in the following tables that a complete match was not possible, in terms of the relevant variables, although a reasonable comparison was achieved. Again, a total response was achieved from the latter set of officers.

Validity and Reliability

There has to be some concern in relation to the accuracy of the questionnaires, in as much as, although they were completed anonymously, of course it was obvious that their identity were known to the researcher, and the possibility may have existed whereby they felt obliged to impress, or more importantly, not wish to become involved in providing sensitive answers. This problem was never fully overcome, and the only remedy was to provide adequate reassurances to the respondents, and to advise of the importance in giving frank and honest answers. The fact that a 100% response was achieved goes some way to negating the concerns. Where possible, the data supplied in the questionnaires was checked against existing police records, particularly in relation to the respondents personal details such as age and length of service. Again this was possible due to personal knowledge, even though the questionnaires were returned anonymously, and this created a test of validity against the rest of the data.

Tables 1 to 4 show selected sociodemographic features of the respondents in terms of rank, gender, age and present posts held by the Handlers, and the non Handlers. These tables show how the two groups may be safely compared even though the non-Handlers are not an exact match.

Table 1 - Ranks of police Handlers and non Handlers

	HANDLER	NON HANDLER	TOTAL
CONSTABLE	14	28	42
SERGEANT	7	16	23
INSPECTOR	1	2	3
CHIEF INSPECTOR	3	4	7
TOTAL	25	50	75

Table 1 gives the data in terms of the rank of the respondents.

Table 2 - Gender of police officers

	HANDLER	NON HANDLER	TOTAL
MALE	22	42	64
FEMALE	3	8	11
TOTAL	25	50	75

Table 2 gives the data in terms of Gender. It can be seen that out of the 25 Handlers, only 3 (or 12%) were female. This, on the face of it seems a low figure, but in fact is comparative to the percentage of female officers in the Lincolnshire Police, presently standing at approximately 12%. One of the respondents is a detective policewoman aged 26 - 36 years, having handled Informers for 3 - 5 years; she suggested the main reason she became involved was the detection of crime. The second officer was a female uniform sergeant, aged 26 - 35 years, engaged in handling for 1 - 2 years and she gave the main reason as being a cost effective tool. She said, *"So far my experiences with informants have not been particularly fruitful but I continue as I have been involved in successful jobs where the information provided has been correct and property recovered and prisoners arrested."*

The third Handler was a Chief Inspector aged 36 - 40 years, involved in handling for 3 - 5 years who also gave the detection of crime as the main motivation.

Unfortunately, the data does not allow further analysis to be carried out regarding gender issues. For example, the female Handlers were not questioned about the categories of crime they were interested in, or more importantly, whether they dealt specifically with female Informers. In hindsight perhaps, the research should have considered these issues which are clearly important in this context, although even so the numbers are too small to draw meaningful conclusions.

There are however, some assumptions that can be made by the researcher through the personal knowledge of the respondents. All three have considerable crime investigation experience, and all said they were able to cover the full range of offences with their Informers. It is also known that all three officers also handled male Informers, in fact they had rather more male than female Informers. There is no evidence that the 3 female Handlers placed any specific emphasis on their gender.

Table 3 - Age groups of police officers

	HANDLER	NON HANDLER	TOTAL
19-25	0	2	2
26-35	10	23	33
36-40	10	9	19
41-50	5	16	21
TOTAL	25	50	75

Table 4 - Status of police officers

	HANDLER	NON HANDLER	TOTAL
UNIFORM	6	17	23
CID	11	26	37
OTHER POST	8	7	15
TOTAL	25	50	75

$$(\chi^2 = 3.46, df = 2, p = 0.177)$$

It was important to match as many of the variables as possible in order that any comparisons could be made between the two groups. This was achieved using the officers rank, sex, age structure and post held, as shown in Tables 1 to 4. Table 3 recasts the data in terms of age, and Table 4 extends this to cover status. No significance tests were appropriate in Tables 2 and 3 because the numbers were too small in some of the cells.

As already discussed, the two groups were well matched, even though there were slightly more non-handlers in the over 40 age group, and proportionally fewer aged 36-40. There is no obvious reason for this, and if the two age groups are considered together, that is 36 - 50 years, then the comparison is more balanced. These results are not significant.

The reference in Table 4 to 'other posts' include the Regional Crime Squad, Drug Squad and local Drug Enforcement Teams; there were proportionally less of the non Handlers in this group. A chi square test was carried out but was found not to be significant at the 90% or even 85% levels. There is therefore no statistical evidence of a difference between the two groups. To speculate, it could be argued that the specialist squads tend to be more proactive and therefore rely more heavily on the use of Informers. It would be more likely therefore to find officers in this group to be Handlers.

With these exceptions, there appears to be no relevant difference between the two groups, and it may be concluded that the two populations can reasonably be used as control groups against each other.

The Handler

The first part of the analysis was to examine the data provided by the 25 active Handlers who were asked their main reason for becoming involved in Informer handling and Table 5 looks at the responses they gave for their involvement.

Table 5 - Main reason for involvement

REASON	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE
DETECTION OF CRIME	12	48
ARREST OF CRIMINALS	5	20
ENJOY DEALING WITH CRIMINALS	4	16
COST EFFECTIVE TOOL	3	12
EXCITEMENT	1	4
TOTAL	25	100

It has to be accepted that some of the respondents may have more than one reason for becoming involved as Handlers, and this study does not try to establish an order of priorities. For these purposes, it was sufficient to obtain the 'main' reason, that is the one which, in their view, was the most important.

Table 5 examines the main reason given by the Handlers for informing. The data shows that only one Handler (4%) considered the main reason to be excitement. He was a male detective constable, aged between 26 and 35 years, working in mainstream CID with more than 6 years experience as a handler. He explained

his answer saying, *"Dealing with informants creates a personal interest in specific crimes, and therefore having a personal interest contributes to maintaining my enthusiasm for dealing with the job and securing the correct result. I feel a mood of contentment whenever I am involved in a job from start (obtaining the information) to finish (securing the conviction)"*

This officer does not expand on what he considers to be the 'correct result' but presumably he is suggesting the arrest and conviction of criminals. It may be argued that this does not tie in with his reply that he is involved with Informers for the 'excitement'. In fact, his response suggests that he is more concerned with being fully involved with an enquiry; nevertheless, the excitement seems to be uppermost in his mind.

Another four Handlers (16%) stated that they enjoyed dealing with criminals. A further three (12%) felt that the use of Informers was a cost effective method of crime investigation. However, the majority of those interviewed, seventeen in all (68%) gave their main reason as the 'arrest of criminals' (5) and the 'detection of crime' (12). The dominant feature here then is the responses from 20 (80%) of the Handlers who wanted to get the job done, arresting criminals, detecting crime and doing it cost-effectively. Of the three officers who felt that the use of Informers was a cost effective investigative tool, one detective constable remarked that he felt that senior police officers were not fully aware of the need to pay Informers a suitable amount of money, and with the least possible delay. This is not an uncommon criticism of the police system, and there is ample evidence throughout the country which indicates that bureaucracy tends to take priority over complaints from practitioners. A male uniform inspector with 3 to 5 years experience as a Handler said, *"The cultivation and usefulness of a tried informant can be an effective and efficient tool in the detection of crime."* He warned though that, *"the informant system is now becoming more frustrating*

due to the introduction of the disclosure rules". This may suggest that practitioners feel the constraints and controls on them are inhibiting their role as Handlers.

Of the four Handlers who gave 'enjoyment' as their main reason, one detective constable said it was obtaining the information that he enjoyed most, whilst a young male uniform constable with little over a years experience as a Handler said, *"I find dealing with criminals far more interesting and rewarding than any other aspect of my police service. I enjoy a pro-active approach to police work. Dealing with and obtaining information can be rewarding and it may detect crime that may otherwise go undetected. I find I am able to communicate well with criminals and this has been of benefit in cultivating informants. But being in uniform makes it difficult due to the lack of time to allow for the numerous visits that are often required to meet informants."*

This officer's final point suggests that uniformed officers are by definition restricted in what they can do, and there can be few who believe that "being in uniform" cannot have some effect on the cultivation of Informers. That is not to say though that detectives will become more involved simply because they are "in plain clothes", merely that there is an assumption that plain clothes officers have more opportunity.

In relation to the arrest of criminals, one young male uniform officer attached to a pro-active team said, *"The more people you arrest, the more opportunity there is for recruiting informants."* He is suggesting that the best time to recruit Informers is when the individual is in custody who, for various reasons, they will provide more information. This aspect of recruitment will be discussed later in the main research study.

Out of the 12 officers who felt that the 'detection of crime' was the main reason they became involved, one detective constable suggested that Informers are now the only method of recovering stolen property, and a male detective sergeant with 1 to 2 years experience as a Handler said, *"Dealing with informants is an easy and unique method of detecting crime. They are an essential tool in the pro-active field of work. The difficulty, sometimes, is obtaining quality information that can be acted upon."* Other practitioners may disagree that Informers are easy to deal with; 'easy' is rather a poor term to use in these circumstances. Nevertheless, few can argue that their use is not unique.

Table 6 - Main reason for involvement, by rank of Handlers

	CONSTABLE	SERGEANT	INSPECTOR/C/INSP	TOTAL
EXCITEMENT	1	0	0	1
DETECTION OF CRIME	6	4	0	12
ARREST OF CRIMINALS	2	2	0	5
ENJOY DEALING	4	0	0	4
COST EFFECTIVE TOOL	1	1	1	3
TOTAL	14	7	1	25

Table 6 sets out the main reason for being involved with Informers in terms of the rank of the Handlers. It is clear from Table 1 that the majority (14, 56%) of respondents were constables, and this is not surprising. However, Table 6 shows that only the constables considered their involvement was due to 'enjoyment' or 'excitement'. The supervisory ranks were involved because they felt that the use of Informers gets the job done. The detection of crime, the reason given by most of the Handlers seems to relate to most ranks of the officers.

The Non Handlers

The study examines those 50 police officers who were known not to have become involved in the use of Informers. The findings from this study can not be linked to the main research (Chapter seven) as non-Handlers do not feature there. Table 7 examines the reasons these officers gave for their non-involvement.

Table 7 - Reasons given by non-handlers for not being involved

	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE
NO OPPORTUNITY	23	46
NOT INTERESTED	9	18
HASSLE	8	16
NOT CUT OUT FOR IT	5	10
NO SUCCESS	2	4
DISAGREE MORALLY	1	2
SUPERVISORY OFFICER	1	2
HANDED OVER TO CID	1	2
TOTAL	50	100

Table 7 shows that by far the most dominant feature was those respondents (23 or 46%) who claimed to have had a lack of opportunity to cultivate Informers. There is then a group (24 or 48%) who gave an assortment of negative reasons, including those who claimed they were 'not interested' (9 or 18%), or it was too much 'hassle' (8 or 16%), or they felt they were 'not cut out' for this type of work (5, 10%), or merely that would have 'no success' from such an involvement (2, 4%).

Three others (6%) were more positive in their responses, one saying that he 'disagreed morally', and another suggested that any involvement would be 'handed over to the CID', and the third explained that he was a 'supervisory officer'. In fact, he was an experienced male detective sergeant who said,

"I am a supervisory officer. Detective constables in my section involve themselves in informants which I encourage. Whenever I come into contact with potential informants, I steer them towards one of my men. I retain practical interest in the informant handling activity of my men while avoiding personal ownership."

It is difficult to understand what this officer is trying to say, when he obviously does not feel comfortable about getting too involved with Informers, and is quite content to leave such work to his staff. But as a supervisory officer, perhaps one could be forgiven for thinking that he is merely avoiding his responsibility. More importantly, as a detective, perhaps he has failed to understand the importance the police service is presently placing on this aspect of crime investigation. He does however only represent 2% of the population studied.

Table 8 - Reasons for non involvement of police officers by status

	UNIFORM	CID	DRUG SQUAD	OTHER	TOTAL
INCONVENIENCE(HASSLE)	0	4	4	0	8
NOT CUT OUT FOR IT	1	3	0	1	5
NOT INTERESTED	0	8	1	0	9
DISAGREE MORALLY	0	1	0	0	1
NO OPPORTUNITY	13	9	1	0	23
NO SUCCESS	2	0	0	0	2
SUPERVISORY OFFICER	0	1	0	0	1
HANDED OVER TO CID	1	0	0	0	1
TOTAL	17	26	6	1	50

Table 8 recasts the data and shows the main reasons given for not being involved in terms of status. It is not surprising to see that the majority of the uniformed officers (13 or 76%) felt they had 'no opportunity' to act as Handlers. One such officer suggested, "*If it has looked likely that I would get an informant, then the CID approach and want to take over.*" This suggests that the officer may have given up his right to cultivate an Informer because he was not in the C.I.D., but it could also be the case that this uniformed officer was quite satisfied to hand over an Informer to an officer with more opportunity to cultivate that Informer. There is no data available from this study to confirm this or otherwise, and similarly, there is no evidence that the relationship between uniformed officers and the C.I.D has created any sort of conflict.

Another young constable in uniform believed that his lack of involvement was due to what he called the necessity to pass on potential informers to the C.I.D. He said, "*All persons to date that have passed information onto me, I have introduced to detectives to register, who have more time and means to deal with informants.*" This officer's answer was not dissimilar to that uniformed officer who felt that he did not have the opportunity because the C.I.D took over the handling of his potential Informers.

More interestingly, though, this 'lack of opportunity' was offered as a reason by the majority (9 or 35%) of mainstream C.I.D. officers. These were all sergeants or constables who presumably were in the business of detecting crime. None of these officers felt it necessary to explain their answers further, and this in itself is interesting.

Further more, if it is assumed that C.I.D. officers are actively involved in the investigation of crime, there seems to be some conflict with the 15 (58%) detectives who were 'not interested', 'not cut out' for this type of work or

thought it was 'hassle'. All of the 9 (18%) respondents who said they were 'not interested' were detectives working in mainstream C.I.D. or drug squad. A sergeant attached to the drug squad suggested that, *"This is not the way to get on in the job. There are easier ways."* This may or may not be right, but must be seen as something of a surprise from an officer who is presumably dedicated to pro-active policing in the fight against drug abuse - as well as being a supervisory officer. This particular point will be examined again in the main body of the research when the respondents there were asked if the use of Informers advances them in their careers. Here, a detective constable in the C.I.D. remarked that, although he was not against using Informers in the fight against crime, he merely preferred to use other ways himself.

Out of the 5 (10%) officers who felt they were 'not cut out' for this type of work, only 1 was a uniformed officer; the remaining 4 were established detectives, 3 (12%) from mainstream C.I.D.. The uniformed officer was a female sergeant, aged between 26 and 35 years of age who said, *"I do not feel I have the necessary skills, but also because there is no training programme, I cant learn."*

These sentiments were echoed by a male constable attached to a proactive team, who explained that he had never been taught how to handle Informers. This is true for most police forces in this country as there have been few courses teaching officers how to be a Handlers; such training has come with experience and officers having the necessary flair. There is ample evidence that police forces are recognising the need to establish training packages for Handlers and their controllers. Lincolnshire in fact are spearheading a radical package which centres on improving the knowledge and awareness of active practitioners. In addition, the National Criminal Intelligence Service have piloted a scheme which, if approved, will be accepted nationally.

A similar picture emerges in relation to those who thought the involvement was 'hassle'. Again, all the respondents (8) were detectives from either mainstream CID or drug squads. Perhaps one can assume they at least tried cultivating Informers. Only two officers decided to qualify their answers, and a detective sergeant on the drug squad exclaimed, *"I cant believe why anyone should get involved. They're shit."* A detective constable working in the C.I.D added, *"I'm not going to put my neck on the line for them."* One may assume that this officer believes that by becoming involved will automatically compromise his position as a police officer. In effect, there is a tacit assumption that the use of Informers must involve breaking laws or violating laid down procedures.

Table 9 - Ranks of those officers who suggested a lack of opportunity

	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE
CONSTABLE	12	52
SERGEANT	5	22
CHIEF INSPECTOR	4	17
INSPECTOR	2	9
TOTAL	23	100

Table 9 looks more closely at those officers who thought they had no opportunity to act as Handlers in terms of their rank. The data shows that of the 23 respondents, over half (52%) were constables; this is a large proportion of the total non-Handler population (Table 1). One male uniform constable explained, *"As a uniformed town officer, there is a very limited opportunity to become involved. People are generally reluctant to give information to the uniform."*

Discussion and Conclusions

Although the two groups are relatively small, they are closely matched in terms of age, sex, rank and role.

It could be suggested that, in relation to the first 25 interviewees, the data offers few surprises. Those who get involved in handling, it appears, are very positive about the benefits and are clear about their reasons for doing so. The majority of officers engaged in this type of work are constables who work in plain clothes. As such, it is hardly a revelation to learn that the majority of those officers considered the main reason for their involvement to be the arrest of criminals or the detection of crime. Indeed, that has to be their main objective as detectives anyway. There emerged, though, two separate groups. Firstly there were those who saw handling as a way of getting the job done effectively, who were concerned about the arrest and detection of crime. The second group, though, were involved for more personal reasons, either for enjoyment or excitement. This second group were all constables whilst those having what could be seen as a more professional approach seemed to be of higher rank. This may have some implications; that is to say, the constables who are involved for personal reasons, may not be as professional as they ought to be. The concern is not that police officers have expressed feelings of enjoyment or excitement, but rather that some have considered such feelings to be rather more important than the more professional reasons. This concern may emerge during the main study but whether it does or not, will not detract from the need to refer to these concerns in the recommendations (Chapter eight).

The fact that none of these Handlers thought that career advancement was a reason for involvement was a little surprising, particularly regarding the detective officers. Informer handling is considered to be an important aspect of

detecting crime, and therefore one which detectives could be judged in terms of their performance. Clearly this is not the case; these findings will be compared with the respondents in the main study (Chapter seven).

The second group of police officers, that is the 50 who had not become involved in the handling of Informers, have also been examined. This group appeared to be much more negative or evasive about their reasons for not being involved. Nearly half of this group felt that they did not have the opportunity to do so and interestingly, 10 officers in that group were detectives. This lack of involvement by detectives becomes even more interesting after finding that a further 9 detectives admitted they had no interest in this side of their work, and another 8 detectives considered that Informer handling was 'hassle'.

When including the detectives who felt that they were not comfortable with this type of work, or disagreed morally with its use, and the detective sergeant who used his supervisory duties as an excuse for not engaging in the use of Informers personally, then it is apparent that a majority (33 or 66%) of the respondents directly concerned with the detection of crime, were not actively involved in Informer use.

This research has not examined the reasons why such a high proportion of detectives in either C.I.D or specialist roles (62% Table 8) have decided not to become involved in the handling of Informers. A large case load, for example may restrict the time available, or the level of support and advice offered by their supervisory officers may have failed to provide the correct level of enthusiasm. The fact remains, though, that a high proportion of detective officers who presumably have been made aware of the importance of cultivating Informers, have decided to ignore this particular method of crime investigation.

A number of the respondents referred to the lack of training given to them, and it is true that very few police forces provide training courses on the use of Informers. This situation is slowly improving nationally, but it is suspected that the 'lack of training' may be nothing more than an excuse for not wanting to become involved. Indeed, some police officers argue that the skills required to be an Informer Handler cannot be taught and come only from experience. However, the new Codes of Practice which every force is now signed up to, requires that officers are given appropriate training, and defence lawyers will undoubtedly be interested if untrained Handlers and Controllers are involved in trials where Informers have been used.

Table 5 has shown that 80% of the Handlers (20) became involved in the use of Informers because 'they wanted to get the job done'. It could be assumed, because the second group were drawn from similar backgrounds, that they too would have wanted similar results. The difference however, is that the second group of 50 respondents have not felt that the use of Informers helps them to achieve this. Indeed, Table 8 shows that 9 officers, all detectives admitted they were not interested in Informers. These results are surprising when the Audit Commission, Her Majesty's Inspectors of Constabulary and the police service generally have all agreed that such use is an efficient and cost effective tool.

There is perhaps a more simplistic conclusion that can be drawn from this work. The individual, a police officer, who ever he or she may be, of whatever rank, gender and background, may have merely decided that he or she does not wish to enter into this type of work. Because one officer feels comfortable with dealing with Informers and has been successful, that is not to say that another officer feels the same. Some officers prefer to present a crime file, some prefer surveillance work, whilst others like the management and strategic planning of an operation. It follows then that, whilst some police officers will enjoy handling

Informers, not all will do so, and it must be accepted that the use of Informers is not the only investigative tool to be used by the police service.

This small part of the research has tried to examine the rationale behind police officers becoming Informer handlers within the police service. It has identified a number of known active handlers, and compared them with another group made up of similar antecedent history who are known to have gone through their policing service without involving themselves in Informer use. The research has failed to establish any definitive reason for the actions of the two groups, except to show that the decision to become a Handler is a subjective one, and depends solely on the preferences of the individual. In essence, if an officer shows an aptitude towards this method of policing, then the chances are that he or she will continue to pursue this area, as long as there is the opportunity, and to some degree, the support from supervisory officers.

It has to be conceded that this study, having been carried out in a rural police force, may not be representative of the country. Lincolnshire can only be compared in terms of size, population and the level of crime with a handful of other forces in England, and a study undertaken in a larger urban area would possibly have produced different results. However, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary it is reasonable to assume that the population used in this study forms an acceptable cross section of police Handlers throughout England.

Perhaps the conclusions to be drawn from this study can provide something of a foundation for the rest of the work. The fact that an individual will decide for himself whether or not he will become involved should be borne in mind when discussing the relationship between the Informer and Handler. The variables identified here relating to the lack of opportunity, insufficient interest in this

method of policing, an acceptance that the officer is not suited to Informer handling, are all acceptable and to some extent reasonable explanations for their non involvement. We are dealing here with a cross section of officers, all with their own priorities, objectives and standards.

For every police officer who has some inclination towards using Informers, there are at least two more with similar backgrounds, rank and experience, who do not. Nevertheless, it is those officers who become involved who are important to this study. Drawing from the findings of this study, we know that 62% of the non-Handlers were detectives or plain clothed officers such as drug squad officers. This is the type of work in which it would be expected that Informers feature heavily. Nevertheless, a substantial number of officers have decided not to become involved.

It has been the case in the past that as soon as a police officer becomes a detective, he is automatically considered to be an expert Informer Handler. It was thought to be a qualification for selection, and there is evidence that officers attending selection interviews for CID would register a number of Informers to convince the panel that he/she was actively involved in the use of Informers. Similar examples are less likely to be seen now, probably due to the fact that competency skills for detective training identifies Informer Handling as one of many investigative skills required by crime investigators. As a result, what seems to be happening in the police service today, is that specialist dedicated units are being set up with far less officers given the opportunity or required to handle Informers. This situation is made worse by the publication of stringent codes of practice, and the implementation of the Human Rights Act 1998 (operative from 2 October 2000) which will demand tighter controls of the use of Informers in terms of an individual's right to privacy etc. It is expected that future trials, and

case law will not favour the use of Informers, and this may deter officers from becoming involved.

If this does occur, then not only will it affect Handlers, but also Controllers. The police service will require Inspectors and above to control the use of Informers, when in fact those officers will probably have no experience as Handlers themselves. Such controllers will not understand the problems of handling Informers; not be able to carry out meaningful risk-assessments; and therefore not make appropriate decisions. It is feared that Controllers will not be in a position to control those Handlers under their supervision, resulting in the potential for corruption, miscarriages of justice, and abuse of authority.

There is an argument then, for the police service to consider career detectives and their appropriate training through the ranks. This specific study will link the findings regarding the active Handlers with the main body of the research. However, the importance of the conclusions drawn in respect of the non-Handlers must not be forgotten.

The aim of this specific study was to determine why some police officers become involved in informer handling, and others do not. The results have shown that most Handlers start because they feel it will increase their chances of success in their role; that is to say, Informers will help to detect more crime or arrest criminals. On the other hand, those police officers who had not become involved either thought that they had not been given the opportunity, or they were merely not interested in that type of work. Very few of the respondents referred to the relationship with an Informer. Even from the respondents who had not become involved with Informers, hardly any seemed to be critical of the relationship itself. This fact does not seem, on the face of it, to link the findings of this specific study with the main research, which concentrates on the

relationship between an Informer and Handler. However, the results could suggest that the initial motives of a police officer are not likely to affect the relationship. Put simply, the reasons for a police officer becoming a Handler may not have any relevance to the Handler/Informer relationship. The relationship may not be so important when it first starts, but becomes more important as it develops through time. The relationship itself will be examined in more detail in chapter seven.

The study in Lincolnshire has highlighted the importance of recognising some of the motives of police officers, and also that those motives are as important as those of the Informer. The study has also shown though that any attempts to produce a profile of a typical police Handler (Sub aim 2a of the study - To establish a profile for Handlers) are difficult, to say the least. This issue will be examined further in chapter seven.

CHAPTER SEVEN

Results

The analysis of the data is discussed in order of the six Aims referred to in Chapter Four.

The data are based on the information obtained from the questionnaires. Some assumptions can be made from the available data. In relation to employments, for example, it would be safe to assume that those who were unemployed, had they secured any job at all, would have been in Social Class 5 (unskilled labourer) (Appendix I). That assumption is based on the fact that 38% of the Informers in employment described themselves as labourers, and it would be likely therefore that a substantial number of the remaining Informers would have been in the same social class.

Aim 1 - To determine what constitutes an Informer.

Sub Aim A. To define an Informer

The aim here is to define an Informer. The data is set out in Tables 1, 2 and 3. Table 1 compares the perceptions of the Informers and Handlers; both were asked to give their definition of an Informer. Table 2 examines the definitions

given by the Informers in relation to their reasons for starting informing, and Table 3 provides more detailed information on this theme.

Table 1 - Definition of an Informer, as perceived by the Informer and Handler.

	INFORMER	HANDLER	TOTAL
PASSING INFORMATION	0	116	116
PERSONAL BENEFIT	12	0	12
HELPING POLICE	102	0	102
OTHER	6	4	10
TOTAL	120	120	240

($\chi^2 = 230.4$, $df = 3$, $p = <0.001$).

Informers and Handlers were asked how they would define an Informer. The statistical significance in Table 1 could be discounted, the Chi square test being meaningless due to number of cells showing no figures. Nevertheless, the table does show clear differences.

Table 1 shows that for the Informers Group, most (102 or 85%) saw themselves as someone who helps the police or catches criminals. Twelve regarded themselves as informing for payment or reward. For these, the reward was crucial as one Informer (34) explained

- *"My mates are all criminals and I know I'm dropping them in the shit but I've got to get the money from somewhere."*

Another (61) said,

- *"I'm in this business because I can make more money this way than the dishonest way without worrying about you lot knocking on my door. Anyway, I enjoy it".*

In contrast, the majority (116 or 97%) of Handlers believed that the Informer's role was to pass information, as suggested by one Handler (215) who defined an Informer as,

- *"A person who associates with villains, possibly a villain himself, prepared to give me information".*

The difference may be quite subtle, in that providing information and helping the police could be construed as being one and the same thing.

Clearly most Informers consider they are working together assisting the Police. As one Informer (1) explained,

- *"Assisting with evidence to convict somebody. Being able to find out things that other people can't. To gain access to places where police officers can't go."* Another Informer (7) suggested a more simplistic role defining it as,
- *"Catching little shits".* The Handler, on the other hand merely believes the Informer is someone to be used to achieve his objective, as suggested by one Handler (213) who defined an Informer as,
- *"A necessary tool who has to be used for information against criminals".*

Interestingly, 4 Handlers considered Informers to be dangerous, but none of the Informers saw themselves in this way. Also, it is surprising to see that none of the Handlers suggested that 'obtaining personal benefit' by the Informer should be part of the definition, even though, as we will see later, one of the main motives is financial.

The distinction between the two groups is more apparent after the Handlers were asked to explain their role. One (214) said,

- *"Controlling Informers - maintaining the upper hand, but treat them as a friend"*. This element of control was highlighted by another (228) who saw his role as,
- *"Managing the Informer and the information, directing the Informer"*. Others saw it as their responsibility to protect the Informer and some (288) considered the development of the relationship as their prime role.

Table 2 - Informers reasons for starting, by definition.

		DEFINITION	
	PERSONAL GAIN	HELPING POLICE	TOTAL
PERSONAL BENEFIT	12	74	86
OTHER REASON	0	34	34
TOTAL	12	108	120

$$(\chi^2 = 5.3, df = 1, p = 0.021)$$

Developing the definition further, Table 2 compares the reasons given by Informers for getting involved, with the definitions they gave for their role. The table shows that 12 (10%) Informers define an Informer as someone who does it for 'personal benefit', and 12 also confirm that is why they started informing, like the Informer (54) who said,

- *"I have been bled dry by the dogs of the earth. The only way I can get back at them is to tell the police about their activities"*.

'Personal benefit' may also include those who use the police, like a female (120) who explained,

- *"To look after myself I give information to the police. In my business, I need them to be on my side, but it suits them as well. They wouldn't get the information if I didn't carry on business."*

This particular Informer was a married woman who lived in privately owned good class accommodation. She ran an illegal brothel which was well known to the local police, and all the information she gave was connected with her clients and often involved child pornography and sexual offences. It was established during the interview, that she was having a sexual association with her Handler, and this fact seemed to be common knowledge, at least in police circles. Her interpretation of 'personal benefit' was probably different to some of the others.

A discrepancy emerges with the 108 (90%) Informers who define an Informer as someone who helps the police or has some other non-personal motivation; in that out of those 108 Informers, 74 (69%) said started for personal reasons, not in any way connected with helping the police. This suggests some conflict between the Informer's reason for giving information and their definition of the role of an Informer. It should be noted here that Table 2 shows 108 Informers who said they were helping the police, as opposed to 102 in Table 1. This is because Table 2 includes 6 Informers who did not know why they started informing.

There is conflict also in the results when comparing Table 1 and Table 2. As already noted, 86 Informers accepted that they started informing for personal reasons, but when asked to define an Informer, only 12 thought 'personal benefit' was worth mentioning. Perhaps though, this is not so surprising as they may well have considered that 'helping the police' would have ensured that they themselves benefit.

The fact remains though that 74 Informers who started informing for their own benefit defined their role as 'helping the police'. This fact becomes even more confusing when in Table 1, it is shown that none of the Handlers defined an Informer as someone who 'helped the police'.

Table 3 - Detailed comparison between definition of an Informer and reasons given for informing.

	Catching/Grass	Reward	Helping Police	Dont know	Total
REVENGE	3	2	8	2	15
REDUCE SENT	6	0	10	0	16
Friendly with officer	0	0	6	2	8
Dislikes that crime	5	0	12	0	17
FINANCIAL	13	6	11	2	32
ENJOYMENT	0	0	1	0	1
Gratitude	0	0	2	0	2
LOOKING FOR FAVOUR	3	2	4	0	9
Police pressure	2	0	2	0	4
PART OF A DEAL	0	0	2	0	2
CHALLENGE	0	0	2	0	2
GET ON RIGHT SIDE	4	2	3	0	9
Take out competition	0	0	3	0	3
TOTAL	36	12	66	6	120

Table 3 extends even more the definition of Informers and highlights the discrepancy which has emerged between how the Informers define an informer and what they say their reasons for informing are, as shown in Table 2. Even though significance tests are not relevant here, because the cells are too small, the point is made that although 108 Informers define their role as helping the police or catching criminals, it becomes apparent that 86 of them became

Informers for other reasons, all of which benefit themselves personally (those reasons are highlighted in Table 3). For example, 32 Informers became involved for financial reasons; this does not easily fit in with the concept of 'helping the police'. However, out of those 32, only 6 included payment or reward in their definition.

Perhaps what these first three tables show is that the reason why Informers start informing cannot necessarily be related to their definition of an Informer. It will be seen later the motives appear to change throughout their career, but it seems reasonable to accept that the reason an Informer first becomes involved has little bearing on what he later perceives his role to be. What is clear though, is that no agreed definition emerges, and in fact the two groups, the police and Informer have little common ground.

Sub Aim B. To differentiate between a registered Informer, a police contact and a public spirited citizen.

The research was directed at registered Informers, that is those who inform on a regular basis. It has therefore not been possible to compare other informants known by the police simply as contacts¹ or as public spirited citizens². Although there is no data available from this study in relation to each of these other types of informants, the interviewees were asked what they perceived the differences to be between the various groups. The results are set out in Tables 4 and 5.

¹ A contact is defined as someone who regularly gives information, but who does not have a criminal background, and does not require payment or other reward, E.g. a Bank Manager.

² A public spirited citizen is defined as someone who gives information to the police about a particular incident, the sole reason being as a public duty, E.g. witness to a road accident or Neighbourhood Watch Co-ordinator.

Table 4 shows the Handlers' views on what they perceive to be the differences between an Informer and each of the other two groups, the contact and public spirited citizen.

Table 4 - Differences between Informers and contacts or public spirited citizens according to the Handlers.

	INFORMER/CONTACT	INFORMER/PSC
SOMETHING IN RETURN	38 (32%)	45 (38%)
CRIMINAL HISTORY	38 (32%)	35 (29%)
REGULARITY	19 (16%)	NO DIFFERENCE
OTHER REASONS	13 (11%)	27 (22%)
QUALITY OF INFORMATION	12 (10%)	NO DIFFERENCE
PUBLIC DUTY	NO DIFFERENCE	13 (11%)
TOTAL	120 (100%)	120 (100%)

First, Table 4 looks at how the Handlers perceive the main differences between the Informer and the Contact and also the differences between the Informer and the Public Spirited Citizen. The table describes how they, the Handlers, differentiate between an Informer and other sources of information. The results show that Handlers saw Informers as different to both the Contact and the Public Spirited Citizens in two respects; first, due to the previous ‘criminal history’ of the Informer group, and second due to the Informers’ demands for ‘something in return’. As one Handler (207) put it,

- *"My Informers are professional criminals".* Another Handler (235) adds that,
- *"His motives for giving information usually being financial reward".*

Handlers distinguished between Informers and Public Spirited Citizens in two distinct ways. First there was a sense of public duty (11%) by the Public Spirited Citizen and second, in their willingness to give evidence in court, shown as 'other' (7%) in the Table. One Handler (225) explained,

- *"An Informer does it for a reason, gain power, revenge, whereas a public spirited citizen does it out of a sense of duty"*. Another (227) said,
- *"They do not usually mind if their identity is disclosed and therefore will act as witnesses"*. One Handler (286) suggested the Public Spirited Citizen was
- *"-Limited; one-off information"*.

When comparing the Contact group with the Informer group, the Handlers thought that the unique differences were that the Informers were more regular with their information (16%) and the information was usually better quality (10%). Amongst the 'other' reasons, it was felt that the Informer's demand for anonymity (6%), set them apart.

A number of assumptions can be made in relation to an assessment of the Handler's responses. The analysis has shown a number of characteristics which specifically relate to the Informer, the Contact or the Public Spirited Citizen. These can be shown as follows:

(a). The Informer will probably have a criminal history, will be highly motivated by payment or reward and be in regular contact with their Handler. He will be able to offer good quality information, give it for his own benefit and will demand anonymity.

(b). The Public Spirited Citizen will be much likely to be selfless, and driven by a sense of public duty. He will be prepared to give evidence in court and as such will not demand anonymity, and will not necessarily have a criminal background.

He will not be motivated by payment or reward and will make contact on an ad hoc basis.

(c). The Contact group are similar to Public Spirited Citizen group but do not have the same altruistic motives. Contacts prefer anonymity and are unlikely to give evidence in court; they are not motivated by a sense of duty, but more likely to be interested in some personal benefit; they are likely to be in more regular contact than the Public Spirited Citizen.

(d). The Contact is a long way from being an Informer, and closer to the Public Spirited Citizen in many respects, so that it is suggested they are at different points on the same continuum. Indeed the latter probably constitutes a different type of informant altogether, whereas the Informer and Contact are similar. However, it is easy to see how each could move up or down as their motives and rewards change.

Clearly the Public Spirited Citizen is far removed from the Informer and equally a long way from the Contact. Simply put, they are all so different. The result may be considered surprising in that all give information to the police, but their motives are substantially different, as too are their backgrounds. Perhaps that is why the police deal with them differently, and in particular it may be why only the Informer is registered and controlled.

Sub Aim C. To establish a profile for Informers: a sociodemographic analysis.

The aim here is to arrive at a profile of an Informer in terms of selected sociodemographic features. The results are shown in Tables 6 to 18. Table 6 refers to the age and sex of the Informers, whilst Tables 7 to 10 look at their

marital status. Tables 11 to 14 examine the employment details and Tables 15 and 16 examine their criminal backgrounds. Table 17 links those Informers with previous convictions first by length of time informing and second, by gender. Table 18 looks at the Informer's knowledge about whether other members of their family are also informing.

Broad Demographic Detail of Informers.

There were 120 Informers in all, and 120 Handlers interviewed during this study.

Table 5- Age/Gender profile of Informers.³

	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL	NATIONAL COMPARISON
18-21	9 (9)	3 (11)	12 (10)	7%
22-28	23 (25)	6 (21)	29 (24)	14%
29-35	34 (37)	5 (18)	39 (32)	13%
36-42	7 (8)	8 (29)	15 (13)	13%
OVER 42	19 (21)	6 (21)	25 (21)	53%
TOTAL	92 (100)	28 (100)	120 (100)	100%

(Figures in brackets refer to percentages)

($\chi^2 = 10.09$, $df = 4$, $p = .0388$)

Table 5 shows that 10% of all Informers were aged between 18 and 21 years, and 21% over 42 years. The data does not show specific ages, only age groups, but the youngest Informer was 18 years of age and the eldest Informer was 48 years of age. The Male:Female ratio was 77:23, which compares with 49:51 for the adult population generally (Appendix G). Out of the 120 Informers in the population, 92 were males and 28 females, showing that males were over

³ The National comparison figures are taken from the 1991 census in relation to adult populations.

represented. The males were mainly in their early 20s to mid 30s (62%), whereas females were more evenly distributed across the age groups. Females were significantly over-represented in the 36-42 age group (Standardised Residual = 2.4) and under-represented in the 29-35 age group (5), suggesting that the male Informers tend to be younger than females.

Compared with the population generally, Informers were over-represented (by a ratio of 2:1) in all the age groups up to 42, but under-represented (by 2:5) in the age groups over 42. The 29-35 age group accounted for the biggest single group, being 32% of the total - this compared with a National figure of 13%. These figures suggest that informing is primarily a younger person's activity, with 66% of the total under 36 years of age.

Table 6 - Marital status of Informers by gender.

	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL
MARRIED	42	6	48
DIVORCED/SEPARATED	17	13	30
SINGLE	33	9	42
TOTAL	92	28	120

$$(\chi^2 = 9.9, df = 2, p = 0.007)$$

A good deal of care needs to be exercised when interpreting marital status as reported by the Informers. Some, who are separated, saw themselves as single, and some who are married but separated saw themselves as married. The data in Table 6 therefore is only concerned with the responses, and compares the marital status of the Informers with gender. The Table shows there were many single informers - rather more than expected, (35% compared with only 24% nationally) with almost one third single males and one third single females. The

most significant feature in terms of marital status is 46% (13) of females were divorced or separated, (Standardised Residual = 2.3) and the correspondingly low percentage who were married (21%, 6). Only 6 females out of 28 (23%) said they were married, compared with 42 males out of 92 (or 45%). This was a little surprising, especially as Table 5 showed that females were generally older than the males.

Table 7 - Divorced/separated Informers reasons for informing, by gender.

	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL
PERSONAL GAIN	12	6	18
FRIENDSHIP/GRATITUDE	2	4	6
MORAL REASONS	1	3	4
POLICE PRESSURE	2	0	2
TOTAL	17	13	30

Table 7 shows the listed reasons for informing given by those divorced or separated Informers, by gender. Those 30 Informers who were divorced or separated were analysed separately to determine whether their marital status had any bearing on their reasons for starting informing. Table 7 shows the results. The data shows male Informers to be more interested in materialistic gains, personal gain and police pressure (14, 82%) whilst the females gave more 'humanistic' answers, with Friendship/Gratitude and Morality their main concern (7, 54%).

Table 8 - Marital status of Informers by age group.

	AGE					
	18-21	22-28	29-35	36-42	OVER 42	TOTAL
MARRIED	0	9	25	6	8	48
DIVORCED/SEPARATED	0	7	6	3	14	30
SINGLE	12	13	8	6	3	42
TOTAL	12	29	39	15	25	120

($\chi^2=47$, df = 8, $p < 0.001$)

Table 8 examines the data in terms of marital status and age and shows, not surprisingly, that all the Informers in the 18-21 group were single. Again, nearly half of those aged 22-28 were also single, with correspondingly fewer single Informers in the older age groups. There was a large group of married Informers, aged 29-35 - the data from Table 6 shows that the majority of these were males. Also, unsurprisingly, nearly 50% of those divorced or separated were over 42 years of age.

Using Factor Analysis a typical profile for Informers has emerged. Factor Analysis identifies groups of variables, examining the statistical similarities which might be explored further. In effect, this statistical technique summarised a large number of variables with a smaller number of derived variables, or factors. The variables originated from the already known data in relation to the Informers, comprising of:

- (a) Accommodation
- (b) Age
- (c) Children
- (d) Convictions
- (e) Employment
- (f) job
- (g) gender
- (h) marital status

The interesting point in this exercise is that the factors which emerged, useful for characterising a set of variables were not known in advance, but predetermined by the Factor Analysis. It is interesting then, that the following three separate factors were produced:-

- A. Domestic situation
- B. Employment situation
- C. Criminal history

Below, each of these factors is analysed in detail to determine their impact on the sociodemographic nature of Informers, and to show to what extent these factors might affect the Informers' motives.

A. Domestic situation

First, domestic situation: this is defined in terms of marital status, but as said earlier the data should be interpreted with care given the type of responses listed.

Table 9 - Extended table of marital status by gender.

	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL
MARRIED	42	6	48
MARRIED/APART	1	1	2
SEPARATED	2	4	6
DIVORCED	9	8	17
SINGLE	33	9	42
WIDOW	5	0	5
TOTAL	92	28	120

Although chi Square tests break down badly in Table 9 because of the small numbers in the cells, this additional chart shows that roughly two-thirds of both men (64%) and women (68%) were either married or had been married.

It is difficult to compare these figures with the population at large because the 1991 Census did not categorise 'separated' as a category. However if we group

the separated and divorced women together, it is clear that they are massively over-represented in this group of informers, accounting for 46% of the total, as highlighted in Table 6.

Certainly, there is a high proportion of single people among the Informers, as seen in Table 6, and the majority of those were male. Compared with the adult population generally, single males are over-represented by a ratio of 4:3 and females by 3:2.

B. Employment situation

The second factor to be analysed is in relation to the employment of the Informers.

Table 10 - Employment status of Informers.⁴

EMPLOYMENT	INFORMERS	WIDER POPULATION
EMPLOYED	50 (42%)	87%
UNEMPLOYED	63 (52%)	11%
OTHER	7 (6%)	2%
TOTAL	120 (100%)	100%

$$(x^2 = 44.3, df = 2, p = < 0.0001)$$

Table 10 examines the employment status of the Informers. Although there is a slight weakness in one of the Chi square tests due to a small number in one of the cells, the table shows some interesting results. Fifty two percent of the

⁴ Data taken from the 1991 Census and based on the over 16s who are considered to be economically active and therefore able to work.

Informers were unemployed. This compares with only around 9% of the economically active adult population generally. Also, only 42% of the Informers were employed compared with a National figure of 89% (6% were classified as 'other' i.e. students and housewives). Unemployment then can be assumed to be an interesting facet in relation to Informers, and will be an important factor in building up a profile of the Informer. Interestingly in this respect, this high level of unemployment is consistent with most studies of offender populations, particularly where certain types of persistent offenders are concerned.

By speculation, it may be assumed that those people who are out of work have more opportunity to concentrate on informing. More importantly perhaps, their motives may have some bearing on this; for example, the study will show later that financial motivation is important. (See Table 38).

Table 11 - Unemployed Informers, by age and gender.

AGE	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL
35 and under	30	7	37
Over 35	17	9	26
Total	47	16	63

($\chi^2 = 1.9$, $df=1$, $p = <0.159$)

Table 11 further examines unemployed Informers and compares their ages and gender. Despite the fact that the Chi Square test is not fully valid, there are definite characteristics for the unemployed Informers. Of the 47 unemployed males, 30 (64%) were 35 years of age and under. Of the 16 unemployed females, these were relatively evenly distributed across the age range, although more than half (56%) were over 35 years of age.

There is a suggestion then that unemployed male Informers are generally younger than the unemployed females. There is no significant difference, though and for profiling purposes, it would seem that the ages of unemployed Informers is not a strong feature.

Table 12 - Informers in full time employment, by age and gender.

AGE	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL
35 and under	24	1	25
Over 35	5	1	6
Total	29	2	31

$(\chi^2 = 1.2, df = 1, p = <0.257)$

Table 12 gives the details of the 31 Informers who were employed in terms of their age and gender. The Table shows that the Chi Square test is not fully valid. owing to the small number of female Informers - 2 in all. However, as in Table 11, it can be seen that far more of the male Informers (83%) were aged 35 and under, with only 5 (17%) male employed Informer over 35. This seems to compare reasonably with Table 5 which showed that 71% of all male Informers were aged 35 and under, perhaps reinforcing the argument that Informers generally tend to come from the younger age groups.

There was only one single (i.e. unmarried) male in full-time employment; the other single Informers were all unemployed (70%). He was aged 29-35, a painter and decorator who lived in a council house with three dependent children. He had previous convictions for drug offences and had been informing for 3-5 years. The main distinguishing factor with this man was that he had a skilled trade (Social Class 3). Although he classed himself as single, the presence of his children suggested that he had at least one serious relationship.

Only 2 of the 28 females were in full-time employment, whereas most were either unemployed or classified as housewives. These two Informers had very little in common. One was single, aged 22-28, a farm worker living in owner-occupied property. She had no children, no previous convictions and been informing for less than a year. She said she started informing to get on the right side of the law, and was first recruited during police enquiries. She saw the role of an Informer as one of helping the police, and apparently did not take payment for her information.

The second woman was married, aged 36-42, worked as a self employed masseuse, lived in her own house with her two children. She had previous convictions for sexual offences, and had been informing for over 6 years. She started informing to take out some of the competition and was also recruited during police enquiries. She saw her role as helping to catch criminals, and was paid in cash for her information. On the face of it, this woman came from a good background and was financially stable. She had little incentive to become as involved as she was with the police, particularly when her information involved child abuse, a category of crime especially distasteful to most people.

Curiously enough both lived in owner-occupied property; only one other female in the sample was found to be in a similar situation. The difference between the two women described above is that one was young and apparently innocent, involved as an Informer for altruistic reasons, whilst the other was more professional and so called 'business-like'.

Table 13 - Age groups by employment status and gender

AGE	EMPLOYED		UNEMPLOYED		OTHER		TOTAL
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	
35 and under	32	6	30	7	4	1	80
Over 35	9	3	17	9	0	2	40
Total	41	9	47	16	4	3	120

Table 13 shows the data in terms of the Informers' employment status and gender, where their age groups are dichotomised between those aged 35 and under and those over the age of 35.

Table 13, as in Table 12, the Chi Square list is not valid, and for the same reasons. However, the Table links the two previous tables in terms of employment, age and gender. The data shows those Informers in the 'other' employment included housewives and students.

Again we see twice as many Informers aged 35 and under, and the largest group is the unemployed males (47) followed by the employed males (41).

It is interesting to see that in terms of employment status and gender, one group stands out from those Informers over 35 years of age. These are the unemployed females (9 out of 16). These figures do not include those shown as 'housewives' which makes the figures even more surprising, although of course they may well have been married but divorced or separated. However, with only 40 Informers in total over 35 years of age, this group make up a large proportion. This may suggest, in terms of profiling, that the more mature female could well appear more often than expected.

Table 14 - Type of employment, by gender

	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL
LABOURER (5)	17	2	19
MASSEUSE (3)	0	1	1
SHOP ASSISTANT (4)	0	2	2
BUILDER (3)	3	0	3
DRIVER/MECHANIC (3)	7	0	7
ANTIQUE DEALER (3)	2	2	4
PAINTER/DECORATOR (3)	3	0	3
SECURITY (4)	3	0	3
FARMER/HORSE TRAINER (2)	2	1	3
SALES/CLERK (3)	4	1	5
TOTAL	41	9	50

(Figures in brackets refer to Registrar General's Classification of Occupations in terms of Social Class)

Table 14 links type of employment to gender and looks at specific employments. The data shows there were 41 employed males, almost all were either manual tradesmen (social class 4) or were unskilled labourers (social class 5). The 9 employed females were also in the range of manual or practical trades. The majority of working Informers were labourers (38%) with the next largest group working with vehicles (14%) although none of these were female.

To summarise, the data in this section examines the employment of the Informers and shows that the majority were unemployed. The majority of males were under 35 years of age, but that was not the case with the females. Most of

those Informers who were employed were either manual workers or unskilled labourers.

C. Criminal history

In this section an examination is made of the criminal history of the Informers. Table 15 examines this in terms of gender.

Table 15 - Informers with criminal convictions, by gender.

	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL	PERCENTAGE
YES	89	18	107	89
NO	3	10	13	11
TOTAL	92	28	120	100

$$(x^2 = 23.4, df = 1, p = < 0.0001)$$

Although the majority (107, 89%) of the Informers reported they had previous convictions, Table 15 shows a significant difference between males and females in this respect. Thirty six percent (10) of women had no criminal history (Standard Residual = 4.0), but only 3% (3) of the men had no such history. Those 10 females do not stand out in any way, and they had no special characteristics. It is interesting to see the disparity between males and females in terms of previous convictions, but the data is insufficient to examine the reasons in more detail. A study of the female Informer generally would require further research.

The high proportion of males generally, compared with females is highlighted in Table 6, and it can be assumed that the majority of those with previous convictions are male. This data suggests that having a criminal background is an

important feature in the profile of an Informer. Incidentally, as many convictions as possible were checked from current records using the Informers' dates of birth, but not all gave this information. Presumably they felt this may compromise their identities.

Table 16 - Previous convictions by type and gender

	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL	PERCENTAGE
NO PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS	3	10	13	11
FRAUD/DISHONESTY	44	16	60	50
ASSAULT	6	0	6	5
DRUGS	23	1	24	20
SEXUAL	1	1	2	2
BURGLARY	9	0	9	8
ROBBERY	6	0	6	5
TOTAL	92	28	120	100

Table 16 examines the type of previous conviction by gender listed according to an Index Offence, that is, the main category of offending for which the Informers have been convicted. It is acknowledged that many criminals commit different crimes, that is to say a drug offender may well also be a burglar in order to provide the funds to feed his habit. The category of crime offered by the Informers is the one perceived by themselves to be the 'main' category, or Index Offence. One hundred and seven (89%) Informers had previous convictions, which is shown in Table 15 and these are mainly for fraud or dishonesty (50%) which is the largest category for both males and females. Those offences are predominantly property offences. Drug misuse (20%) is the next largest category but interestingly, only one female Informer had drugs convictions. Twenty one male Informers had convictions for assault, burglary and robbery, whereas none of the females had been convicted of these types of offences.

It is interesting to see that previous convictions for females were restricted mainly to dishonesty and fraud, and this is in line with patterns of female criminality generally. As mentioned, few female Informers had a criminal history in Drugs. It is not known why this is, but to speculate perhaps female drug offenders do not want to get involved in informing, or the police are not specifically recruiting them. This may be an area for future research.

Table 17 - Length of time as an Informer with convictions, by gender.

	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL	PERCENTAGE
LESS THAN 1 YEAR	10	7	17	16
1-2 YEARS	32	6	38	36
3-5 YEARS	36	4	40	37
6 YEARS OR MORE	11	1	12	11
TOTAL	89	18	107	100

$$(\chi^2 = 9.18, df = 3, p = 0.2695)$$

Table 17 examines the length of time being an Informer in terms of gender and previous convictions. The data confirms that the majority of male Informers had previous convictions (89 out of 92). Far fewer females had previous convictions (18,64%) and they tended also to have shorter informing careers, the majority (39%) having been involved for less than a year. Informing generally seems to be a temporary occupation for the majority, with 89% who had been informing for less than 6 years and 52% for less than 2 years. Relatively few had been informing for less than a year or more than 6 years, although the largest age group for females had been informing for less than a year. Out of the 12 Informers who had been informing for more than 6 years, 11 (92%) were male; here again we see a difference between the two groups, suggesting that perhaps that males have a longer informing career.

In terms of criminal backgrounds, there appears to be no relationship between the data in Table 14 (referring to types of occupation) and that of Table 16 (Categories of previous convictions). For example, it is interesting that none of those Informers whose occupation involved the driving or repairing of vehicles were convicted of vehicle related crime. As will be seen later, nor is there any relationship between the previous convictions and occupations and the way Informers select information to give to the police. That is to say, an Informer with convictions for drugs does not necessarily restrict his informing to drug offences. It could be assumed therefore, that the relevance of having a criminal background is merely one of association; that is to say someone with previous convictions has more opportunity to receive information, regardless of his/her employment. For example, a drug user who is associating with burglars, is more likely to have information about burglary than drugs.

Table 18 - Other members of the Informer's family

	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE
YES	4	3
NO	91	76
DONT KNOW	25	21
TOTAL	120	100

Table 18 examines whether other members of the Informer's family are also Informers, and the data shows that 76% (91) of informers thought they were the only member of their family who were informing, but a further 21% (25) weren't sure. Put another way, only 3% (4) knew of other informers in their family, although it is not clear how those 91 Informers could be so positive that their family members were not Informers, when anonymity is so important. Given that confidentiality is an important aspect of the Informer/Handler relationship, at

least 4 Informers seem to know of the existence of other family members, and another 25 Informers believe it is possible a family member is also informing. This is interesting and the whole matter of confidentiality is specifically addressed in Tables 31 and 32 below.

Of the 4 Informers who knew that other family members were also Informers, two were female aged between 36 - 42 years, and two were the males aged 18 - 21 years. All were single and unemployed. The males lived with their parents, and the females lived in council accommodation. Three of the 4 Informers described their relationship with the police as 'friendly' and the fourth as 'trusting'. Their reasons for informing were all different. One of the female Informers referred to her family and said,

- *"I would tell my handler anything concerning anyone including my own family, and leave him to use his own discretion".*

This show of loyalty to the Handler against family members emphasises how important the relationship is to the Informer in many cases. There are a few Informers who seem not to be dissuaded from informing, even when they know other family members are doing the same. Clearly their motivation to inform is very powerful, whatever the reasons they give.

A profile of an Informer

An aim of this research has tried to provide a profile of a typical Informer. The data has shown that such a profile must centre around the Informers' marital status (See Table 8) from which 3 main categories emerge:

- (a). The young single.
- (b). The family man, and

(c). The divorced/separated.

These categories can then be linked to some of the other characteristics identified by the data such as accommodation, previous convictions etc.

(a) The young single

He is a young unemployed single male, aged between 18 and 28 and living in private rented accommodation with no dependents. He will probably have previous convictions for either fraud, dishonesty or drugs, and possibly robbery. If he does work, he will probably be in an unskilled occupation, i.e. social class 5. He will be a relative newcomer to the informing scene.

(b) The family man

He is a married male also working in an unskilled or perhaps semi-skilled occupation (social class 4 or 5), living in council property with his wife and children. He will have previous convictions for either fraud, dishonesty or drugs, and will have been informing for 1 - 5 years.

(c) Divorced/separated

A typical informer in this group will be either:-

a) An unemployed male, living in council or private rented accommodation without any dependent children. He will have previous convictions for dishonesty or drugs and will have been informing for at least three years. He is quite likely to be aged over 42, but could easily fall into the 22-35 age group.

Or,

b) An unemployed woman, living in council or private rented accommodation with her children. She may well have previous convictions for fraud or dishonesty, but will have been informing for less than two years. She will be any age over 21.

Expanding the profiles

To develop the profiles further, other factors can be considered, including the data relating to the Informer's relationship with the Handler, the Informer's motives and criminal history etc., as shown in Tables 5 to 17.

The data suggests that the largest group consists of unemployed males, aged 29 - 35, married and living with their wives and two children in council or housing association property. The categories are not discrete as Informers could be described under more than one heading, nevertheless the groups listed above represent the main profiles of Informers as shown by the data. However using additional information from the interviews, it has been possible to arrive at a more sophisticated profile which categorises all the respondents used in this research.

The Beginner

He will be a relative newcomer to the informing scene. He probably sees informing as a game or as a way of making easy money. He is not particularly bothered about what information he gives, nor what the 'knock-on' effects might be. He has some reservations about the risk of physical violence, but that will probably not stop him. He places a lot of importance on confidentiality in his dealings with the handler, but is quite cavalier in other respects. He is more interested in the excitement and challenge than in forming a solid relationship.

He is happy for the Handler to arrange the meetings and to determine the location. He is consumption-orientated, spending most of his money on food, drink, clothes and drugs.

The Provider

He started informing for the money or to get a reduced sentence, following previous criminal activity. While those initial reasons have been satisfied, he has continued informing because he sees it as a way of providing earnings for his family. He may develop an opposition to drugs and start informing on people who deal in them. He places great value on confidentiality, trust, truth and honesty in his relationship with the Handler. Informing is a valuable source of income and he does not want to sour the relationship by passing poor quality information. He is happy for either party to arrange meetings, but prefers to meet in licensed premises.

The Estranged

This refers to the divorced or separated man or woman. He is likely to be recruited whilst in custody, but she will probably start informing after police enquiries. He is likely to want to restrict himself to certain categories of crime e.g. drugs, but she is less particular. He is quite likely to refuse to get involved if there is any danger of violence either to him or his friends and family, but she is less likely to refuse. Confidentiality is considered to be important to both although she will put a higher value on this. Another major difference between the male and female Informer is that he puts very little value on friendship with the handler, whereas she considers this to be quite important. Neither take the lead in arranging meetings, but he prefers to meet in a public place or a vehicle.

She on the other hand prefers to meet in her own home. He spends his money on food, drink and drugs while she spends her money primarily on her family, but of course she has children to care for, and her male counterpart does not.

The Professional

He is driven by financial reward, although initially his motives could have been many and varied. His relationship with his Handler probably started when they met during police enquiries or socially. During his informing career there isn't much he hasn't informed about but that is not to say he is reckless about getting involved. He is well aware of the dangers, and would rather hold back information than be required to give evidence in court. He tries to maintain a 'professional' relationship with his Handler, as this is an important source of income for him and his family.

The motives of the Informer

The data can be recast into the motives of an Informer (although this will be discussed in detail under Aim 4) and to this end, the data has produced three distinct categories. These can be described as:-

- (a). The financially motivated.
- (b). The experienced criminal.
- (c). The inexperienced.

Interestingly, these separate categories, which relate specifically to the Informer's motives, can easily be linked with those categories referred to earlier. For example, the 'financially motivated' is closely connected to 'The Provider',

the 'experience criminal' to 'The Professional' and the 'inexperienced' to "The Beginner"

(a) The Financially Motivated

He will be motivated by money and appear to be quite a desperate individual who can be kept under control as long as there is a promise of reward. The Handlers will probably have a lot of influence over these individuals. The Informer is not too concerned about the terms and conditions of the relationship - he will be quite blinkered. As long as he gets his money, he is happy. He puts a high value on trust and understanding because he needs to know that the money will be there if he needs it.

(b) The Experienced Criminal

This is the hard-core offender who has a long criminal history and is well used to dealing with the police. He sees himself as in business, the same business as the handlers, only on the other side of the counter. He expects the relationship to proceed with a degree of mutual respect and professional recognition. He will offer some information in return for a reduced sentence, but is unlikely to lay all his cards on the table at once. He does not see his reasons for informing as significantly affecting the way the relationship should proceed. For him, the information itself is much more important.

(c) The Inexperienced

These Informers have probably been involved with crime before, but the situation has suddenly become more serious. He can be quite frightened and is likely to respond to the suggestions of the Handler. The Handler may not hold

all the cards, but seems to be in control. This Informer is more nervous about his relationship, his reasons for informing are quite important, particularly because it can affect the way he would like to proceed.

Summary for Aim 1

The results show that most of the Informers started informing for personal reasons, including financial. However, no agreed definition emerged, indeed the Informer and Handler have different perceptions of the Informer's role; that is to say, the Informers generally defined their role as helping the police, whereas the Handlers specifically thought that the Informers' role was to pass information. It would seem that an Informer's reason for becoming involved has no bearing on his perception of the role. The study also shows that, although the Informer, Contact and Public Spirited Citizen all give information to the police, they are treated very differently, and only the Informer is registered and controlled by the police.

The study has been able to provide a sociodemographic profile of an Informer. This has been achieved by classifying the categories of marital status, then reclassifying in terms of employment, motivation and relationship, as shown below.

MARITAL	EMPLOYMENT	MOTIVATION	RELATIONSHIP
single	unemployed	criminal	professional
family	employed	non criminal	beginner
divorced	other	financial	social

The list above shows the potential features that may make up an Informers profile, although the actual numbers of Informers which fit into each category

are not relevant here. This study has shown that an Informer does not have only one specific profile. He may just as easily be married as single, the majority of Informers are unemployed, but not all. His reasons for informing may well be financial but not necessarily (see later) and the relationship also is diverse; although the study will show later that Informers tend to be more social, whilst the Handler is professional. It is suggested then, that a number of profiles exist which make up a typical Informer. Nevertheless, distinct categories have emerged which will enable practitioners to determine probable profiles of Informers.

The female Informer

A special category related to gender needs to be considered. It is apparent that the majority of Informers are male (Table 5) and although the male Informer tends to be in the younger age groups, that is not the case with female Informers. The majority of female Informers were either divorced or separated (Table 6) and most of them seemed to have become involved because they wanted friendship or for moral reasons, whereas the males were more concerned with personal benefit (Table 7). Unlike their male colleagues, a large proportion of females had no previous criminal convictions (Table 15), and those that did, had been involved mainly in fraud and dishonesty (Table 16). It was interesting to find that those female Informers with previous convictions had far shorter careers than their male colleagues.

It may be assumed that there is a definite distinction between male and female Informers in terms of their profiles. It is probably not the case, although this study fails to support the argument, that female Informers will only give information about female criminals. Nor is it likely that female Informers prefer to be handled by female police officers.

Nemitz ⁵ has examined a number of criminological theories relating to women, and specifically refers to 'biological determinism'. Here, the female is depicted as devious, neurotic and evil, and attributes their lower rate of criminal behaviour to the female biological make-up, being essentially passive and non-criminal. Nemitz is surprised that there are not more female Informers if indeed they are naturally devious, deceitful and more cunning and crafty than men. Especially as such traits are commonly accepted as necessary for Informers. Perhaps this is too simplistic; that is to say, there may be many other factors to consider, such as association. For example, later in this study whilst examining the relationship between an Informer and Handler, it will be seen that most Informers first become involved whilst in custody, where the majority of prisoners are male.

Nemitz suggests in her study that female Informers tend to become involved for reasons relating to their families or 'loved ones'. It was also apparent that female Informers particularly disliked a type of crime, usually drugs, especially if a member of her family was involved in drug abuse. Also, the majority of female Informers were financially rewarded for their information, often to help pay for the upkeep of their families. Moreover, Nemitz suggests that the female Informers' motivation tends to be altruistic, caring or '*traditionally feminine*'. ⁶

Aim 2 - To determine what constitutes a Handler

Sub Aim A. To establish a profile for Handlers.

⁵Nemitz T Gender issues in Informer handling (In Informers: Policing, Policy, Practice. Billingsley R, Nemitz T, Bean P (Eds) (Willan Publishing, Devon 2000)

⁶ Ibid.

In terms of trying to establish a typical police Handler, the data has concentrated on rank, post and length of service. Handling Informers is defined in terms of the task rather than of the individual Informers. That is to say, a Handler may be handling Informers over a number of years but those Informers may change, some lasting a short time; others much longer. For example, one of the respondents was a Detective Sergeant who had been handling for over 5 years, but only handled 1 Informer during that time.

The analysis of existing data is shown in Tables 19 to 23. Table 19 looks at the Handlers by rank, and Table 20 at their occupational position in the police; Table 21 links the two together. Table 22 considers the Handlers length of service in terms of rank, whilst Table 23 examines that length of service in terms of their current posts.

Table 19 - Handlers by rank.

RANK	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE
CONSTABLE	70	58
SERGEANT	35	29
INSPECTOR	13	11
CHIEF INSPECTOR	2	2
TOTAL	120	100

Table 19 shows that the majority of Handlers were constables (58%) but surprisingly a high proportion were sergeants (29%) (compared with a national average of 15%). It is less surprising that only 13% were of inspector ranks, as these are recognised by the police service generally more as controllers than Handlers. It is not uncommon though for senior ranks to continue handling Informers.

Table 20 - Handlers by position.

POST	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE
CID	83	69
UNIFORM	11	9
DRUG SQUAD	2	2
OTHER SPECIALIST SQUAD	24	20
TOTAL	120	100

Table 20 looks at the position within the police the Handlers held at the time they were interviewed. The data shows that the majority were C.I.D officers (69%). Indeed only 11 (9%) Handlers were uniformed officers, compared with the national uniform establishment at around 80%. This may indicate their lack of opportunity in cultivating Informers, but clearly it can be assumed that the police Handler is more likely to be a plain clothes officer working within general C.I.D or specialist squads than anything else. It is surprising though that so few Handlers were drug squad officers; it has been a common assumption that the investigation of drug abuse is pro-active and relies heavily on information received by the police

Table 21 - Handlers position, by rank.

	RANK				TOTAL
	CONSTABLE	SERGEANT	INSPECTOR	C/INSPECTOR	
UNIFORM	11				11
CID	45	24	13	1	83
DRUG SQUAD	2				2
OTHER SQUADS	12	11		1	24
TOTAL	70	35	13	2	120

Table 21 recasts the data and shows the Handlers' rank. All of the uniformed officers (11, 16%) were constables. This is interesting, in that there are no rules within the police service which suggest that Handlers should be restricted to one rank, and in fact it could be argued that the supervisory officers have the same opportunity to cultivate Informers as other ranks

Sergeants and above may see their supervisory duties as more important than being involved with an Informer. The same may be said of drug squad officers (2, 3%) but in other specialist squads, 50% (12 from 24) were supervisors, mostly sergeants. This is discussed further in Chapter 5.

Table 22 - Handlers experience, by rank.

	CONSTABLE	SERGEANT	INSPECTOR	C/INSPECTOR	TOTAL
LESS THAN 1 YEAR	2	2			4
1-2 YEARS	10		2		12
3-5 YEARS	25	11	2		38
6 YEARS OR MORE	33	22	9	2	66
TOTAL	70	35	13	2	120

Table 22 recasts the data again, this time in terms of levels of experience measured by time spent as Handlers. The Table shows that not all constables are inexperienced Handlers. In fact 33 (47%) had been handling for over 6 years - this was the largest group - and only 2 (3%) had been handling for less than a year. Most sergeants had been handling for over 6 years (22, or 63%) and that was also true of the other ranks. Of all the Handlers, a clear pattern emerged in terms of experience; that is to say only 4 (3%) had been involved in informing for less than a year, 12 for 1-2 years, 38 for 3-5 years, and a further 66 (55%) of them having more than 6 years experience. Similar patterns occur in relation to

rank where it seems that Handlers with the highest rank have the greatest experience i.e. there are no police officers with less than 1 years handling experience above the rank of sergeant, but 11 out of 66 with 6 years or more handling experience. This is probably due to the fact that Handlers first become involved in the lower ranks, but continue to handle Informers despite their promotion.

Table 23 looks at the data in terms of length of service and occupational position.

Table 23 - Handlers experience, by occupational position and length of service

	UNIFORM	CID	DRUG SQUAD	OTHER SQUAD	TOTAL
LESS THAN 1 YEAR	2			2	4
1 - 2 YEARS	7	5			12
3 - 5 YEARS	2	29	1	6	38
6 YEARS OR MORE		49	1	16	66
TOTAL	11	83	2	24	120

The previous table showed that, regardless of rank, Handlers tend to continue to handle Informers, but Table 23 shows a different picture when the data is recast in terms of the Handlers' position in the police. This table produces some odd results which are difficult to interpret. There are few Handlers in the Drug Squad but where they exist they seem to be long term Handlers. Also, CID officers seem to dominate (83 out of 120) the majority of whom have at least 3 years experience.

It can only be speculation, but the small number of uniformed officers who have shown a liking for Informer handling could well find themselves working in the C.I.D. or squads at a later stage, whilst those officers who remain in uniform, perhaps do not receive the support or incentive to continue in this role.

To summarise Sub Aim A, the existence of a Handler's profile has been examined in terms of rank, occupational post and handling experience. The data has shown that the majority of Handlers are constables who work in the CID. More than half of the Handlers had over 6 years experience, and the majority of supervisory officers seemed to have more handling experience. There were surprisingly few Handlers working in the drug squad but those that did, seemed to have more experience than some of the others.

Because of the low numbers, the data did not cater specifically for gender issues. However, it is known from the interviews that the female Handlers held various ranks and worked either in the CID or a plain clothes department. They had all been handling Informers for some time.

Sub Aim B. To identify the Handler's role.

The Handlers were asked how they define their role, and the results are shown in Tables 24, and 25. The first Table gives their perceptions and the second examines these findings against the Handler's experience in the use of Informers.

Table 24 - Frequency of Handler's role.

ROLE	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE
GATHERING INTELLIGENCE/INFORMATION	66	55%
CULTIVATING INFORMERS	18	15%
TASKING	10	8%
LOOKING AFTER INFORMER	7	6%
OBTAINING EVIDENCE	4	3%
OTHER	15	13%
TOTAL	120	100%

Table 24 sets out what the Handlers thought was their primary responsibility or role expectation when dealing with Informers. The data shows the Handlers expressed a wide range of attributes as to what they perceive their role to be. The majority (66, or 55%) thought their role was to gather intelligence or information, but 4 (3%) considered that it was to obtain evidence. How and why this differed from gathering intelligence is not clear. However, there is in the police service today, an emphasis on Handlers becoming part of Dedicated Source Units, whose objectives are to collect information, leaving the arrest of criminals to others. This change will have some bearing on the Handler's responses. So for example, the cultivation and tasking of Informers⁷ (28, or 23%) was considered to be important, but this too could be seen as being the same as collecting information, i.e. merely another way of saying the same thing.

That apart it is interesting that 7 (6%) Handlers considered their role was to 'look after their Informer', - this does not relate to the collection of information

⁷ The 'tasking of Informers' is a phrase used by the police service which means instructing the Informer to obtain information about a particular crime or criminal.

or evidence. To these respondents, the relationship or partnership between themselves and the Informer is the most important aspect, whereas the majority were more concerned with information than anything else. This small group or minority of Handlers are likely to pose a problem for the police service, in that their priority clearly lies with the protection of the Informer. This group will be looked at again when the study considers the development of the relationship between an Informer and Handler.

Table 25 - Role of the Handler, by length of time being a Handler

ROLE	LESS THAN 1 YR	1-2 YRS	3-5 YRS	6 YRS OR MORE	TOTAL
GAIN INTELLIGENCE/INF	4	9	14	39	66
CULTIVATE			12	6	18
TASKING			5	5	10
LOOK AFTER INFORMER		2	2	3	7
OBTAIN EVIDENCE			2	2	4
OTHER		1	3	11	15
TOTAL	4	12	38	66	120

Table 25 recasts the data in terms of the Handlers role and the length of time being a Handler. The Table looks again at the role of the Handler and shows how their perception changes as they become more experienced. All those who had been informing for less than a year (4, 3%) considered their role to be obtaining intelligence or information. This seems to take priority throughout their careers, increasing through the years. The cultivation and tasking (the proactive use of Informers) does not begin until they have at least 3 years experience. Although only 7 (6%) said they were 'looking after their Informer', the numbers involved seem to increase with experience, and may be another indication of how the relationship develops and becomes stronger over a period of time.

Summary of Aim 2

The results show that most Handlers tend to be constables and work within the C.I.D or plain clothes departments. This seems to confirm the findings from the Lincolnshire case study (Tables 1 and 4). It would also appear that plain clothes officers handle their Informers longer than their uniformed colleagues. It may be assumed that crime investigators have more opportunity to recruit Informers. The majority of Handlers thought their role was to obtain information or intelligence. This can be compared with the Lincolnshire case study where the majority of Handlers considered their main reason for involvement was the detection of crime and arrest of criminals (Table 5) both of which are closely linked with intelligence gathering. It is interesting though that in the case study, none of the Handlers mentioned 'personal gain' or 'advancement' as being important, and yet in the main study, both these areas were considered to be an advantage. It is difficult to draw conclusions from this, other than to suggest that because of the researcher's personal knowledge, the respondents were apprehensive about reporting these as reasons for becoming involved; to consider 'personal benefit' as a reason is perhaps not considered to be professional.

A number of respondents also considered that looking after their Informer was the most important function. The data also suggests that the Handler's need to look after his Informer increases with experience.

The female Handler

As already discussed, the gender issues have not been a priority of this study. Nevertheless, if a meaningful Handler profile is to be determined, some reference must be made to those few female officers. This can be best achieved by

recalling the data available from the Lincolnshire Case Study (Chapter Six). Here we identified that only 3 of the 25 Handlers were female (Table 2) which is in fact an accurate reflection of female officers in the force generally. From personal knowledge of the 3 Handlers, the researcher is satisfied that their Informers were predominantly male and it was their current role which was of importance to them as Handlers, not any specific gender issue. The three officers were drawn from varying backgrounds, and their ranks, ages and police roles were wide ranging.

Nemitz ⁸ makes the point that female police officers know that they must perform better than their male colleagues if they are to be given credibility. It follows therefore, that female Handlers will ensure that the information they obtain from their Informers is also credible. Female Handlers believe that the most credible information comes from the local community, as opposed to the criminal world. Indeed, the female Handler will be highly critical of her male colleague for suggesting that Informers must be 'good criminals'. Nemitz suggests that female Handlers are in many ways different from male Informers. For example, female handlers will usually recruit their Informers who have been victims of crime or witnesses, and the relationship is developed based on trust and respect. This present research will show, however, that trust particularly is a common feature for Handlers, irrespective of their gender. The results will also show that Informers can usually give credible information only if they associate with criminals.

It could therefore be suggested that the role of the Handler is not gender driven.

⁸ Op Cit: Nemitz

Aim 3 - To determine the relationship between the police and the informer

Sub Aim A. How is that relationship initiated?

The study now turns towards examining the relationship between the Informer and Handler and begins with a close look at the start of the relationship. The results are set out in Tables 26 to 28. Table 26 examines where the relationship is likely to begin, with Table 27 specifically looking at those who meet socially, that is to say, meeting as friends rather than partners. Table 28 compares the social activity of the two groups.

Table 26 - Where the relationship first starts

	INFORMER	HANDLER	TOTAL
CUSTODY RELATED	60	105	165
DURING ENQUIRIES	50	11	61
OTHER	10	4	14
TOTAL	120	120	240

($\chi^2 = 38.5$, $df = 2$, $p < 0.0001$)

Table 26 looks at where the respondents thought the relationship began and the data shows a significant difference of opinion between the Handlers and the Informers in terms of where the relationship actually starts. Eighty eight per cent (105) of the Handlers said it is 'custody related' whilst 9% (11) said 'during enquiries'. Only 50% (60) of the Informers said it was 'custody related', but 42% (50) said during enquiries. It could be argued that these results are merely a difference of perception by the two groups. That is to say, they may be in fact reporting the same thing, but from different viewpoints; some Informers prefer to see themselves as helping with enquiries rather than having been in custody.

It could also be argued that because police officers are constantly told to recruit Informers from the cells, commonly known as ‘cell intervention’, then they may feel it appropriate to suggest that the majority of first meetings were from there when in fact they were not. For example, one Handler (257) who thought the relationship started whilst in custody, then qualified his response by saying,

- *"I have dealt with a number of women who have been superb. Once you get them on your side, they are good. They are usually cultivated whilst their partners are in custody".*

Table 27 - Situations where relationship began

	INFORMER	HANDLER	TOTAL
LICENSED PREMISES	2	0	2
PRISON VISIT	1	0	1
SOCIALLY	7	0	7
ANYWHERE	0	4	4
TOTAL	10	4	14

Table 27 looks more closely at the situations in which the relationship began and examines those 14 respondents who said the relationship started other than ‘during custody’ or ‘enquiries’ (Table 26). Seven Informers suggested that they first met during social occasions, and yet none of the Handlers said this was the case. Also, a minority of Informers said it started as a result of prison visits or licensed premises as a place they first met but none of the Handlers thought this to be the case. Perhaps this difference is because police officers may feel uncomfortable about these venues as being acceptable places to meet, or maybe the Handler wanted to give the Informer the impression they were meeting socially, when in reality the police officer was on duty treating the meeting as

business. This seems to be borne out by one Handler (288) who said that he meets with his Informers socially but qualified his answer by saying,

- *"I will take him and his wife out for a meal but I am always on duty".*

If this is the case, then a disparity in the relationship emerges. The police look on the partnership as professional whilst the Informer considers it more informal and friendlier. This so called 'friendship' characteristic appears above in Table 20, and is discussed later in this study. At this stage it is important to note that only one respondent referred to 'prison visits' as the place where the relationship started, whereas the police service have generally accepted the usefulness of obtaining intelligence from such interviews following conviction. Perhaps though, the police officers are aware of Her Majesty's Inspectors of Constabulary who have warned police forces that far too many crimes are recorded as 'cleared-up' as a result of prison visits. Also, both groups may well consider that such meetings fit into the category of being 'custody related'.

Table 28 - Start of relationship, with respondents who meet socially.

	INFORMER	HANDLER	TOTAL
CUSTODY RELATED	4	13	17
DURING ENQUIRIES	14	2	16
LICENSED PREMISES	1	0	1
SOCIALLY	3	0	3
TOTAL	22	15	37

The respondents were asked if they met their partner, the handler or Informer, in social situations; that is to say outside of their normal working environment. Twenty two (18%) Informers and 15 (13%) Handlers said they met 'socially'. Table 28 examines those 37 individuals in terms of where they thought the relationship started. There seems to be no connection between the fact that they met socially and what they said about the start of the relationship, as only 3 out

of the 37 said it started 'socially', and none of those were Handlers. Most of the Informers (18, 82%) and all of the Handlers said their relationship started 'during enquiries' or whilst in 'custody'.

Sub Aim B - Can the relationship be categorised?

Here, the data concerns the various categories which, put together, provide an assessment of the Informer and Handler relationship. The results are set out in Tables 29 to 32 inclusive. Table 29 compares descriptions of the relationship by the groups, and Table 30 develops this by concentrating on the so called extent of 'friendship' between them. Tables 31 and 32 show the level of importance placed on each of these characteristics.

Table 29 - Description of relationship, compared by Informer and Handler.

	INFORMER	HANDLER	TOTAL
PROFESSIONAL	13	45	58
FRIENDLY	51	13	64
NECESSARY	18	16	34
TRUSTING	29	29	58
DIFFICULT	0	12	12
OTHER	9	5	14
TOTAL	120	120	240

$$(\chi^2 = 53.4, df = 5, p = <0.001)$$

Table 29 shows how the respondents described their relationship. The data shows evidence of statistical significance between the two groups. Although only 6 Informers considered 'respect' worth mentioning, (shown as 'other') there were no Handlers who referred to it. Conversely though, 12 Handlers said that they found the relationship 'difficult', none of the Informers felt this way. The Handlers may well find it 'difficult' to manage some Informers, whereas the Informer clearly finds no difficulty with his role. It is interesting that the same

number from each group (29) thought their relationship was 'trusting', that is 25% of the group as a whole, and yet it is felt by most practitioners that 'trust' is an important element of a partnership. Clearly this is not what the groups considered to be the most important feature.

Table 29a - Relationship described as friendly, by Informer and Handler

	INFORMER	HANDLER	TOTAL
FRIENDLY	51	13	64
OTHER	69	107	176
TOTAL	120	120	240

$$(x^2 = 30.8, df = 1, p < 0.001)$$

Table 29a recasts the data in terms of a 2X2 table where the data from Table 29 is taken. The 64 respondents from Table 29 who said the relationship was 'friendly' were tested against the remainder.

Table 29b-Relationship described as professional, by Informer and Handler

	INFORMER	HANDLER	TOTAL
PROFESSIONAL	13	45	58
OTHER	107	75	182
TOTAL	120	120	240

$$(x^2 = 23.3, df = 1, p < 0.001)$$

Table 29b takes out those respondents who said the relationship was 'professional' from Table 29, and in the form of a 2X2 table, tests 'professional' against the remainder.

The data from Tables 29a and 29b which look specifically at the responses in relation to 'friendly' and 'professional', both produce a highly significant result. Forty five (38%) Handlers described their relationship as 'professional' compared

with 13 (11%) Informers. Fifty one (43%) Informers thought it was 'friendly' whereas only 13 Handlers (11%) thought it so. This suggests that the perceptions of the two groups are very different; Handlers believing that the relationship is professional and formal, Informers suggesting that it is more informal and friendly.

This conflict is interesting when considering the relationship as a whole, which clearly cannot be as close as one would imagine when the two roles are seen so differently by the Informers and Handlers. The 'friendship' characteristic will be discussed in more detail below.

To examine the relationship further, the interviewees were asked to show the level of importance they placed on the relationship according to 7 main headings. The categories were shown as:-

- i. Confidentiality
- ii. Friendship
- iii. Honesty
- iv. Reliability
- v. The Relationship
- vi. Trust
- vii. Truth

With one exception, both groups considered all these to be important. In terms of the matter of 'friendship' there was some disparity, as is explained in Table 30 below.

Table 30 - The importance placed on 'friendship' by Groups.

	INFORMER	HANDLER	TOTAL
VERY IMPORTANT	15	2	17
IMPORTANT	34	29	63
NOT VERY IMPORTANT	51	52	103
UNIMPORTANT	20	37	57
TOTAL	120	120	240

$$(x^2 = 15.41, df = 3, p = 0.00149)$$

Table 30 looks at the importance placed on the 'friendship' between the Handler and Informer. The table shows that there was a significant difference of opinion between the two groups. This divergence was most notable at the extremes of the rating scale (i.e. Very Important and Unimportant).

The tables show an unexpectedly high number of Informers who rated 'friendship' as Very Important (15, 12%, Standardised Residual = 2.2) and an unexpectedly low number rated it as unimportant (20, 17%). Conversely, an unexpected high number of Handlers rated friendship as Unimportant (37, 31%), and a correspondingly low number rated it as Very Important (2, 2% Standardised Residual = -2.2). The proportions in the mid ranges were roughly equal, and in fact a similar number in both groups considered it to be not very important.

It is known that regarding the 2 Handlers who rated 'friendship' as Very Important, both were meeting their Informers socially, although none of the Handlers said they started their relationship during social occasions (Table 27). The suggestion that Handlers are far less interested in a friendly relationship with their Informer is emphasized by one Handler (15) who said,

- *"If he gets too friendly, he gets knocked back to a police/Informer relationship".*

This aspect was supported by another Handler (298) who recalled that his Informer,

- *"Got too friendly. He thought he could do what he wanted. I had to sort him out - put him straight".*

Table 31 - Level of importance given to main factors of the relationship, by Informers

	VERY IMPORTANT	IMPORTANT	NOT VERY	UNIMPORTANT
CONFIDENTIALITY	94(78.3%)	24(20%)	0(0%)	2(1.7%)
FRIENDSHIP	15(12.5%)	34(28.3%)	51(42.5%)	20(16.7%)
HONESTY	38(31.7%)	61(50.8%)	18(15%)	3(2.5%)
RELIABILITY	53(44.2%)	48(40%)	17(14.2%)	2(1.7%)
THE RELATIONSHIP	45(37.5%)	70(58.3%)	5(4.2%)	0(0%)
TRUST	55(45.8%)	57(47.5%)	8(6.7%)	0(0%)
TRUTH	40(33.3%)	67(55.8%)	11(9.2%)	2(1.7%)

Table 31 looks at the level of importance given by the Informers to each of the main factors of the relationships as shown above. Two notable minority groups emerged from the data. Firstly, only 5 (4%) Informers thought 'the relationship' was not important. Secondly, only 8 (7%) Informers thought that 'Trust' was unimportant, and yet, when they described the relationship with their Handlers, as shown in Table 29, 29 (25%) Informers described their relationship as 'trusting'. On the face of it then, there appears to be conflict in the Informers' responses. That of course may be due to a measure of confusion about the terms. Perhaps they wished to describe their relationship as 'friendly' which to them may include 'trust' as well.

Table 32 - Respondents rating of each characteristic as Important or Very Important.

	INFORMERS	HANDLERS	VARIATION (%)
Confidentiality	118 (98%)	120 (100%)	2
Friendship	49 (41%)	31 (26%)	-15
Honesty	99 (83%)	104 (87%)	4
Reliability	101 (84%)	104 (87%)	3
The Relationship	115 (96%)	113 (94%)	-2
Trust	112 (93%)	108 (90%)	-3
Truth	107 (89%)	101 (84%)	-5

The data in Table 32 is taken from Table 31 comparing the two groups in terms of those characteristics of the relationship considered by them to be important. Clearly there is a marked variation between the two groups in relation to their perception of 'friendship' emphasising the disparity shown in Table 30. There is little variation between the two groups in relation to the other characteristics.

Interestingly, 'friendship' is the one category where both the Informers and the Handlers place relatively little importance, yet this is the category which yields the greatest difference of opinion. The vast majority of respondents from both groups rate all the other factors as Important or Very Important, with very little variation between them; that is to say, the data in Table 32 shows that the respondents from both groups agree on the importance of all the characteristics of the relationship with the exception of 'friendship'.

Out of the 240 respondents, only 2 thought 'Confidentiality' was unimportant. These were both young (18-21) unemployed male Informers, both single and with no children. Both had previous convictions for Fraud or Dishonesty and

both started informing according to them because of police pressure. With these exceptions, 'confidentiality' is an integral part of Informing , and yet, as discussed in Table 18, there were a number (3%) of Informers who knew that other members of their family were also informing. Nevertheless, the importance of confidentiality seems to be a high priority for both groups.

To summarise Sub Aim B, in order to categorise the relationship between the Informer and Handler, it is interesting to note that whilst describing their relationship, the Handlers considered the most important feature to be 'professionalism', whereas 'friendship' was more important to the Informers. Additionally, the groups identified a number of characteristics of the relationship, and here again there is a significant variation by the groups in terms of the level of importance placed on 'friendship'.

Sub Aim C - What significance is the relationship to Informer handling?

In developing the so called relationship theme, it is important to establish its relevance to how the Informer and Handler behave to each other. The results are shown in Tables 33 to 37 inclusive.

Table 33 shows the importance placed on the relationship by the two groups, whilst Tables 34 and 35 show the advantages and Table 36 the disadvantages by each of the groups. Table 37 establishes the level of protection afforded to the Informers by the police.

Table 33 - Importance of the Relationship to Informers and Handlers.

	INFORMER	HANDLER	TOTAL
VERY IMPORTANT	45	57	102
IMPORTANT	70	56	126
NOT VERY IMPORTANT	5	7	12
TOTAL	120	120	240

Table 33 examines the level of importance placed on the 'Relationship' by the groups. The data shows that the majority of Informers and Handlers consider the relationship to be important or very important (126 & 102, or 95%) and the degree of importance seems to be evenly spread between the two groups. Some of the reasons why members of each group consider the relationship to be important are given below. For example, one Informer (120) who thought that the relationship was important, also believed that it could change, saying,

- *"If I needed some help on some thing and I didn't get it, then I would lose interest".*

Similarly, another Informer (34) felt that the relationship would change if,

- *"I found out he wasn't acting on my information, I wouldn't bother with him".*

For the Handlers, some thought the relationship could change and one (1) said,

"Once an Informer gave false information to get money. I lost all confidence and trust in him".

One Handler (237) admitted that in one case the relationship,

- *"started off professional but over time I have grown to hate him. But he is successful".*

Another (286) explained that,

- *"Our first meeting was whilst he was in custody. After his release, the relationship changed. Also, he lost his wife and of course his needs change. You have to adapt".*

It was also suggested that the relationship will change because of the Informers actions, as the case of one Handler (288) who recalled,

- *"When my Informer got nicked by Customs, my relationship changed to a formal basis. Then it changed back".*

Another reason the relationship may change is when the Informer becomes disillusioned by his reward. This was the case with one Handler (320) who explained,

- *"I had a guy recently put in a theft of a JCB valued at £16,000. I paid him £400 by the force. The insurance company wouldn't pay any out so I was blamed for not getting him enough. We're starting to get back together, now".*

In summary, the Handlers and Informers agreed that the relationship was important to them, but for different reasons. The Informers thought the relationship could change over such things as money or not being given sufficient help or support. The Handlers, though took a more professional view and suggested that the relationship could change if it started to affect the results.

Table 34 - Main advantage of the relationship, as perceived by Informers and Handlers.

	INFORMER	HANDLER	TOTAL
NONE/DONT KNOW	13	1	14
PROFESSIONAL EFFECTIVENESS	11	70	81
FRIENDSHIP	21	0	21
PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE	11	6	17
PERSONAL SATISFACTION	0	37	37
PERSONAL GAIN	40	6	46
REVENGE/COMPETITION	24	0	24
TOTAL	120	120	240

To establish whether there is any relevance to the relationship, the study looked at the advantages and disadvantages declared by the Informers and Handlers in terms of whether they thought there was any benefit or otherwise to them during their relationship.

Looking at the main advantages, Table 34 shows a marked difference of opinion between the two groups ($\chi^2 = 161.86$, $df = 6$, $p < 0.00001$). Seventy (58%) Handlers quoted 'Professional Effectiveness' as an advantage but only 11 (9%) of the Informers thought this was an advantage to themselves in terms of the relationship with their Handler. Thirty seven (31%) Handlers thought 'Personal Satisfaction' was an advantage but none of the Informers reported this. Thirty four (28%) Informers thought there was a 'Financial' or 'Family Benefit', 24 (20%) quoted 'Revenge' or 'Competition', and 15 (13%) said it was an advantage 'Keeping in with the Police'. None of the Handlers reported any of these as advantages. Clearly, taking out the competition would be a particular advantage to the Informer, and one Handler (317) recalled,

- *"There is one man who is a druggy. He thinks that I will protect him so he gives information to get his associates arrested, so that he can carry on. I will not get involved, but I know of a sergeant, ex drug squad who is using him".*

An example of 'revenge' was given by another Handler (319) who said,

- *"-I remember once when an Informer gave me information that another criminal had some bent gear. I found out that the Informer had planted the gear himself to get rid of him, 'cos he had been grassed up by this man".*

What we are seeing here again is the conflict in perceptions of the relationship between the two groups, as shown also in Table 29 when the groups were asked to describe their relationship. The two groups have different objectives, and of course this may explain why they see the advantages differently. The presence of 'friendship' appears again, and Table 34 supports the previous finding that although the Informer may consider 'friendship' to be an advantage to them in their relationship (21, 17.5%), none of the Handlers agreed.

In summary then, this table shows that the Handlers and Informers had quite different perceptions of the advantages of the relationship.

Table 35 - Does the use of Informers advance the Handler personally?

	FREQUENCY
YES	41 (34%)
NO	37 (31%)
POSSIBLY/PROBABLY	41 (34%)
DONT KNOW	1 (1%)
TOTAL	120 (100%)

Table 34 has shown that, in relation to the Handlers, only 6 thought there was any personal gain involved in being a Handler, but when it was further examined, this response may not turn out to be accurate. Table 35 shows that the Handlers thought their use of Informers advanced them personally, and 41 were adamant that it did. A similar number (41, 34%) thought it might, and only 37 (31%) said not. This seems surprising, as any advancement in their careers would certainly be beneficial, i.e. probably financial. However, there seems to be no justification for these views, as there is no evidence that Police Handlers can expect any sort of advancement. This issue has been examined in detail in Chapter Six.

Table 36 - Main disadvantage of the relationship, as perceived by Informers and Handlers.

	INFORMER	HANDLER	TOTAL
NONE	20	13	33
DANGEROUS	91	19	110
AGGRAVATION	5	58	63
INSUFFICIENT RECOGNITION		14	14
ADDS TO WORKLOAD	0	13	13
DONT KNOW/OTHER	4	3	7
TOTAL	120	120	240

($\chi^2 = 120.3$, $df = 5$, $p < 0.001$)

Table 36 looks at the disadvantages of the Informer/Handler relationship. It shows that the Handlers expressed a range of disadvantages, in contrast to the more limited disadvantages noted by the Informers. The majority of Informers said that the relationship was dangerous, 87 (73%) of whom quoted 'Being Found Out' as the main disadvantage. One such Informer (58) explained that,

- *"There is a contract out on me already over a £15 million drugs job. I need some heavy money to get out of it".* Another (114) said,

- *"- I was into some mega criminals from abroad who would shoot your legs off as soon as look at you. I've got two kids. I'm not stupid".*

Only 19 (16%) of the Handlers thought the relationship was 'dangerous', but their perception of dangerous was different in that they felt they were susceptible to allegations being made against them. Those Handlers who felt the relationship was 'Aggravation' (58 or 59%), thought so mainly because they could be contacted at home or off duty. To a lesser extent, some suggested 'Insufficient Recognition' (12%) and 'Adding to their Workloads' (11%) were also disadvantages. One Handler (290) suggested,

- *"A lot of the Controllers have never had a snout so they don't want to know. The job discourages you because they don't understand".*

There appears to be a clear difference of opinion between the Informers and Handlers as to what they perceive the disadvantages to be. The Informers see it as dangerous for themselves to be involved, i.e. in terms of physical dangers, but the Handlers are thinking of how dangerous it is in terms of their susceptibility of allegations made against them. These findings help support the hypotheses referred to under Table 32, suggesting that both groups consider the 'relationship' to be important; although for different reasons.

Table 37 - Protection given to Informer, by groups.

	INFORMER	HANDLER	TOTAL
ALWAYS/USUALLY	96	98	194
SOMETIMES	17	20	37
RARELY/NEVER	7	2	9
TOTAL	120	120	240

The study so far has shown the relationship between the Handler and Informer to be far from close, due largely to the different objectives of the two groups. Table 37 describes an additional feature, in this case where the Handler and Informer happen to be in total agreement. Ninety six Informers (80%) and 98 Handlers (82%) had no doubts that the police would grant the Informer protection, with a further 37 (15%) stating that protection would be afforded only sometimes.

If by protection, they mean protection of the Informer's anonymity, and this is most likely, then this finding is supported by the data in Table 32 where both groups considered confidentiality important to their relationship. However, 9(4%) Handlers and Informers thought that affording protection was rare or would never happen. This is quite a disturbing figure, as a number of Informers and Handlers, albeit small, did not consider protection of the Informer to be important. The implications are that, if one Handler alone fails to recognise the importance of protecting the Informer's identity, then that single case could jeopardise the integrity of the relationship within the criminal justice system. It can be assumed that Informers expect their anonymity to be maintained, and it would only need one case to drastically reduce the numbers of Informers recruited.

Sub Aim D - To compare those features of the relationship with other partnerships.

Chapter Five examined the theoretical relationships involving professionals and identified some common features which existed between them. This study looks at those categories which seem to make up the relationship between the

Informer and Handler as discussed in Sub Aim B, to establish if there is a similarity between the relationships.

The presence of 'power' and 'control' on the face of it, is not manifested through the groups' perceptions of their relationship and is not mentioned in their descriptions (Table 29). However, when the respondents gave the main advantage of the relationships (Table 34) the majority of the Handlers suggested 'professional effectiveness' which could give some indication of control. In relation to the Informers, 40 (33%) thought that 'personal gain' was the main advantage and this in itself could provide them with some degree of power.

Similarly, no direct reference has been made to 'accountability' or 'bureaucracy', and yet when the Handlers proposed their main disadvantages of the relationship (Table 36) a substantial number thought it was 'aggravation' and 'added to their workload' which may well be some criticism of their bureaucratic systems.

An examination of the relationships between police officers and other groups in Chapter Five clearly showed professionalism as an important factor and that has also emerged from the Informer/Handler partnership. What is perhaps more surprising though is that 'trust', 'confidence' and 'friendship' have all been identified as features in other police relationships. All three were also identified as characteristics by both groups in this study (Table 32) and with the exception of 'friendship', all the respondents considered them to be important features. In relation to 'friendship', the Informers placed far more importance on this than the Handlers, but nevertheless it was a feature worthy of mention by both groups.

Summary of Aim 3

The relationships between the Informer and Handler have been examined in terms of how the relationship begins and the important features of the relationship. What is particularly striking about the comparison of the two groups is that their perceptions of each other are vastly different. For example, most of the Handlers thought the Informer was recruited whilst in custody; far less of the Informers thought this was the case. Similarly, some Informers believed they met their Handler during a social occasion, but none of the Handlers agreed.

The general feeling about this 'relationship' was that the Informers considered it to be friendly, whereas the Handlers thought of it in a much more professional way. This highlights again the difference between the two groups, emphasising the diversity between the Informer and Handler. It is perhaps not surprising though that both groups suggested 'confidentiality' to be important where protection of the Informer's identity was a priority given by the Informer and the Handler. However, as said above, it only needs one such case to attack the fabric of the relationship.

Aim 4 - To determine what the Informer wants to get out of the relationship.

Sub Aim A - What are the motivational factors for Informers?

The study has looked specifically at why Informers first become involved with the police in this type of work, and the results are shown in Tables 38 and 39. Table 38 lists the motives; that is the main reasons for starting informing. Table 39 links these to the Handlers perceptions. In this study, motives, motivations

and motivational factors have been defined to include the so-called 'reasons' for being involved in informing, and these terms will be used throughout.

Table 38 - Main reasons for starting informing, by the Informer.

INITIAL REASON	FREQUENCY
FINANCIAL	32
DISLIKES THAT CRIME	17
REDUCED SENTENCE	16
REVENGE	15
RIGHT SIDE OF THE LAW	9
LOOKING FOR A FAVOUR	9
FRIENDLY WITH OFFICER	8
POLICE PRESSURE	4
TAKE OUT COMPETITION	3
PART OF A DEAL	2
THE CHALLENGE	2
GRATITUDE	2
ENJOYMENT	1
TOTAL	120

Table 38 lists the motives, i.e. the reasons given by the Informers for starting to act as Informers. This table shows the most common reason is financial (32); perhaps this is not surprising when 52% of the Informers were unemployed (Table 10). The financial benefit was certainly uppermost in the mind of one Informer (96) who said,

- *"If the money they're offering isn't enough, I wont bother. I do it for the money. I have something the coppers want - information. They have to pay otherwise they get nowt".*

Not all the respondents were satisfied with their financial arrangements though, and one Informer (62) stated that,

- *"I was happy until recently. I got £55 million of paintings back and my share was £100,000, but I've been waiting for 2 years and I still haven't got it".*

Incidentally, paying Informers can lead to anomalies. For example, over half of the Informers were unemployed, and probably therefore also claiming unemployment benefit from the State, whilst being paid out of public funds by the police for informing. The police service are examining whether their reward procedures are compatible with Social Security Regulations. Also, the question being asked is, are these payments taxable? At present there is no definitive ruling on these issues either from the Department of Social Security or the Inland Revenue..

The second most frequent reason given for informing, and perhaps more surprising, is the Informer's stated dislike for a particular type of crime. This is usually stated on moral grounds, as shown in Table 38 above.

Other reasons given for informing include 'reducing sentence' and 'revenge'. These are particularly good examples where the Informer is prepared to give information in return for some personal benefit to himself. In fact, Table 38 shows that there are very few reasons why an Informer gives information without some sort of personal advantage.

Table 39 - Compares the Informers' motives against the Handlers perceptions.

	INFORMER	HANDLER	TOTAL
PERSONAL REASONS	86	112	198
FRIENDSHIP/GRATITUDE	10	4	14
MORAL REASONS	17	0	17
OTHER	7	4	11
TOTAL	120	120	240

$$(x^2 = 23.8, df = 3, p = 0.00003)$$

Table 39 compares what the Informers state are their reasons for informing, against what the Handler believes are the reasons. There are some strong indications of a difference of opinion between the two groups as to why the Informers start informing. This Table condenses the data from Table 38 into three main reasons for informing. Firstly, there are those reasons which personally benefit the Informer. Secondly, there are social reasons such as friendship, and thirdly, moral reasons against a particular type of crime, for example drugs. It is interesting that these categories can be compared with Weber's definition of social behaviour (see Chapter Five), and therefore perhaps not coincidental that Table 39 uses a similar set of factors.

Table 39 supports the previous finding that 17 (14%) Informers said they disliked that type of crime on moral grounds. Handlers did not consider this to be an option. One of these Informers was an ordinary, hard working married man with no previous convictions. He had been an innocent victim of an unprovoked attack in a busy London street, when for no apparent reason a youth threw acid in his face resulting in substantial disfiguration. He decided to help the police in ridding the streets of violent crime so that decent people could go

about their business in safety. It appears that his fight against crime became an obsession with this particular Informer.

The majority of Handlers (93%) thought the Informer started for 'personal reasons', whereas only 72% of the Informers agreed. Out of these, 32 (27%) Informers said it was for financial reasons, whereas 62 (52%) Handlers thought this was the prime reason. Nine (8%) Informers said it was to get on the right side of the law, but only 2 (2%) Handlers gave this explanation. Finally, not surprisingly, no Handler acknowledged that they applied police pressure, yet 4 (3%) Informers said this was why they started.

Clearly, the analysis shows that the two groups disagree on the motivational factors of the Informers, particularly in relation to financial motivation and moral objections. One can only speculate as to why their beliefs are so apart. It could be that the Handlers did not consider it worthwhile to establish the reasons, or if they did, then they misinterpreted the responses. In any case, we are again seeing a conflict between the two groups in terms of their relationship, and at the very least, a misunderstanding by the Handlers for whatever reason of the Informer's motivation.

Sub Aim B - How do these factors affect the use of Informers

Having established the various motives for informing, the study has looked at whether they affect the relationship; the results are shown in Tables 40 to 42 inclusive. Table 40 determines what the two groups opinions are, and Table 41 develops this further. Table 42 links the Informers motivations with their perceptions of the relationship.

Table 40 - Do the reasons for informing affect the usefulness of the relationship?

	INFORMER	HANDLER	TOTAL
YES	24	56	80
NO	54	46	100
DONT KNOW	42	18	60
TOTAL	120	120	240

$$(X^2 = 23, df = 2, p = 0.00001)$$

Table 40 shows a difference of opinion between the two groups, that is to say the Handlers and Informers had differing views on whether they thought the reasons for informing in any way affected the usefulness of the relationship.

Nearly half of the Handlers (47%) thought they did whereas only 20% of the Informers thought so. Again this may be due to the lack of thought given by the Informers, whilst the Handlers may be more in tune with the motives. In any case only 80 (33%) out of the total group had considered this to be relevant. Also, the Handlers seemed more positive about the relationship, only 18 didn't know, whilst 42 Informers were not sure.

One of the Informers (62) whose main reason for informing was financial, but also accepted that he enjoyed it said,

- *"I take satisfaction in taking the riff raff off the streets, but I don't know if it makes any difference".*

Table 41 continues this part of the discussion and looks at the reasons given as to why the relationship may be affected.

Table 41 - Reasons why relationship affected.

	INFORMER	HANDLER	TOTAL
NOT APPLICABLE	92	55	147
AFFECTS THE WAY YOU PROCEED	19	18	37
IRRELEVANT IF INFORMATION IS GOOD	2	15	17
MAY AFFECT RELIABILITY	2	32	34
DONT KNOW/OTHER	5	0	5
TOTAL	120	120	240

$$(x^2 = 50.7, df = 4, p = < 0.00001)$$

Table 41 examines the views of the groups about their reasons for informing, in terms of any likely effect on their relationship. The results show the Handlers were much more definite that motivational factors affected the relationship. They were concerned about the reliability of the information (27%), and tended to give more examples as to how the relationship may be affected. In contrast the Informers were more vague; the majority who responded though (19,16%) thought that the motives may affect the way relationship proceeded. For example, an Informer who needs the money will probably put more effort into collecting the right information. One such Informer (34) who was involved solely for the money said,

- *"If you need money like I do, you have to come up with good information".*

Another Informer (40) who became involved due to his dislike for drug abuse explained,

"It's important to me. I want to wipe drug dealers off the face of the earth. It makes a difference to me, and the police need to know I'm genuine".

Another (39) added,

"I do it because crime is wrong. But there are devious reasons why some people inform. The police need to know if they're going to do a proper job".

This point is supported by one Handler who said,

- *"Some might be trying to get rid of the competition. They might be bigger than I thought. You can trust the information more if you know".*

Another Handler (235) who thought that the reasons for informing made a difference to the relationship suggested that,

- *"-revenge is likely to make the Informer exaggerate a lie in order to get the person arrested to satisfy his ego".*

On the other hand, a large number of Handlers felt that it made no difference, and one (239) explained quite simply,

- *"As long as there is a result".*

This stance was supported by another (315) who said,

- *"It's nice to be aware but if we get a result we shouldn't be looking too closely at their reasons".*

In summary, although only a minority of Informers and Handlers thought that the motives of an Informer affected the relationship, those that did responded in a number of diverse ways. There were those Informers who for their own benefit made sure that the information they obtained was useful, whilst others had a genuine wish to help the police. Some of the Handlers recognised that where the motive was personal, for example taking out the competition and revenge, then the Handler would need to exercise more care over the relationship.

Table 42 - Motivations compared with Informers description of relationship.

MAIN REASON FOR STARTING	DESCRIBING THE RELATIONSHIP					TOTAL
	PROFESSIONAL	FRIENDLY	NECESSARY	TRUSTING	OTHER	
PERSONAL REASONS	12	30	16	19	9	86
FRIENDSHIP	0	8	0	2	0	10
MORAL REASONS	1	11	0	5	0	17
POLICE PRESSURE	0	2	0	2	0	4
REMOVE COMPETITION	0	0	2	1	0	3
TOTAL	13	51	18	29	9	120

Table 42 compares the description given by the Informer of their relationship with the Handler (Table 29) with their main reason for starting (Table 38). It seems that those who started informing for 'personal reasons', for example to get a reduced sentence and for money, mostly described the relationship with their handler as friendly, and those who wanted to 'remove the competition' described the relationship as necessary. The majority of Informers who started for 'moral reasons' described their relationship as friendly. Also, the majority of Informers who started mainly for 'friendship' with the police, also described their relationship as friendly. This may indicate a level of satisfaction on their part with the partnership.

In summary, this study has examined whether the motives of the Informer in any way affect the relationship. A difference of opinion was identified between the groups when a substantial number of Handlers thought the reasons made a difference whereas few Informers agreed. Both groups, though agreed that if the motives did make a difference it would be in terms of how the relationship progressed, but the Handlers were far more concerned about how the motives affected the quality and reliability of information.

The study has also shown that most of the Informers described their relationship as 'friendly' despite their motivation to inform.

Sub Aim C. - Can the reasons change?

In developing this study of the motives of Informers, it was important to establish whether their motives or reasons changed over time. The results are shown in Tables 43 to 45 inclusive. An examination of motivational change was undertaken, comparing the motivations with the length of time they had been informing. Table 43 shows how the initial reasons for starting changed as their informing career progressed. Table 44 links the Informers length of time working for the police, by age, and Table 45 shows the potential change of reasons over time.

Table 43 - Informers reason for informing - changes through time.

	INITIALLY	WITHIN 1 YR	WITHIN 2 YRS	WITHIN 5 YRS	ALL INFORMERS
OWN BENEFIT	86	86	89	85	83
SOCIAL CONSCIENCE	17	17	17	20	24
HELPING POLICE	14	14	12	10	8
REMOVE COMPETITION	3	3	3	5	5
TOTAL	120	120	120	120	120

Table 43 demonstrates how the initial reasons for informing changed over time. The respondents were asked if their initial motives had changed during their informing career. Of course, it was not possible to identify exactly when they changed; the table therefore generalises and relates to their length of time as an Informer. The objective of this table was to identify the existence of any pattern of change.

‘Own benefit’ includes financial and reduced sentence etc.; it features prominently, showing a similar number of Informers giving this reason throughout their careers, being at its peak within the first 2 years of informing. ‘Social conscience’ mainly describes those Informers who are opposed to drugs, and increases in numbers over time, and certainly after 5 years. ‘Helping the police’ does not appear to be a great motivator at any level, and tails off the longer the Informer is active.

‘Removing competition’ slightly increases as time passes; this may suggest that they may not have been effective in achieving their goals originally, or it could be that the Informers have identified new competition.

Table 44 - Informing experience by age.

	18-21	22-28	29-35	36-42	OVER 42	TOTAL
LESS THAN 1 YEAR	2	8	0	5	8	23
1-2 YEARS	10	8	16	5	2	41
3-5 YEARS	0	11	21	4	8	44
6 YEARS OR MORE	0	2	2	1	7	12
TOTAL	12	29	39	15	25	120

To expand on the length of experience as an Informer, Table 44 looks at the length of time spent as Informers in terms of their respective ages. It could be assumed that as people get older their circumstances change as perhaps do their interpretation of the role; but this is not entirely true.

Admittedly, there were no 18-21 year olds who had been informing for more than 2 years, and most of those who had been informing for more than 6 years were aged over 42. However, 10 Informers (40%) aged over 42 had been informing for less than 2 years, and 10 (67%) of those aged 36-42 had been

informing for less than 2 years. It could be assumed therefore that their ages are not relevant to the length of time of the Informer.

The Table also shows that nearly half of the Informers (56) were aged between 22 and 35 years of age and had been informing for 1 to 5 years.

Table 45 - Breakdown of how the reasons for informing are likely to change through time.

INITIAL REASON	FREQ.	% WHO CHANGE	WITHIN 1 YR	WITHIN 2 YRS	WITHIN 5 YRS	AT SOME TIME
FINANCIAL	32	22		ENJOYMENT	ENJOYMENT	ENJOYMENT
DISLIKE THAT CRIME	17	12			FINANCIAL	
REDUCED SENTENCE	16	62		FINANCIAL	FIN/COMPETITION	FINANCIAL
REVENGE	15	93	FINANCIAL	FIN/ENJOY	FIN/ENJOYMENT	DISLIKES THAT CRIME
RIGHT SIDE OF LAW	9	22		FINANCIAL		
SEEKING FAVOUR	9	78		FIN/FAMILY	FIN/DISLIKES CRIME	
FRIEND OF OFFICER	8	25				DISLIKES THAT CRIME
POLICE PRESSURE	4	100		FINANCIAL	DISLIKES THAT CRIME	
TAKE OUT COMPET.	3	0				
PART OF A DEAL	2	100			FINANCIAL	
CHALLENGE	2	0				
GRATITUDE	2	0				
ENJOYMENT	1	0				
TOTAL	120	42	9	31	39	42

To understand how motivations change over time, and therefore to have an indication of what will happen with individuals who are being recruited, an examination of the data was carried out looking at the reasons for starting, the propensity to change, and likely changes. Having established what the initial motives were for the Informers, the respondents were asked to state whether those reasons had changed, and if so to what. Table 45 shows the frequency distribution of the different reasons for starting informing, as found in Table 29; the proportion of each group who change their reasons; what they change to; and at what point in time those changes are likely to take place. The findings

from this table reveal a totally new concept for practitioners to consider. Firstly, the table provides evidence of motivational change over time, and secondly identifies the reasons the Informer may change to. This data will undoubtedly provide the police service with important management information for the use of Informers.

There are a number of points to be made from Table 45. Firstly, 42% of the Informers changed their reason for informing at some stage during their career, with 9% of Informers changed in the first year, and 31% changed within 2 years. Those who started informing for financial reasons are, it seems unlikely to change (22%), but if they did, it was because they started to enjoy informing.

Secondly, those who started because of so called 'moral objections' (those who have a dislike for that type of crime for moralistic reasons) were unlikely to change (12%). One or two placed a higher value on the financial benefits but by and large it is their moral objection which dominated. Clearly, from the police perspective, it would not be worthwhile to get them to inform about things which they do not have strong feelings about.

Thirdly, those who start informing either to get a reduced sentence as part of a deal, or for some other favour, are very likely to change (70%), most probably after the first 2 years. It is strongly suspected from the data that they will be easily tempted by the money, so they are more of an easy target for the police to recruit them.

Fourthly, those who start for what has been called 'revenge' are extremely likely to change (93%). The data shows that they will quickly become attracted to financial benefits, and in the medium term may even be encouraged to enjoy informing. In the longer term however, they may develop a conscience and

carry on informing out of a sense of public duty or because of moral objections, but in any case with so many of the group changing their view on informing, one could speculate that their initial needs were satisfied. 'Revenge' itself could be closely allied with what has been called 'Taking out the competition', and yet Table 45 clearly shows that these Informers do not change. This matter is also discussed in Table 43.

Finally, the minority who start informing for other reasons are not likely to change. These are out of the mainstream, perhaps having fallen into informing through a friendship with an officer, or while looking for a favour, or through gratitude for a favour done. Retaining these individuals as Informers will depend more on the continuation of that relationship than on the lure of other rewards. If the relationship does break down, they might possibly be tempted to continue for financial reward. It would seem though, that if this minority group do not begin informing for financial reasons in the early stages, they are unlikely to do so during their informing career.

Summary of Aim 4

The Informers' motives have been examined, showing that the majority of Informers start for financial reasons. Again though, the perceptions of the Informer and Handler are different; Handlers thought the main reason why Informers started was for 'personal benefit'; substantially less Informers gave this as their main reason.

The study has shown that motives can change. For example, those Informers who start for 'financial' reasons may change within 2 years because the 'enjoyment' of informing becomes their priority. Similarly, those who start to obtain a 'reduced sentence' could also change within 2 years for 'financial' reasons. Those who start for 'revenge' could change within a year either for

‘financial’ reasons or because they ‘enjoy’ informing. On the other hand, it is probable that an Informer who starts to ‘take out the competition’ will never change his motives.

There is an indication that the reason why an Informer becomes involved, itself dictates subsequent change; that is to say for example, those Informers who start for ‘revenge’ are more likely to change within a year, and become more interested in financial rewards, whereas other motives may never change throughout the relationship.

Aim 5 - To determine whether the police use of informers breaches the law, or Police Discipline Code and if so, to what extent.

Sub Aim A - Does selective informing exist?

Selectivity in this context means making choices by the Informers and Handlers for whatever reason, about the information available to them; that is to say, the Informer may decide not to give his Handler a particular piece of information, or the Handler decides, having been given that information, not to take action on it. This would be defined as ‘selective’. The research concentrated on three specific areas of selectivity. Firstly, on the types of crime; secondly, on the information received or given; thirdly, on whether the groups had been selective about particular individuals. The results are shown in Tables 46 to 53 inclusive.

Table 46 looks at the reasons some Informers are selective in relation to certain types of crime. Table 47 links that with the Informers’ previous convictions, and Table 48 looks at how many Informers were selective about their information, further developed in Table 49 in terms of the reasons for such selectivity. Table 50 considers the Handlers reasons for selectivity and links that with their

experience as police Handlers. Tables 51 to 53 develop the issue further providing examples of crimes not acted on, criminals not acted against, and in particular, specific groups of people.

Table 46 - Reasons for Informers being selective by types of crime.

	DRUGS	OTHER	TOTAL
PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT	16	13	29
MORAL REASONS	15	0	15
TOTAL	31	13	44

Table 46 shows that 44 (37%) Informers said that they had restricted themselves to informing about certain types of crime, that is they only informed about specific types. The study does not confirm, however, that the respondents were selective in every case, but only that they had previously acted in this way. Among those who were selective, there were basically two groups; those who informed primarily about Drugs, and those who informed about other offences, for example Burglary, Theft and Robbery. There were also two Informers who said they restricted their information to Firearms offences. One of these was a taxi driver (114) who said,

- *"It's what I hear about as a cabby and I try to sort it out. I cant sit back and see guns on the streets so I tell the cops".*

The most significant feature was that all those who informed about crimes other than drug offences did so because they were involved in those crimes themselves or had some personal knowledge. None of them reported having moral objections to those crimes. This was not the case however for those who restricted themselves to Drug offences. Whilst there were some who restricted themselves because of personal knowledge; that is to say, they were personally involved or associated with drug offenders, some (15, 50%) restricted their

information to Drug offences because of 'moral objections' to that type of crime. This was the case with one Informer (40) who said,

- *"My daughter is on heroin, so I started doing all I can for the police to help".*

Another Informer (28) was more general stating that,

- *"I'm against drug abuse especially involving kids".*

Drugs was by far the largest type of crime, where 31 Informers said they had been selective. One Informer (51) explained,

- *"All my mates are into drugs so its easy money for me".*

One Handler (253) restricted his activities to Drugs because,

- *"I have an interest in drugs. It is more common to turn someone into an Informer who is involved in drugs because they have more to lose in terms of sentencing".*

Another (201) said,

- *"Knowing that an Informer has handled stolen property, I have turned a blind eye to get the burglar".*

In relation to the types of crime, then, there appears to be 2 distinct categories: drugs and others. Drug Informers may be selective either because they have a moral dislike for that type of offence or because they are personally involved,

whereas those giving information about other types of crime are all personally involved.

Table 47 - Selectivity of Informers with convictions, by types of crime.

PREVIOUS CONVICTION	TYPE OF CRIME		
	DRUGS	OTHER	TOTAL
NO PREVIOUS	4	1	5
FRAUD/DISHONESTY	8	9	17
ASSAULT	0	2	2
DRUGS	13	0	13
SEXUAL	0	1	1
BURGLARY	6	0	6
TOTAL	31	13	44

Table 47 takes the argument a little further by linking those Informers with previous convictions to the types of crime where selectivity has occurred. The Table shows that of the 31 Informers who restricted their activities to drugs (Table 46), 27 (87%) had previous convictions. Only 13 of those Informers had convictions for drugs (48%); 8 (30%) for Fraud/Dishonesty and 6 (22%) for Burglary.

It seemed reasonable to assume that those Informers who were involved with drug abuse, for example previously convicted of a drug offence, may confine themselves to information about drugs, but this was not exclusively so.

Table 16 shows that 24 Informers had convictions for drugs, but only 13 drug offenders restricted their information to drugs. However, it is clear that if an

Informer with drug convictions does decide to be selective, he will probably restrict his information to drugs.

Table 48 - Selectivity of information given or received.

	INFORMER	HANDLER	TOTAL
YES	43	74	117
NO	70	44	114
REFUSED TO ANSWER	7	2	9
TOTAL	120	120	240

$$(x^2 = 16.92, df = 2, p = 0.0002)$$

Table 48 suggests that when examining selectivity of information given or received, there is a marked difference between the two groups, the Handlers and the Informers. To speculate, the reasons for this may be that their responses are reflecting the two completely different backgrounds/roles in the relationship. That is to say, the police officer will naturally want to prioritise the information dependent on his current investigations, whereas the Informer will have no such requirement; making him far less selective.

Overall, more Handlers were much more selective about the information received, 62% of them reported being selective, compared with 36% of the Informers. This does seem to reflect a very high level of selectivity by the Handlers. It seems as though they have the authority to make decisions about whether criminal intelligence is to be acted upon, when in fact it would be natural to assume that all information is analysed and actioned. Indeed, this is fundamental to the concept of 'Intelligence Led Policing' advocated by most law enforcement agencies.

Table 49 - Reasons for selectivity, by Groups.

	INFORMER	HANDLER	TOTAL
NOT SELECTIVE/REFUSED TO ANSWER	77	47	124
TURN A BLIND EYE	0	4	4
OFFENCE IS RELEVANT	0	4	4
OTHER AGENCIES INVOLVED	2	9	11
SELECTED BEST JOBS	0	28	28
TO PROTECT INFORMER	0	11	11
PETTY CRIME	0	6	6
DUBIOUS QUALITY	17	9	26
REFUSED TO ANSWER	2	2	4
LET OFFENDER ESCAPE FIRST	3	0	3
IF I AM TOO CLOSE	8	0	8
FAMILY AT RISK	3	0	3
DEPENDS WHO THE TARGET IS	8	0	8
TOTAL	120	120	240

Table 49 shows the reasons given for being selective by the Informers and Handlers. The main concern for Handlers was selecting the best jobs (28, 39%) and protecting the Informers (11, 15%). The Informers however were more concerned with the quality of information (17, 14%), although the Handlers also referred to this reason, making it the main factor which caused both groups to be selective.

One Handler (257) explained,

- *"Last year, the movement of a large consignment of guns from London into the Counties. They were in the possession of known criminals. I didn't act*

because the information was not good enough. I still haven't done anything".

Informers were also concerned about who the target was (8, 20%), and being too close themselves (8, 20%). An example of this was given by one Informer (25) who explained,

- *"If I'm involved in the job, I won't say so. I'll just drop the others in it".* Another (26) said,
- *"I remember when I did a job with some others. I informed on them but didn't say I had some of the gear".* A similar example was given by an Informer (53) who explained,
- *"When I can make a few bob from nicked gear, I'm not going to give that up am I?".*

One of only 3 who said he would let the offender escape first (1) remarked,

- *"I've missed a job out to let the offender get out the way. The police are happy if they get the property back".* Another example was given by an Informer (9) when he said,
- *"It was a difficult situation. I was dealing with two forces and I got in too deep. I tried to be selective."*

This issue of involving other agencies seemed to be of more concern to the Handlers than the Informers (9 and 2). One such Handler (209) expressed his concern when he said,

- *"I got intelligence that the Informer had repeatedly misled other agencies and he was touting for the highest bidder".* Surprisingly, none of the Informers suggested they were selective about petty crime, although one (57) qualified his response by saying,

- *"Petty things, yeah, like shoplifting, theft from cars and stuff like that".*

This may be a matter of interpretation; it will be seen later (Table 51) that 'petty crime' is highly featured.

Generally, it would appear that the Informers' reasons revolved around concerns for their safety and welfare, or that of their family. One Handler (296) tended to support this prioritisation and explained,

- *"I sometimes turn a blind eye if my man is involved. It's part of the game, but he always tells me. He trusts me to look after him".*

The majority of Handlers, on the other hand were far more professional in their reasoning, most of them simply taking the best jobs from the pile. One Handler (207) gave as an example where the information,

- *"-is for another Agency and I know they don't want to know, I don't bother".* Another example was given by a Handler (207) who said,
- *"Another Informer has come in and given information about my Informer. If we had acted on it, it would have jeopardised his role".*

It would seem also that the Informer does not consider the seriousness of the crime when being selective, and yet 6 (5%) Handlers said they would be selective about petty crime. There is some evidence, then that some Handlers are using their discretion, for whatever reason, in relation to the commission of crime, and only considering the more serious offences, as one Handler (209) suggested when he said,

- *"I tend to tell them to concentrate on one job. I will address the main job".*

This was supported by another Handler (256) who said,

- *"On a meeting, he might give information about ten to fifteen jobs. I will pick the best - "*

Another Handler (237) made this point far more succinctly by saying,

- *"Forget the crap, I want the good stuff".*

The aspect of discretion will be discussed later (Aim 5C) but there is clear evidence from this study that the Handlers often make the decision about what action they will take on information obtained from Informers. The two groups have given different reasons for their selectivity, the Handlers wanting to select the best jobs, whilst the Informers giving more consideration to the quality of the information.

What has been surprising though is that none of the Handlers suggested they would be selective merely because the information related to a type of crime not in their jurisdiction. This contradicts Skolnick's suggestion that "- narcotics police typically ignore burglaries when questioning their informants. Likewise, burglary detectives overlook the use of narcotics by their informants -" ⁹ One reason for this may be that nowadays, police Handlers often work within dedicated units and rather than specialise in specific crimes, for example drugs, are expected to secure information on a range of crimes. Of course, this contradicts the Handler's decision to be selective.

⁹ Skolnick J H Justice without trial - Law enforcement in democratic society, (John Wiley & Sons Inc, USA 1966) p137.

Table 50 - Handlers selectivity of information by length experience.

	< 1 year	1-2 years	3-5 years	>6 years	TOTAL
NOT SELECTIVE	2	7	18	20	47
TURN A BLIND EYE	0	0	2	2	4
OFFENCE IS RELEVANT	0	0	2	2	4
OTHER AGENCIES INVOLVED	0	0	3	6	9
SELECTED BEST JOBS	0	0	5	23	28
TO PROTECT INFORMER	0	2	1	8	11
PETTY CRIME	0	2	1	3	6
DUBIOUS QUALITY	2	1	4	2	9
REFUSED TO ANSWER	0	0	2	0	2
TOTAL	4	12	38	66	120

Table 50 compares the length of time as an Handler with their reasons for being selective. Results show the most significant feature in terms of experience as a Handler was that those who 'selected the best jobs' (information which was most likely to result in arrests, and therefore success) had all been handling for at least 3 years, and 23 (35%) had 6 or more years experience. Those few less experienced Handlers who were selective were more concerned with the quality of information; that is to say, its accuracy. It is also apparent that those with over 6 years experience in handling show more concern for the protection of the Informer, than do others.

Overall, it is clear that the more experienced the Handler becomes, the more likely he/she will be selective, ranging from 44% (7) of those handling less than 2 years to 70% (46) of those handling 6 years or more. It is not known, however, why this may be, but clearly the long term Informers are far more prepared to be selective than the others.

Table 51 - Examples where crime is not acted on, by groups.

	INFORMER	HANDLER	TOTAL
PETTY CRIME	34	22	56
INFORMER TOO CLOSE	8	12	20
FRIEND INVOLVED	7	0	7
OTHER	17	18	35
TOTAL	66	52	118

Table 51 develops the issue of selectivity and gives examples where the commission of crimes had come to the respondents' knowledge but they had decided not to act; for example, the Informer had given information about a crime but the Handler decided not to take any action. A total of 118 respondents gave examples, and this seems to compare with the 117 in Table 48 who said they had been selective about information.

When comparing the examples in Table 51 with Table 49 (Reasons for selectivity) however, there is an interesting difference between the two. Thirty four (52%) Informers and 22 (42%) Handlers, 56 in total, gave 'petty crime' as an example of where they had either not given the information or not acted on it. However, when they were asked about selectivity in general, none of the Informers and only 6 (5%) Handlers mentioned 'petty crime'. There appears to be no explanation for this disparity, but nevertheless, from a police perspective, it is a matter of concern when so many admit take no action because it relates to 'petty crime'.

Table 51 also shows that 7 (11%) Informers said they would not give information if a friend was involved, but this was not referred to at all in Table 49. This is surprising, as it will be shown later (Table 53) both groups had no

doubts that they would be selective in relation to friends and relatives (108, 89%). One such Informer (116) recalled,

- *"This youth I know pinched a car and knocked somebody down and badly injured him. He was me best mate so I didn't grass on him".*

There was a similarity, though with the 8 (12%) Informers, and 12 (23%) Handlers (20, 17%) who referred to the 'Informer as being too close'; that is, the Informer was so closely associated with the crime that by giving information about it would put the Informer in jeopardy. Table 49 shows that none of the Handlers mentioned this, although 11 suggested they would protect the Informer, and this could be regarded as much the same thing. The number of Informers were the same in both tables (8, 7%).

There appears to be no obvious reason for the differences in these responses, but this may be explained by their interpretation of the questions. There may also be some subtle difference in their perceptions of selectivity and not acting on a crime. Whatever the reasons though, it is clear that a large proportion of the respondents (118) were not prepared to take action about certain crimes that had been committed. This appears to conflict with the objective of the Informer/Handler relationship, i.e. to clear up crime generally.

Table 52 - Criminals not acted against, by groups.

	INFORMER	HANDLER	TOTAL
YES	88	33	121
NO	29	83	112
MAYBE	3	4	7
TOTAL	120	120	240

$(\chi^2 = 51.2, df = 2, p < 0.001)$

Table 52 develops the issue of selectivity further and asks whether Informers and Handlers had failed to act on information relating to known criminals. The table shows a highly significant difference of opinion between the Handlers and Informers. Eighty eight (73%) Informers said they would be selective with criminals, whereas only 33 (28%) Handlers agreed. Conversely, 83 (69%) of the Handlers said they were not selective, compared with 29 (24%) Informers. This may not however be so surprising, when recalling from Table 15 that 89% of the Informers had criminal backgrounds themselves. In reality, the number of Handlers who said they were selective is less relevant if the Informer decides for himself that he is not going to furnish the police with information against a particular individual. In such cases it is likely that the police will not even hear about it. Nevertheless, there are still a number of Handlers who, given the opportunity, will not take action against criminals, showing again that police officers find it acceptable to make such important decisions which in effect usurps the criminal justice system.

Table 53 - Examples of selectivity of individuals, by groups.

	INFORMER	HANDLER	TOTAL
FRIENDS/RELATIVES	88	20	108
INFORMERS	0	14	14
TOTAL	88	34	122

Table 53 develops the selectivity of individuals and examines who might escape action by the Informer or Handler. The Table shows that all of the 88 Informers who said they would be selective (Table 52), specified 'friends or relatives' as those who were so favoured. One such Informer (22) explained that he would not give information against friends if,

- *"-they use drugs at a party where I am".*

Of the 34 Handlers who gave examples, 20 (59%) also stipulated 'friends or relatives', but a further 14 (41%) said they would not act against other Informers. It is not surprising that the Informers did not mention other Informers, as they are not likely to know their identities, and perhaps even if they did, they would not have any allegiance towards them. The Handlers, on the other hand may feel that it would not be in the best interest to act against other Informers, especially if they are providing current information. Again, this shows some conflict in the Informer/Handler relationship; the police officer will be aware of a number of active Informers but the Informer will be quite isolated, relying solely on his Handler.

More importantly perhaps, there is an indication here that an Informer may have a distinct advantage over other criminals in that the Informer may not be dealt with for crimes he is committing. Indeed, this study has shown that in relation to selectivity, a large number of Handlers are prepared to take no action regarding certain types of criminality. It is apparent they are abusing their authority making decisions which they are ill-placed to do. The study will develop this issue further in relation to discretion.

Sub Aim B - Does the use of Informers break the law?

The study has considered whether this unique relationship between an Informer and Handler breaches the criminal law; that is to say, is the partnership between an Informer and Handler instrumental in the commission of crime. The results are set out in Tables 54 to 63 inclusive. Table 54 sets out the number of respondents in each group who believe it does, with examples given in Table 55. Tables 56 and 57 then looks at how many have been involved in setting up crimes. Table 58 establishes any significance between the category of crime set up by the Informer, and his of previous convictions. Then, Table 59 looks

specifically at those who had been party to the commission of crime. Tables 60 to 62 relate to Participating Informers.¹⁰ Table 63 examines the responses by both groups who were asked if the police allowed Informers to commit crime.

Table 54 - Informers breaking the law, by groups.

	INFORMER	HANDLER	TOTAL
YES	17	50	67
NO	58	58	116
DONT KNOW	24	2	26
REFUSED TO ANSWER	21	10	31
TOTAL	120	120	240

$$(\chi^2 = 38.8, df = 3, p = <0.001)$$

Table 54 looks at whether the two groups, Informers and Handlers, believe that their relationship with each other can itself be instrumental in breaking the law. The Table shows there is a significant difference of opinion between the Handlers and Informers; the most apparent was the 20% (24) of Informers who said they didn't know if the use of Informers breaks the law; (standardised residual = 3.1) and the 42% (50) of Handlers who said the use of Informers did break the law. (standardised residual = 2.9). Interestingly, though, there were identical numbers of both groups (58, 48%) who said such use did not breach the law.

¹⁰ A Participating Informer is a registered Informer who is authorised by a police officer of Assistant Chief Constable rank to take part in a crime, taking a minor role and not acting as Agent Provocateur. For completeness sake, it is worth pointing out that the police service are currently reviewing their procedures for the use and authorisation of Participating Informers to ensure compatibility with the Human Rights Act 1998.

It could be argued that the observed differences between the two groups are not reflecting a difference of opinion, but rather a difference of awareness of the law itself. Clearly, the police officers will have a better understanding of this subject, with 90% giving a definite yes or no, whereas only 63% of the Informers were able to do so. Nevertheless, these findings are important as 17 Informers (14%) were in no doubt that breaches were occurring.

A total of 67 respondents were clear that the informer relationship breached the law. There were a substantial number who refused to answer (31) and so it could be assumed that the actual figure could be far more. This acceptance by so many of the respondents that their relationship could break the law is of concern, and the implications for law enforcement policy makers are clear; there is a need to acknowledge these findings, and by introducing robust policies to alleviate such occurrences show that these actions are not condoned.

Table 55 - examples where the law was broken.

EXAMPLE	INFORMER	HANDLER	TOTAL
ARRANGING/ORGANISING CRIME	2	8	10
PARTICIPATING INFORMER	1	21	22
HANDLING STOLEN PROPERTY	2	4	6
STEAL CARS	2	2	4
ACTIVE CRIMINAL	0	5	5
BUYING/SELLING GOODS egDRUGS	2	9	11
REFUSED TO ANSWER	3	1	4
OTHER	5	0	5
TOTAL	17	50	67

Table 55 expands on Table 54 and looks at the examples given by those 17 Informers and 50 Handlers who agreed that laws had been broken during the use of Informers. One such Informer (1) said,

- *"I sometimes drive whilst disqualified but the police don't bother if I'm involved in a job".* Another (99) agreed that the police were fully aware of this situation and said,
- *"Once my Handler wanted to know if I was doing any jobs. I told him I was involved in a good class house burglary. I told him all about it. He said I could do it as long as he was told where and when. The others got pulled and I was left alone. I made a few bob out the job and got some money from the coppers aswell. Cant be bad!"*

One of the Informers (8) who gave drugs as an example said,

- *"I know an Informer who was playing one police force against another so that he could carry out his drugs business".*

One of the Informers (114) who gave an example of handling stolen property said,

- *"I have handled property which meant that I was breaking the law. I had to handle it to get it to the police and it was the only way to sort out the target. It was a sawn off shot gun".*

All but 1 of the Handlers gave examples, the remaining respondents refused to answer. Their responses reflected the fact that they were content to use Informers to commit crime in order to achieve their objective to detect other crime, for example, they would use Participating Informers (21, 43%), to organise or arrange crime (8, 16%), or get them to buy and sell illegal property (9, 18%).

The use of Participating Informers is referred to in Chapter II (Agent Provocateur) and Chapter III (Police Use of Informers) and in essence refers to those Informers who are authorised by the police to take a 'minor role' in the commission of a criminal offence with a view to resolving a more serious crime. It is clear that Informers generally are unaware of the rules governing Participating Informers, but more importantly, police officers themselves are sometimes not sure. A Participating Informer commits a criminal offence, even though the police authorise such commission. However, one Handler (202) has not understood this, explaining,

- *"There is a fine line between Participating Informants and commission of the offence. Some don't know the difference".*

There is presently a research project being undertaken (led by the author of this research), looking specifically at Participating Informers. Clearly the question which arises from Table 55 is how many Informers are engaged in this type of work and are not aware they have been authorised as participants? This study shows that only 1 Informer thought this to be the case. The use of Informers in this way means they are asked to breach the criminal law, and suggests too that the police are content to legitimise their actions. An example was given by one Informer (120) who explained,

- *"I went to work for an escort agency as a prostitute. I offered myself for information against the owner who was pushing child pornography. It took about 5 or 6 weeks, that's all".*

Twenty one (42%) Handlers gave 'Participating Informers' as examples of where the law has been broken. As already stated, the use of Participating Informers, if authorised is a legitimate process for breaking the law but as one (257) explained,

- *"If you put a Participating Informant report up, you have to indicate exactly what his actions are. But if you hold back after he steals the car, for example, then you just say that he is being the driver. It's bending the rules".*

In relation to the Handlers, 8 (16%) admitted that they arranged or organised certain crimes through the use of Informers. Such an example was given by one (201) who said,

- *"I instructed my Informer to make sure the target was in possession of stolen credit cards when I arrested him".*

A further 9 (18%) Handlers allowed their Informers to buy stolen goods or illegal drugs, one such Handler (221) explaining that it was necessary,

- *"-so you can get into the operation".*

Another (237) agreed and recalled,

- *"Where he (Informer) is handling and I have allowed him to keep the property".*

A further Handler (284) who referred to drugs said,

- *"-My snouts are all druggies. They have to be to be any good. If I tried to stop them getting their own gear, I would be shooting myself in the foot".*

Five (10%) Handlers accepted that their Informers were active criminals, but as one (278) admitted,

- *"- I have no direct knowledge, and I have done nothing about it".*

Another (281) agreed and recalled that one of his Informers was,

- *"- heavily into nicking cars. You see, a successful informant is usually always an active criminal".*

This was confirmed by another Handler (297) who explained,

- *"Informers are usually criminals so they always break the law. The fact that you use them doesn't make any difference to that. In fact, if they stop nicking or whatever, then they're not so useful".*

A further Handler (292) recalled that one of his Informers was an illegal immigrant and was,

- *"-allowed into the country illegally and allowed to commit crime, an armed robbery. He wasn't arrested so that his background wasn't disclosed".*

Table 56 - Informers and Handlers involved in setting up crime.

	INFORMER	HANDLER	TOTAL
YES	41	42	83
NO	59	70	129
REFUSED TO ANSWER	20	8	28
TOTAL	120	120	240

$$(\chi^2 = 6.09, df = 2, p = 0.048)$$

Table 56 compares the responses by the two groups to the suggestion that they have been involved in the 'setting up' of at least one crime. The respondents were quite clear that 'setting up' crime meant instigating a crime which would not have been committed without their involvement, commonly known as 'agent provocateur'. The results are only just significant at the 95% level, however the differences are exaggerated by the different proportions of respondents who were prepared to answer the question. The Informers were generally more

evasive with 20 (17%) refusing to answer, compared with 8 (7%) Handlers. Interestingly, the proportions who reported being involved were similar; 34% of Informers and 35% of the Handlers, 83 respondents in total. Out of the 70 Handlers who said they would not become involved in setting up crime, it is not clear how many of those had been nevertheless approached to do so by their Informers. One Handler (222) however referred to this and said,

- *"I targeted a drugs dealer with the Informant. After a week I hadn't got very far. He suggested he supply the target with a kilo of amphet and a shooter (firearm). I said no, forget about it".*

Table 57 - Examples of crime set up, by groups.

	INFORMER	HANDLER	TOTAL
BURGLARY	6	6	12
ROBBERY	0	2	2
DRUGS	18	2	20
FIREARMS	4	0	4
HANDLING STOLEN PROPERTY	8	0	8
PARTICIPATING INFORMER	0	22	22
OTHER	1	4	5
REFUSED TO ANSWER	4	6	10
TOTAL	41	42	83

Table 57 shows examples given by the respondents where crimes had been 'set up'. There were 41 Informers and 42 Handlers as shown in Table 56. The Table shows that 22 (26%) Handlers referred to Participating Informers, but none of the Informers did. This may add to the point that Informers are often unaware of this working practice within the police service: It may also suggest that Handlers tried to justify their actions by referring to 'Participating

Informers', even though this is not an example of crime but merely a means used by the police to 'set up' crime.

A number of categories of crime are mentioned by the respondents but only the burglary offences show a similarity between the groups. One such Informer (85) said,

- *"The police were after someone who was a regular burglar. I set up a job for him to do and make sure he took the gear to his house. The police were waiting for him, it was easy. He cleared up a load of jobs".* Another (238) recalled,
- *"The informant was told to arrange a supermarket burglary. He was involved. It was not disclosed but it ended in a good result".*

Handling stolen property is not mentioned by the Handlers, and it is not clear whether this is because the offence is not set up at all, or the Handlers do not consider it to be worth mentioning. The latter seemed to be the case with one Handler (237) who gave burglary as an example but said,

- *"Which one? There are so many. To give the Informer credibility I gave him a warehouse to set up handling jobs. He got so involved he was setting up burglaries".*

One of the Informers (76) though recalled,

- *"I have made sure a villain is in a house with some gear on him so that the police know all about it. It saves the police time trying to catch them. Like drugs, its easy to set them up but they're at it anyway so I don't think that's wrong".*

One example which suggests the police are well aware that crimes are being set up is given by an Informer (34) who said,

- *"A man from — does a decent living out of crime. I arranged to have a stolen bike which had been recovered by the police, to go to this man. They then did an operation on him. I kept the money I made from selling the bike to him".*

A similar story was told by an Informer (40) who reported that,

- *"I found out about two villains and I rang my Handler and he told me to get some gear and put it in their house. He told me when he was doing the bust so I could be away".*

One Informer involved in drugs (112) said,

- *"They use me all the time, 'cos I'm into heroin. All they have to do is plant me somewhere and its like flies round a honeypot. Easy, that is".*

Another drugs Informer (88) explained,

- *"Every job I set up comes up. For instance, a drugs job. Some dealers on crack cocaine are earning 3 to 4 thousand a night. I became part of the team and I needed to set the main man up. He was from Trinidad. There was dealing every day but the main man -we had to make sure he was involved".*

The area of drugs was mentioned regularly by the Informers but only 2 of the Handlers referred to it specifically. One of those (278) said,

- *"I remember an informant rang in and told me some drugs were in a biscuit tin at the villains home. We arrested him but I knew that the informant had sold the drugs in the first place to him".*

Another Informer (108) referred to illegal firearms and said,

- *" I remember once they were after a certain bloke for supplying guns to villains but they couldn't catch him. I managed to put a moody shooter (illegal firearm) in his house which they found. He was locked up for it. I thought at the time it was a bit iffy, but as they told me - he was bang at it so he had to be stopped. That's fair enough isn't it?"*

One Handler (276) was more general when he said that,

- *"I've dealt with informants who have set up targets. I do discourage them because I don't want to lose the case at court, but I know it will go on anyway".*

This seemed to be the attitude shared by a number of Handlers, one of whom (285) said,

- *"Where the target is active, I have often asked the snout to, well you know, spur him on a bit. He's going to commit crime anyway so we might as well control it".*

One Informer (8) who referred to firearms was a middle aged man living in the North East of Britain, and on the face of it was a legitimate businessman. He was also heavily into the importation of illegal drugs, which of course his Handler was well aware of. He gave the impression that he was a good friend of the police and wanted to help them as much as he could. It is not clear whether he was trying to help, or there was some other reason when he said,

- *"I knew a man who could get hold of a shotgun. I made sure that he obtained it and hid it in his settee so that when I told the police, they knew exactly where to find it".*

To summarise, the data has shown that a large number of the respondents were prepared to 'set up' crimes and a number of examples were given involving

various types of crime. Such action can never be justified, even though some Handlers tried to do so by suggesting that authorisation was given to use 'Participating Informers'. If the practice of 'setting up' crimes is commonplace, and it seems to be the case, then it could be argued that the use of Informers increases criminality.

Table 58 - Category of crimes set up, by previous convictions.

CRIMES SET UP	PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS						TOTAL
	DISHONEST	ASSAULT	DRUGS	SEXUAL	BURGLARY	ROBBERY	
BURGLARY	4	0	0	0	2	0	6
DRUGS	8	0	6	0	2	0	16
FIREARMS	2	0	2	0	0	0	4
STOLEN VEHICLE	0	0	1	0	1	0	
STOLEN PROPERTY	2	1	0	0	0	2	5
SEXUAL	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
TOTAL	16	1	9	1	5	2	34

Table 58 looks more closely at the types of crimes which had been 'set up' by the Informers and compares them with the Informers' previous convictions. The aim here is to see if there is a connection between the two. Results show that 34 Informers who admitted setting up crimes had a criminal history. A closer look at the data shows no obvious connection between the types of crimes 'set up' and the Informers' previous convictions, that is other than those relating to drugs. Nine (26%) Informers had been convicted of drug offences, and 6 (67%) of those had set up drugs related offences. None of the other categories had any obvious connection, although 1 Informer who had been convicted of a sexual offence, also set up a similar type of offence. This was a female who managed a brothel, and the offences she set up had in fact been connected with her employment. Presumably this was because of her unique position to assist the police.

In total, 83 (35%) Informers and Handlers agreed that they had been involved in the setting up of various criminal offences. This practice can only be described as criminal in itself and the interesting aspect of this is that those respondents involved seemed generally comfortable talking about this matter, and appeared to not see the need to justify their involvement. This was so for both groups.

Table 59 - Respondents who have been party to the commission of crime

	INFORMER	HANDLER	TOTAL
YES	89	51	140
NO	9	34	43
PROVIDING IT WAS AUTHORISED	8	24	32
DEPENDS ON CIRCUMSTANCES	14	11	25
TOTAL	120	120	240

$$(x^2 = 33.2, df = 3, p < 0.001)$$

Table 59 looks at those respondents who allowed themselves to become involved in the commission of a crime. This involvement is slightly less dramatic than being involved in the 'setting up' of a crime, or agent provocateur. The data shows that 140 (58%) respondents said they would be prepared to be party to the commission of crime, with only 18% saying they would not. This is to be compared with 83 respondents who said they had been involved in setting up a crime (Table 56). There were statistically significant differences between the two groups in that a high proportion of Informers said they would be so involved (Standardised residual = 2.3) with a high proportion of Handlers who said they would not (Standardised residual = 2.7). Out of the 89 Informers who seemed to have no doubts, one such Informer (99) said,

- *"I don't mind what I do as long as I get paid. If the coppers say its OK then I'm on to a winner".*

Another Informer (98) agreed that he would do anything, stating that,

- *"If my Handler is happy I'll do what he says. He sorts everything out, I trust him. He wouldn't let me down".*

This response by the Informers suggesting that they will unconditionally do what is asked of them is confirmed by an Informer (84) who said,

- *"I owe my Handler. He has helped me no end. If it wasn't for him I would be in prison now. Like, you know, he can square jobs up. Well the least I can do is help catch the villains he wants, and I get paid for it. Cant be bad".*

Twenty four Handlers (20%) agreed that they would be involved in crime as long as the involvement was properly authorised. This condition refers to the process of authorising Participating Informers and seems to support the findings of Table 57 where 22 Handlers said that they had allowed crimes to be set up through authorised use. One Handler (201) though was less specific and said,

- *"It's our job to put them away (the criminal). If we can catch them, I'll do anything".*

Another (237) agreed and said,

- *"-It's in a good cause. A necessary evil".*

In addition, 25 respondents stated they would become involved in crime in certain circumstances, and these include 7 Handlers where the crime was of a minor nature; 6 Informers if it kept them out of trouble, and a further 6 Informers where they had bought stolen property. An example given by one Handler (276) was,

- *"Yes we had a lad who was nicking cars for a team of armed robbers. We allowed him to steal a car to be used on a job. We had an opportunity to nab some armed robbers".*

Again, drugs offences featured highly here and one Informer (104) agreed saying,

- *"Yes, I would offer to drive the local heroin dealer to pick up his score in order to discover who his supplier was as this would catch the bigger fish".*

To summarise, it appears that, with the exception of drugs offences, there is no connection between the types of crime 'set up' by the Informers and their previous convictions. A large number of Informers and Handlers seemed comfortable with being involved in the commission of crime, and although some of the Handlers again used 'Participating Informers' as some justification, there were a large number who did not. A number of examples were given, but the general feeling from both groups suggests that the means justifies the ends. Such action is commonly known within the police service as 'noble cause corruption' and can never be condoned or authorised. Such a high number of respondents being prepared to be involved in the commission of crime must be of concern to police policy makers.

Table 60 - Informers who have participated in crime whilst informing

INFORMERS	FREQUENCY
YES	60
NO	48

Table 60 looks at Informers who had participated in crime whilst giving information to the police. This is the same as taking part in the commission of crime. Forty eight Informers said they would not participate in crime and only 9 Informers said they had not been party to the commission of crime in Table 59. Sixty Informers admitted that they had participated in crime, but 89 said they had been involved in the commission of crime in Table 59. This disparity may of course be due to the respondents' differing perceptions of being involved in crime. Nevertheless, the data yet again confirms the Informers' apparent willingness to participate in crime. One Informer (27) had no doubts and said,

- *"I have often been used on jobs. It's easier for the police to control the situation. Usually as a driver".*

Table 61 - Examples of crimes in which Informers had participated

CRIME	FREQUENCY
DRIVER	9
DRUGS	28
BURGLARY	8
CAR THEFT	2
OTHER	3
REFUSED TO ANSWER	10
TOTAL	60

Table 61 further examines the 60 Informers identified in Table 60 as having participated in crimes. The table lists the type of crimes each of those 60 respondents had participated in whilst informing. The data shows that most Informers (28, 47%) had arranged drugs deals. One Informer (34) suggested,

- *"A drugs job, when there was no money forthcoming, I was allowed to get involved instead of payment".*

Another example was given (35) when,

- *"I was once used to deliver drugs from one target to another. They were arrested and I escaped".*

Nine Informers (15%) had been drivers during the commission of crime, and 8 (13%) had been involved in burglaries. One such Informer (57) recalled,

- *"I was doing a shop burglary with some others. I rang my Handler ten minutes before the job and he didn't have time to do anything about it, so I did the job and afterwards the others got arrested and charged. They arrested me so it looked right but I wasn't charged".*

Not all the Informers who get involved in this type of activity told the police. One Informer (90) said,

- *"It was a burglary and I was the look-out. The security guard turned up out of the blue, so I had to warn the villains and they ran off, like. They never got caught".*

Five others (8%) had been involved in other crime. One such Informer (53) said,

- *"My home was used to stash the gear until it was safe to move it. The police knew and they let me keep a few bits".*

Handling stolen property was mentioned again by one Informer (108) who said,

- *"Handling nicked gear - by using me as a fence, they (the police) could control where everything was going. I even got to keep some of it".*

Another Informer (56) recalled,

- *"Someone asked me to look after a shotgun. I kept it at my house for a while, then I told the police where it was. They didn't arrest the bloke because he would have known it came from me".*

One Informer (58) gave Robbery as an example and said,

- *"Some villains want me to do a post office job. There's about five grand in it. I'm supposed to go in the place but I'm too old for that sort of thing. I'm hoping my Handler will blow the job out but if it goes ahead I'll have to take part".*

There were also 10 Informers (15%) who refused to give examples of the type of crimes they had participated in.

Drugs offences features highly in the examples given, but the qualitative data specifies a number of so called serious crimes such as burglary, handling stolen property, firearms offences and robbery. The data again seems to confirm the Informers' willingness to commit crime, and the Handlers' apparent acceptance that crimes are being committed by their Informers.

Table 62 - Whether participation in crime had been declared by Informer

INFORMER	FREQUENCY
YES	14
NO	8
DONT KNOW	38
TOTAL	60

Table 62 further examines the possible confusion between 'Participating Informers', and those 'taking part in the commission of crime'. To address this

issue, the 60 Informers referred to in Tables 60 and 61 were asked whether their participation had been declared. Thirty eight (62%) did not know. To speculate, that suggests their Handlers were possibly aware that this was happening, but the Informers did not know if authorisation had been given by their supervisors. Indeed, it may be in the Handlers' interests to convince their Informers that authorisation had been given. At the time of this study, there was no procedure in place in England for the Informer to be aware of any necessary documentation to be completed, however the National Informer Working Group are reviewing current police practices, and it is expected that major changes are inevitable.

Table 62 suggests that although 8 Informers believed their participation was not disclosed - the majority were unable to answer, suggesting that the Informer/Handler partnership may lack a measure of communication. The reason could of course be more sinister; that is to say some Handlers may have decided not to seek the necessary authority, but instead took the decision themselves to allow an Informer to participate.

Table 63 - Handler will allow Informer to commit crime, by groups.

	INFORMER	HANDLER	TOTAL
ALWAYS/USUALLY	24	23	47
SOMETIMES	37	35	72
RARELY/NEVER	59	62	121
TOTAL	120	120	240

Table 63 shows the responses by both Informers and Handlers when asked if they believed the police would allow Informers to commit crime whilst informing. There was a high degree of agreement between the two groups, with no evidence of a difference of opinion. Forty seven (20%) said the police would

always or usually allow this, and a further 72 (30%) said they would sometimes. Half the respondents agreed that Informers are allowed to commit crime, and with such a positive agreement between the two groups, there can be little doubt that the results are valid.

In summary, the findings support the hypothesis that the use of Informers is instrumental in the commission of crime. A substantial proportion of the respondents gave examples where this was the case, and both Informers and Handlers accepted that crimes had been set up as a result of the Informer/Handler relationship. Examples of various types of crime were given including drugs, firearms offences, robbery, theft and others. The participation in crime has been discussed and although there currently exists a procedure for police officers to allow Informers to participate subject to proper authorisation, it is clear that these procedures are not understood or in some cases not adhered to. The practice of allowing Informers to participate is being reviewed in this country and this review must take account of this study.

Sub Aim C - Level of discretion used with the law.

It was identified in Chapter Five, whilst examining the theoretical issues, that there was concern about the growing use of discretion involved in the use of Informers. This specific issue is covered in this section.

To examine possible breaches of the law in more detail, both groups were asked to what extent they use their discretion during their informing activities. The results are set out in Table 64, with Table 65 developing the point in terms of the immunity offered by the police. Discretion is linked closely with those findings in relation to 'selectivity' referred to in Tables 46 to 53. Discretion here means the

freedom used by the respondents to make judgments and act as they see fit in relation to the criminal law.

Table 64 - Use of discretion about the law

	INFORMER	HANDLER	TOTAL
YES	86	54	140
NO	12	50	62
DEPENDS ON CIRCUMSTANCES	22	16	38
TOTAL	120	120	240

$(\chi^2 = 31.6, df = 2, p < 0.001)$

Table 64 looks at whether discretion is used by Informers and Handlers in relation to the law, whilst engaged in informing. On the face of it, the most significant feature is the proportion of Handlers who said they would not use discretion (standardised residual = 3.4). However there were only 50 (42%) and part of the significance is that they are being compared with Informers, the majority of which as we know from Table 15, have criminal histories; so perhaps it is not that surprising. Even those who said they would not use discretion were not all emphatic about their decision. For example, one Handler (290) said,

- *"-I make it clear that there are certain things I don't want to know about".*

The most alarming feature is regarding those 54 (45%) Handlers who said they would use their discretion. One (215) had no doubts, saying,

- *"Yes, I do that as well. I think you've got to give them a 'by'".*

A further 16 (13%) Handlers said they would use discretion under the right circumstances, which could include minor offences (11, 9%). This seems to be supported by the findings in Table 37, where a number of Handlers agreed they

would be selective in petty crime. The study does not determine however, what crimes these Handlers consider to be petty, but one Handler (307) suggested,

- *"Where I suspect my informants may be guilty of minor offences e.g. possession of drugs or minor traffic offences I may avoid further investigation as this may interfere with the informant/handler relationship".*

Twenty two Informers also thought that circumstances would dictate their answer, this includes 8 (7%) who thought their use of discretion would help the police, and a further 4 (3%) who approved as long as they did not get involved themselves. Only 12 Informers said they would not use any discretion. One who had no doubt (116) explained that,

- *"I have driven cars without insurance and tax if it helps the police to get their target, yeah".*

Another (114) responded by saying,

- *"I don't want to be an informant. I'm not committing crime and I don't want paying. It just suited me at the time because I'm a taxi driver and I don't have any licence. The police can help me there".*

Only 62 of the total respondents said they used no discretion, with the majority accepting that some use is made of this factor.

In summary, this part of the study shows that widespread use of discretion is made by Informers and Handlers. These findings tend to confirm the concern expressed by some partners of the police (Chapter five) who fear that another Stephen Lawrence enquiry may just be round the corner due to an abuse of authority. It may also be supposed that those supporters of the police use of discretion are unaware of it's widespread use by Informers and Handlers resulting in a flagrant abuse of the law.

This use of discretion may suggest a lack of control and supervision on both groups, and again provides some doubt about the management of their relationship.

Table 65 - Immunity granted, by groups.

	INFORMER	HANDLER	TOTAL
ALWAYS/USUALLY	4	4	8
SOMETIMES	12	25	37
RARELY/NEVER	104	91	195
TOTAL	120	120	240

To further develop the matter of discretion, Table 65 compares the responses from the two groups as to whether Handlers will grant immunity to their Informers in exchange for information.

The results do not seem to support Table 63, where 50% of the respondents disagreed that the Informer is allowed to commit crime. Table 65 shows that only 8 (3%) respondents said that immunity was always or usually given. Another 37 (15%) thought this occurred sometimes, but there were twice as many Handlers as Informers, and the majority of respondents (195, 81%) disagreed that such practice occurred.

These findings do not compare either with the use of discretion (Table 64) where 178 respondents thought that such use was possible. To speculate, perhaps the difference with immunity is that it requires positive action on the part of the Handler, whereas when he allows the Informer to commit crime, or he uses his discretion, then a more passive role can be taken. That is to say, the Handler in effect omits to do something rather than takes positive steps.

However, it does seem that more of the Handlers are likely to consider granting immunity than the Informers believe.

Sub Aim D - Do Police Officers breach the Discipline Code?

The study looked at the level of breaches by the Handlers in relation to the Police Discipline Code (Appendix H) and the results are set out in Tables 66 to 68 inclusive. Table 66 shows the proportion who have done so, and Table 67 lists examples. Table 68 further develops this area and establishes what sort of problems the Handlers were prepared to sort out on behalf of their Informers.

Table 66 - Breaches of the Police Discipline Regulations.

	INFORMER	HANDLER	TOTAL
YES	0	58	58
NO	15	46	61
DONT KNOW/REFUSED TO ANSWER	105	16	121
TOTAL	120	120	240

$(\chi^2 = 139.2, df = 2, p < 0.001)$

Table 66 shows a significant difference between the two groups in relation to breaches of the Police Discipline Regulations ¹¹ in that 102 (85%) Informers said they did not know if such breaches occur; a further 3 Informers refused to answer. None of the Informers could say positively that they had breached the police discipline code. It could be argued that they do not need to know, but here again an example emerges of how the partnership between the two groups is far from close. Clearly, the Informers know little about police procedures, in

¹¹ In the interests of clarity, it should be pointed out the Police Discipline Regulations have since been replaced by the Police (Conduct) Regulation 1999.

much the same way as they lack knowledge about Participating Informers (Table 62).

Fifty eight Handlers (50%) agreed they had previously committed disciplinary offences, a particularly high figure, bearing in mind this data was obtained after the A.C.P.O. Guidelines had been circulated in 1995 which was intended to alleviate such practice.

Table 67 - Examples of breaches of the Discipline Regulations

	FREQUENCY
UNAUTHORISED MEETINGS	20
LOCAL RULES AND ORDERS	14
FAIL TO ARREST WANTED INFORMER	7
PAYMENT PROCEDURES	4
SHOWING INFORMER DETAILS OF TARGET	3
HAVING AN AFFAIR WITH INFORMER	2
REFUSED TO ANSWER/OTHER	8
TOTAL	58

From the 58 Handlers who admitted breaches, Table 67 breaks down the types of breaches. The majority relate to meeting their Informers without the necessary authority from their supervisors. The A.C.P.O. Guidelines on this issue are clear and advise all Police Forces that for the safety of the officers and Informers, all meetings must be authorised. This practice does not appear to be adhered to, and as one Handler (276) put it,

- *"I would suggest that any sensible detective would go ahead and see them anyway".*

Another Handler (290) seemed to be blaming his supervisor when he said,

- *"If you have a DCI who doesn't want to know about informants, he will try to persuade you to steer clear. Then you have to be a bit devious and sometimes the rules are broken".*

Other local rules breached include where a Police Force dictate that Informers should not be met on licensed premises or whilst on bail. Again, this rule is broken on a number of occasions. One Handler (235) explained,

- *"Sometimes authorised meetings may have to take place on the 'hurry up' when codes cannot be complied with i.e. informant on bail refuses or unable to make a meeting at the police station and the information is so serious as to outweigh the risks of breaching the rules".*

Another (315) said,

- *"Drinking on licensed premises, drinking and driving, those sort of things. That's just meeting them on their home ground. Also, I tend to take a 'blind eye' policy. You have to".*

There are 4 occasions where payment procedures are not complied with. It can be assumed that they refer to the local police standing orders, which are put into place mainly for the safety of the officer; as well as to prevent corruption and abuse of public funds. One such Handler (237) suggested that,

- *"In relation to the payment, some don't want anyone else present. Also, when I have paid money out of my pocket, the claim is really for me and the boss signs the form so I can get the money back".*

Such practice was supported by another Handler (239) who said,

- *"I pay out my own pocket. When the money eventually comes through, the gaffer signs the form but knows the money is yours. He just signs the form".*

Seven Handlers suggested that they had neglected their duty by failing to arrest their Informer wanted for a criminal offence. One such respondent (297) said,

- *"As a police officer I should be arresting my snout all the time. Its neglect of duty, but if I do that he wont be much use. That's life".*

Although the Informers were not asked about breaches of the Police Discipline Code because it was felt they would not have the necessary knowledge, they were nevertheless asked how they would react, having broken the rules, if a criminal was not processed as a result. There were those who felt that such a situation did not help the relationship, and one Informer (62) complained that,

- *"The jobs I've got running at the moment are being stretched because there is a bent copper at the big house (police station). My Handler cant do nothing 'cause he don't know who he can trust. There's a Chief Inspector still being paid by one family and he's already retired. It leaves me in a mess. I cant trust no-one".*

Others felt it was not their responsibility. For example, one Informer (34) said,

- *"My job is to give information even if it means bending the rules but its the police job to make sure he gets done".*

Another (116) agreed stating that,

- *"It would be the police's fault, not mine, so I don't care but obviously I would sooner get a result for them".*

One Informer (39) said he relied on the police and reported,

- *"I rely on my Handler to teach me the pitfalls. I'll do what he says. I was in the box (witness box) for five hours recently and said the right things. You've got to".*

Table 68 - Occasions where Handlers had sorted out problems.

PROBLEM	FREQUENCY
SORTED WARRANTS /FINES	10
ARRANGED BAIL AFTER ARREST	9
CANCELLED PARKING TICKETS	4
SORTED EXPIRED CAR TAX/INSURANCE	4
PAID RENT	4
WARNED OF DRUGS RAID	4
HELPED FAMILY	3
ARRANGED CAUTION FOR SHOPLIFTING OFFENCES	2
REFUSED TO ANSWER	5
TOTAL	45

Table 68 examines the practice of breaching the rules in more detail. The Informers were asked to give examples when Handlers had sorted out individual problems for their Informers during their relationship. Table 68 shows that 45 (38%) Informers had been helped, presumably some on more than one occasion. A proportion of the incidents amounted to breaches of police discipline, for example one Informer (57) reported,

- *"I got drunk and damaged a cab door. My Handler came down and sorted it out. I didn't get charged so it saved me another conviction. I paid my Handler for the damage caused".*

However, some Handlers were contravening the criminal law. For example, 4 Informers said that whilst involved in supplying drugs, they had been warned by their Handlers of impending drugs raids. This was stated by one Informer (120) who said,

- *"One girl who works for me is on drugs. He (my Handler) has told me if the drug squad intend to take out a warrant on her, he will tell me and I can make sure the place is clean".*

Another Informer (112) said,

- *"I'm a registered addict, but sometimes I need a bit more. They (the police) sort that for me but only after a job has gone down".*

A drug related incident was also reported by one Informer (104) who said,

- *"I was caught in a catch 22 situation where the dealer I was informing on pressured me to take drugs into a prison visit and although I informed my Handler prior to doing so it led to me being arrested. He sorted it and no action was taken".*

Another Informer(114) was stopped by the police whilst driving his car without insurance and his Handler sorted it out. He explained that,

- *"-It's my livelihood and I'll do anything to keep my business. That's why I'm involved in this sort of thing. I don't like it but I have to do it".*

Ten Informers stated they had warrants or fines sorted for them, but there is no indication specifically how that was done. It may be that the Handlers paid off the fines, as suggested by one Informer (75) who said,

- *"He paid a fine for me once. I didn't ask him to. I suppose he was trying to do me a favour. I was grateful anyway".*

More seriously, the police Handler may have in some way arranged for the fines to be cancelled. This was suggested by one Informer (88) who said,

- *"All the time, parking tickets and that rubbish. It's all squared up for me. Compared to the information I give him it's nothing. It helps when I'm waiting for a pay out. It's only right that I get something from the system. You have to take a little to give a little, know what I mean".*

Similarly, 2 Informers believed that they received cautions for shoplifting charges, but there is no indication that they were treated differently because they

were informing. To speculate here, it may be the case that the Handler suggested he was helping the Informer as a means to secure an advantage for the future, when in fact he did nothing to help at all. One Informer(26) was in doubt about the help he received when he said,

- *"I was on bail for a job. I don't know what they had on me but my Handler squared the job up and I never heard no more".*

Another Informer (25) refers to bail and recalled that,

- *"Whilst I have been on bail, my Handler has got me off in exchange for information".*

There were 3 Informers who referred to the police helping other members of their family, and one example was given by a respondent (2) who explained that his Handler helped his brother,

- *"-who's always in trouble. The police will get him out of the shit if I give them good jobs".*

Whatever the circumstances, it is a fact that 45 Informers believed they were being helped because of their relationship with their Handler.

Regarding the Handlers, a comparison can be drawn between the 58 (48%) who acknowledged breaches of the Police Discipline Regulations (Table 64), the 54 (45%) Handlers who also accepted using their discretion with the law (Table 62), and the 45 Informers who said their Handlers had sorted out some of their problems (Table 68). These three aspects, although themselves quite separate, together show a high degree of independence on the part of the Handlers which may suggest a lack of control or supervision; but also displays a lack of respect for the law and procedures. It may also show, but it is not proven in the study, how important the relationship is to the Handlers, in that a good proportion of

them are prepared to risk their jobs and livelihood in favour of this unique partnership they have with the Informer. It is apparent that the relationship they have is very important to them, and not the individual Informer. This is confirmed by the fact that only 31 of the Handlers considered friendship to be important (Table 30) and 112 of them thought that the Informers motivation was for personal gain (Table 39), a fact not supported by the Informers themselves.

Summary of Aim 5

The study has examined the extent to which the police use of Informers breaches the law and the police discipline regulations. It has been shown that both the Informer and Handler are selective about the information they deal with, for a number of reasons. The study also shows that both groups are prepared to break the law giving examples of various crimes where this has occurred. Both the Informers and Handlers have also been involved in 'setting up' crimes, and being party to the commission of crime. The results confirm that both groups use their discretion with the law, and examples are given where immunity was granted to Informers by the Handlers.

The results show that police officers are prepared to breach the police discipline regulations, sometimes quite serious breaches. Handlers have also sorted out various problems for their Informers, which has required them to break the rules.

Aim 6 - To make recommendations, if relevant, relative to the relationship between the Informer and Handler.

Sub Aim A - Does the Informer/Handler relationship in any way affect working practices?

Drawing from the results of the analysis in Aim 5 of this study, which was to determine whether the police use of Informers breached the law or Police Discipline Code, it is reasonable to suggest that the relationship between the Informer and Handler has played a major part. To put this another way, had the relationship not existed, then accepted working practices would not have been abused.

The working practices referred to are those agreed nationally by all police forces and which are consolidated into the Association of Chief Police Officers Guidelines on the Use and Management of Informers. These are confidential and circulated only to senior police officers. Permission was not given for the contents of this document to be produced as part of this study, although parts have been specifically referred to. The main thrust of the Guidelines was to ensure that police officers acted within the law and Police Discipline Regulation, as discussed in Aim 4 of this work, and it is this area where the Informer/Handler relationship has been examined.

The study has shown that selective informing exists by both groups in terms of the information itself as well as certain categories of crime. Tables 46 to 53 look at this issue specifically. The level of selectivity has been identified as well as the circumstances surrounding such practice.

In relation to the criminal law, evidence has emerged suggesting that both Informers and Handlers are prepared to commit criminal acts themselves in furtherance of the relationship they have with each other. Tables 54 to 63 examine the data in relation to this aspect, and in particular, there seems to be a clear indication that both groups have been prepared to instigate or set up crimes themselves, in order to progress the partnership to its optimum.

The use of discretion has also been considered and Table 64 has analysed the findings which support the hypotheses that the majority of both groups Informers and Handlers, will use their own discretion, especially if the circumstances suit their situation. This is closely linked to the question of immunity offered or accepted by the groups (Table 65). The A.C.P.O. Guidelines have failed to address either of these issues and clearly there is a need to debate this further, in order for recognised rules to be laid down.

Finally, the existence of breaches to the Discipline Code have been studied, and Tables 66 to 68 have analysed the data appropriate to this issue. There is support for the theory that breaches are common place; although the Informers themselves were unable to provide much data, the police officers responses have been sufficient to give concern to the police service.

Sub Aim B - Is there a need to make recommendations.

A list of recommendations have been made based on the findings of this research, and are shown in Chapter 7. Clearly, the recommendations will be of interest and concern to the police service. However, there are more and more agencies becoming involved in the management and use of Informers, and it is likely that the recommendations will be relevant to them also. Such agencies may include Her Majesty's Customs & Excise, Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, Home Office Animal Rights National Index, the Security Services, and other such bodies.

CHAPTER EIGHT

Summary of the thesis

The thesis examines the relationship between an Informer and his/her Handler. This relationship is made up of a professional, the police Handler, and a lay person, the Informer. A police officer will often need to exert power and control in order to carry out his business. The thesis examines whether such use of power and control exists in the context of Informer handling, and whether that power and control is authorised. The results of this examination were achieved firstly by considering the theoretical implications raised in Chapter Five, and secondly through the results of the data analysis in Chapter Seven.

The theory drew heavily from Weber's distribution of power ¹, and Freidson's work on professionalism ² so that the features making up a classic professional relationship could be identified. Reference has been made to Weber's definition of social behaviour, where he lists the various categories of conduct found in most behavioural situations. This list can be compared with an Informer's motives, suggesting that the Handler/Informer relationship is perhaps not dissimilar to other classic professional relationships.

¹ Gerth H H & Wright Mills C (Ed.), from Max Weber - Essays in sociology London: Routledge, (1970)

²Freidson E, Professional dominance: the social structure of medical care Atherton Press, New York (1970)

The police officer as a professional emerged as a key issue, with the Informers being best described as clients or customers. Chapter five begun with an assumed model of the relationship between the Informer and Handler. This assumed model showed the perceived differences between the Handler and Informer and, based on common perceptions, served as a bench mark to compare with the findings from this research.

The theoretical examination has produced a number of factors which exist in other classic partnerships between professionals, including those where the police are not involved. Some of those partnerships have been examined. Those factors have been compared with the findings from this research (chapter seven) relating specifically to the relationship between an Informer and Handler, to determine whether the comparison is in fact legitimate; put simply, to determine whether the Handler/Informer relationship is in any way different to other professional relationships. The assumption was that the Handler/Informer relationship is in fact unique; there being few other relationships where the professional rewards the client for his services, as opposed to say the doctor/patient, or lawyer/client relationship, for example, which operate the other way.

It has also been assumed that relationships between Informers and Handlers cannot run smoothly, when their objectives and priorities are so different. Nevertheless, it is also assumed that a police officer is a professional and he will behave accordingly; that is to say, he will act in accordance with the rules and regulations laid down. The study identifies two central features common to a professional police officer; power and control. It is acknowledged that police officers require a level of power and control in order to carry out their duties to uphold the law. The thesis has shown that both these features also exist within the relationship between an Informer and Handler.

Sadly, the results show that in this relationship there is in fact an abuse of power and control as afforded to the Handler. For example, the police Handler has the power to deal with crime and criminals brought to his attention through the Informer, but rather than take action, he will use his discretion far too often. Similarly, he will be selective with the information he obtains, depending on the circumstances. For example, he may disregard information which relates to petty crime, or not relevant to his particular enquiries. Also, friends and relatives, as well as other Informers, are likely to escape action by the Informer or Handler. More importantly, though, the thesis has shown a substantial abuse of authority when the police officer allows his Informer to commit crime, or even sets up crime in order to arrest a target criminal: often, such crimes are far from petty and may include burglary, drugs, robbery and firearms offences. In effect, such abuse of authority has meant an increase in criminality; totally contrary to the objectives of law enforcement officers.

As a professional police officer, bound by rules and regulations, it will be of concern to police managers that a substantial number of respondents admitted breaching the police discipline codes, and often were prepared to help their Informers in such a way that was ethically and morally wrong. For example, there were a number of cases where the police officer warned their Informers of drugs raids, cancelled parking tickets and even arranged police cautions after arrest. These are clear indications that the relationship between an Informer and Handler has a direct effect on the abuse of power and control.

It would be reasonable to ask why a police officer should act in this way, allowing his relationship with the Informer to bring about such abuse. Could it be simply explained by the fact that the officer is corrupt? Perhaps there is a lack of supervision and management: or merely that insufficient training has been afforded to the Handlers? Whatever the reason, this thesis has identified a real

link between the standard professional relationship and the Informer/Handler relationship - one of power and control. The difference seems to be that the latter group are content to abuse these features to such an extent that if not addressed, the use of Informers within the police service will become corrupt. The thesis has identified that for some at least, the Informer/Handler relationship takes priority over everything else - including law enforcement.

The thesis does not conclude, and therefore can not suggest that the partnership between an Informer and a Handler is corrupt; that is to say, that both partners have conspired together to attack the integrity of the police service. Sadly though, the data cannot suggest the contrary - that corruption does not in fact exist. The thesis has shown though, that the relationship between an Informer and Handler may provide the potential for corruption by its very existence. A police officer acting alone may not have the inclination or opportunity to abuse his authority, but when he associates with an Informer, it is possible that he could be persuaded, through the partnership, to do so. It seems, then that it is the relationship itself, unlike any other, which may be the cause of the problem. Although of course, the potential threat of the relationship will depend largely on the strength and integrity of its partners.

Although there is no law of entrapment in England, there has been a number of interesting cases in America and some of them have been discussed in Chapter Two. These are closely related to the circumstances of agent provocateur and are an important matter for this study. Such circumstances will impact on the relationship between the two groups, and the study examines the level at which this is practised. Although the study does not cover all the issues discussed, this chapter has provided a basic foundation of the legal issues. There has recently been a number of well publicised cases criticising the use of Informers and highlighting the dangers in terms of miscarriages of justice, and of allegations of

pervverting the course of justice. There is no doubt that public opinion will now have an effect on police working practices, and clearly the legal aspects must impact on the police/Informer relationship.

Chapter Seven contains the analysis for the main body of the research, related to the Aims as outlined in Chapter four. It has been said on a number of occasions that the relationship between the Informer and Handler is central to this study. The apparent conclusion is that it is not always a close relationship, as shown when, for example the two groups were asked to define an Informer: they responded with very different views on the other. The study has been aimed at arriving at an acceptable profile covering the Informer and the Handler. A number of key factors have been used including the previous criminal background of the Informers, if it exists, and their antecedant background including employment. In particular, a comparison has been made of the Informer's category of work in relation to the Registrar General's Classification of Occupations, 1970 (Appendix I) to determine whether this has any impact on their relationship with the Handler.

The research has identified a number of factors which make up the relationship between an Informer and Handler but one of the most interesting aspects is that the relationship changes in one crucial way. The Informer usually begins his career because he has committed crime or associated with criminals. He is therefore a 'customer' or 'client' of the police; someone who is involved in the criminal justice system. However, at some stage, he provides information usually on a regular basis, for which he is rewarded. He has in fact become a service provider. To put this into perspective - compare this relationship with, for example the solicitor and his client. A man who needs advice on legal issues will seek help from a solicitor and is therefore a client. That client may however also clean the solicitor's windows of his office, for which he is paid a wage. That

man also provides a service to the solicitor. Using this analogy, it could be argued that the Informer/Handler relationship is no more unique than many others. After all, the Informer is providing a service in the form of information, in exchange for some reward. Perhaps if the mystery disappears, and the Informer is looked upon merely as a service provider, then management issues may become less complex.

The relationship between the Informer and the Handler formed an integral part of this research and was a common thread throughout. That is not to say that the relationship can be described as close, on the contrary, it seemed to be a necessary partnership, with little in common between the two groups. They fail to agree about a number of key areas, in particular the importance of friendship between each other. Confidentiality, on the other hand was regarded as important by both groups; one of the few areas of agreement. There were, however, so many areas of conflict it is difficult to imagine how the partnership survives. There is clearly a differing opinion in terms of their objectives, and perhaps this is not so surprising when the two groups are so far apart. The police officer, on one hand, a law enforcement officer whose role includes the investigation and detection of crime, and the Informer, on the other, generally originates from a criminal background, but not always, and becomes involved usually to gain some personal benefit. Despite all this, the partnership seems to work well, at least in the short term, probably because each uses the other for their own purposes, in fact they rely to a large extent on the other partner.

The motivations were examined in depth, including looking at how the Informers motives changed over time. The study has also compared the Informer with a Contact and a Public Spirited Citizen, although the study has merely sought the views and perceptions of the respondents, in trying to determine the differences between each of the types. Again this study failed to provide conclusive results,

but the results do show a number of factors which can differentiate between an Informer and other sources of information.

A crucial result was to show how Informers and police officers had, to varying degrees, breached the law as a result of the partnership, and contravened the police discipline regulations. The study looked at the level of such breaches. The breaching of the criminal law and the police discipline code have provided the most interesting results arising from the relationship. It can be concluded that a significant proportion of the respondents have themselves been involved in crime, or set up crimes, or at least crimes have gone on with their knowledge and without interference from them. The implications of these findings will certainly be of concern to the police service, and particularly the Association of Chief Police Officers who believed that the circulation of new guidelines in 1995 would have removed this behaviour. This research has shown that such incidents exist, and it may be that the relationship between the Informer and Handler has itself been the cause of this.

It should be stressed that this study has not examined the ethical situation involved, but merely the fact that such breaches occur. Such ethical questions could be considered in a future research study, to look at the ethics of Informer handling separately. Selectivity of information and the police use of discretion have been examined, both of which are closely allied to the existence of criminality resulting from the partnership. The study has shown that both groups have used their discretion about the law, more so by the Informers, particularly so with petty or minor crime. There is also evidence that some Informers are granted a measure of immunity by the Handler, in fact it would appear that the Handler's are more likely to grant immunity than the Informer thinks.

Other important findings from this study include:-

- **Evidence of setting up crimes**

Both Informers and Handlers are prepared to engineer criminal acts in order to arrest an identified target. Those police officers who engage in these tactics are themselves committing criminal offences, and can only be described as corrupt.

- **Being involved in the commission of crimes**

The study shows that as well as setting up crimes, a number of Informers also agreed to involve themselves in the actual commission of those crimes, and their Handlers were aware of the Informer's involvement.

- **Evidence of Handlers allowing Informers to commit crime**

It is hardly surprising that Informers with criminal convictions have a propensity towards crime, but the study shows that the Handlers allowed their Informers to commit crime and did nothing. Such incidents are clearly in breach of the ACPO Guidelines on the use and management of Informers.

- **The granting of immunity by some Handlers**

Police Officers have no authority whatsoever to grant a criminal immunity from the Criminal Justice system, and Informer Handler's are no exception. The study shows, however, that such decisions are made by Handlers without any reference to their supervisory officers or the Crown Prosecution Service.

- **Breaches of the Police Discipline Regulations**

The study found many instances where Handlers had disregarded the rules surrounding police discipline which, had they been investigated, may well have resulted in the officer being severely punished, or in some cases subjected to criminal proceedings.

- **Evidence of Handlers prepared to sort out Informer's problems without authority**

The study shows that on a number of occasions, where the Informer has requested help with various problems such as outstanding fines, the Handler has

been prepared to assist in an unofficial capacity rather than report the facts to an appropriate agency. Again, the police officer is making unauthorised decisions in the furtherance of his relationship with the Informer.

It is the area of criminality which has given the most concern during the study. The high proportion of respondents who were prepared to become involved in criminal acts in the furtherance of their relationship must be acknowledged as a matter of urgency requiring action to ensure that it does not continue. One of the Aims of the study was to make recommendations in relation to its findings, and this will be done later in this Chapter.

The situation relating to Participating Informers has been touched on in the research, and referred to a number of times by the respondents. This aspect has caused some confusion, mainly because of the lack of knowledge by the Informers, and to a certain extent by the Handlers as well. The results therefore must be treated with some caution - incidentally, this area is the subject of research presently being undertaken by the police service. Nevertheless, there was a significant number who had participated, but a substantial amount of doubt was expressed by the Informers in relation to such activity being authorised. It is clear, though, that a number of incidents did involve the commission of crime, and not all were declared. This was another area where both groups were in agreement.

The ACPO Guidelines on the use of Informers used by the police service are clear that no Informer should be used as agent provocateur, or to set up a crime. Indeed, this issue together with misprision and entrapment, referred to in Chapter Two, shows how the criminal justice system is concerned about the existence of such activity. Clearly this is a fundamental issue in the debate on

Informers, yet the study has revealed that a large proportion of both groups have been involved in setting up crimes.

The type of crime which had been set up was found to be far from petty or minor; and included burglary, drugs, firearms related offences and even robbery. This was a sensitive area, and it was not surprising that a substantial number of both groups refused to answer, and so it may be assumed that the numbers who have been involved could well be greater than shown here. Most of those respondents who had been involved were quite content to give examples which may suggest that either they do not consider what they have done is wrong or, because of their special relationship with each other, believe they are allowed to take such action.

In relation to breaches of the police discipline regulations, the Informers were unable to give specific responses and it has been assumed that because they are not subject to the regulations, their knowledge of these would be limited. To some extent, this is not surprising, but it does again confirm that the relationship between Informer and police officer is not a close one, and more importantly, may suggest that if Informers are not directly affected, they will not involve themselves. A large proportion of the Handlers agreed that they had breached the rules, giving numerous examples, all of which breach the ACPO Guidelines; some having far more serious implications. A number of Handlers went on to list occasions when they had to sort out various problems for their Informers, and again gave examples which were quite varied - including those where the criminal law again had been breached.

The analysis suggests that when these incidents occurred it was to maintain the relationship which was most important to them. It shows again how remarkable this partnership is which takes priority over everything else. It is the relationship

itself, this unique and intangible union between the two groups, which somehow takes precedence over all other matters, even the criminal law. This is why it is a dangerous relationship and one which has always needed careful control, but in the light of this study, may require a total overhaul of working practices if allowed to continue. There can be no doubts that, armed with the analysis as described here, the situation must be given serious consideration.

Theoretical implications

Having considered the issues raised in Chapter Five in relation to the theoretical decisions, it is important to see if those decisions are present in the empirical study which appears in Chapter Seven (Results) and Chapter Six (Case Study in Lincolnshire).

It was assumed before the theoretical examination had been carried out that the relationship between an Informer and Handler was unique and different from any other. However, a comparison of other professional relationships, police and otherwise has shown some commonality, and it could now be assumed that the Handler/Informer relationship is similar, at least in some respects to other professional partnerships. In fact, the Informer and Handler, as Skolnick³ suggests, probably exists merely for one partner to gain something from the other; and that may be the main objective in most professional relationships. Indeed, if there was no 'benefit' to each of the partners, it is unlikely that the relationship would continue.

³Skolnick J H Justice without trial - Law enforcement in democratic society, John Wiley & Sons Inc, USA (1966)

The study has produced some support for Skolnick's theory, in so far as the majority of Informers said they gained some personal benefit from informing. That was not the case with the Handlers, though. Their motives seemed to be organisational, seeking intelligence in order to arrest offenders. There was no evidence of personal gain. That said, the conclusions drawn from the Case Study in Lincolnshire (Chapter Six) may be relevant. Again, the findings did not show that the Handlers gained any personal benefit, or even career advancement. On the contrary, those police officers in the study who decided not to become involved in the use of Informers, were clear that there was little advantage for them to do so. Nevertheless, this study suggests that a Handler's involvement in the use of Informers may be merely subjective; that is to say, he/she might just have a propensity towards this type of work, and it is this that is persuading him to continue. If this is the case, presumably the Handlers enjoy what they are doing, or they would find another investigative skill, and perhaps this enjoyment could be regarded as a 'benefit' in itself.

The main study has shown how the relationship has created an abuse of authority, to the extent that police officers as well as Informers are prepared to bend the rules, breach laid down procedures, and even break the law in order to maintain the Informer/Handler relationship. Perhaps Reiner ⁴ was anticipating this situation when he suggested that "power is legitimised into authority". He was referring to the police as an authority and as such were considered legitimate, but he suggested that did not mean their rules should always be agreed with. It would seem that a good proportion of police Handlers in the study also appeared to disagree with the rules to such an extent that they were prepared to disregard them.

⁴Reiner R The politics of the police, Wheatsheaf, London (1985)

This Informer/Handler partnership is capable of such abuse of authority perhaps because the police officer is a professional. Professionalism is examined by Freidson who suggested that a professional is creative and self regulating, and even considers himself to be better than the rest of society. This arrogance could well contribute to the reason why a Handler may be prepared to abuse his authority so easily. For example, the study shows that police Handlers are prepared to break the law, in fact commit criminal acts, in order to sustain the Informer/Handler relationship. That officer could face criminal proceedings himself if caught, and yet he continues despite the implications. This surely is evidence of the officer's arrogance and total disregard for the criminal justice system.

This abuse of authority, according to some theorists, may be connected to the presence of bureaucracy. Freidson ⁵ identifies the problem when a professional is handicapped by a client who is not subject to the same bureaucratic authority, and this is certainly the case between a Handler and his Informer. The findings of this study have shown a number of cases where the bureaucratic rules of the police service have been breached by the Informer/Handler relationship. In particular, the study shows that a large proportion of police Handlers breached the Police Discipline Regulations, especially in relation to the laid-down rules for handling Informers. In contrast, though, Weber ⁶ feels that the professional, acting as a bureaucrat, will ultimately work within the rules to the disadvantage of people's feelings. Ironically, this has also been supported in the study, as a substantial number of Handlers were prepared to work within the rules with little regard for their Informers.

⁵Freidson E Professional dominance: the social structure of medical care, Atherton Press, New York (1970)

⁶Runciman W G (Ed) Weber - selections in translation, University Press, Cambridge (1978)

The study has highlighted an important factor which seems unique to the Informer/Handler relationship and yet has been identified by those theorists who have examined the concept of professionalism and bureaucracy; that is the notion of 'friendship'. The study has shown that Informers consider their friendship with the Handler to be a very important part of their relationship. The Handlers, on the other hand, gave little importance to this feature. In fact there was real disparity here, in that this was the only characteristic of the relationship which the two groups disagreed on significantly.

That is not to say that a degree of friendship does not exist between the partners of other relationships, but it certainly does not appear to feature as an important issue for them (See Assumed Model - Chapter Five). Again, this finding tends to support Weber's ⁷ theory in relation to bureaucracy when he suggests that the professional will disregard human feelings, and will therefore not allow himself to become involved as a 'friend'. Russell et al ⁸ have similar thoughts on this issue although they discuss professionalism specifically. Russell concedes that police officers have the same human feelings and emotions as those he is dealing with, but as a professional, he is able to anticipate those feelings and deal with them objectively allowing him to focus on the problems at hand. Again, the study may support this theory, perhaps evidenced by those Handlers who would meet their Informers in a social environment, for example a public house, giving the impression they are friends, but in reality only concerned with obtaining information.

The common thread running throughout Chapter Five is the reference to 'power and control' Here again, Weber has studied the distribution of power and

⁷Op Cit: Gerth H H & Wright Mills(1970)

⁸Russell H. E., & Beigel A., Understanding Human Behavior for Effective Police Work, Basic Books Inc, USA, (1982) p26

concludes that such distribution is reflected through status groups and classes. The study has provided no evidence to suggest that the Informer/Handler partnership is considered a status group. However, Elliott's theory of elitism may be more relevant. He suggests that where the professional holds a strong position over his client, he may well ignore that client's representations. This is perhaps another example of the professional disregarding the client's feelings, a factor which has emerged during the study of the relationship between the Informer and Handler. For example, the study has shown that an Informer's motives are likely to change over time, and yet this fact does not seem to be important to the Handler who is content to assume the initial reason for informing continues throughout the Informer's career.

Accountability is considered by Skolnick as an important feature of a professional relationship. He suggests that professionalism often conflicts with accountability, in that the professional is striving for improved management but restrained by rules and regulations. Holdaway ⁹ suggests that more and more groups are questioning the accountability of professionals. Despite this, there is clearly a lack of accountability in relation to the use of Informers. The study has shown that the rules are often broken and the Handlers seem to disregard their obligation to uphold the law when it comes to using Informers; in effect, disregarding the need for strict levels of accountability. This study has identified the need to adopt far more methods of accountability within the police service, and this is reflected in the recommendations within this Chapter.

Kinlaw ¹⁰ has examined the existence of empowerment within a professional relationship, and suggests that managers are against empowering those under

⁹Holdaway S Inside the British police - a force at work, Basil Blackwell Publisher Ltd., Oxford (1983)

¹⁰Kinlaw D C The Practice of Empowerment: Making the most of human

their supervision because it could reduce their own effectiveness. He also makes the point that managers are often not technically experienced and are therefore not sufficiently qualified to empower their subordinates. The study has provided some evidence of empowerment, in that Handlers have made decisions which would normally have been made by the Controllers; that is to say, their supervisors. For example, Handlers have sorted out problems for their Informers without the Controllers authority, such as cancelling parking tickets, arranging bail after arrest and even paying overdue rent. The difference here, though, is that the Controllers were probably not aware that such decisions were being made, and therefore not able to empower the Handler. In fact, the Controller would probably not sanction such action if he did know. Nevertheless, the Handler has decided to empower himself without seeking the necessary authority. Also, Kinlaw's submission that 'grass-roots' workers know more than their supervisors could be apparent between the Handler and his Controller, as the study has highlighted that Controllers have often not had the necessary training and have probably not experienced handling Informers themselves. This situation was highlighted by one Handler who said, *"A lot of the Controllers have never had a snout so they don't want to know. The job discourages you because they don't understand"*.

The police use of discretion became apparent during the study, a factor discussed by Skolnick in particular. Skolnick suggests that one way to show the level of power and control by the police is to note their discretionary powers, especially if that discretion is unauthorised. Other theorists support the police use of discretion, describing it as a pragmatic approach to modern day policing. Nevertheless, they would not agree with unauthorised use of discretion; that is to say the use of discretion by a police officer which is not properly delegated.

It is a fact that police officers are often called upon to use their discretion, for example in a public order situation where it would be more prudent not to arrest the offender at the time in order to quell the crowd. Indeed, it is recognised that the police use of discretion is an acceptable form of dealing with a situation. This study has shown, though, that the majority of police officers involved in the handling of Informers are willing to use their discretion when not authorised to do so. Additionally, very few of the Informers were not prepared to use their discretion during the relationship. Such discretion by the Handler or Informer was usually in relation to taking no action against minor crimes, or even committing crime or breaching the rules in order to achieve their objective, whatever that may be. Such use of discretion can never be regarded as authorised.

The findings in relation to the police use of discretion support the theorists view that power and control is a common ingredient in a professional relationship. More importantly, though, this study has shown that the Informer/Handler partnership is prepared to use their own power by taking unauthorised action, in effect taking control over the organisation to which they are serving. This situation must be regarded as different to any other professional relationship.

The comparison between the theoretical issues identified in Chapter Five and the empirical findings from Chapter Seven have indeed found some clear integration and commonality. This conclusion can be best shown by referring again to Weber's ¹¹ definition of social behaviour, where it was seen in Chapter Five that he distinguishes between three main practical applications; they are, a rational goal-oriented conduct, a rational value-oriented conduct, and an affectual

¹¹Freund J The Sociology of Max Weber Allen Lane The Penguin Press London (1968)

conduct. This theory can be compared with the motives of the Informer and Handler, as identified in the study.

Firstly, the 'goal-oriented' conduct is where the objective is to obtain some benefit. We have already discussed that both the Informer and the Handler achieve some benefit from the relationship, and certainly in the case of the Informer, his motives are often financially led. Perhaps the benefit to the Handler is less obvious, but it may merely be the enjoyment they experience in such a relationship.

Weber refers to 'value-oriented' behaviour in terms of doing the right thing, having high moral standards or strength of conviction. The study has undoubtedly identified such characteristics with the 'public spirited citizen' who gives information because, for example, of his dislike for a particular type of crime. It is far more difficult, though to find this type of behaviour in an Informer/Handler relationship. However, the study shows that at least some of the Informers started informing for altruistic reasons, such as a dislike of drug trafficking. In relation to the Handlers, most saw the Informer as someone to pass information about crimes and criminals, which could in itself be seen as being involved in a relationship which is 'doing the right thing'.

Weber's third type of behaviour, the 'affectual conduct', is where there is some emotional motivation, or where a person's passion is evident. Translated in terms of the Informer/Handler relationship, such conduct is clearly apparent where the Informer gives information for 'revenge', or to secure a 'reduced sentence', or to take out the competition. The study has also identified such conduct by the handler. For example, he has been so frustrated by rules and regulations; in effect bureaucracy, that he is prepared to breach those rules in order to achieve the objective, whatever that may be.

It can indeed be argued, then, that the Informer/Handler relationship is not dissimilar from other professional relationships. There is of course a mystique which exists around the police use of Informers, and the lack of research and the unwillingness by many senior officers to examine the relationship in the past, has undoubtedly fuelled that mystique. And so, perhaps the assumed model, as suggested in Chapter Five, presupposes that the Informer/Handler partnership is unique, when in fact it is not. When all said and done, Informers and Police Officers are human beings, and as such will interact together in a similar way.

It is a unique partnership in terms of it being a collaboration between those who commit crimes and those who investigate crimes, but their behaviour towards each other and the organisation they represent is clearly not that unique. Despite all this, the study has shown that there exists an abuse of authority, a disregard for the criminal justice system, and a flagrant misuse of laid-down rules and regulations. There can be few other professional relationships which generate such abuse, and it is this aspect which has to be addressed. With this in mind, a number of recommendations can be made from this study.

Theoretical overview

It is apparent from an examination of the theoretical implications that the work of a wide range of theorists has been considered in this study. This was necessary because the theorists have individually concentrated on a large and diverse number of factors, all of which appear to be relevant to the relationship between an Informer and Handler. Each of the theories referred to in this study are equally important, and therefore could not be compressed into one over-arching theory which could totally reflect the Handler/Informer relationship.

Having said that it has not been possible to choose one specific theory above all others, it is nevertheless important to mention again the relevance of Weber's theory in relation to social behaviour. Weber distinguishes between behaviour in general and social behaviour, the latter term being reserved, "*- for activities whose intent is related by the individuals involved to the conduct of others and is oriented accordingly.*" ¹² In effect, social behaviour is where the actions of one has a meaningful bearing on the conduct of others, but Weber points out that it is not necessary for the person who is perpetrating the action to be aware of it.

Weber defines social behaviour in order to interpret the concept as accurately and rationally as possible. He does this by distinguishing the types of conduct which make up social behaviour; described as the 'ideal type' and these have been discussed in Chapter Five. What is so interesting about this is that the conduct which takes place between the Informer and Handler can be easily fitted into one of Weber's 'ideal type'.

Although many of the other theories, for example bureaucracy, discretion, professionalism and accountability, are all important factors which exist within the Informer/Handler relationship, it is Weber's theory that is arguably the most cogent. Chapter Five sets out the aims of the theoretical examination which were to identify some of the theories relating to professional relationships, and to determine whether they also existed in the Informer/Handler relationship. It was from these theories, and in particular that of Weber, which enabled this study to conclude that the Informer/Handler relationship was in fact not as unique as initially assumed. On the contrary, the social behaviour which was apparent between an Informer and his Handler appeared not dissimilar to many

¹²Ibid (p 102)

other types of professional relationship. The study also concluded that perhaps it was only the mystique and secrecy which surrounded the use of Informers which made it different from other examples of social behaviour.

Recommendations

Aim six (Chapter Four) seeks to make recommendations for the future, relevant to the relationship between the Informer and the Handler. Any such recommendations will be based on the summary and conclusions drawn mainly from the analysis in chapter seven. First though, it must be decided to whom the recommendations should be made. Clearly the police service will need to be made aware of the findings. Does this mean every police force in England, or only those forces which participated in the study? There have been numerous references in this thesis to the Association of Chief Police Officers, and their Guidelines on the use and management of Informers, circulated in 1995. The findings have identified breaches of these Guidelines, and with this in mind, it has been considered right and proper to address the recommendations to this body, ACPO and specifically the Crime Committee, one of a number of separate groups working under the auspices of ACPO. It may be the case that ACPO will consider the Guidelines to be insufficient, and examine the possibility of replacing them with something else - perhaps legislation. For example, the Crime and Disorder Act, 1998 provides a legal responsibility for the police and local authorities to work in partnership and provide a strategy to reduce crime. Perhaps there is an argument for similar legislation here also. The recommendations will be based in order of the aims as set out in Chapter Four.

Information identifying a typical profile of an Informer would be an advantage for police supervisors, particularly those involved in recruitment of Informers, and police trainers. With this in mind, an acceptance should be made of the

sociological profile which exists categorising Informers as Beginners, Providers, Estranged and Professional.

Consideration should be given to registering not only those sources of information commonly known as Informers, but also other sources such as Contacts and Public Spirited Citizens. This would bring an element of uniformity to the process, and provide a wider spectrum of intelligence to the police service.

The police service should recognise that not all police officers are suited to or interested in the use of Informers, and in order to identify those who may have potential, some consideration should be given to profiling police Handlers. It would also be useful to identify their role.

The results of a study in Lincolnshire (Chapter Six) suggests that not every police officer, whether a detective or not, wants to become involved in handling Informers. It has to be recognised by the police service that this situation exists, and encourage those who do wish to become involved. This study has also identified that some police officers become involved with Informers because of the 'excitement' rather than having a more professional motives, such as the detection of crime. This shows again that the motives of Handlers need to be known to ensure that they can be managed.

Accepting that the relationship between the Informer and the Handler may be the underlying cause of some of the problems which exist, then some consideration should be given to the police service learning more about its implications. It is suggested that some infrastructures of this relationship form part of a training package to police officers.

The police service should place more importance on the motivational factors of Informers, and in particular, the possibility of motivational change should be recognised and used to its optimum, when supervising and controlling Handlers.

There was an acceptance by a number of respondents that they did meet socially with their partner. More research is required in this area, and in particular there is no data which confirms whether or not the Handlers document their meetings in this respect. Nevertheless, the implications of such meetings are apparent, and more control and supervision is required to dissuade this practice.

There is evidence that Handlers and Informers are selective in their approach to the information they have, the categories of crime, and even the individuals subject of the information. This is also the case with the amount of discretion used. More stringent rules should be implemented to combat this, with clear direction given to police officers in terms of minimum standards.

A proportion of Informers and Handlers commit criminal offences, are party to the commission of such offences, or having knowledge of these offences, take no action against them. There can be no justification for this, and the police service must recognise its existence as a matter of urgency and take remedial action.

There is evidence that Informers do act as Agent Provocateur, inciting a criminal to commit crime, and practice what is called in America, entrapment. In order to ensure that such practices are alleviated, it may be worth considering looking at the American courts as described in Chapter two in terms of the subjective test, that is focusing on the defendants state of mind. This test known as the Origin of Intent allows a defence of entrapment if the offence was found to have been created by the police.

The research has also concluded that breaches of the police discipline code are prevalent, and clearly there exists a real disregard for the ACPO Guidelines on the Use and Management of Informers. This situation must be accepted as a reality, and remedial action taken as a matter of urgency.

Future research

This study has identified a number of issues which require more in-depth examination in terms of working practices and policy for law enforcement agencies.

Juvenile Informers, for example is an area which so far has seen little research in this country and even less abroad. The police service, though will be obliged to consider this issue, particularly with regards to agreeing the correct level of risk assessment. The implications of the Health and Safety Act, 1998 may well impact on the use of juvenile Informers especially in relation to proper assessment; in this day and age of litigation, the police service will have to acknowledge their responsibilities in terms of providing a 'duty of care' to juvenile Informers. Additionally, more responsibility is being directed towards the police service under the Crime and Disorder Act, 1998 especially relating to youth offending, and this could well urge the police service to increase their use of juvenile Informers in order to reduce youth crime.

Perhaps the most important piece of legislation to impact on the use of Informers in recent times is the Human Rights Act 1998 which became effective in October 2000. This Act aims to protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of everyone. The most relevant sections are Article 6, which gives the right to a fair trial and Article 8, which grants the right to privacy. Both these areas are relevant to the use of Informers, and it is feared by some practitioners that the

use of Informers will directly conflict with the Human Rights Act. It will be important for research to be undertaken in the future to determine how this Act has impacted on the use of Informers.

In addition, the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 was implemented as a result of concerns arising from the Human Rights Act to improve the controls and culture of covert policing. In particular, this act concentrates on Covert Human Intelligence Sources (CHIS) a term now used to describe Informers. Interestingly, though, this Act does not cover the use of Participating Informers mainly because the Government did not wish to be seen as condoning criminality by including their use in legislation.¹³ At the time of writing this thesis, Law Enforcement Agencies in this country were unsure how they were going to manage this important omission. It is imperative that this issue is revisited, to determine whether Participating Informers continue to be used, and if so, whether they exist as a legitimate investigative tool within the criminal justice system.

The concept of witness protection is quickly becoming an issue for the police and is closely connected to the management of Informers. Cost, ethics and legal implications are beginning to impact on police management regarding the protection of witnesses, and will require serious consideration. Some police forces have recognised the need to look at this area and have set up their own witness protection departments, but to date, no research has been carried out. The fact that the police are prepared to re-house, relocate and sometimes even change the identity of a witness who is often a registered Informer, paid out of public funds, demands an evaluation of present working practices. This will

¹³Neyroud P et al Regulating informers: the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, covert policing and human rights in Informers: Policing, Policy, Practice, Billingsley R, Nemitz T, Bean P (Eds) Willan Publishing Devon (2000)

identify 'best practice', as well as ensuring the integrity of the individuals involved is maintained.

Other such issues arising from the use of Informers which have been identified from this study, and coincidentally are also recognised by ACPO and the National Informer Conference, include the use of Information Technology, Training, the formation of Dedicated Handler Units, and the registration of Informers. The use of Crimestoppers as an alternative method of source handling is also worth examining; especially in relation to the payment of rewards, registration and disclosure, as well as the duplication of records. All these aspects are policy questions which will effect the practical use of Informers.

This study has produced a profile of an Informer which may be used by law enforcement agencies to understand what type of person they are dealing with. It has however been recognised that this work is somewhat shallow and requires more research. For example, there has been little differentiation between the female and male Informer. It would have been interesting to look more closely at why there are so few female drug offenders who turn to informing. The motives of female Informers may also be different to those of their male counterparts, and this could also be of interest to the police service if they are to manage all Informers properly. Nemitz ¹⁴ has identified a lack of research regarding gender issues but has nevertheless, using the data from this study and additional interviews, further examined the female Informer and Handler, as well as witness protection matters relating to women. There are a number of questions which remain unanswered; these can only be resolved through additional research.

¹⁴Nemitz T Gender Issues in Informer Handling in Informers: Policing, Policy, Practice, Billingsley R, Nemitz T, Bean P (Eds) Willan Publishing Devon (2000)

This study has touched on the possibility of more than one member of the same family informing, and a number of interesting responses from the Informers have been recorded. This feature impacts heavily on the question of confidentiality, as well as the ethical issues and further work is required. If there is evidence of multi Informer families, then this must be recognised by the law enforcement agencies and managed appropriately.

This study has found that Informers and Handlers meet 'socially', that is to say outside of their normal business. The Informers suggest that there is a strong element of 'friendship' between themselves and their Handlers although this has been disputed by the Handlers. Nevertheless the extent to these so called social meetings should be examined further. The police service do not support such practice, their fear being that the partnership would be far too close and could lead to corrupt practices. Perhaps this is already happening, and although this study has no evidence to support such accusations, neither can it refute them. Any meetings by the Informers and Handlers in a social context must impact heavily on their relationship, and as such is far too important to disregard.

The research has concentrated on the relationship between a police officer and Informer, and all of the Handlers in this work were serving officers. It must be acknowledged, though that Informers are used by a number of other agencies including Her Majesty's Customs & Excise, the Security Services (MI5 and MI6) Post Office Investigations and others perhaps less common such as the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA). It would be useful, then to carry out some research comparing the use of Informers between the various agencies. When this has been done, it may then be feasible to consider distributing present Guidelines to all the relevant agencies, not just the police, creating standardisation throughout the country.

The ACPO working group on Informers is presently researching the definition of an Informer in order that all references to them can be standardised. Indeed, this study has shown disparity in the interpretation of an Informer and an Informant. Other names such as 'source' and 'agent' are also widely used. Other areas of research by the group include Participating Informers, and already a substantial amount of work has been done nationally. Unfortunately, the police service continue to view research into Informers as too sensitive, and will not allow researchers to collect data who are not employed by the police. Such fears are hardly surprising, but this attitude is to say the least blinkered, and there is strong opposition to this, arguing that research requires academic resilience. It is important that this debate is continued robustly, otherwise the subject of Informers will not have the opportunity to be examined independently.

Relating to the methodology used for this study, for the first time ever, data was collected from a substantial number Informers by way of personal interviews. This has proven to be invaluable and despite its many problems, must be recommended for the future.

There is a need to consider which direction law enforcement agencies should take in the future. This study has concentrated on the sociological issues surrounding the relationship between the Informer and the handler. There is clearly a need now to research the ethical dilemmas which confront them. The findings will inevitably impact on the practical use of Informers, but it is timely that the philosophy of Informers is examined to determine whether it is ethically and morally right to continue to use Informers as a legitimate part of the British Criminal Justice System. The use of the data and findings from this present study will allow subsequent research to impose a theoretical input.

It is also important to say where future theoretical development should be in terms of Informers. It is of course apparent that there are so many gaps in existing research, and there are therefore many areas which could be usefully examined. That said, it is the area of social behaviour which may benefit the most from future research. It has already been noted in this Chapter that Weber's definition of social behaviour is surprisingly relevant to the use of Informers. This needs to be developed as it is important to understand how the interaction between an Informer and Handler can affect the conduct arising from social behaviour. Weber identified that the parties of social behaviour would not necessarily be aware they had been subjected to the conduct of another. Few could argue that further research in this area would benefit the use and management of Informers. It is imperative that the Informer, the Handler, as well as the Controller and their managers are fully aware of the effects of conduct which exists as a result of the social behaviour between an Informer and his Handler.

The Research Design (Chapter Four) has identified that this thesis will have a low theoretical input and high level of data collection, and that clearly has been the case. Nevertheless, the theoretical implications (Chapter Five) have become a major contributor to this thesis. This is because the features which are common in most professional relationships seem to exist also in other relationships including that between the Informer and the Handler. In particular, power and control have been highlighted as common features, but with the relationship between an Informer and a Handler, these features are abused. It is hardly surprising then that this research has concentrated on the relationship between an Informer and his Handler, and the consequences of that relationship.

In reality, it is the secrecy and mystique shadowing the use of Informers which appears to encourage an abuse of authority. In order for such abuse not to be

allowed to continue, law enforcement agencies will need to consider far tighter controls, better management and supervision, and far more transparent working practices capable of independent audit and inspection. This will not be possible without more research being undertaken regarding the police use of Informers. As this study was carried out following the circulation of the ACPO Guidelines on the Use and Management of Informers, it is important to ensure that, once new Guidelines have been published, the issues raised in this study are revisited. In essence, research into the use of Informers must be allowed to continue. Despite the fact this study concludes that the Informer/Handler relationship is not so dissimilar from other professional relationships, the consequences of the relationship most certainly are. There can be no other partnership which a law enforcement officer enters into that creates an abuse of power and authority, often leading to criminality. This is far too serious an issue to neglect in any future research.

A number of important issues have been examined in this study, surrounding the use of Informers by the police in England. At a time when the Association of Chief Police Officers are beginning to recognise that existing Guidelines are flawed, and that there is a need to review present working practices, this study is to say the least timely, but more importantly will be seen as a definitive work on a subject where research is largely absent. Law enforcement agencies including the police are already improving their systems and tightening up their control and supervision of Informers and Handlers. However, national agreement is necessary and until this is reached then the concerns and shortcomings identified in this study will not be fully resolved.

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INFORMERS - ENGLAND

No.	Force	(Regular) Establishment	Registered Informants	Budget (1994/95) (£)
1.	Avon & Somerset	3087	659	60,000
2.	Bedfordshire	1178	600	27,600
3.	Cambridgeshire	1241	139	10,300
4.	Cheshire	1920	381	15,000
5.	City of London	877	297	40,000
6.	Cleveland	1502	517	15,600
7.	Cumbria	1187	158	17,000
8.	Derbyshire	1850	1200	30,000
9.	Devon & Cornwall	2928	743	47,200
10.	Dorset	1302	726	50,000
11.	Durham	1389	681	10,600
12.	Essex	2950	1405	15,800
13.	Gloucestershire	1184	478	20,000
14.	Greater Manchester	7077	3000	99,000
15.	Hampshire	3289	3500	46,600
16.	Hertfordshire	1684	423	13,000
17.	Humberside	2034	1068	32,000
18.	Kent	3136	620	40,000
19.	Lancashire	3229	1206	31,000
20.	Leicestershire	1853	122	18,000
21.	Lincolnshire	1206	590	20,000
22.	Merseyside	4706	614	105,000
23.	Metropolitan	28276	4000	708,000
24.	Norfolk	1446	1900	25,000
25.	Northamptonshire	1190	752	18,000
26.	Northumbria	3613	1500	50,000
27.	North Yorkshire	1418	591	8,000 -
28.	Nottinghamshire	2344	760	40,000
29.	South Yorkshire	3031	1462	55,000
30.	Staffordshire	2215	847	40,000
31.	Suffolk	1234	1539	30,000
32.	Surrey	1873	186	20,000
33.	Sussex	3014	540	29,000
34.	Thames Valley	3812	3477	53,000
35.	Warwickshire	1020	250	22,500
36.	West Mercia	2053	1331	50,000
37.	West Midlands	6977	2938	175,800
38.	West Yorkshire	5295	1604	46,000
39.	Wiltshire	1181	550	15,400
	Total	118,498	43,352	2,147,400

Notes:

- (1) Some Forces have now weeded their registrations.
- (2) Forces have varying levels of recording systems.
- (3) Figures as at 1.1.95.
- (4) Budget figures do not necessarily reflect total payments.
- (5) Only refers to payment from public funds.

INFORMERS QUESTIONNAIRE

PART ONE

1. WHAT IS SUBJECTS CODE.....			1 - 3
2. WHAT IS YOUR PSEUDONYM.....			-
3. WHAT IS YOUR DATE OF BIRTH.....			-
4. WHAT IS PRESENT AGE	18-21	1	4
	22-28	2	
	29-35	3	
	36-42	4	
	OVER 42	5	
5. WHAT IS YOUR SEX	MALE	1	5
	FEMALE	2	
6. WHAT IS MARITAL STATUS	MARRIED	1	6
	MARRIED/APART	2	
	SEPARATED	3	
	DIVORCED	4	
	SINGLE	5	
	WIDOW	6	
	OTHER (SPECIFY)	7	
7. HOW MANY CHILDREN DO YOU SUPPORT	NONE	0	7
	ONE	1	
	TWO	2	
	THREE	3	
	FOUR +	4	
8. WHAT TYPE OF ACCOMMODATION DO YOU LIVE IN	OWNER/OCCUPY	1	8
	COUNCIL	2	
	PRIVATE RENT	3	
	BED-SIT	4	
	OTHER (SPECIFY)	5	
9. WHAT IS YOUR PRESENT STATE OF EMPLOYMENT	FULL TIME	1	9
	PART TIME	2	
	CASUAL	3	
	UNEMPLOYED	4	
	STUDENT	5	
	OTHER (SPECIFY)	6	

10.STATE JOB	NOT APPLICABLE	0	10
	LABOURER	1	
	MASSEUSE	2	
	SHOP ASSISTANT	3	
	BUILDER	4	
	MECHANIC/DRIVER/TAXIDRIVER	5	
	ANTIQUE DEALER	6	
	PAINTER/DECORATOR	7	
	OTHER (SPECIFY)	8	
11.DO YOU HAVE PREVIOUS	YES	1	11
CONVICTIONS FOR CRIME	NO	2	
	REFUSED TO ANSWER	3	
12.TYPE OF OFFENCE, MAINLY	NOT APPLICABLE	0	12
	FRAUD/DISHONESTY	1	
	ASSAULT	2	
	DRUGS	3	
	SEXUAL	4	
	TRAFFIC	5	
	REFUSE TO ANSWER	6	
	OTHER (SPECIFY)	7	
13.HOW LONG HAVE YOU BEEN	LESS THAN 1 YR	1	13
AN INFORMER	1-2 YRS	2	
	3-5 YRS	3	
	MORE THAN 6 YRS	4	
14.HAS ANY OTHER MEMBER OF	YES	1	14
YOUR FAMILY INFORMED TO	NO	2	
THE POLICE	DONT KNOW	3	
	REFUSE TO ANSWER	4	
15.IN YOUR OWN WORDS, HOW WOULD YOU DEFINE AN			15
INFORMER.....			
.....			
.....			
.....			
.....			
.....			
16.IS YOUR INVOLVEMENT IN INFORMING	YES	1	16
RESTRICTED TO CERTAIN CATEGORIES	NO	2	
OF CRIME			

17.PLEASE SHOW MAIN CATEGORY	NOT APPLICABLE	0	17
	DRUGS	1	
	BURGLARY	2	
	THEFT	3	
	ROBBERY	4	
	HANDLING	5	
	REFUSED TO ANSWER	6	
	OTHER (SPECIFY)	7	

18.EXPLAIN WHY YOU RESTRICT YOUR INFORMATION TO THIS		18
CATEGORY OF CRIME.....		
.....		
.....		

PART TWO

19.IN YOUR OPINION, WHERE DOES A	ON ARREST	1	19
RELATIONSHIP WITH A HANDLER	AFTER INTERVIEW	2	
FIRST START, NORMALLY	ON RELEASE	3	
	CRIME ENQUIRIES	4	
	OTHER ENQUIRIES	5	
	LICENSED PREMISES	6	
	PRISON VISIT	7	
	SOCIALLY	8	
	OTHER (SPECIFY)	9	

20.WHAT WORD BEST DESCRIBES YOUR	PROFESSIONAL	1	20
RELATIONSHIP	FRIENDLY	2	
	SOCIAL	3	
	TRUSTING	4	
	REWARDING	5	
	NECESSARY	6	
	DONT KNOW	7	
	OTHER (SPECIFY)	8	

21.CAN A RELATIONSHIP CHANGE	YES	1	21
BETWEEN HANDLER/INFORMER	NO	2	
	DONT KNOW	3	

22.GIVE AN EXAMPLE OF HOW THIS	NOT APPLICABLE	0	22
HAS OCCURRED			
.....			
.....			
.....			
.....			

23.WHAT IS THE MAIN ADVANTAGE TO YOU	NONE	0	23
OF YOUR RELATIONSHIP	PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE	1	
	DETECTION OF CRIME	2	
	REVENGE/COMPETITION	3	
	DONT KNOW	4	
OTHER (SPECIFY)		5	
24.WHAT IS THE MAIN DISADVANTAGE	NONE	0	24
	BEING FOUND OUT	1	
	DONT KNOW	2	
OTHER (SPECIFY)		3	
25.WHO USUALLY ARRANGES THE MEETING	INFORMER	1	25
	HANDLER	2	
	EITHER	3	
	BOTH	4	
	CONTROLLER	5	
OTHER (SPECIFY)		6	
26.WHERE DO YOU NORMALLY MEET	REST/CAFE/PUB	1	26
	COUNTRY/PARK/COMMON	2	
	BETTING SHOP	3	
	INFORMERS HOME	4	
	ANYWHERE	5	
	IN VEHICLE	6	
	CAR PARK	7	
	BUS STATION	8	
OTHER (SPECIFY)		9	
27.HOW IS CONTACT MAINTAINED MAINLY	TELEPHONE	1	27
	PAGER	2	
	LETTER	3	
	PERSONAL VISIT	4	
	THROUGH THIRD PARTY	5	
OTHER (SPECIFY)		6	
28.DO YOU USE JOINT HANDLERS	YES	1	28
	NO	2	
29.WHAT IS YOUR OPINION	NOT APPLICABLE	0	29
OF JOINT HANDLERS	CAN BE USEFUL	1	
	NOT USEFUL	2	
OTHER (SPECIFY)		3	
30.DO YOU MEET WITH YOUR HANDLER	YES	1	30
SOCIALY	NO	2	
	REFUSED TO ANSWER	3	

31. WHAT LEVEL OF IMPORTANCE DO YOU PLACE ON THE
FOLLOWING

	VERY	IMP.	IMP.	NOT VERY.	UNIMP
THE RELATIONSHIP	1	2	3	4	31
TRUST	1	2	3	4	32
FRIENDSHIP	1	2	3	4	33
HONESTY	1	2	3	4	34
TRUTH	1	2	3	4	35
CONFIDENTIALITY	1	2	3	4	36
RELIABILITY	1	2	3	4	37

PART THREE

32. WHAT WAS THE MAIN REASON YOU STARTED INFORMING	FINANCIAL	1	38-9
	ENJOYMENT	2	
	GRATITUDE	3	
	FRIENDS WITH OFFICER	4	
	LOOKING FOR A FAVOUR	5	
	PRESSURE BY OFFICER	6	
	PART OF A DEAL	7	
	REDUCE SENTENCE	8	
	DISLIKE OF THAT TYPE OF CRIME	9	
	REVENGE	10	
	CHALLENGE	11	
	BE ON THE RIGHT SIDE OF THE LAW	12	
	TAKE OUT THE COMPETITION	13	
	OTHER (SPECIFY)	14	
33. LIST OTHER REASONS (INCLUDING THOSE IN 32 ABOVE)	NOT APPLICABLE	0	40
	ENJOYMENT	1	
	PUBLIC SPIRITED	2	
	LIKES CID WORK	3	
	OTHER (SPECIFY)	4	
34. SINCE YOU STARTED INFORMING, HAS THE MAIN REASON CHANGED	YES	1	41
	NO	2	
35. WHAT IS IT NOW	NOT APPLICABLE	0	42
	OTHER (SPECIFY)	1	
36. HAVE THE REASONS FOR YOUR INVOLVEMENT BEEN SATISFIED	YES	1	43
	NO	2	
	DONT KNOW	3	
37. DOES YOUR HANDLER KNOW WHY YOU ARE INFORMING	YES	1	44
	NO	2	
	DONT KNOW	3	

38.HAS HE/SHE EVER ASKED YOU FOR YOUR REASONS

YES 1
NO 2

45

39.WERE YOU HONEST ABOUT YOUR REASONS

NOT APPLICABLE 0
YES 1
NO 2

46

40.IF NOT, PLEASE EXPLAIN

NOT APPLICABLE 0

47

.....

.....

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.....

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41.DO THE REASONS FOR INFORMING MAKE ANY DIFFERENCE TO THE USEFULNESS OF INFORMER HANDLING

YES 1
NO 2
DONT KNOW 3

48

42.PLEASE EXPLAIN YOUR REASONS.....

49

.....

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.....

.....

.....

43.ARE THERE ANY CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH YOU WOULD REFUSE TO BECOME INVOLVED IN INFORMER USE

YES 1
NO 2

50

44.ARE THOSE REASONS

NOT APPLICABLE 0
LEGAL 1
MORAL 2
SOCIAL 3
PHYSICAL 4
OTHER(SPECIFY) 5

51

45.GIVE EXAMPLES

NOT APPLICABLE 0

52

.....

.....

.....

46.WHAT DO YOU THINK YOUR	ARRESTING CRIMINALS	1	53
HANDLER GETS OUT OF THE	DETECTING CRIME	2	
RELATIONSHIP	CAREER PROSPECTS	3	
	DONT KNOW	4	
OTHER (SPECIFY)		5	

PART FOUR

47.TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE, HAS A CASE	YES	1	54
BEEN DROPPED TO PROTECT YOUR IDENTITY	NO	2	
	DONT KNOW	3	
	REFUSED TO ANSWER	4	

48.TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE, HAS THE POLICE	YES	1	55
HID THE FACT THAT YOU GAVE	NO	2	
INFORMATION RATHER THAN DISCLOSE	DONT KNOW	3	
YOUR IDENTITY	REFUSED TO ANSWER	4	

	N/A	0	56
49.HOW WOULD YOU REACT TO YOUR	STOP INFORMING	1	
IDENTITY BEING DISCLOSED	BE ADVISED BY HANDLER	2	
TO COURT	WOULD NOT MAKE A DIFFERENCE	3	
	DENY ALL KNOWLEDGE	4	
	NOT SURE	5	
	REFUSED TO ANSWER	6	
OTHER(SPECIFY)		7	

PLEASE COMMENT ON THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS(50-52):-

A U S R N
L S O A E
W U M R V
A A E E E
Y L T L R
S L I Y
Y M
E
S

50.POLICE WILL PROTECT ME	1	2	3	4	5	57
---------------------------	---	---	---	---	---	----

51.POLICE WILL ALLOW ME TO	1	2	3	4	5	58
COMMIT CRIME WHILE I AM						
INFORMING						

52.I HAVE BEEN GRANTED IMMUNITY	1	2	3	4	5	59
ON THE SPOT BY MY HANDLER IN						
EXCHANGE FOR INFORMATION						

53.HAVE YOU EVER BEEN PERSONALLY	YES	1	60
SELECTIVE ABOUT THE INFORMATION	NO	2	
YOU HAVE GIVEN.	REFUSED TO ANSWER	3	

54.GIVE AN EXAMPLE WHEN	NOT APPLICABLE 0	61
THIS HAS OCCURRED		

.....

.....

.....

55.ARE THERE ANY PERSONS WHO YOU	YES 1	62
WOULD NOT INFORM ON, WHO ARE	NO 2	
COMMITTING CRIME	DONT KNOW 3	

56.WHO	NOT APPLICABLE 0	63
	RELATIVES 1	
	FRIENDS 2	
	POLICE OFFICER 3	
	REFUSED TO ANSWER 4	
OTHER (SPECIFY)	5	

57.HAVE THERE BEEN OCCASIONS WHEN	REGULARLY 1	64
A CRIME HAS COME TO YOUR NOTICE	OFTEN 2	
BUT YOU HAVE NOT GIVEN	SOMETIMES 3	
INFORMATION ABOUT IT	RARELY 4	
	NEVER 5	
	REFUSE TO ANSWER 6	

58.GIVE AN EXAMPLE	NOT APPLICABLE 0	65
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59.HAVE YOU ANY KNOWLEDGE OF INCIDENTS	YES 1	66
WHERE THE USE OF INFORMANTS HAS BROKEN	NO 2	
THE LAW	DONT KNOW 3	
	REFUSE TO ANSWER 4	

60.GIVE AN EXAMPLE	NOT APPLICABLE 0	67
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61.HAVE THERE BEEN OCCASIONS WHEN THE POLICE DISCIPLINE CODE HAS BEEN BREACHED TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE

REGULARLY	1	68
OFTEN	2	
SOMETIMES	3	
RARELY	4	
NEVER	5	
DONT KNOW	6	
REFUSE TO ANSWER	7	

62.GIVE AN EXAMPLE

NOT APPLICABLE	0	69
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63.HOW IS PAYMENT MADE

CASH	1	70
CHEQUE	2	
OTHER(SPECIFY)	3	

64.WHAT DO YOU SPEND THE MONEY ON

DRUGS	1	71
DRINK/FOOD	2	
FAMILY	3	
CANT REMEMBER	4	
REFUSED TO ANSWER	5	
OTHER(SPECIFY)	6	

65.WHO ELSE IS PRESENT WHEN PAYMENT IS MADE

OTHER POLICE OFFICER	1	72
NO-ONE	2	
CANT REMEMBER	3	
REFUSED TO ANSWER	4	
OTHER(SPECIFY)	5	

66.HAVE YOU BEEN USED TO SET UP A CRIME

YES	1	73
NO	2	
REFUSED TO ANSWER	3	

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68.PLEASE COMMENT ON THE FOLLOWING:- "THERE ARE OCCASIONS WHEN I WILL ALLOW MYSELF TO BE PARTY TO THE COMMISSION OF A CRIMINAL OFFENCE IF I FEEL THAT IT WILL HELP TO DETECT A MORE SERIOUS OFFENCE"

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69.PLEASE COMMENT ON THE FOLLOWING:- "I BELIEVE THE USE OF INFORMANTS IS CRUCIAL TO THE DETECTION OF CRIME AND THEREFORE, SOMETIMES I USE MY OWN DISCRETION ABOUT THE LAW"

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DATE

70. Have you ever participated in a crime whilst informing	Yes	1	77.
	No	2	
	Refused to answer	3	
71. If so, has the fact been declared	Not Applicable	0	78.
	Yes	1	
	No	2	
	Dont know	3	
72. Give the circumstances	Not applicable	0	79.

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73.Whilst informing, have you ever Yes 1 80.
asked your handler to sort out No 2
other matters for you. e.g. square Cant remember 3
up a speeding ticket etc. Refused to answer 4

74.Give an example Not applicable 0 81.

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75.How would you feel if you had broken the rules,and 82.
as a result, a criminal walks free.
Not applicable 0

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HANDLERS QUESTIONNAIRE

PART ONE

1. WHAT IS SUBJECTS CODE..... 1-3
2. YOUR PRESENT FORCE..... -
3. YOUR CURRENT RANK
CONSTABLE 1 4
SERGEANT 2
INSPECTOR 3
CHIEF INSPECTOR 4
OTHER 5
4. YOUR PRESENT POST
UNIFORM 1 5
C.I.D 2
SPECIALIST (SPECIFY) 3
5. HOW LONG HAVE YOU
BEEN A HANDLER
LESS THAN 1 YR 1 6
1-2 YRS 2
3-5 YRS 3
MORE THAN 6 YRS 4
6. EXPLAIN YOUR ROLE AS A HANDLER..... 7
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7. AT WHAT POINT DOES AN
INFORMER BECOME REGISTERED
FIRST INFORMATION 1 8
SECOND INFORMATION 2
OTHER (SPECIFY) 3
8. EXPLAIN THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN AN INFORMER AND
CONTACT..... 9
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9. EXPLAIN THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN AN INFORMER AND PUBLIC SPIRITED CITIZEN.....

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10.IN YOUR OWN WORDS, HOW WOULD YOU DEFINE AN INFORMER.....

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11.IS YOUR INVOLVEMENT IN INFORMING RESTRICTED TO CERTAIN CATEGORIES OF CRIME

YES 1

NO 2

12.PLEASE SHOW THE MAIN CATEGORY. NOT APPLICABLE 0

1

13.EXPLAIN WHY YOU RESTRICT YOUR INFORMATION TO THIS CATEGORY OF CRIME.

NOT APPLICABLE 0

DRUG SQUAD OFFICER 1

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14.IF YOU DO RESTRICT YOUR INFORMATION WHAT DO YOU DO ABOUT OTHER CATEGORIES

N/A 0

IGNORE 1

INFORM OTHER OFFICER 2

INFORM OTHER DEPARTMENT 3

OTHER (SPECIFY) 4

358

PART TWO

15.	IN YOUR OPINION, WHERE DOES A RELATIONSHIP WITH AN INFORMER FIRST START, NORMALLY	ON ARREST 1 AFTER INTERVIEW 2 ON RELEASE 3 CRIME ENQUIRIES 4 OTHER ENQUIRIES 5 LICENSED PREMISES 6 PRISON VISIT 7 SOCIALLY 8 OTHER (SPECIFY) 9	16
16.	WHAT WORD BEST DESCRIBES YOUR RELATIONSHIP IN GENERAL	PROFESSIONAL 1 FRIENDLY 2 SOCIAL 3 REWARDING 4 NECESSARY 5 UNDERSTANDING/TRUSTING 6 DONT KNOW 7 OTHER (SPECIFY) 8	17
17.	CAN A RELATIONSHIP CHANGE BETWEEN HANDLER/INFORMER	YES 1 NO 2 DONT KNOW 3	18
18.	GIVE AN EXAMPLE OF HOW THIS HAS OCCURRED	NOT APPLICABLE 0	19
19.	WHAT IS THE MAIN ADVANTAGE OF YOUR RELATIONSHIP FOR YOU.	NONE 0 DETECTION OF CRIME 1 ARREST OF CRIMINALS 2 DONT KNOW 3 OTHER (SPECIFY) 4	20
20.	WHAT IS THE MAIN DISADVANTAGE	NONE 0 BEING CONTACTED OFF DUTY 1 CONTACTED AT HOME 2 INSUFFICIENT RECOGNITION 3 ADDS TO WORK LOAD 4 SUSCEPTIBLE TO ALLEGATIONS 5 DONT KNOW 6 OTHER (SPECIFY) 7	21
21.	WHO USUALLY ARRANGES THE MEETING	INFORMER 1	22

	HANDLER	2			
	EITHER	3			
	BOTH	4			
	CONTROLLER	5			
	OTHER(SPECIFY)	6			
22.WHERE DO YOU NORMALLY MEET	PUBLIC HOUSE	1	23		
	RESTAURANT	2			
	BETTING SHOP	3			
	INFORMERS HOME	4			
	PARK/COMMON/STREET	5			
	IN VEHICLE	6			
	CAR PARK	7			
	BUS STATION	8			
	OTHER(SPECIFY)	9			
23.HOW IS CONTACT MAINTAINED USUALLY	TELEPHONE	1	24		
	PAGER	2			
	LETTER	3			
	PERSONAL VISIT	4			
	THROUGH THIRD PARTY	5			
	OTHER(SPECIFY)	6			
24.DO YOU USE JOINT HANDLERS	YES	1	25		
	NO	2			
	SOMETIMES	3			
25.WHAT IS YOUR OPINION OF JOINT HANDLERS	NOT APPLICABLE	0	26		
	USEFUL	1			
	NOT USEFUL	2			
	OTHER(SPECIFY)	3			
26.DO YOU MEET WITH YOUR INFORMER SOCIALY	YES	1	27		
	NO	2			
	OCCASIONALLY	3			
27.WHAT LEVEL OF IMPORTANCE DO YOU PERSONALLY PLACE ON THE FOLLOWING.					
	VERY IMP.	IMP.	NOT VERY.	UNIMP	
THE RELATIONSHIP	1	2	3	4	28
TRUST	1	2	3	4	29
FRIENDSHIP	1	2	3	4	30
HONESTY	1	2	3	4	31
TRUTH	1	2	3	4	32
CONFIDENTIALITY	1	2	3	4	33
RELIABILITY	1	2	3	4	34

PART THREE

28. IN RELATION TO YOUR LAST REGISTERED INFORMER, DO YOU KNOW WHY HE STARTED GIVING YOU INFORMATION	YES 1 NO 2 DONT KNOW 3	35
29. HOW DID YOU BECOME AWARE	NOT APPLICABLE 0 YOU ASKED HIM/HER 1 HE VOLUNTEERED 2 FROM A THIRD PARTY 3 OTHER (SPECIFY) 4	36
30. DID YOU VERIFY THE REASONS	YES 1 NO 2 DONT KNOW 3	37
31. HOW DID YOU VERIFY	NOT APPLICABLE 0 ACCEPT HIS WORD 1 CHECKED WITH OTHER 2 DOCUMENTATION 3 OTHER (SPECIFY) 4	38
32. IN YOUR EXPERIENCE, WHAT IS THE MAIN REASON FOR INFORMING	REVENGE 1 REDUCE SENTENCE 2 FRIENDLY WITH OFFICER 3 DISLIKE OF THAT TYPE OF CRIME 4 FINANCIAL 5 ENJOYMENT 6 GRATITUDE 7 LOOKING FOR A FAVOUR 8 PRESSURE FROM OFFICER 9 PART OF A DEAL 10 CHALLENGE 11 GET ON THE RIGHT SIDE OF THE LAW 12 TAKE OUT THE COMPETITION 13 OTHER (SPECIFY) 14	39-40
33. LIST OTHER REASONS YOU HAVE EXPERIENCED (INCLUDING THOSE IN 32 ABOVE)	NOT APPLICABLE 0 ENJOYMENT 1 TAKE OUT COMPETITION 2 LIKES CID WORK 3 OTHER (SPECIFY) 4	41
34. CAN YOU RECALL A SITUATION WHERE THE MAIN REASON CHANGED	YES 1 NO 2 DONT KNOW 3	42
35. WHAT DID THE REASON CHANGE TO	NOT APPLICABLE 0 OTHER (SPECIFY) 1	43
36. DO THE REASONS FOR INFORMING MAKE ANY DIFFERENCE TO THE USEFULNESS OF	YES 1 NO 2	44

DONT KNOW 3

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39.ARE THOSE REASONS	NOT APPLICABLE	0	47
	LEGAL	1	
	MORAL	2	
	SOCIAL	3	
	PHYSICAL	4	
OTHER (SPECIFY)		5	

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PART FOUR

43.HAVE YOU EVER HID THE FACT THAT AN INFORMER WAS USED, RATHER THAN DISCLOSE HIS/HER IDENTITY

YES	1	51
NO	2	
DONT KNOW	3	
REFUSED TO ANSWER	4	

A U S R N
L S O A E

W U M R V
A A E E E
Y L T L R
S L I Y
Y M
E
S

44.I HAVE BEEN PUT UNDER PRESSURE TO PRODUCE RESULTS AS A HANDLER	1 2 3 4 5	52
45.I WILL PROTECT MY INFORMER	1 2 3 4 5	53
46.I WILL ALLOW MY INFORMER TO COMMIT CRIME WHILST HE/SHE IS INFORMING	1 2 3 4 5	54
47.I HAVE GRANTED IMMUNITY TO AN INFORMER IN EXCHANGE FOR INFORMATION	1 2 3 4 5	55
48.FAILURE TO SUCCEED ON JOBS USING INFORMERS CAN EFFECT MY CREDIBILITY REFUSED TO ANSWER	YES 1 NO 2 3	56
49.HAVE YOU EVER BEEN PERSONALLY SELECTIVE ABOUT THE INFORMATION YOU HAVE RECEIVED.	YES 1 NO 2 REFUSED TO ANSWER 3	57
50.GIVE AN EXAMPLE	NOT APPLICABLE 0	58
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51.ARE THERE ANY PERSONS KNOWN TO BE COMMITTING CRIME WHO YOU WOULD NOT ACT AGAINST	YES 1 NO 2 DONT KNOW 3	59
52.WHO ARE THEY	NOT APPLICABLE 0 RELATIVES 1 FRIENDS 2 INFORMERS 3 POLICE OFFICERS 4 OTHER (SPECIFY) 5	60
53.HAVE THERE BEEN OCCASIONS WHEN A CRIME HAS COME TO YOUR NOTICE BUT YOU HAVE NOT ACTED ON IT	REGULARLY 1 OFTEN 2 SOMETIMES 3 RARELY 4	61

NEVER 5

REFUSED TO ANSWER 6

54.GIVE AN EXAMPLE

NOT APPLICABLE 0

62

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55.HAVE YOU ANY KNOWLEDGE OF INCIDENTS

YES 1

63

WHERE THE USE OF INFORMERS HAS

NO 2

BROKEN THE LAW

DONT KNOW 3

REFUSED TO ANSWER 4

56.GIVE AN EXAMPLE

NOT APPLICABLE 0

64

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57.HAVE THERE BEEN OCCASIONS WHEN THE

REGULARLY 1

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POLICE DISCIPLINE CODE HAS BEEN

OFTEN 2

BREACHED, TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE

SOMETIMES 3

RARELY 4

NEVER 5

DONT KNOW 6

REFUSED TO ANSWER 7

58.GIVE AN EXAMPLE

NOT APPLICABLE 0

66

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59.HOW IS PAYMENT MADE CASH 1 67
(WHERE RELEVANT) CHEQUE 2
OTHER (SPECIFY) 3

60.DO YOU ASK WHAT THE MONEY YES 1 68
IS SPENT ON (WHERE RELEVANT) NO 2
SOMETIMES 3
REFUSED TO ANSWER 4

61.GENERALLY WHAT IS THE REPLY NOT APPLICABLE 0 69
DRUGS 1
FOOD 2
FAMILY 3
DONT KNOW 4
REFUSED TO ANSWER 5

62.WHO ELSE IS PRESENT OTHER POLICE OFFICER 1 70
WHEN PAYMENT IS MADE NO-ONE 2
CANT REMEMBER 3
REFUSED TO ANSWER 4
OTHER (SPECIFY) 5

63.HAVE YOU EVER USED AN INFORMER YES 1 71
TO SET UP A CRIME NO 2
REFUSED TO ANSWER 3

64.GIVE AN EXAMPLE NOT APPLICABLE 0 72

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65.PLEASE COMMENT ON THE FOLLOWING:- "THERE ARE OCCASIONS
WHEN I WILL ALLOW MYSELF TO BE PARTY TO THE COMMISSION
OF A CRIMINAL OFFENCE IF I FEEL THAT IT WILL HELP TO
DETECT A MORE SERIOUS OFFENCE".....73

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66.PLEASE COMMENT ON THE FOLLOWING:- "I BELIEVE THE USE
OF INFORMANTS IS CRUCIAL TO THE DETECTION OF CRIME AND
THEREFORE, SOMETIMES I USE MY OWN DISCRETION ABOUT THE
LAW"

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COMMENTS BY INTERVIEWER

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.....DATE.....

CONTRACT

THIS DOCUMENT CONFIRMS IN WRITING THAT DETECTIVE SUPERINTENDENT ROGER BILLINGSLEY OF THE LINCOLNSHIRE POLICE GIVES THE FOLLOWING UNDERTAKING:

THAT WHILST INVOLVING THE
(POLICE FORCE/AGENCY) IN RESEARCH PRESENTLY BEING
CARRIED OUT INTO THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INFORMERS
AND THEIR HANDLERS,

1. ALL INTERVIEWEES WILL MAINTAIN THEIR ANONYMITY
2. THE COMPLETED QUESTIONNAIRES WILL BE CONFIDENTIAL
3. ANY SUBSEQUENT ANALYSIS WILL NOT SPECIFY
INDIVIDUALS FROM ANY SPECIFIC POLICE FORCE
4. EACH INTERVIEWEE WILL BE ADVISED THAT THEIR
RESPONSES ARE VOLUNTARY
5. THEIR ANSWERS WILL NOT BE USED IN ANY FUTURE
CRIMINAL OR POLICE DISCIPLINARY HEARINGS
6. THE CHIEF CONSTABLE OF LINCOLNSHIRE IS AWARE OF THIS
RESEARCH AND SUPPORTS ITS COMPLETION
7. NO SUBSEQUENT PAPERS IN RELATION TO THE RESEARCH
ANALYSIS WILL BE PUBLISHED WITHOUT PRIOR
CONSULTATION WITH THE FORCE/AGENCY INVOLVED

SIGNED.....

DETECTIVE SUPERINTENDENT

DATE.....

THE ROLE OF THE DETECTIVE

INTERIM REPORT

TERMS OF REFERENCE

To undertake an Activity Analysis of all C.I.D. Officers across the Force, from C.I.D. Aides up to and including Detective Chief Inspectors, within the existing Area Activity Analysis schedule and to provide a report in tabular format summarising the measured activities.

INTRODUCTION

The report details the data gathered, in relation to C.I.D., from the Activity Analysis samples carried out so far this year. The Areas included in this report are West Lindsey, Lincoln and Kesteven. The recording period covered is from 20th February 1995 to 16th July 1995.

The results contained in this report are concerned with Detectives only. Those sections within C.I.D. that include Uniformed Officers will be dealt with in the final report.

RESULTS

The tabulated results of the activity recording programmes are shown together with graphical summaries in the following order:

Section 1 Detective Constables

Section 2 Detective Sergeants

Section 3 Detective Chief Inspectors and Detective Inspectors

Further information concerning the number of recorded crimes over the period is tabulated in Appendix A.

Each Section contains a similar set of tabulations, graphs and comments on the significant data obtained. The tables contained in each section are as follows:

- Table 1** A summarised list of activities sub-divided into **INCIDENT** linked activities (I), **NON-INCIDENT** linked activities (P), **SUPERVISORY** (S) and **UNCOMMITTED** (U). The table shows the number of hours recorded against type of activity, percentage of total hours, percentage of incident related hours, percentage of non-incident related hours and an average time, in minutes per day expended by each officer for each type of activity.
- Table 2** A summarised list of **INCIDENT** related activities shown against the type of incident. This is divided into **CRIME** (C) and **NON-CRIME** (N) categories and shows the total hours of activity recorded against each type of incident, percentage of total incident hours and percentage of total hours recorded by the particular category of officer.
- Table 3** A complete list of total hours recorded for each type of activity during a specific hour of the day over the recording period. This is sub-divided into **INCIDENT** related hours, **NON-INCIDENT** related hours, **SUPERVISORY** and **UNCOMMITTED** hours.
- Table 4** An extract from Table 2, outlining percentages of time spent on activities for each Crime category. (included in Section 1 only)
- Graph 1** This is a combination pie and stack chart which identifies the proportion of **INCIDENT** related work and further analyses into more specific areas of activity.
- Graph 2** This is similar to Graph 1 except that it concerns the **NON-INCIDENT** related work and identifies the proportions of that category in terms of Briefings and Special Operations etc.
- Graph 3** This is a bar chart which identifies the amount of time spent on Crime. It details the various activities i.e. observation and clerical etc., for each

category of Crime. (included in Section 1 only).

Graph 4 This is a pie chart 1 which identifies the percentage of time spent on Crime as a proportion of recorded crime.

SECTION 1

DETECTIVE CONSTABLES

The main areas of activity for Detective Constables are detailed in the table below:

ACTIVITY	%
Travel to/from and Deal with Incident	11.47%
Enquiries/Observation/Searches	14.22%
Interview/deal with Detainees	6.58%
Clerical R.O.T.I.	11.97%
Clerical/Paperwork	21.33%
Briefings/Meetings/Conferences	5.10%
Special Operations/Events	5.53%
Uncommitted (refreshments)	4.88%
Other Work	18.88%
Time in Station	52.98%

During the sample period a total of **5438.25 hours** were recorded. Out of the total hours **3007.75**, (55.31%), was spent on incident linked work with **2948.25** hours, (54.2%) spent on crime activities.

Table 2 shows that Detective Constables spend the biggest proportion of the total time, 825 hours, (15.2%), on activities associated with Domestic Burglary. This equates to 27.4% of the time booked against crime. The highest proportion of time recorded on an activity relating to Domestic Burglary was Clerical R.O.T.I. which over the period accounted for 171.75 hours.

The category which also takes up a significant amount of time is all other crime. This accounts for 664.50 hours of the total time recorded, which is 22.1 % of the total crime activities.

The highest proportion of time spent on an activity was on enquiries.

Enquiries take up a total of 556.75 hours, (19%) of the time recorded against crime activities. Of the total hours booked on enquiries, (556.75 hours), 167.25 hours, (30%), is spent on Burglary and 161.75 hours, (29%), on other crimes.

To put these figures in perspective, recorded crime over the period shows that 'other offences' accounted for 4556 offences, (19.7%), out of a total recorded crime figure of 23185. Other offences, as per the Home Office classification, include blackmail, treason and perverting the course of justice.

It is possible that officers involved in the recording have included other crimes such as shoplifting or handling stolen property in the other category so in this case it is not a true reflection of 'other crime'.

Recorded crime figures have been provided for the period 1/2/95 to 31/7/95 and broken down into categories to show what percentage of the total, burglary etc. is. These percentages have been compared with the amount of time Detectives have actually spent on the particular categories. For example violent crime, including physical attacks, sexual offences and robbery, make up 6.40% of the total recorded crime. Detective Constables spent 20.10% of incident time on activities involved with violence offences. Criminal damage, including arson and threats, accounts for 14.50% of the total recorded crime and officers recorded only 1.50% of the incident time on activities linked with this crime.

A breakdown of recorded crime can be found in Appendix A, with Graph 4 showing how it relates to incident linked activity for Detective Constables.

Overall, Detective Constables spent 3007.75 hours, (55.31%), on incident linked activities, 2154.75 hours, (39.62%) on non-incident linked activities, 10.50 hours, (0.19%) on supervisory work and 265.25 hours, (4.88%), on refreshments.

SECTION 2

DETECTIVE SERGEANTS

The main areas of activity for Detective Sergeants are listed in the table below.

ACTIVITY	%
Travel to/from and Deal with Incidents	5.82%
Enquiries/Observation/Searches	11.27%
Paperwork/Clerical (inc. Supervisory)	28.34%
Briefings/Meetings/Conferences	11.89%
Other Managerial/Supervisory	12.15%
Other Work	25.62%
Uncommitted (refreshments)	4.96%
Time in Station	64.67%

During the sample period a total of **927.75** hours were recorded. Out of the total, **317.25** hours, (34.20%) was spent on incident linked activities with **306.75** hours, (33.1 %) being spent on crime activities.

The data in Table 2 shows that the highest proportion of time was spent on domestic burglary, 77.75 hours, which is 24.5% of the time booked against crime. Detective Sergeants spent most of their time, 77.50 hours on enquiries with the highest proportion on burglary.

Overall, the highest proportion of their total time was on non-incident linked work.

SECTION 3

DETECTIVE CHIEF INSPECTORS & DETECTIVE INSPECTORS

The main activities are detailed in the table below.

ACTIVITY	%
Enquiries/Observation/Searches	7.18%
Paperwork/Clerical (including Supervisory)	28.76%
Briefings/Meetings/Conferences	21.90%
Other Managerial/Supervisory	22.43%
Other Work	13.35%
Uncommitted (refreshments)	5.00%
Time in Station	69.17%

Activity Analysis is normally only carried out up to and including Inspector rank, therefore the D/C11 has been accounted for with the Inspectors.

During the sample period a total of **470.25** hours were recorded. Out of the total, **93.50** hours, (19.88%) was on incident linked work with 98.7 hours being on crime activities.

Of the hours recorded against crime activity, clerical other accounted for the highest proportion of time.

Activity Analysis Results C.I.D (D/C)

ACT CODE DESCRIP					Average
P02REP					Time per Day
20/02/95 to 16/07/95					(mins)
All days selected					
Force: LINCOLNSHIRE					
Command unit: All					
Officers: DC					
Unit types: All		Percentage	Percentage	Percentage	
No of shifts: 669		of Total Hrs	of Incid. Hrs	of Non-Incid. Hrs	
		TOTAL			
JA	Deal with incident	343.00	6.31%	11.40%	30.76
1A0	Travel to/from incident	280.75	5.16%	9.33%	25.18
IB	Enquiries	575.75	10.59%	19.14%	51.64
[C	Observation	143.00	2.63%	4.75%	12.83
[D	Searches	54.50	1.00%	1.81%	4.89
E	Issue advice/warning/VDRS	0.00	0.00%	0.00%	0.00
IF	Interview detainees	172.75	3.18%	5.74%	15.49
IG	Dealing with detainees	185.00	3.40%	6.15%	16.59
1H	Paperwork	118.25	2.17%	3.93%	10.61
		373			

1HO	Clerical - R.O.T.I.	651.00	11.97%	1	21.64%	58.39
1H1	Clerical - Computer	31.50	0.58%		1.05%	2.83
1H2	Clerical - Other	290.50	5.34%		9.66%	26.05
11	At court	70.50	1.30%		2.34%	6.32
li	Other incident linked	91.25	1.68%		3.03%	8.18
jz	TOTAL MAN-HOURS (1):	3007.75	55.31%		100.00%	269.75
PA	Preventative patrol	97.50	1.79%		4.52%	8.74
PAO	Prev. patrol - Car/Van	127.751	2.35%		5.93%	11.46
PB	Briefings/meetings	275.00	5.06%		12.76%	24.66
PC	Relief station duties	0.50	0.01%		0.02%	0.04
PD	Court duties/escort	57.25	1.05%		2.66%	5.13
PE	Special operations/events	300.75	5.53%		13.96%	26.97
PF	Investigate complaints	4.25	0.08%		0.20%	0.38
PG	Dealing with informants	68.25	1.25%		3.17%	6.12
PH	Community involvement	2.75	0.05%		0.13%	0.25
PI	Property enquiries	29.00	0.53%		1.35%	2.60
PJ	Enquiries (firearms,etc)	1.50	0.03%		0.07%	0.13
PJO	Eng. - Summons/Warrants	16.00	0.29%		0.74%	1.43
PJ1	Eng. - Foreign Force	37.75	0.69%		1.75%	3.39
PJ2	Eng. - Other	172.25	3.17%		7.99%	15.45
PK	Crime prevention activity	146.00	2.68%		6.78%	13.09
PL	Prison interviews	27.75	0.51%		1.29%	2.49
PM	Paperwork - other	580.00	10.67%		26.92%	52.02
PMO	Clerical Computer	140.00	2.57%		6.50%	12.56
PN	Other non incident linked	70.50	1.30%		3.27%	6.32
PNO	Kennel Duties	0.00	0.00%		0.00%	0.00
PN1	Dog Training	0.00	0.00%		0.00%	0.00
PZ	TOTAL MAN-HOURS (P):	2154.75	39.62%		100.00%	193.25
SA	Handover Procedures	0.75	0.01%			0.07
SB	Staff appraisals/develop	0.00	0.00%			0.00
SC	Relief custody duties	0.00	0.00%			0.00
SD	Relief station/cntri sgt	0.00	0.00%			0.00
SE	Monitoring cell block	0.00	0.00%			0.00
SF	Conferences	2.00	0.04%			0.18
SG	Planning for known events	6.25	0.11%			0.56
SH	Identification parades	0.00	0.00%			0.00
SI	Checking paperwork	0.251	0.00%			0.02
SJ	Other managerial/supervis	1.25	0.02%			0.11
SZ	TOTAL MAN-HOURS (S):	10.50	0.19%			0.94
UA	Refreshments	265.25	4.88%			23.79
UAO	Clerical: Paperwork-Patrol	0.00	0.00%			0.00
UA1	Misc:Translinc/Deliveries	0.00	0.00%			0.00
UA2	Escort Abnormal Loads	0.00	0.00%			0.00
UZ	TOTAL MAN-HOURS (U):	265.251	4.88%			23.79
ZZ	TOTAL MAN-HOURS:	5438.251	100.00%			487.74
ZZZ	Man-hours in station:	2881.25	52.98%			
ZZZ	Paid overtime:	339.25	6.24%			
ZZZ	Unpaid overtime:	13.25	0.24%			
ZZZ	% IN STATION:					
ZZZ	% AID OVERTIME:					
1 ZZZ	1% UNPAID OVERTIME:			1		

Activity Analysis Results C.I.D (DIS)

ACT CODE DESCRIP
P02REP

20/02/95 to 16/07/95
All days selected
Force: LINCOLNSHIRE
Command unit: All
Officers: DS
Unit types: All
No of shifts: 112

		TOTAL	Percentage of Total Hrs	Percentage of Incid. Hrs	Percentage of Non-incid. Hrs	Average Time per Day (mins) per Officer
IA	Deal with incident	26.75	2.88%	8.43%		14.33
1A0	Travel to/from incident	27.25	2.94%	8.59%		14.60
[B	Enquiries	79.00	8.52%	24.90%		42.32
]C	Observation	18.75	2.02%	5.91%		10.04
0	Searches	6.75	0.73%	2.13%		3.62
E	Issue advice/warning/VDRS	0.00	0.00%	0.00%		0.00
IF	Interview detainees	7.50	0.81%	2.36%		4.02
IG	Dealing with detainees	5.25	0.57%	1.65%		2.81
H	Paperwork	6.75	0.73%	2.13%		3.62
1110	Clerical - R.O.T.I.	31.50	3.40%	9.93%		16.88
1H1	Clerical - Computer	5.25	0.57%	1.65%		2.81
1H2	Clerical - Other	35.75	3.85%	11.27%		19.15
11	At court	34.75	3.75%	10.95%		18.62
IJ	Other incident linked	32.00	3.45%	10.09%		17.14
IZ	TOTAL MAN-HOURS (1):	317.25	34.20%	100.00%		169.96
PA	Preventative patrol	21.25	2.29%		6.15%	11.38
PAO	Prev. patrol - Car/Van	23.00	2.48%		6.65%	12.32
PB	Briefings/meetings	71.50	7.71%		20.68%	38.30
PC	Relief station duties	0.00	0.00%		0.00%	0.00
PID	Court duties/escort	8.50	0.92%		2.46%	4.55
PE	Special operations/events	30.00	3.23%		8.68%	16.07
PF	Investigate complaints	0.00	0.00%		0.00%	0.00
PG	Dealing with informants	5.25	0.57%		1.52%	2.81
PH	Community involvement	6.25	0.67%		1.81%	3.35
PI	Property enquiries	2.00	0.22%		0.58%	1.07
PJ	Enquiries (firearms,etc)	0.00	0.00%		0.00%	0.00
PA	Eng. - Summons/Warrants	0.00	0.00%			0.00
PJ1	Eng. - Foreign Force	5.50	0.59%		1.59%	2.95
PJ2	Enq. - Other	7.25	0.78%		2.10%	3.88
PK	Crime prevention activity	33.50	3.61%		9.69%	17.95
PL	Prison interviews	4.50	0.49%		1.30%	2.41
PM	Paperwork - other	84.75	9.14%		24.51%	45.40
PMO	Clerical Computer	31.50	3.40%		9.11%	16.88
PN	Other non incident linked	11.00	1.19%			
					3.18%	5.89
PNO	Kennel Duties	0.00	0.00%		0.00%	0.00
PN1	Dog Training	0.00	0.00%		0.00%	0.00
PZ	TOTAL MAN-HOURS (P):	345.75	37.27%		100.00%	185.22
SA	Handover Procedures	0.00	0.00%			0.00
SB	Staff appraisals/develop	2.75	0.30%			1.47
SC	Relief custody duties	0.00	0.00%		1	0.00
SD	Relief station/cntri sgt	0.00	0.00%			0.00
SE	Monitoring cell block	0.00	0.00%			0.00
SF	Conferences	38.75	4.18%			20.76
SG	Planning for known events	23.50	2.53%			12.59
SH	Identification parades	0.00	0.00%			0.00
SI	Checking paperwork	67.25	7.25%			36.03
SJ	Other managerial/supervis	86.50	9.32%			46.34
SZ	TOTAL MAN-HOURS (S):	218.75	23.58%		1	117.19
UA	Refreshments	46.00	4.96%			24.64
UM	Clerical: Paperwork-Patrol	0.00	0.00%			0.00

UAI	Misc:Translinc/Deliveries	0.00	0.00%	0.00
UA2	Escort Abnormal Loads	0.00	0.00%	0.00
UZ	TOTAL MAN-HOURS (U):	46.00	4.96%	24.64
ZZ	TOTAL MAN-HOURS:	927.75	100.00%	497.01
ZZZ	Man-hours in station:	600.00	64.67%	
ZZZ	Paid overtime:	48.50	5.23%	
ZZZ	Unpaid overtime:	12.50	1.35%	
ZZZ	% IN STATION:	64.67		
ZZZ	% PAID OVERTIME:	5.23		
ZZZ	% UNPAID OVERTIME:	1.35		

Activity Analysis Results C.I.D (D/C/1 & D/I)

ACT CODE DESCRIP

PO2REP					
20102195 to 16107195					
All days selected					
Force: LINCOLNSHIRE					
Command unit: All					
Officers: DICII & DA					
Unit types: All					
No of shifts: 52					
		TOTAL	Percentage of Total Hrs	Percentage of Incid. Hrs	Average Time per Day (mins)
				Percentage of Non-Incid. Hrs	
IA	Deal with incident	2.25	0.48%	2.41%	2.60
IA0	Travel to/from incident	1.50	0.32%	1.60%	1.73
IB	Enquiries	21.75	4.63%	23.26%	25.10
IC	Observation	11.25	2.39%	12.03%	12.98
ID	Searches	0.751	0.16%	0.80%	0.87
IE	Issue advice/warning/VDRS	0.00	0.00%	0.00%	0.00
IF	Interview detainees	0.00	0.00%	0.00%	0.00
IG	Dealing with detainees	2.25	0.48%	2.41%	2.60
M	Paperwork	0.00	0.00%	0.00%	0.00
IHO	Clerical - R.O.T.I.	0.00	0.00%	0.00%	0.00
IH1	Clerical - Computer	3.50	0.74%	3.74%	4.04
IH2	Clerical - Other	35.25	7.50%	37.70%	40.67
II	At court	0.00	0.00%	0.00%	0.00
IJ	Other incident linked	15.00 1	3.19%	16.04%	17.31
IZ	TOTAL MAN-HOURS (1):	93.50	19.88%	100.00%	107.88
PA	Preventative patrol	1.00	0.21%	0.54%	1.15
PAO	Prev. patrol - Car/Van	0.75	0.16%	0.41%	0.87
PB	Briefings/meetings	65.00	13.82%	35.37%	75.00
PC	Relief station duties	0.00	0.00%	0.00%	0.00
PD	Court duties/escort	0.00	0.00%	0.00%	0.00
PE	Special operations/events	0.50	0.11%	0.27%	0.58
PF	Investigate complaints	3.75	0.80%	2.04%	4.33
PG	Dealing with informants	22.50	4.78%	12.24%	25.96
PH	Community involvement	0.00	0.00%	0.00%	0.00
PJ	Property enquiries	0.00	0.00%	0.00%	0.00
PJ	Enquiries (firearms,etc)	0.00	0.00%	0.00%	0.00
PJO	Eng. - SummonsWarrants	0.00	0.00%	0.00%	0.00
PA	Eng. - Foreign Force	0.00	0.00%	0.00%	0.00
PJ2	Eng. - Other	6.75	1.44%	3.67%	7.79
PK	Crime prevention activity	3.00	0.64%	1.63%	3.46
PL	Prison interviews	0.25 1	0.05%	0.14%	0.29
PM	Paperwork - other	70.25	14.94%	38.23%	81.06
PMO	Clerical Computer	6.75	1.44%	3.67%	7.79

PN	Other non incident linked	3.25	0.69%		1.77%	3.75
PNO	Kennel Duties	0.00	0.00%		0.00%	0.00
PN1	Dog Training	0.00	0.00%		0.00%	0.00
PZ	TOTAL MAN-HOURS (P)	183.75	39.07%		100.00%	212.02
SA	Handover Procedures	0.00	0.00%			
SB	Staff appraisals/developpt	9.75	2.07%			
SC	Relief custody duties	0.00	0.00%			
SD	Relief station/cntri sgt	0.00	0.00%			
SE	Monitoring cell block	0.00	0.00%			
SF	Conferences	38.00	8.08%			
SG	Planning for known events		7.50	1.59%		
SH	Identification parades	0.00	0.00%			
SI	Checking paperwork	26.00	5.53%			
SJ	Other managerial/supervis		88.25	18.77%		
SZ	TOTAL MAN-HOURS (S):		169.50	36.04%		
UA	Refreshments	23.50	5.00%			
UM	Clerical: Paperwork-Patrol		0.00	0.00%		
UAI	Misc:Translinc/Deliveries	0.00	0.00%			
UA2	Escort Abnormal Loads	0.00	0.00%			
UZ	TOTAL MAN-HOURS (U):		23.50	5.00%		
ZZ	TOTAL MAN-HOURS:	470.25	100.00%			
ZZZ	Man-hours in station:	325.25				
ZZZ	Paid overtime:	0.00				
ZZZ	Unpaid overtime:	9.75				
ZZZ	% IN STATION:	69.17				
ZZZ	% PAID OVERTIME:	0.00				
ZZZ	%UNPAID OVERTIME:	-2.07				

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONNAIRE FOR LINCOLNSHIRE POLICE

- | | |
|--|--|
| 1. WHAT IS SUBJECTS CODE..... | 1-3 |
| 2. CURRENT RANK constable 1 4
sergeant 2
inspector 3
chief inspector 4
superintendent 5 | 3. GENDER male 1 5
female 2 |
| 4. PRESENT POST uniform 1 6
c.i.d 2
complaints and discipline 3
drug squad 4
regional crime squad 5
drug enforcement team 6
other (specify) 7 | 5. AGE 19-25 1 7
26-35 2
36-40 3
41-50 4
over 50 5 |
| 6. HOW LONG HAVE YOU BEEN A HANDLER | n/a 0 8
less than 1 year 1
1 - 2 yrs 2
3 - 5 yrs 3
more than 6 yrs 4 |
| 7. WHAT IS THE MAIN REASON YOU INVOLVE YOURSELF WITH INFORMERS | n/a 0 9
excitement 1
detection of crime 2
arrest of criminals 3
enjoy dealing with criminals 4
cost effective investigative tool 5
other (specify) 6 |
| 8. IF YOU DO NOT INVOLVE YOURSELF WITH HANDLERS, EXPLAIN WHY NOT | n/a 0 10
hassle 1
not cut out for it 2
not interested 3
disagree morally 4
not had the opportunity 5
other (specify) 6 |
| 9. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE ABOVE ANSWER (7 OR 8) IN DETAIL | 11 |

EXTRACT FROM 1991 NATIONAL CENSUS

Table 38 Single years of age

Great Britain, England & Wales, England, regions of England, metropolitan counties, Inner London, Outer London, regional remainders, Wales, Scotland

38. Residents in households

Age	TOTAL PERSONS	Males	Females	Age	TOTAL PERSONS	Males	Females
	GREAT BRITAIN				GREAT BRITAIN -		continued
ALL AGES	54,055,693	26,231,996	27,823,697				
0	738,458	377,643	360,815	45	686,194	341,883	344,311
1	731,877	374,469	357,408	46	713,939	356,116	357,823
2	718,883	367,341	351,542	47	689,894	344,715	345,179
3	727,413	372,593	354,820	48	663,264	331,170	332,094
4	708,157	361,948	346,209	49	594,732	296,240	298,492
5	709,090	363,398	345,692	50	572,928	285,544	287,384
6	694,380	355,035	339,345	51	609,061	303,448	305,613
7	674,903	345,784	329,119	52	606,094	301,575	304,519
8	672,149	344,461	327,688	53	601,696	300,176	301,520
9	682,180	349,232	332,948	54	590,701	294,326	296,375
10	699,742	357,757	341,985	55	578,677	287,474	291,203
11	695,555	356,234	339,321	56	567,600	281,916	285,684
12	657,340	337,959	319,381	57	549,661	271,904	277,757
13	617,066	316,272	300,794	58	556,931	274,678	282,253
14	618,988	317,772	301,216	59	567,802	278,702	289,100
15	646,573	331,768	314,805	60	578,405	280,690	297,715
16	677,595	347,969	329,626	61	566,261	272,695	293,566
17	690,839	352,288	338,551	62	557,553	268,014	289,539
18	722,673	366,638	356,035	63	544,122	260,931	283,191
19	754,579	378,759	375,820	64	554,107	264,185	289,922
20	784,397	390,862	393,535	65	552,635	262,230	290,405
21	774,751	383,842	390,909	66	537,729	250,944	286,785
22	802,852	393,605	409,247	67	536,062	247,277	288,785
23	812,773	397,215	415,558	68	529,486	240,878	288,608
24	840,057	411,130	428,927	69	552,059	248,521	303,538
25	855,248	418,405	436,843	70	562,331	249,035	313,296
26	873,928	427,971	445,957	71	523,495	228,633	294,862
27	870,420	426,570	443,850	72	366,484	156,277	210,207
28	861,094	2422,61	438,477	73	338,377	142,945	195,432
29	847,174	417,324	429,850	74	377,013	157,337	219,676
30	833,477	412,008	421,469	75	372,084	152,232	219,852
31	800,449	396,075	404,374	76	385,982	154,530	231,452
32	792,244	391,754	400,490	77	358,690	140,912	217,778
33	782,735	387,644	395,091	78	330,513	127,093	203,420
34	755,975	374,458	381,517	79	302,174	113,704	188,470
35	734,291	364,600	369,691	80	275,083	100,147	174,936
36	721,154	357,466	363,688	81	249,338	88,364	160,974
37	730,516	361,846	368,670	82	224,460	76,712	147,748
38	719,896	357,012	362,884	83	193,109	64,156	128,953
39	714,858	355,037	359,821	84	165,076	52,526	112,550
40	726,523	360,762	365,761	85	139,678	43,020	96,658
41	753,261	373,614	379,647	86	117,381	34,656	82,725
42	780,527	388,158	392,369	87	94,728	26,899	67,829
43	849,406	422,231	427,175	88	74,835	20,403	54,432
44	883,428	440,545	442,883	89	58,546	15196	43,350
				90 and over	148,849	32916	115,913

Distribution for over 18 years of age

	Male	Female	Total
18-21	1,520,101	1,516,299	3,036,400 (7.3)
22-28	2,897,513	3,018,859	5,916,372 (14.2)
29-35	2,743,863	2,802,482	5,546,345 (13.3)
36-42	2,553,895	2,592,840	5,146,735 (12.3)
over 42	10,186,701	11,861,952	22,048,653 (52.9)
Total	19,902,073 (47.8%)	21,792,432 (52.2%)	41,694,505 (100.00)

**Extract from Statutory Instruments - 1985 No. 518 - Police
The Police (Discipline) Regulations 1985**

Regulation 4(1)

SCHEDULE 1

DISCIPLINE CODE

1. Discreditable conduct, which offence is committed where a member of a police force acts in a disorderly manner or any manner prejudicial to discipline or reasonably likely to bring discredit on the reputation of the force or of the police service.

2. Misconduct towards a member of a police force, which offence is committed where -

- (a) the conduct of a member of a police force towards another such member is oppressive or abusive, or
- (b) a member of a police force assaults another such member.

3. Disobedience to orders, which offence is committed where a member of a police force, without good and sufficient cause -

- (a) disobeys or neglects to carry out any lawful order, written or otherwise;
- (b) fails to comply with any requirement of a code of practice for the time being in force under section 60 or 66 of the Act of 1984; or
- (c) contravenes any provision of the Police Regulations containing restrictions on the private lives of members of police forces, or requiring him to notify the chief officer of police that he, or a relation included in his family, has a business interest within the meaning of those Regulations.

4. Neglect of duty, which offence is committed where a member of a police force, without good and sufficient cause -

- (a) neglects or omits to attend to or carry out with due promptitude and diligence anything which it is his duty as a member of a police force to attend to or carry out, or
- (b) fails to work his beat in accordance with orders, or leaves the place of duty to which he has been ordered, or having left his place of duty for an authorised purpose fails to return thereto without undue delay, or
- (c) is absent without leave from, or is late for, any duty, or
 - (d) fails properly to account for, or to make a prompt and true

return of, any money or property received by him in the course of his duty.

5. *Falsehood or prevarication*, which offence is committed where a member of a police force -

- (a) knowingly or through neglect makes any false, misleading or inaccurate oral or written statement or entry in any record or document made, kept or required for police purposes, or
- (b) either wilfully and without proper authority or through lack of due care destroys or mutilates any record or document made, kept or required for police purposes, or
- (c) without good and sufficient cause alters or erases or adds to any entry in such a record or document, or
- (d) has knowingly or through neglect made any false, misleading or inaccurate statement in connection with his appointment to the police force.

6. *Improper disclosure of information*, which offence is committed where a member of a police force -

- (a) without proper authority communicates to any person, any information which he has in his possession as a member of a police force, or
- (b) makes any anonymous communication to any police authority, or any member of a police force, or
- (c) without proper authority, makes representations to the police authority or the council of any county or district comprised in the police area with regard to any matter concerning the force, or
- (d) canvasses any member of that authority or of such a council with regard to any such matter.

For the purposes of this paragraph the Isles of Scilly shall be treated as if they were a county.

7. *Corrupt or improper practice*, which offence is committed where a member of a police force -

- (a) in his capacity as a member of the force and without the consent of the chief officer of police or the police authority, directly or indirectly solicits or accepts any gratuity, present or subscription, or
- (b) places himself under a pecuniary obligation to any person in such a manner as might affect his properly carrying out his duties as a

member of the force, or

- (c) improperly uses, or attempts so to use, his position as a member of the force for his private advantage, or
- (d) in his capacity as a member of the force and without the consent of the chief officer of police, writes, signs or gives a testimonial of character or other recommendation with the object of obtaining employment for any person or of supporting an application for the grant of a licence of any kind.

8. Abuse of authority, which offence is committed where a member of a police force treats any person with whom he may be brought into contact in the execution of his duty in an oppressive manner and, without prejudice to the foregoing, in particular where he -

- (a) without good and sufficient cause conducts a search, or requires a person to submit to any test or procedure, or makes an arrest, or
- (b) uses any unnecessary violence towards any prisoner or any other person with whom he may be brought into contact in the execution of his duty, or improperly threatens any such person with violence, or
- (c) is abusive or uncivil to any member of the public.

9. Racially discriminatory behaviour, which offence is committed (without prejudice to the commission of any other offence) where a member of a police force -

- (a) while on duty, on the grounds of another person's colour, race, nationality or ethnic or national origins, acts towards that other person in any such way as is mentioned in paragraph 8 (abuse of authority), or
- (b) in any other way, on any of those grounds, treats improperly a person with whom he may be brought into contact while on duty.

10. Neglect of health, which offence is committed where a member of a police force, without good and sufficient cause, neglects to carry out any instructions of a medical officer appointed by the police authority, or while absent from duty on account of sickness, commits any act or adopts any conduct calculated to retard his return to duty.

11. Improper dress or untidiness, which offence is committed where without good and sufficient cause a member of a police force while on duty, or while off duty but wearing uniform in a public place, is improperly dressed or is untidy in his appearance.

12. *Damage to police property*, which offence is committed where a member of a police force -

- (a) wilfully or through lack of due care causes any waste, loss or damage to any police property, or
- (b) fails to report as soon as is reasonably practicable any loss of or damage to any such property issued to, or used by him, or entrusted to his care.

13. *Drunkenness*, which offence is committed where a member of a police force renders himself unfit through drink for duties which he is or will be required to perform or which he may reasonably foresee having to perform.

14. *Drinking on duty or soliciting drink*, which offence is committed where a member of a police force, while on duty -

- (a) without proper authority, drinks, or receives from any other person, any intoxicating liquor, or
- (b) demands, or endeavours to persuade any other person to give him, or to purchase or obtain for him, any intoxicating liquor.

15. *Entering, licensed premises*, which offence is committed where a member of a police force -

- (a) while on duty, or
- (b) while off duty but wearing uniform,

without good and sufficient cause, enters any premises in respect of which a licence or permit has been granted in pursuance of the law relating to liquor licensing or betting and gaming or regulating places of entertainment.

16. *Criminal conduct*, which offence is committed where a member of a police force has been found guilty by a court of law of a criminal offence.

17. *Being an accessory to a disciplinary offence*, which offence is committed where a member of a police force incites, connives at or is knowingly an accessory to any offence against discipline.

Registrar General's Classification of Occupation, 1970

1. Higher Professional/Managerial
2. Lower Professional/Managerial
3. Trained manual
4. Semi-skilled Manual
5. Non-skilled

